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The nature and limitations of human freedom have been discussed for millennia and 
continue to be widely and enthusiastically debated today. This is not surprising, as our 
sense of freedom is felt to be an essential part of what it is to be human and many 
fundamental issues, such as responsibility, praise and blame are commonly considered 
to depend on how freely behaviour is undertaken. Understanding human freedom is 
valuable in itself and in terms of implications for other important areas, for example, the 
Law and Government policy. 
This Thesis critically examines the semicompatibilist free will position in the 
context of implicit bias. Specifically, I answer the question, does implicit bias threaten 
the semicompatibilist position on free will and responsibility? A threat arises if 
behavioural expression of implicit bias is not subject to semicompatibilist conditions of 
agent control and so responsibility (guidance control) in the presence of compelling 
argument and substantial evidence supporting the counter position, that agents are 
responsible for such behaviour. 
Responding to this question, I provide in Part I a brief historical perspective of 
the discussion of human freedom, followed by description of some major positions 
within the free will debate, focusing on semicompatibilism. Part II explores implicit bias 
in terms of what it is, how it is measured and implications for responsibility and control 
of influenced behaviour. 
Having gained insight into semicompatibilism and established a model of implicit 
bias, Part III examines the impact of implicit bias on the semicompatibilist position, 
assessing and reaching conclusions concerning the ability of semicompatibilists to 
accommodate the phenomenon of implicit bias within their explanatory model. I then 
consider the implications of implicit bias for a particular defence of semicompatibilism 
from one of its major threats, the problem of moral luck.  
I show that semicompatibilism successfully accommodates the phenomenon of 
implicit bias; agent responsibility for issuing behaviour is confirmed, in harmony with 
the presented models of implicit bias. A particular understanding of implicit bias is found 
to cause a problem for defence of semicompatibilism from the luck problem.  
In response to the question, does implicit bias threaten the semicompatibilist 
position on free will and responsibility? I conclude that semicompatibilism, as a position 
















I wish to extend sincere thanks and gratitude to my Supervisors, Professor David 
Cockburn and Doctor Tristan Nash, for invaluable guidance and support while writing 
this Thesis and during all my studies with The University of Wales Trinity Saint David. 
 
I thank my wife Barbara, whose patience and support made this Thesis possible, and my 
parents, who would be very proud and delighted. 
 
I am indebted to Bryan Magee (1930-2019) whose philosophical writing and 













Abstract . . . . . . . . . .             iii 
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . .             iv 
Contents . . . . . . . . . .              v 
List of Figures . . . . . . . . .           viii 
Introduction . . . . . . . . . .             ix 
 




What is the Problem? 
1.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . . 2 
1.1 Reflections on Free Will . . . . . . . 2 
1.2 Why Free Will is an Important Issue . . . . .           31 
1.3 Summary . . . . . . . . .           32 
 
Chapter 2 
Contemporary Responses to the Free Will Problem 
2.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . .           34 
2.1 Libertarianism . . . . . . . .           40 
2.2 Compatibilism . . . . . . . .           42 
2.3 Hard Incompatibilism . . . . . . .           65 
2.4 Revisionism . . . . . . . . .           67 




3.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . .           69 
3.1 Semicompatibilism . . . . . . . .           70 






3.2 Summary . . . . . . . . .           74 
3.3 Summary of Part I . . . . . . . .           75 
 
 




The Origin and Meaning of Implicit Bias 
4.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . .           78 
4.1 The Implicit Association Test (IAT) . . . . .           80 
4.2 Duality of Mind . . . . . . . .           85 
4.3 The Origin of Implicit Bias . . . . . . .        104 
4.4 Summary . . . . . . . . .        111 
 
Chapter 5 
Implicit Bias and Control 
5.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . .        114 
5.1 Implicit Bias and Control . . . . . . .        116 
5.2 Summary . . . . . . . . .        145 
5.3 Summary of Part II . . . . . . . .        146 
 
 




Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist position? 
6.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . .        149 
6.1 Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position? . .        150 
6.2 Semicompatibilism, Implicit Bias and Luck . . . .        197 
6.3 Summary of Part Three . . . . . . .        214 
 
 






Conclusion . . . . . . . . . .        217 
Bibliography . . . . . . . . .         225 
 
 
Appendix A Mental Representations and Biased Behaviour . . .        247 
Appendix B Agent Causation . . . . . . .        252 











Title: Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position on Free Will and Responsibility? 










Fig. 2.1 An overview of the main responses to the free will problem. 
 
Fig. 4.1  A typical IAT image from Sequence 1. 
 
Fig. 4.2  A complete IAT schedule. 
 
Fig. 4.3  A typical IAT image from Sequence 3. 
 
Fig. 4.4  Response times for each IAT sequence. 
 
Fig. 4.5  Accumulated characteristics of System One and System Two. 
 
Fig. 4.6 Three nested systems: System One Non-conscious, System Two 
Conscious and System Three Environment. 
 























But Mathieu went on firing. He fired. He 
was cleansed. He was all-powerful. He 
was free. 
         Jean-Paul Sartre1 
 
 
Our position on questions concerning the existence and nature of free will and 
responsibility has important theoretical and practical implications. Practical 
consequences concerning social policy, principles of justice and the basis of moral and 
judicial responsibility often originate from our understanding of human freedom. It is 
not an exaggeration to say, such practical consequences manifest every day, sometimes 
in life-or-death decisions concerning the development and implementation of policing 
and judicial sentencing policy. 
There is much to discuss concerning what it means to act freely and the nature 
of free will and responsibility. It is a common assumption that a necessary condition for 
behaviour to be considered just, unjust, virtuous or corrupt is free choice; for an agent 
to act, for example with courage, the agent must be responsible for their actions and such 
responsibility entails free choice to act otherwise. 2  It will be seen such apparently 
uncontroversial thinking is far from universally accepted. Does the relatively recent 
phenomenon of implicit bias in certain situations reduce or remove completely moral 
responsibility for certain forms of behaviour by taking away or interfering in 
responsibility lessening ways with free choice? Under the influence of implicit bias, it is 
 
1 Iron in the Soul (Sartre 1963: 225). Iron in the Soul was published in 1949 (La Mort dans l’âme), the third 
volume of Jean-Paul Sartre’s series of novels The Roads to Freedom. A fourth volume was published in 
2011 The Last Chance, Roads of Freedom IV. (For the fourth volume, the translation of the series title Les 
Chemins de la Liberté was revised to Roads of Freedom rather than The Roads to Freedom; there is an obvious 
and important difference between freedom as a destination and freedom as an ongoing experience). 
 
2 A comprehensive survey of non-philosophers For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? 
Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures (Hannikainen et al. 2019), spanning twenty countries 
and sixteen languages, shows interesting variations in common assumptions about necessary conditions, 
such as free choice and the possibility to act otherwise, for behaviour to be considered just or unjust, 
virtuous and responsible.  





often claimed, an agent’s actions in ethically relevant circumstances are influenced by 
factors that operate below the radar of consciousness. Typically, implicit bias is described 
as ‘… attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, actions, and decisions in an 
unconscious manner’ (Staats 2013: 6). It is claimed that if an agent is unaware of 
influencing bias and prejudice then associated actions are not freely and so not 
responsibly chosen because an agent is not consciously 3  aware of all relevant factors 
affecting their decision-making. Here, the form of interference with free choice (in 
responsibility lessoning ways) is claimed to be lack of awareness of motivating factors 
behind behaviour. If actions are not freely chosen, assigning responsibility, praise or 
blame for such actions appears to be wrong.4 5Although not accepted by all, the most 
common characterisation of implicit bias is an agent displaying automatic and 
unconscious implicit associations that influence decision-making, often in negative ways, 
particularly judgment and evaluation of existing stereotypes or stigmatized groups. 
Implicit attitudes, ‘likings’ or ‘dislikings’, can be directed towards many things, including 
consumer products, but it is the ‘very morally weighty’ judgment and evaluation of 
existing stereotypes or stigmatized groups of people, and such discriminatory behaviour 
generally, which makes implicit bias matter (following Brownstein 2016a: 765). It is this 
surprising, perhaps alarming, influence of unconscious forces on decision making that 
appears so threatening to our understanding of free choice and responsibility for a 
considerable number of important, emotive and morally relevant actions: Is it possible 
 
3 Eddy Hahmias (2008) summarises widely, but certainly not universally agreed, conditions for free will:  
(CR) Conscious Reflection: Agents have free will only if they have the capacity for conscious deliberation 
and intention-formation and that capacity has some influence on their actions. 
(MR) Motivation by (potentially) endorsed reasons: Agents’ free will is diminished to the extent their 
actions are motivated by factors that they are both unaware of and would reject were they to consciously 
consider them. Such conditions clearly have great resonance with issues relating to implicit bias and will 
be discussed shortly and throughout this Thesis. 
 
4 The relationship between concepts of freedom and responsibility is far from straight forward and is a 
central concern of this Thesis. 
 
5   There are issues here that need unpacking and clarification, for example, the claim that acting 
responsibly entails acting freely, requiring the possibility to act otherwise. Also, the idea that if an agent 
is unaware of influencing bias and prejudice then issuing actions are thereby not freely chosen because 
the agent is not consciously aware of all relevant factors, and so is not responsible. For an in-depth 
exploration of these issue see Moral Responsibility and Consciousness (King and Carruthers 2012), also 
Consciousness, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility (Caruso 2016). 





to be responsible for actions influenced by factors that I am unaware of, have no control 
over and are therefore not freely chosen?  
An essential issue is agent awareness of implicit bias and issuing actions. This is a 
complex and controversial matter; vitally, it will be found there are compelling 
arguments and substantial empirical evidence supporting the claim that agents have 
awareness of and are responsible for behavioural expression of implicit bias (BEIB)6, 
contrary to the widely held view outlined above.7 To produce a meaningful and valid 
critique of semicompatibilism within the context of implicit bias, models of implicit bias8 
will be described and chosen that incorporate degrees of agent awareness and 
responsibility for behaviour that is an expression of implicit bias. I defend this decision 
on the basis that a model that excludes all awareness and responsibility predicated on 
completely unconscious and automatic behaviour is essentially too simple and conflicts 
with considerable and substantial evidence and argument. This is recognised, I believe, 
by Brownstein and Saul when they describe implicit bias as ‘ … evaluations of social 
groups … largely outside conscious awareness or control’ (added emphasis 2016a: 1). 
From the first shock of descriptions of implicit bias and related behaviour ‘operating 
under the radar’ of consciousness with complete absence of awareness and responsibility 
a more nuanced and defensible model of implicit bias is developed in Part II and taken 
forward into Part III where it is used to critically examine semicompatibilism. This 
describes in broadest strokes the landscape of this Thesis. 
 
6 I am grateful to Michael Brownstein for the term ‘behavio(u)ral expression of implicit bias’ (BEIB) 
(Brownstein 2016a: 768). 
 
7 Responsibility for behaviour issuing from implicit bias (BEIB) will be the dominant theme, but there 
are two further areas where responsibility and blame are relevant; responsibility for having implicit-
associations and responsibility for responding appropriately to the knowledge that implicit-associations 
are part of our cognitive make up (following Holroyd 2012: 278). 
 
8 Please note well: The expression ‘model of implicit bias’ is used throughout this Thesis. Unless context 
clearly shows otherwise, this expression is used to describe a model of the mechanisms that mediate the 
influence of implicit social cognition, (i.e., attitudes, stereotypes), and explicit social cognition on 
behaviour, grouped in terms of impulsive and reflective elements; it is a model that shows behavioural 
expression of implicit bias mediated by various elements including the possibility of reflective decision 
making (Fig. 5.1). 





Specifically, my main research aim is to explore and critically examine implicit 
bias and the free will position known as semicompatibilism9 to answer the question; does 
implicit bias threaten the semicompatibilist position on free will and responsibility? I also 
consider the implications of implicit bias for a particular defence of semicompatibilism 
from one of its major threats, the problem of moral luck.  
Responding to this objective, I present a brief overview of some major positions 
within the free will debate, focusing on semicompatibilism. I explore implicit bias in 
terms of what it is and how it is measured. Having gained insight into semicompatibilism 
and implicit bias, I examine the impact of implicit bias on the semicompatibilist position, 
assessing and reaching conclusions concerning the ability of semicompatibilists to 
accommodate the phenomenon of implicit bias within their explanatory model, and 
highlight any issues and areas for future research. 
Part I briefly introduces a diversity of issues relating to human freedom and 
continues with increasing focus to examine contemporary responses to the free will 
problem. Literature relating to free will is vast and continues to increase rapidly, 
however, I have tried within Part I, and elsewhere, to resist many attractive diversions 
into interesting but peripheral areas. In Chapter 1 I reflect on a variety of free will related 
issues based on Ilham Dilman’s (1999) historical survey and consider why free will has 
always been an important issue. Chapter 2 examines the main contemporary responses 
to the free will problem and Chapter 3 discusses the semicompatibilist position in greater 
detail. Part I provides an outline of free will and semicompatibilism sufficient to take 
forward into Part III. 
The aim of Part II is similar to Part I; to achieve a clear understanding of implicit 
bias in preparation for Part III. The history and associated scholarship of implicit bias is 
large but considerably less than free will. While it is said that most well-known 
philosophers have had something to say about free will, this is not the case with implicit 
bias. Chapters 4 and 5 consider the origin and current meaning of implicit bias, and 
implicit bias and control. Implicit bias and the Implicit Association Test are described, 
leading naturally to description of Dual Process and Dual System theories of cognition. 
 
9 Following John Martin Fischer, for example, Four Views on Free Will (2007), I use semicompatibilism, 
rather than semi-compatibilism or Semi-Compatibilism. 





Several approaches to implicit bias and responsibility are considered with view to 
finalising a position. A unified Dual System model is chosen based on the work of 
Deutsch and Strack (2010) together with the contrasting approach of Holroyd and Kelly 
(2016). Importantly, both approaches support the position that individuals are 
responsible for behaviour that has implicit bias as its source. 
Having made necessary preparations within Part I and II, the main objective of 
the Thesis is addressed within Part III; to explore and critically examine the phenomenon 
of implicit bias as a threat to our contemporary understanding of free will and 
responsibility from the semicompatibilist perspective and consider the implications of 
implicit bias on a particular defence of semicompatibilism from the ‘luck problem’. I 
believe this straightforward three-part approach is the clearest way to present the 
investigation and answers to these questions. 
Appendix A describes the nature of mental representations responsible for biased 
behaviour, describing a position that is not built upon traditional propositional attitudes 
or associations. Appendix B outlines some aspects of agency and agent causation, as 
these issues are deeply integrated within discussion of free will and responsibility. 
Appendix C connects particularly with Chapter 1, providing a brief outline of Sophocles’ 
Oedipus Rex. This Work illustrates ways in which human freedom may be restricted or 
eliminated by factors beyond an agent’s control, yet the possibility of meaningful and 
responsible choices remains. This essential idea is present within semicompatibilism; the 
idea of guidance control, where the ability to do otherwise is unnecessary (regulative 
control), yet the possibility of making responsible choices is maintained. 
I believe the important question, does implicit bias threaten the semicompatibilist 
position on free will and responsibility? has not been addressed previously. It is an 
interesting and important question because semicompatibilism is a major position within 
current mainstream compatibilism and implicit bias appears threatening to most 
plausible ideas of control and so responsibility because the influence of implicit bias on 
behaviour is, to a greater or lesser extent, outside conscious awareness. This is 
particularly problematic because our strong intuition is that typical resulting behaviour 
of implicit bias is something we should be taking responsibility for.  
Using the three-part approach described, I argue and conclude that John Martin 
Fischer’s semicompatibilism is not dangerously threatened by implicit bias: I confirm 





that implicit bias related behaviour is subject to guidance control and is therefore 
responsible behaviour, a conclusion in harmony with the presented model of implicit bias 
that is supported by significant theory and practice.  
This is a vital point: There is substantial evidence supporting the claim that agents 
are responsible for implicit bias related behaviour. I investigate and show that 
semicompatibilism successfully accommodates the phenomenon of implicit bias. When 
challenged with implicit bias related behaviour the semicompatibilist model of free will 
and responsibility endorses agent responsibility for such behaviour. If this were not the 
case, some aspect(s) of semicompatibilism would require investigation and possible 
change. Endorsement of agent responsibility is confirmed, but a particular 
understanding of implicit bias was found to cause a problem for a defence of 
semicompatibilism from the luck problem. The essential contribution and conclusion of 
this Thesis: the semicompatibilist position concerning free will and responsibility is not 
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What is the Problem? 
 
Free will is arguably the most 
difficult problem in philosophy.  
Susan Wolf10 
 
The task is to formulate a 
conception of human action that 
leaves agents valuable; but what 





Chapter 1 presents reflections on free will and considers why free will has always been 
an important issue. I intend to introduce the free will debate, to build an historical 
viewpoint showing semicompatibilism as part of a long tradition of thought concerning 
the freedom and control human beings have throughout their lives. 
 
1.1 Reflections on Free Will 
For millennia there has been debate about the possibility and nature of human freedom. 
The debate continues, with many new articles appearing in scholarly journals and books 
every month. Much contemporary and recent historical discussion concerns the seeming 
incompatibility between the truth of physical determinism and human freedom, and the 
relationship between free will and moral responsibility. Adopting many forms and 
perspectives over the centuries, reflection on the nature of human freedom began over 
two thousand years ago within the works of some of the most important writers and 
 
10 Freedom Within Reason (Wolf 1993: vii). 
 
11 Philosophical Explanations (Nozick 1982: 291). 
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philosophers in western culture.12 While perspectives change there is a constant theme; 
‘the extent to which human agents are in control of their own lives and destinies’ (Russell 
2013b: 2).  
 This section begins with some perspectives on the nature of human freedom, 
generally following Ilham Dilman’s (1999) choice of writers and philosophers: 
 
o Early Greeks: Sophocles (Oedipus Rex c429 BCE)13 and Plato (Gorgias c380 BCE). 
o Theological related issues within the works of St. Augustine (354-430 CE) and St. 
Aquinas (1225-1274). 
o Free Will within Descartes (1596-1650), Hume (1711-1776) and Kant (1724-1804). 
o Human freedom in the context of psychology with reference to works by Freud 
(1856-1939) and Sartre (1905-1980). 
 
As mentioned, it is a sweeping yet plausible claim that every major philosopher has said 
something about free will, therefore my choice is to some extent arbitrary. I intend the 
work of the philosophers and writers described within this brief outline to represent 
some of the main perspectives within the historic free will debate. My purpose is not to 
give a detailed and comprehensive account, critique or comparative analysis but show 
briefly how the debate has assumed different forms and place later discussion in a wider 
context. Paul Russell, discussing Bernard Williams’ Shame and Necessity (2008)14 refers to 
the importance of historical context:  
 
Williams argues that methodologically, philosophers need to be historically 
sensitive and informed, and that typically they aren’t. That’s a problem with many 




12 This Thesis only considers literature from within what is generally described as ‘western culture’. 
 
13 See Appendix C for summary of Oedipus Rex. 
 
14 Bernard Williams’ book Shame and Necessity (2008) will be mentioned again as it contains, as one would 
expect, interesting and insightful discussion of free will. 
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While providing ‘historical self-consciousness’ is greatly overstating my aim, it is 
important, I believe, to provide at least some background from which the contemporary 
debate can be seen to emerge and give context to Part II and III. 
 
o Early Greeks: Sophocles, Oedipus Rex 
The extent to which human agents are in control of their lives and destinies is examined 
in timeless epic form in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex c429 BCE. The idea of necessity is 
considered with the forewarning of events to Oedipus by the Oracle of Delphi.15 The 
Oracle announced that Oedipus would incestuously father children with his mother and 
kill his father. As Dilman points out, it is interesting that while fulfilment of such a 
prophecy is clearly to be avoided, it is Oedipus’ own actions while trying to avoid such 
a future that actually produce the events foretold (1999: 11). It is Oedipus who performs 
actions that ultimately lead to the prophecy being realised and so in this sense he has 
individual responsibility for those actions. The oracle’s prophecy describes a future 
situation without detailing how it will be brought about. It is Oedipus’ chosen actions 
that lead to the shocking outcome, actions that reflect Oedipus’ character and so are, 
according to some philosophers, responsible actions. At the centre of this tragedy is a 
clash between inevitability of outcome and freedom of action. Without freedom of 
action the story loses all poignancy, but how can freedom truly exist in the fullest sense 
when a particular future state is inevitable? This is an important question and will be 
raised again shortly in the context of God’s foreknowledge and free will. Dilman (1999: 
14) makes the reasonable point that human freedom cannot exist in a total or absolute 
sense, that physical and logical constraints always apply, allowing action to take place 
only within certain boundaries that define what is within human control.16 It is with a 
background of accepting such boundaries that freedom may legitimately be claimed to 
exist. Meaningful freedom is possible by focusing attention not on the impossible but 
on what can be done. Oedipus has freedom of this form, where constraints are those 
 
15 Delphi was an important ancient Greek religious sanctuary sacred to the god Apollo. Located on 
Mount Parnassus near the Gulf of Corinth, the sanctuary was home to the oracle of Apollo that gave 
cryptic predictions and guidance to both city-states and individuals (Cartwright 2013). 
 
16 Barnard Williams calls such freedom ‘metaphysical freedom’ (2008: 152). 
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determined by ultimate fate17 but still leaving freedom to act within such constraints and 
thereby be responsible for actions. As will be seen later, these ideas resonate with the 
compatibilism of John Martin Fischer (2013) and many others in that personal freedom 
is possible within a world that may be determined.     
 
o Early Greeks: Plato, Gorgias 
From the epic works of Sophocles and reflections on human freedom within the context 
of supernatural adventure, human imperfections and tragic heroes, I now turn to Plato’s 
dialogue the Gorgias. The introduction to the 2004 Penguin Classics addition of Gorgias 
says ‘Plato stands with Socrates and Aristotle as one of the shapers of the whole 
intellectual tradition of the West’ (Plato 2004: 30).18 Engaging with, what Terence Irwin 
describes as, ‘a puzzling and unsatisfactory dialogue’ (1977: 131), Plato’s objectives 
within Gorgias will be briefly outlined, including reference to the long, complex and 
hugely important work within the Platonic corpus, The Republic. 
 The dialogues of Plato discuss basic questions of morality. As Irwin notes at the 
very beginning of his detailed examination of Plato’s moral theory, ‘both Socrates and 
Plato defend some controversial and puzzling answers to these (moral) questions’ (1977: 
1). For example, claims that the virtues of courage, temperance, piety, justice and wisdom 
are in the agent’s self-interest and have intrinsic good distinct from their consequences in 
action. Socrates and Plato believed such claims were entailed within contemporary 
conventional beliefs of their fellow citizens and accessible through dialogue and cross-
examination. As moral philosophers, Plato and Socrates look critically at moral beliefs 
and recognise that vital to their project is clear and agreed understanding of fundamental 
human virtues such as courage and temperance. It is clearly necessary for Socrates and 
Plato to interrogate the meaning of terms, such as just and unjust, to allow meaningful 
discussion of whether something is just or unjust, or how justice is best accomplished. 
 
17 There is a distinct and major difference between Fatalism and Determinism. Fatalism claims the 
inevitability of major events that happen in life such as choice of marriage partner, the place one choses 
to live and so on, typically expressed by ‘it’s meant to be’. Whereas, for Determinism it is some form of 
necessary causality bounded by natural laws that drive and determine outcomes. 
 
18 Citation of Kindle books will include guide location references where real page numbers are not 
available. 
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Further, the nature of virtue is important because whether the concept entails necessity to 
act virtuously will directly affect how freedom within the dialogue is to be understood. 
Plato’s position on virtue is generally more challenging to understand than it may first 
appear, as Plato’s position changes, or better expressed, develops, during later dialogues. 
A vital point, which cannot be discussed within this Thesis, but must be mentioned is 
the vital role of Socrates, individual rationality and the notion of dialogue as the pathway 
that leads to knowledge concerning ethical questions. The importance of this 
development within moral philosophy cannot be overstated.19   
Virtue can be expressed as an excellence in performing a particular function. For 
example, dogs, musical instruments and athletes have or lack virtue depending on 
whether they succeed or fail to meet what is expected within the role of being a dog, a 
musical instrument or an athlete. (Following Republic 353b2 - d1 and 335b6 - c2). For 
Man20 the situation is clearly different. While expectations about what we should do and 
how we should behave as human beings are clearly more complex, more important, as 
human beings we must decide what we expect of ourselves and others. The choice is 
difficult, not least because we do not have a clear, obvious or given function. Is there a 
common expectation shared by everyone? Socrates claims that a final good, such as 
happiness, flourishing or living well21 is the expectation of everyone and authentically 
conducting life in a way that achieves the final good is to be a virtuous man. Perhaps the 
most fundamental question is how should we live to achieve our expectation of 
happiness, of flourishing, and so be wholly virtuous? The answer is to develop a virtuous 
character by being authentically prudent, just, courageous and adopting temperance. 
It is not possible to examine or describe in detail these issues within this Thesis. 
However, I will briefly describe part of the Gorgias dialogue where two alternative and 
opposed ways of life and the form of freedom they entail are examined. The first, 
 
19 An excellent description of this time of transition is presented in the television documentary Socrates 
Genius of the Ancient World by historian Bettany Hughes, first broadcast on Wednesday 12th August 2015 
BBC Four. 
 
20 Unless obviously otherwise, gender specifics such as ‘Man’ and ‘Men’ are used here and throughout 
to describe inclusively all human beings. 
 
21 The term ‘happiness’ is a common translation of the Greek ‘eudaimonia’ however, ‘human flourishing’ 
has been proposed as a more accurate translation. 
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articulated most clearly by the character Callicles in the third dialogue, considers the 
maximisation of pleasure through exercise of power to be the obvious, good and correct 
basis for conducting our lives. The rival position, advocated by Socrates, is a life 
concerned with and directed by moral absolutes such as justice and goodness guided by 
reason. In terms of human freedom, Callicles believes true freedom is expressed by 
unrestricted power to experience whatever pleasure is desired; maximum pleasure and 
desire satisfaction constitutes the good life. Socrates defines and advocates freedom not 
in terms of unconstrained choice but a concept of freedom embracing ‘reasoned choice 
in line with virtue’ (McLoughlin 2012: v).22 
What is the nature of Socrates’ freedom, if action is to be ‘in line’ with virtue? 
There seems to be a sense of necessity within such an idea. Chris Emlyn-Jones’ 
introduction to Gorgias describes Socrates position clearly, where knowledge of the good  
necessitates good action. For Socrates 
 
a necessary precondition of doing right or good is to know what actually is right 
and good, i.e. its nature; moreover, the precondition is not only necessary but 
sufficient: for Plato’s Socrates, to know what is right in any given situation is necessarily 
to do it; and once you really know what is right and good, you cannot want to do 
wrong. (added emphsis Plato 2004: 274) 
 
There is, as would be expected, supporting text within the dialogue for Emlyn-Jones’ 
comment concerning knowing what is right and not wanting to do wrong. For example, 
within the third dialogue Socrates says, ‘[…] no one does wrong willingly, and that all 
wrongdoing is involuntary’ (Callicles 509). Not wanting to do wrong, even if correct, 
clearly does not entail wanting to do right or making right actions necessary. Further 
examination of the text shows various claims and assumptions made by Socrates that 
develop through dialogue towards a position on these issues. 23  The important 
conclusions are (i) For Socrates, the craft of justice or any virtue is different from all 
other crafts in the sense that it is impossible after acquiring the craft of virtue to cease 
 
22 See also later references to Susan Wolf, Freedom within Reason (1993). 
 
23  For a systematic and comprehensive study of freedom within Plato’s dialogues see Siobhán 
McLoughlin’s PhD Thesis, The Freedom of the Good: A Study of Plato's Ethical Conception of Freedom (2012), 
available open access <http://digitalrepository.unm.edu/phil_etds/15>. 
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being virtuous and impossible to cease acting virtuously. (ii) A rational man, in the fullest 
sense of someone who shows reasoned self-control and is well ordered, wanting the 
good, necessarily embraces the reasoned and rational choice in accordance with virtue and 
justice. From the perspective of freedom, such a man does what he wants to do; there is 
no experience or feeling of necessity or compulsion but a real and genuine sense of 
freedom to act in harmony with a balanced and virtuous nature.  
Dilman captures the point: 
 
It is in such self-mastery that the person will have achieved autonomy: what he 
does will be what he wants to do, not what he is forced to do, and he will be 
wholly behind it. This is Plato’s description of how, inevitably living in a world 
of natural necessity, a man can be nevertheless free. (1999: 29) 
 
There is much that could be questioned, discussed and analysed that unfortunately falls 
outside the scope of this Thesis. As previously cited, Terence Irwin’s Plato’s Moral Theory 
(1977) presents a very detailed and systematic analysis of the early and middle dialogues. 
An important point to note, is that at the heart of the above are the problematic claims 
that virtue can be an object of knowledge and whoever has knowledge of virtue is 
virtuous and necessarily acts virtuously.24 
Within the context of Plato’s Gorgias, a conception of freedom is described 
where action is necessitated in an important way, (a moral way), yet it is still legitimate 
to claim such action is free, being a deliberate choice and wholly consistent with what 
an autonomous agent wants. Rosalind Hursthouse, quoted by Nafsika Athanassoulis in 
Virtue Ethics from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, summarises much of what 
has been said so far and makes clear the important point that acting virtuously is of itself 
rewarding and not something desirable simply in terms of good consequences: 
 
[…] virtue is not exercised in opposition to self-interest, but rather is the 
quintessential component of human flourishing. The good life for humans is the 
life of virtue and therefore it is in our interest to be virtuous. It is not just that 
the virtues lead to the good life (e.g. if you are good, you will be rewarded), but 
 
24 See also Jaakko Hintikka’s Knowledge and the Known, for relevant discussion of virtue, skill, belief and 
knowledge (Hintikka 1991: 28). 
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rather a virtuous life is the good life because the exercise of our rational capacities 
and virtue is its own reward. (Athanassoulis 2017) 
 
o Theological related issues within the works of St. Augustine (354-430 CE) and St. 
Aquinas (1225-1274) 
Many see freedom in the context of the Christian faith as particularly problematic, 
generating over the centuries a vast body of theological and philosophical reflection. The 
basic problem has been expressed in many ways; One of the clearest and precise is from 
Linda Zagzebski’s article Foreknowledge and Free Will: 
 
For any future act you will perform, if some being infallibly believed in the past 
that the act would occur, there is nothing you can do now about the fact that he 
believed what he believed since nobody has any control over past events; nor can 
you make him mistaken in his belief, given that he is infallible. Therefore, there 
is nothing you can do now about the fact that he believed in a way that cannot 
be mistaken that you would do what you will do. But if so, you cannot do 
otherwise than what he believed you would do. And if you cannot do otherwise, 
you will not perform the act freely. (2017) 
 
It is a problem for those who believe it is necessary to accept claims that God infallibly 
knows the entire future, and, that human beings act freely. To deny either of these claims 
would be a major difficulty for most believers; the notion of foreknowledge is embedded 
within Christian theology yet without freedom to act otherwise, responsibility, blame 
and punishment appear unjustified and so contrary to the notion of a supremely just 
God. There are many responses to this problem; one of the most important is St. 
Augustine’s De Libero Arbitrio (On Free Will) and The City of God, particularly Book Five. 
St. Augustine is described as ‘a towering figure of medieval philosophy whose authority 
and thought came to exert a pervasive and enduring influence well into the modern 
period’ (Mendelson 1997). St. Augustine produced a huge body of work during his long 
life, much of which survives; over one hundred titles, many of which are themselves 
voluminous and composed over a long time. In addition, there are over two hundred 
letters and nearly four hundred sermons. St. Augustine’s position evolved as Christian 
scripture became increasingly influential in his life. In terms of the free will and Divine 
foreknowledge problem, St. Augustine’s objective was to reconcile the absolute necessity 
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of God’s knowledge, (i.e., if God genuinely knows that x is going to happen, it is 
impossible for x not to take place, see De Libero Arbitrio III.4 and De Civitate Dei V.9), 
with the claim that there can be no moral responsibility unless it is within the agent’s 
power to choose to do other than what in fact was chosen, (see De Libero Arbitrio III.3). 
At the heart of the problem is the notion of necessity that underlies the Greek 
conception of knowledge; simply expressed, something that is known cannot be false, it 
is necessarily true,25 in this case God’s knowledge of the future. Seeking compatibility 
between God’s infallible knowledge of both the past and future, and human free will, St. 
Augustine reflects on the nature of the human will. Based on City of God, Book Five, 
Chapter Ten, Linda Zagzebski expresses St. Augustine’s position: 
 
His argument seems to involve an account of what it is to will. To will just is to 
act voluntarily and this in turn means to have it within our power. He thinks this 
is so because our wills can be contrasted with things that are obviously not in our 
power such as growing old. So, for Augustine any act of will is a voluntary act 
and a free act. But this does not preclude the necessity claimed by the determinist 
[…]. (Zagzebski 1985: 280) 
 
In addition to Chapter Ten, Whether Our Wills are Ruled by Necessity, other chapters 
from Book Five reflect the deep struggle St. Augustine experienced with this problem 
and provide further insight into St. Augustine’s position: Chapter Eight; […] the 
Connection of Causes that Depend on the Will of God and Chapter Nine; Concerning 
the Foreknowledge of God and the Freewill of Man […].  
Discussing fate, Chapter Eight begins with the interesting and relevant statement 
that essentially it is acceptable to describe fate as ‘[…] the whole train and connection of 
causes which makes everything become what it does become’, such connection of causes 
being attributed to ‘the will and power of God most high, who is most rightly and most 
truly believed to know all things before they come to pass and leave nothing unordained’ 
(1871: 209). This definition of fate contrasts with future outcomes being decided by time 
of birth and the position of the stars, something that St. Augustine would clearly reject. 
The remaining text of Chapter Eight presents more questions than answers. After saying 
 
25  My description of St. Augustine’s objective generally follows Michael Mendelson, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1997). 
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that God leaves nothing ‘unordained’ and ‘from whom are all powers’ there follows 
within the same sentence the statement ‘although the wills of all are not from Him’. St. 
Augustine continues, ‘[…] it is chiefly the will of God most high, whose power extends 
itself irresistibly through all things […]’ (added emphasis). The Chapter concludes with 
lines from Seneca and Homer that speak of fate leading the willing but dragging the 
unwilling, suggesting it is ultimately impossible to resist fate, however unwilling. This 
appears counter to the earlier statement that the wills of all are not from Him suggesting 
it could be possible to avoid the hand of fate. Chapters Nine and Ten seek to clarify 
some of this confusing and apparently inconsistent set of statements and claims, 
defending the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and freedom. As will be seen, the 
claims and arguments are not straightforward. For example, Chapter Nine may be 
summarised, informally, as follows: 
 
From Chapter Nine: 
 
o God has infallible foreknowledge, and we have free will. St. Augustine tells us not to 
be fearful about this matter if it turns out that ‘[…] we do not do by will that which 
we do by will because He, whose knowledge is infallible, foreknew that we would do 
it’ (1871: 211). 
o ‘But it does not follow that, though there is for God a certain order of all causes, 
there must therefore be nothing depending on the free exercise of our own wills, for 
our wills themselves are included in that order of causes which is certain to God, and is 
embraced by His foreknowledge, for human wills are also causes of human actions; 
and He who foreknew all the causes of things would certainly among those causes 
not have been ignorant of our wills’ (added emphasis 1871: 213). 
  
This quotation appears to capture St. Augustine’s compatibilist26 position, that human 
free will exists and is in some sense bounded or included within divine foreknowledge. 
The meaning of ‘bounded or included within’ needs clarification if compatibility between 
the apparently opposing claims of foreknowledge and freedom is to be defended 
convincingly. 
 
26 See Chapter 2 for description of compatibilist and other positions on free will and determinism. 
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What can be concluded from this challenging text? For St. Augustine, human 
freedom exists within an all-encompassing divine foreknowledge. God is responsible for 
creating and sustaining the whole fabric of human existence including our freedom to 
act; a legitimate freedom that brings responsibility while sustained by and transparent to 
the divine.27 
For the will to be undetermined and free, and actions to be foreknown and 
necessary remains problematic. Subsequently, philosophers and theologians have 
developed strategies that try to reconcile these disparate requirements, for example, 
resetting what is understood to be the nature of God’s knowledge by reducing what is 
known28 or arguing that God does not exist in time in any sense that is conceivable by 
human beings, hence our human notion of foreknowledge has no actual meaning for the 
Divine. On this view, because God comprehends everything that has happened and will 
happen simultaneously it is suggested that God cannot be said to know things in 
advance.29 It is not surprising there are numerous problems and issues concerning the 
idea of God’s knowledge given the problematic nature of each individual concept.30 That 
said, it is very clear that free will and considerations of blame and responsibility are vital 
within traditional Christian belief as the implications for believers extend beyond this 
short life to all eternity.  
To conclude this brief reflection on human freedom within a theological context 
the ideas of St. Aquinas (1225-1274) will be described. The text to be considered is the 
first part of The Summa Theologica, Question 83; Of Free Will (consisting of 4 points of 
enquiry) (1947) written by St. Thomas Aquinas, one of the Catholic Church’s greatest 
theologians and philosophers, between 1265 and 1274 C.E. It is the first point or article 
of enquiry that is most relevant; Whether man has Free Will? Five objections to Man 
 
27 St. Augustine’s De Libero Arbitrio (On Free Will) is not considered here. It is unfortunately impossible 
to respond appropriately to such a work within the confines of an overview. See for example Russell 
Danesh Hemati’s Thesis St. Augustine‘s Solution to the Problem of Theological Fatalism (2010) for detailed 
consideration of Human freedom within St. Augustine. 
 
28 See Richard Swinburne The Coherence of Theism (1993). 
 
29 See Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann Eternity (1981). 
 
30 See Edward Wierenga Omniscience (2011). 
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possessing free will are noted and supported by Biblical quotations. St. Aquinas makes a 
general response to these objections with a Biblical quotation that supports his position; 
‘God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel’ 
Ecclesiasticus 15:14 (King James Version). St. Aquinas then makes a more substantial 
general reply pointing out that without free will, reward and punishment would be in 
vain and continues by describing how some things act without judgment, such as a stone 
moving downwards, some act from judgment but not free judgment, such as animals, 
and lastly, how man acts from judgment because by his apprehensive power he judges 
that something should be avoided or sought. This judgment, in the case of some 
particular act, is not from instinct but from some act of comparison utilising reason, 
therefore man acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various 
things. Particular operations are contingent, therefore in such matters the judgment of 
reason may follow opposite courses and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as 
man is rational is it necessary that man have a free will (my summary of St. Aquinas 1947: 
Question 83). 
 Having made this general response, the five objections are addressed individually. 
These make important claims that draw discussion back to the determining role of God, 
not framed in terms of foreknowledge directly but in terms of causation. For example, 
St. Aquinas says in reply to objection two, Man’s free will is not sufficient on its own but 
must be moved and helped by God. This is clarified in reply to the third objection, where 
free will although the cause of its own movement is not necessarily the first cause. God 
is the first cause, who moves causes both natural and voluntary. By moving natural 
causes He does not prevent their acts from being natural, so by moving voluntary causes 
He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary and subject to responsibility31 (my 
summary from 1947: Question 83). How can moving voluntary causes and not depriving 
their actions of being voluntary be understood? Understanding is possible for St. 
Aquinas by considering God’s relation to time, mentioned previously. It is beyond the 
 
31 St. Aquinas is not suggesting joint responsibility for such actions, as made clear in the following;  ‘It is 
also apparent that the same effect is not attributed to a natural cause and to divine power in such a way 
that it is partly done by God, and partly by the natural agent; rather it is wholly done by both, according 
to a different way, just as the same effect is wholly attributed to the instrument and also wholly to the 
principal agent’ (Summa Contra Gentiles III.70.8 translated by Vernon J. Bourke). 
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scope of this section to provide a comparative analysis of God’s causation and Man’s 
causation, but in essence it is claimed that the nature of God with respect to time is such 
that human causation can be truly free within an all embracing, all knowing God. St. 
Aquinas describes God’s knowledge and temporal status at length in Summa Contra 
Gentiles I.64-71, (particularly Chapter 66.7 and 67). The essential claim is that God’s 
knowledge relates equally to every moment of time that from our perspective is 
expressed in terms of past, present and future. Therefore, the term foreknowledge is at 
best misleading as it assigns a position in time to God’s knowledge of some contingent 
event that will occur in our future. Perhaps it is better to say that God simply knows 
rather than foreknows. From God’s perspective, certain and unchangeable knowledge 
of future (for us) events is possible even when in themselves they are contingent and 
liable to change.32 
Is this a convincing argument for compatibility of foreknowledge and human 
freedom? It is the case with all the perspectives described within this Chapter that much 
more could and perhaps should have been said. Here, the situation is particularly acute 
given the scale of works by the hugely prolific, influential and historically prominent 
figures St. Augustine and St. Aquinas. Reassessing the relationship between time and the 
divine such that God has total knowledge of (for us) the past, present and future in one 
timeless gaze appears a positive and plausible suggestion in terms of trying to resolve the 
dichotomy of foreknowledge and freedom. That said, the challenge of foreknowledge to 
our sense of freedom is still hugely demanding to resolve satisfactorily, with obvious 
implications for our understanding of responsibility, praise and blame. At the centre of 
this issue is one of the most difficult and intractable concepts in philosophy, the nature 
of God.33 Ascribing to a divine being, existing in a profoundly different temporal mode, 
concepts such as knowledge and causation, each a difficult and contentious concept, is 
obviously extremely challenging and problematic. Such is the ontological difference 
between man and God that ultimately, resolving questions concerning our notion of 
foreknowledge is surely impossible?  
 
32 There is a sense of incongruity when describing something ‘from God’s perspective’. 
 
33 For example, expression of this idea is made by the character Demea from David Hume’s Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion 1779; God exists but has a nature beyond our ability to understand. 
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o Free Will within Descartes (1596-1650) 
John Cottingham describes René Descartes, the ‘Father of modern philosophy’, as ‘[…] 
occupy(ing) a pivotal role in the transition from the widely accepted scholastic view of 
science to its complete rejection, and the emergence of what we think of as modern 
scientific methodology’ (1992: 12). (The context of this quotation may be found in Brien 
Brockbank’s Paper Descartes and Scholasticism: An Analysis (2019)). To begin consideration 
of Descartes’ complex and changing position on human freedom I will refer to two 
quotations from perhaps his most well-known work, published in 1641 in Latin, 
Meditations on First Philosophy. The quotations are from Meditation IV, Of the True and the 
False, a meditation whose main aim is to answer the question, if God is perfectly good 
and the source of everything, then how is it possible that error and falsehood exist within 
creation? The answer is essentially that mistakes in judgment are our fault because we do 
not restrict our will to clear and distinct ideas. Attention will focus on freedom within 
this meditation, but first it is necessary to engage with one of Descartes’ most 
fundamental objectives, to set up a solid metaphysical basis for knowledge whereby 
reason, when functioning correctly provides truths, guaranteed by a non-deceiving God. 
‘Clear and distinct ideas - the tools of reason - may confidently be used: God guarantees 
their reliability’ (Berman 2004: 2): 
 
God exists, and that my existence depends entirely on Him in every moment of 
my life — I do not think that the human mind is capable of knowing anything 
with more evidence and certitude. And it seems to me that I now have before me 
a road which will lead us from the contemplation of the true God (in whom all 
the treasures of science and wisdom are contained) to the knowledge of the other 
objects of the universe. For, first of all, I recognize it to be impossible that He 
should ever deceive me; for in all fraud and deception some imperfection is to be 
found, and although it may appear that the power of deception is a mark of 
subtlety or power, yet the desire to deceive without doubt testifies to malice or 
feebleness, and accordingly cannot be found in God. (Descartes 1911: 19) 
 
The second quotation considers the faculty of the will: 
 
For although the power of will is incomparably greater in God than in me […] it 
nevertheless does not seem to me greater if I consider it formally and precisely 
in itself: for the faculty of will consists alone in our having the power of choosing 
Title: Title: Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position on Free Will and Responsibility? 
Chapter 1 




to do a thing or choosing not to do it (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or to 
shun it), or rather it consists alone in the fact that in order to affirm or deny, 
pursue or shun those things placed before us by the understanding, we act so that 
we are unconscious that any outside force constrains us in doing so. For in order 
that I should be free it is not necessary that I should be indifferent as to the choice 
of one or the other of two contraries; but contrariwise the more I lean to the one 
— whether I recognize clearly that the reasons of the good and true are to be 
found in it, or whether God so disposes my inward thought — the more freely 
do I choose and embrace it. And undoubtedly both divine grace and natural 
knowledge, far from diminishing my liberty, rather increase it and strengthen it. 
Hence this indifference which I feel, when I am not swayed to one side rather 
than to the other by lack of reason, is the lowest grade of liberty, and rather 
evinces a lack or negation in knowledge than a perfection of will: for if I always 
recognized clearly what was true and good, I should never have trouble in 
deliberating as to what judgment or choice I should make, and then I should be 
entirely free without ever being indifferent. (1911: 21) 
 
A long quotation, but one that resists summary, particularly points concerning 
indifference and freedom even when God disposes inward thought towards a particular 
action. There is much that may be, and has been, said about this text; the key points are 
as follows. God can produce within man inclinations or a disposition that gives actions 
at least some degree of predictability, (‘impossible that He should ever deceive me’) but 
are not absolutely determined. Clear and distinct ideas enable freedom of spontaneity; 
in the limit, this is perfect freedom and a determination towards the good and true. 
Whether this is absolute determination is a controversial point. Confused or obscure 
ideas bring about freedom of indifference, an imperfect freedom, (‘the lowest grade of 
liberty’), that is not determined.34 There is a problem concerning Descartes’ claim that 
Man and God’s wills are essentially the same except the latter being incomparably 
greater. Part of God’s perfection is being completely undetermined, having profound 
indifference in terms of action. For Man, the situation is just the opposite, when God so 
disposes our inward thoughts to the good the more freely they are chosen. Tad Schmaltz 
expresses the point, ‘In contrast to the case of God, then, the perfection of our freedom 
 
34 There is much debate concerning freedom of indifference and freedom of spontaneity; it is beyond 
my present scope to explore these issues but detailed analysis may be found within Tad Schmaltz's 
fascinating book, Descartes on Causation (2008). 
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consists in the determination to the true (and the good) rather than in an indifference to 
action’ (Schmaltz 2008: 196). 
Further insight into Descartes position on human freedom is found within the 
huge exposition of his system completed in Latin in 1644, the Principia Philosophiae, (or 
Principles of Philosophy). From Part One, the following articles are relevant: 
Article 37. The highest perfection of man is that he acts freely or voluntarily, and that is 
what makes him deserve praise or blame. 
[…] When we embrace something true, that is much more to our credit if we do it 
voluntarily than it would be if we couldn’t help embracing it. 
 
Article 39. It is self-evident that there is free will. 
There’s freedom in our will, and we often have the power to give or withhold our assent 
at will — that is so obvious that it must be regarded as one of the first and most common 
notions that are innate in us. […]. 
 
Article 40. It is also certain that everything was preordained by God. 
 
Article 41. How to reconcile the freedom of our will with divine preordination. 
But we will get out of these difficulties, (trying to reconcile divine preordination with the 
freedom of our will), if we bear in mind that our mind is finite, and that God has infinite 
power by which he not only knew from eternity everything that was or could be going 
to happen, but also willed it and preordained it. We can know enough about this power 
to perceive vividly and clearly that God has it; but we cannot get our minds around it 
well enough to see how it leaves men’s free actions undetermined. As for our own liberty 
— our ability at a given moment to go this way or that — we are so intimately aware of 
this aspect of our nature that we see it as clearly and comprehend it as fully as we do 
anything. When something is as intimately and securely grasped as that, it would be 
ridiculous to doubt it just because we don’t grasp something else — namely its relation 
to God’s powers of knowledge — that we know must by its very nature be beyond our 
comprehension. (Descartes 2012: 9-10) 
 
Because of the quantity of text only part of Articles 37 and 39 are presented. Article 41 
has been given in full, as it is particularly relevant. In one sense the above is quite clear. 
The claims are robustly made but Article 39 and 40 lead to a familiar difficulty, (trying 
to reconcile divine preordination with the freedom of our will), that Article 41 is intended 
to resolve. It is worth noting that unlike Meditation IV there are no claims that 
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determination, even if understood loosely as an inclination, enables a higher form of 
freedom. Article 37 seems to claim that real freedom precludes determination of any 
sort, giving actions of automata as an example of determined behaviour that clearly 
cannot be subject to praise or blame. Returning to Article 41, it is suggested by Brian 
Collins in his Paper Adding Substance to the Debate: Descartes on Freedom of the Will (2013) 
that Descartes’ position is illuminated by considering an analogy between divine and 
created substance and divine will and human will: 
 
God is a substance in the primary sense because God is completely independent 
(i.e., not dependent on anything). Humans are substances in a secondary sense 
because we are independent of all substances other than God. God is free in the 
primary sense because God is completely undetermined. Humans are free in a 
secondary sense because our will is only internally determined by our recognition 
of truth and goodness (which is created and dependent on God). (2013: 232) 
 
Collins continues with clarity, noting that ‘for human freedom, the degree of freedom 
increases as the will acts with greater ease (i.e., more spontaneously/voluntarily). When 
the will acts with more spontaneity it is following a more clearly perceived good’ (2013: 
233). Is Collins’ suggested comparison, (substance in the primary or secondary sense), 
helpful and does Descartes’ claim that our liberty is ‘intimately and securely grasped … 
and it would be ridiculous to doubt it just because we don’t grasp something else’ bring 
any kind of satisfactory closure, resolution or explanation? I believe that it does not, but 
there are more reflections by Descartes on these issues to be considered. 
In a letter to the Jesuit Denis Mesland of 9th February 1645, well known in the 
ongoing controversy concerning Descartes’ position as Compatibilist or Libertarian,35 
Descartes again discusses the nature of the will. Descartes describes a freedom of 
indifference where the content of what is chosen is not important. In other words, it is 
possible to choose arbitrarily among possibilities in quite an indifferent way. While there 
seems no deep inconsistency with the Meditations where Descartes writes, ‘For it is always 
open to us to hold back from pursuing a clearly known good, or from admitting a clearly 
perceived truth, provided that we consider it a good thing to demonstrate the freedom 
 
35 Responses to the free will problem in terms of Libertarianism, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism 
will be described at some length in Chapter 2 of this Thesis. 
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of our will by so doing’ (Lennon 2013: 225)36 it is difficult to imagine circumstances that 
would lead an agent to consider it a good thing to make such a demonstration. In 
addition to the mysterious demonstration of freedom, it is difficult to imagine why one 
would want to hold back from experiencing higher freedom by pursuing a guaranteed 
and clear good, having its origin in God. Detailed analysis of this letter is available37 and 
there are further Works within Descartes’ body of writing that continue to refine and 
develop his position on the freedom of the will and the closely related issues of God’s 
knowledge and causation. The Passions of the Soul (1650) and correspondence with 
Elisabeth of the Palatinate (1618 – 1680), (also known as Elisabeth of Bohemia, Princess 
Elisabeth of the Palatinate or Princess-Abbess of Herford Abbey), are further examples 
of substantial insights into Descartes’ thought that cannot be considered in this brief 
outline. For Descartes, free will is self-evident and in an imperfect sense may be likened 
controversially with the freedom of God. Human freedom exists in its highest form 
when choosing the good in harmony with God’s desire and influence. Such influence 
could, in its strongest interpretation, be described as determination, thereby bringing 
together the apparently disparate requirements of human freedom within a necessarily 
determined world. It is interesting to note the concept of freedom just described, where 
action is necessitated and yet also free by alignment of the will with the divine or the 
good, although separated by time, culture and purpose, has appeared previously in 
various forms from the beginning of this brief survey. 
 
o Free Will within Hume (1711-1776) 
David Hume is ‘generally regarded as one of the most important philosophers to write 
in English’ (Morris and Brown 2014), and ‘widely recognized as providing the most 
influential statement of the “compatibilist” position in the free will debate’ (Russell 
 
36 This quotation is taken from the full text of Descartes’ letter to Mesland reprinted in Thomas M. 
Lennon’s Paper, Descartes’s Supposed Libertarianism (2013). The Paper discusses in detail the controversy 
concerning Descartes’ Libertarian or Compatibilist position.  
 
37 Detailed analysis of the entire letter can be found in C.P.Ragland Descartes on Degrees of Freedom: A Close 
Look at a Key Text (2013). 
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2014).38 (A position claiming freedom and moral responsibility can be reconciled with 
the truth of (causal) determinism). Hume’s work on free will is contained within Of 
Liberty and Necessity published in A Treatise of Human Nature 1738-40 (Book 2, Part 3, 
Sections 1 and 2) and later, in slightly amended form in Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding (Section 8, Parts 1 and 2, Liberty and Necessity). To provide an outline of 
Hume’s ideas, I will look at Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Section 8, and for 
better understanding also briefly mention some of Hume’s ideas in the preceding Section 
7, The Idea of Necessary Connection. 
 Hume believed lack of progress in resolving metaphysical issues was due to 
ambiguity of key terms and obscure ideas. Separate groups could not agree because 
although using the same terms there were different assumptions about the meaning of 
those terms. Hume believed the debate about free will was protracted because of this 
problem and resolved to clarify the terms used and effectively end the debate. Hume 
believed that clarifying key terms such as necessity and liberty would allow everyone to 
agree that human beings are free, and actions follow necessarily, and by so agreeing end 
the long running debate. First, from Section 7, Hume addresses causation:  
 
We are never able to discover any power or necessary connection, any quality 
that ties the effect to the cause and makes it an infallible consequence of it. All 
we find is that the one event does in fact follow the other. (2004: 31)  
 
In other words, it is claimed the idea of necessity and causation arises entirely from the 
uniformity we see in the operations of nature where similar items are constantly 
conjoined. The mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of 
the other. The necessity that we ascribe to matter is based on the constant conjunction 
of similar objects and the consequent inference from one to the other. Apart from these 
we have no notion of necessity or connection. This idea is extended from the material 
world to the world of human action. To give up our clear sense of personal freedom 
seems wrong, but to be consistent these ideas must surely be extended to human action: 
 
 
38 See also ‘Hume’s Lengthy Digression’: Free Will in the Treatise, Hume’s Treatise: A Critical Guide (Russell 
2015b). 
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The same (one event following another) holds for the influence of mind on body: 
the mind wills, and then the body moves, and we observe both events; but we 
don’t observe — and can’t even conceive — the tie that binds the volition to the 
motion. (2004: 36)  
 
Hume argues that our life experience and history generally support this claim, that to 
study history is to discover universal principles of human nature. The essential claim is 
that the mysterious process of constant conjunction legitimately describes material 
processes in nature and the relationship between motives and voluntary human actions. 
This seems counter to experience; it feels from the inside that human actions are not 
universally predictable in the sense that other events in nature are predictable and human 
beings would be diminished by such predictability. Hume partly accepts this, suggesting 
differences in character are responsible at a fine level of detail for different outcomes 
under the same initial conditions. Further, Hume suggests (from Section 8, Part One) 
because ‘[…] a human body is a mighty complicated machine and many secret powers 
lurk in it that we have no hope of understanding’ (2004: 43), some causal factors are 
effectively hidden, making it only appear as if there are variations in the effect of 
apparently identical causes. There seems to be a problem, with endless variation in 
human behaviour driving ever more complex and possibly hidden preconditions such 
that the claim of constant conjunction seems to be getting lost in ever increasing detail. 
With material objects this problem does not seem to exist, with relationships of constant 
conjunction much more apparent. Familiarity and dependability of constant conjunction 
within the material world, such as released objects falling, does not diminish the 
mysterious nature of the conjunction of these events. Hume describes constant 
conjunction in the material world and in the context of human action as ‘entirely 
incomprehensible’ and something ‘we don’t observe and can’t even conceive’ (2004: 36). 
However, although mysterious, for Hume there is nothing in addition within the causal 
process for material or human related causation. 
 How is human freedom understood within Hume’s universal conjunction model 
of cause and effect? Liberty means a power of acting or not acting according to the 
determinations of the will. ‘This hypothetical liberty - hypothetical because it concerns 
what we may do if we so choose - is universally agreed to belong to everyone who isn’t 
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a prisoner and in chains’ (Hume 2004: 48). It is claimed that for morality to have 
foundation the agent’s character must have the power to produce sentiments, (feelings 
and opinions), which have a constant effect in producing actions. There is constancy and 
predictability in the way character drives sentiments and actions. In Hume’s words, ‘It 
seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage either in learning or in action of any kind 
without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, and this inference from motives to 
voluntary actions, from characters to conduct’ (2004: 45). Such a doctrine of necessity 
and liberty is essential to Hume’s notion of morality.  
For Hume, necessity, in the sense of cause-and-effect relationships that are 
observed as objects constantly conjoined, is true within the material world and within 
human mental and physical activity. Liberty to act is possible, whereby morally relevant 
actions originate from within the agent, flowing from the nature of the agent’s character. 
(It will be seen later, this is a problematic notion due to, for example, the role of luck in 
the formation of an agent’s character). Thus, existence of morality together with 
associated praise or blame is claimed to be possible. For Hume, both necessity and liberty 
exist and are compatible, being the basis of our experience of morality. 39  Further 
reflection quickly shows issues for consideration. As mentioned, actions originate from 
the agent; I do what I want to do, driven by character, plans, objectives and so on. If 
action is determined by character, there seems to be only one possibility; at the moment 
of choosing there is one choice based on what it is that I want. It seems misleading 
perhaps to describe such a choice as free. William James (1842-1910) discussed such 
difficulties during a lecture40 to Harvard Divinity School students, calling compatibilism 
a ‘quagmire of evasion’. These issues will continue to be explored in the next section 




39 With reference to previous discussions of Divine foreknowledge, it is interesting to note that David 
Hume claims ‘It has so far been found to be beyond the powers of philosophy to reconcile the 
indifference and contingency of human actions (so that men could have acted differently from how they 
did act) with God’s foreknowledge of them, or to defend God’s absolute decrees and yet clear him of 
the accusation that he is the author of sin’ (2004: 52). 
 
40 The Dilemma of Determinism was delivered as an address to Harvard Divinity School students in Divinity 
Hall on March 13th, 1884 at 7:30 pm and published in the Unitarian Review September 1884. 
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o Free Will within Kant (1724-1804) 
Kant’s importance in the history of Philosophy is immense. Bryan Magee describes Kant 
as ‘ … the man most widely regarded as the greatest philosopher since the ancient Greeks 
…’ (1987: 170). In conversation with Magee, Sir Geoffrey Warnock suggests the origin 
of the problems Kant endeavoured to solve was ‘the apparent conflict between the 
findings of the physical sciences in his day and our fundamental ethical and religious 
convictions’ (Magee 1987: 171). Specifically, conflict between the ascendancy of 
determinism within the physical sciences and necessary belief in alternative possibilities 
within the realm of human behaviour that allows responsibility to be assigned to our 
actions.41 Magee and Warnock agree that as a builder of systems, it is difficult to explain 
or describe one aspect of Kant’s thought in isolation; ‘an immense range of views fit 
together in a systematic and comprehensive way’ (1987: 171). However, the aim here is 
to provide a brief outline of Kant and free will, and I will endeavour to begin with 
minimum preliminaries. I will refer to The Critique of Practical Reason (1889), translated by 
Thomas Kingsmill Abbott: (i) Section I: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of 
Morals, Third Section, and, (ii) Section II: Critical Examination of Practical Reason, First 
Part, Book 1, Chapter 3. On Kant’s view, moral praise, blame, the very legitimacy of 
moral appraisal, presupposes that an agent is able to do otherwise (1889: 190). Kant 
makes a clear and vital distinction between the world as appearance, (the world of the 
sciences, where physical determinism rules), something that is the object of our 
experience, and the world of things in themselves, (a world that includes, for example, 
free will, right and wrong and the soul) (1889: 70). As Warnock notes, to position right 
and wrong outside of the world of experience raises the obvious and unresolved problem 
of how the will and moral thought can actually ‘make any difference’ or connect with 
the world of experience. (Magee 1987: 183). Kant’s essential method is to place the 
causality of science, of matter in motion, in the world of appearances that exists within 
the context of time and space, and place freedom within the world of things in 
themselves, outside of time, so immune from any notion of causality and determinism.  
 
41 In a typically clear and incisive manner, Bryan Magee describes the (free will) problem; ‘So the problem 
is: how, in a universe in which the motions of all matter are governed by scientific laws, can any of the 
motions of those material objects which are human bodies be governed by free will?’ (1987: 172). 
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Section I: Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, Third Section, 
begins by describing the will as a kind of causality that is possessed by rational living 
beings42 and freedom as a property of this causality, independent of determination by 
‘foreign causes’ (1889: 65). By contrast, physical necessity is the property of causality 
relating to irrational beings and is determined by ‘foreign causes’. Defining freedom in 
terms of what it is not, (not dependent on foreign causes), is considered unfruitful in 
terms of revealing its essence. Freedom is not lawless, except in terms of physical laws, 
because any form of lawlessness will make free will ‘an absurdity’. It is claimed that the 
will is autonomous, that is, it is a law-to-itself. In the text that follows, Kant seeks to 
express and develop the relationship between freedom, autonomy, morality, law, 
rationality and the categorical imperative, (‘the idea of the will of every rational being as 
one that legislates universal law’43 (R. Johnson and Cureton 2016)). This proves to be 
ultimately problematic, with Kant commenting that further work is required. The 
difficulty that Kant recognises is ‘it must be freely admitted that there is a sort of circle 
here from which it seems impossible to escape’ (1889: 69). However, escape is thought 
to be possible as ‘one resource remains’. 
The ‘remaining resource’ is the possibility of seeing ourselves from two different 
points of view. First, as a subject of experience mediated by the senses, (passive and 
originating from without), and subject to laws of nature. Second, ‘as belonging to the 
intelligible world, under laws which being independent of nature have their foundation not in 
experience but in reason alone’, (added emphasis 1889: 72). In other words, to be 
independent from the determining causes of the sensible world is freedom. Kant believes 
the circle has been broken; ‘Now the suspicion is removed which we raised above, that 
there was a latent circle involved in our reasoning’ (1889: 72). Kant expresses the whole 
point as follows, a long quotation but one that captures in one elegant statement the 
essence of Kant’s position: 
 
42 The translator, (Thomas Kimsmill Abbott), uses the term ‘living being’ rather than specifically human 
being. Presumably, in Kant’s view, it is possession of particular attributes such as autonomy that is 
decisive. See also Kant: Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View published in 1798 for further general 
discussion. 
 
43 There are several formulations of the Categorical Imperative. This formulation is usually described as 
the Autonomy Formulation (R. Johnson and Cureton 2016). 
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[…] hence, he (Man) has two points of view from which he can regard him-self, 
and recognise laws of the exercise of his faculties, and consequently of all his 
actions: first, so far as he belongs to the world of sense, he finds himself subject 
to laws of nature (heteronomy); secondly, as belonging to the intelligible world, 
under laws which being independent on nature have their foundation not in 
experience but in reason alone. 
As a rational being, and consequently belonging to the intelligible world, 
man can never conceive the causality of his own will otherwise than on condition 
of the idea of freedom, for independence on the determining causes of the 
sensible world, (an independence which Reason must always ascribe to itself), is 
freedom. Now the idea of freedom is inseparably connected with the conception 
of autonomy, and this again with the universal principle of morality which is 
ideally the foundation of all actions of rational beings, just as the law of nature is 
of all phenomena. 
Now the suspicion is removed which we raised above, that there was a 
latent circle involved in our reasoning from freedom to autonomy, and from this 
to the moral law […]. (1889: 72) 
 
Kant continues, trying to reconcile these two aspects of man; when man is considered 
free and when man is considered part of nature. In fact, not just reconciliation is sought 
but the nature of the necessity of such unity. My reading of Kant does not ultimately 
identify a satisfactory conclusion, in fact Kant ends Section I: Fundamental Principles of 
the Metaphysic of Morals, Third Section, by admitting the limitations of what has been 
shown, but not in an apologetic tone, noting that sometimes an end stop is reached at 
the ‘very limits of human reason’ (1889: 84). 
 From Section II: Critical Examination of Practical Reason, First Part, Book 1, 
Chapter 3, Kant develops the significance of time in understanding freedom and 
determination: 
 
The notion of causality as physical necessity, in opposition to the same notion as 
freedom, concerns only the existence of things so far as it is determinable in time, 
and, consequently, as phenomena, in opposition to their causality as things in 
themselves. (1889: 188) 
 
Kant continues to argue that if freedom is to be ‘saved’ then while ‘a thing’ subject to 
causation and determinism exists in time and the world of appearance, the attribute of 
freedom belongs to ‘the being’ as a thing-in-itself. Freedom does not exist just because 
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the determining physical cause is within the person that acts, this is the freedom of the 
clock and arguments to the effect that such freedom is sufficient are a ‘wretched 
subterfuge’ (1889: 189). Freedom in the full and legitimate sense is the necessary basis 
of moral law and ‘imputation’, (to enter in the account44), to be responsible in a morally 
important sense. 
Importantly, Kant tries to explain and clarify the notion of responsibility Critique 
of Practical Reason (1889: 191). ‘A subject’ is conscious of himself as being within the world 
of appearance and as a thing-in-himself, not subject to time conditions, determined only 
by laws that are self-given using reason and the necessary synthesis of moral law and 
freedom. In this mode of existence nothing is antecedent in a freedom limiting sense to 
the ‘determination of his will’. Every action, including what Kant describes as ‘the whole 
series of his existence as a sensible being’, is within the consciousness of his 
‘supersensible existence’ and the result of his causality as a noumenon, (as a thing-in-
himself45). Kant continues, saying that an agent could have done otherwise because 
although actions are determined and necessary when seen looking back into the 
appearance of the past, there is in a mysterious sense a ‘single phenomenon’ of character, 
whereby freely created and ongoing actions of the agent originate from the intelligible 
mode of the agent’s existence that includes, it will be recalled, ‘the whole series of his 
existence as a sensible being’. Such self-creation gives the agent meaningful responsibility 
with attendant praise and blame. This is difficult to grasp; the difficulty is largely caused 
by the notion of two modes of existence that seem in conflict with respect to freedom 
and determinism. While the idea of freedom existing within a non-causal world is 
scarcely graspable as an idea, it is the relationship, the interaction of the deterministic 
world of appearance and the intelligible world, that remains mysterious and 
incomprehensible. 
 
44 Origin: Late Middle English; from Old French imputer, from Latin imputare ‘enter in the account’, 
from in- ‘in, towards’ + putare ‘reckon’. 
 
45 The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy succinctly describes the ‘noumenal self’ as an uncaused cause 
outside of time, which therefore is not subject to the deterministic laws of nature in accordance with 
which our understanding constructs experience (Rohlf 2016). 
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 There are many questions that quickly emerge from the above description. For 
example, in addition to the issue of the interaction of the deterministic world of 
appearance and the intelligible world, how do multiple transcendentally free agents 
interact? How are my free actions integrated into the experience that your understanding 
constructs? Even though there are problems like these, Kant holds that we can make 
sense of moral appraisal and responsibility only by thinking about human freedom in 
this way; it is the only way to prevent natural necessity from undermining both (following 
Johnson and Cureton 2016). 
 In summary, the above does not scratch the surface of the depth and complexity 
of Kant’s response to free will, or more accurately free will as an element within an 
interlocking and all-embracing explanatory system. However, some insight into his 
position, in terms of bringing together key elements of determinism, freedom and 
responsibility, has been suggested. 
 
o Human freedom within Freud (1856-1939) and Sartre (1905-1980). 
That philosophical reflection on free will develops and evolves is plainly seen within the 
work of Kant and Freud. Freud’s thinking on free will is clearly described by Alfred 
Tauber, Freud, the Reluctant Philosopher (2010). Chapter Four, The Paradox of Freedom, 
begins with a summary of the essential claim: 
 
Basically, Freud divided the mind between the unconscious grounded in the 
biological and thus subject to some natural causation, and a rational faculty, which 
lodges itself in consciousness and exists independent of natural cause. The critical 
distinction resides in Freud’s acceptance, as a psychologist, of a functional mind-
body dualism, and in the higher functions of the mind, he places the repository 
of interpretative reason. This is basically a Kantian construction, where-by reason 
assumes an independent character that allows for a detached scrutiny of the 
natural world. Beyond this epistemological partitioning, Freud further followed 
Kant in assigning the scrutinizing ability of a rational self-consciousness the basis 
of choice and moral reckoning. Consequently, the epistemology leads to a moral 
philosophy. Freud’s debt to Kant thus centres on the dialectical interplay of each 
domain with the other, and in the end a ‘moral-epistemology’ emerges. (2010: 
116) 
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A long quotation, but one that captures succinctly a large measure of Freud’s position 
and its link with Kant. There is more to say about Freud and his debt to Kant that will 
further illuminate Freud as ‘the reluctant philosopher’. Essentially, Freud’s concept of 
unconscious mental activity ‘appears to us … as an extension of the corrections 
undertaken by Kant of our views on external perception’ (from Freud, The Unconscious 
(1915: 121), quoted by Tauber (2010: 117). As Kant argued that our perceptions are 
subjectively conditioned, not identical with the object that is perceived, so Freud warns 
us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental 
processes that are their objects. Freud likened Kant’s noumenal self with the 
psychoanalytic unconscious, neither being directly perceived or knowable. 
 While these connections between Kant and Freud are interesting, what is the  
relevance for free will in Freud’s adoption of fundamental Kantian ideas upon which 
‘the entire psychoanalytic edifice’ (Tauber 2010: 122) was built? Importantly, while Freud 
believed that the unconscious was unknowable in a way that mirrored Kant’s noumenal 
self, there is a difference in position regarding ‘internal’ and ‘external’ perception: 
 
Like the physical, the psychical is not necessarily in reality what it appears to us 
to be. We shall be glad to learn, however, that the correction of internal 
perception will turn out not to offer such great difficulties as the correction of 
external perception - that internal objects are less unknowable than the external world. 
(added emphasis Freud 1915: 121) 
 
That internal objects are ‘less unknowable’ is based on the claim that reason has a special 
standing, having the capacity, through psychoanalysis, to release from acting in accordance 
with desires, (unconscious forces), and act autonomously in accordance with reason and 
moral duty. Note that moral responsibility is the normal and desirable state of existence. 
As described earlier, reason is independent of the natural world of appearances and 
causation, it is free and autonomous, directing human beings within a moral landscape. 
 Freud’s enterprise, from the beginning, was built on two fundamentally opposed 
metaphysical positions. First, humans are determined, allowing Freud’s work to be 
grounded within science and so provide naturalistic explanations governed by 
naturalistic causes. Second, that humans are free, exercising free choice, independent of 
natural causation. For Kant, opposition is resolved ‘on the basis of reason’s standing and 
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the arch-precept of human freedom leading to moral responsibility: ‘The entire Kantian 
philosophical edifice hangs together on these intimate linkages … and while Freud does 
not address the issue head-on, he basically accepts this construction and, with it, 
assumptions supportive to his own agenda’ (Tauber 2010: 140). Freud does not attempt 
to resolve the free will – determinism paradox and this is a problem because the collision 
between the determinism exerted by unconscious psychical forces - constituted by 
naturalistic causation - opposes the other, free will, which Freud often refers to as an 
illusion. Thus, the structure of Freudian psychoanalysis sits on an unresolved conflict. 
However, as Dilman points out, ‘if Freud was really a strict determinist a priori, if the 
divisions he attributed to personality and mind were immutable structures, there would 
be no question of such psychological liberation’ (1999: 174). I believe it can be claimed 
that while Freud tried for good reasons to ground his work upon scientific methods, he 
could ultimately be forgiven for not resolving the historically intractable free will – 
determinism paradox that his methodology draw attention to, (while producing and 
inspiring significant scholarship concerning psychotherapy, science, philosophy, 
literature, literary criticism and Feminism). From Freud’s point of view his methods 
worked, psychoanalysis as a therapy yielded desired outcomes while resolution of what 
Tauber describes as ‘the stark determinism of his science’ remained unresolved, put ‘to 
the side as he steadfastly pursued human freedom and self-fulfilment’ (2010: 144). 
Engaging Kant as the philosophical basis upon which to build a theoretical and 
therapeutic enterprise is certainly not putting issues of determinism too far ‘to the side’.  
 Turning finally to Jean-Paul Sartre, I will briefly outline Sartre’s ideas concerning 
human freedom. Summarising Sartre’s ideas is far from straight forward as his initial 
concept of human freedom meshes with a difficult and complex ontology that later 
evolves, or certainly changes, into what is often described as a material conception of 
freedom. Initially freedom is expressed in terms of the ability of consciousness to 
transcend the material realm; ‘ … the permanent possibility … of wrenching itself away 
from its past so as to be able to consider it (it’s past) in the light of a non-being …’ Being 
and Nothingness (Sartre 1984: 563). Later, focus shifted to freedom as a function of 
meeting material needs of human beings; ‘It would be quite wrong to interpret me as 
saying that man is free in all situations … . I mean the exact opposite: all men are slaves 
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in so far as their life unfolds … always conditioned by scarcity’ Critique of Dialectical Reason 
Volume One (Sartre 2004: 332). This was a huge shift, and I will endeavour to outline 
features of each perspective. 
 The essential starting point is the claim that freedom for human beings is the very 
nature of human consciousness (being-for-itself). Consciousness has no inherent 
content, it is in an important sense nothing, but can define itself at any moment. It is 
future orientated and seeks content: ‘This is its freedom. Freedom allows the for-itself 
to redefine itself in every instant, it gives it the power to break from the past and to 
redefine the future’ (Franchi 2020). On this view, normal conscious human beings are 
condemned to be free (Sartre 1984: 567), unlike inert matter it is the very nature of their 
being, hence the description ‘ontological freedom’. It will be quickly realised that the 
claim of ontological freedom has counter intuitive implications, in that freedom is not 
considered contingent; a prisoner is free because choices are available concerning how 
to respond to being in prison (Sartre 1984: 622).  
The reasons for transition to essentially a material conception of freedom are the 
subject of much discussion, but it is generally believed that the Second World War and 
the Holocaust were instrumental in bringing about this change. The idea that human 
beings are free in any situation was surely unsustainable given the nature of what 
happened during the war years, as expressed for example in excerpts from Anti-Semite 
and Jew (Sartre 1976) published in Temps Modernes in 1945. The notion of free in chains 
(Sartre 1984: 703) was not entirely discarded as an ontological quality of being human 
but had been shown as a grossly incomplete characterisation of human freedom. What 
was lacking was a material conception of freedom. 
 Consideration of material freedom begins with choice: As suggested above, the 
ontologically free prisoner detained in Alcatraz has a choice, to accept captivity or try to 
escape by swimming over a mile from Alcatraz Island to the San Francisco shoreline, 
but these are clearly poor choices. Choice does not necessarily mean freedom, in a normal 
and plausible sense. Being oppressed or imprisoned is not all about absence of choice 
but being forced to choose between bad options. Material freedom requires freedom 
from coercion and domination. Note the radical change from an ontological based 
notion of freedom to considerations that are independent of human nature; for example, 
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considerations based on human rights and material security, availability of food, water, 
shelter and education, and freedom from slavery, poverty, discrimination, domination 
and persecution. 
Material freedom for Sartre is essentially basic material security, an absence of 
coercion, but has been articulated in terms of access to cultural and social goods 
necessary for pursuing personal projects and ambitions, (following The Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy Sartre’s Political Philosophy Section 3: Freedom, based on 
Sartre’s Notebooks for an Ethics (1992: 329-331)). 
 The above offers a very brief sketch of Sartre’s notions of human freedom; 
description of Sartre’s ontological perspective is slight, but unfortunately giving justice 
to the complexity and scope of Sartre’s philosophy on this point as part of a very much 
larger and complex interlocking system of ideas is unfortunately beyond the scope of 
this Thesis.46 
 A much wider context of Sartre and Existentialism may be found in 
Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience (Flanagan and 
Caruso 2018). Three ‘waves’ of existentialism are described. The first, relates to anxiety 
about justification of moral norms without theological foundation. The second, anxiety 
over the catastrophic failure of human goodness and rationality to respond to this 
absence, as manifest, for example, by the Second World War, Stalin and Pol Pot as 
mentioned above. Third, Neuroexistentialism; anxiety caused by the rise of a ‘scientific 
image’ implying denial of free will and any ultimate human outcome other than death, 
as per all other mammals (following Flanagan and Caruso 2018: 2).47 
 
1.2 Why Free Will is an important issue 
There are numerous expressions of the ‘free will problem’ and the importance of the 
notion of free will generally, in the context of moral responsibility, the law, our concept 
 
46 In this section I follow closely Storm Heter’s article from The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
Sartre’s Political Philosophy Section 3: Freedom <https://www.iep.utm.edu/sartre-p/#H3>. For a detailed 
and clear exposition of Sartre’s ontological perspective on freedom see Gary Cox, Sartre: Consciousness, 
Freedom, Bad Faith (2014). Alternatively, Diané Collinson and Kathryn Plant Fifty Major Philosophers (2006) 
presents an exceptionally clear description of Sartre’s concept of consciousness, described by the authors 
as ‘perhaps a difficult idea to grasp’ (2006: 231). 
 
47 This is a gross simplification of Flanagan and Caruso’s wide ranging and hugely interesting Paper.  
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of ourselves as persons, and so on. This is one such concise and eloquent expression in 
the context of consciousness: 
 
For any materialist vision of consciousness, the crucial stumbling block is the 
question of free will. A modern, enlightened person tends to feel that he or she 
has rejected a mystical, immaterial conception of the eternal soul in exchange for 
a strictly scientific understanding of consciousness and selfhood – as something 
created by the billions of neurons in our brains with their trillions of synapses 
and complex chemical and electrical processes. But the fact of our being entirely 
material, hence subject to the laws of cause and effect, introduces the concern 
that our lives might be altogether determined. Is it possible that our experience 
of decision-making – the impression we have of making choices, indeed of having 
choices to make, sometimes hard ones – is entirely illusory? Is it possible that a 
chain of physical events in our bodies and brains must cause us to act in the way 
we do, whatever our experience of the process might be? (Parks and Manzotti 
2020) 
 
I believe the brief historical perspective of Section 1.1 clearly and concisely reflects, 
confirms and demonstrates the ‘problem’ of human freedom; to understand ‘the extent 
to which human agents are in control of their own lives and destinies’ (added emphasis 
Russell 2013b: 2) when threatened, for example, by fate, theological issues or physical 
determinism. Seeking to understand the tension between the internal sense of freedom 
experienced by most human beings and freedom regulating, perhaps eliminating, 
features of the world and our religious beliefs is an ongoing search across many cultures 
and centuries that is self-evidently important. Important in itself, and because of many 
vital consequences that follow from our understanding of the extent or possibility of 




Chapter 1 offers reflections on free will based on the work of some major philosophers 
and theologians. The importance of the free will debate is confirmed across a multitude 
of areas, for example, moral responsibility, metaphysics and jurisprudence. I have 
introduced the free will debate that will continue over the next two chapters, showing 
semicompatibilism developing from a tradition of thought concerning the control that 
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human beings have over their lives that began thousands of years ago. This provides a 
foundation and context for Part III where the impact of implicit bias on a particular free 
will position will be examined. The intention is to increase focus through the Chapters 
of Part I, concluding with a description of semicompatibilism in Chapter 3. 
What is the problem? With Nagel (2003), I believe ‘the essential problem’ can be 
summarised as the challenge of resolving the tension between our self-image as agents 
in control of our lives, making rational, responsible decisions in a way that makes us feel 
like things are, in an important sense, ‘up to us’ and, as outlined, the various challenges 
to such feelings of agency and so responsibility.48  
How a particular understanding or concept of freedom and responsibility 
(semicompatibilism) responds to the challenge of implicit bias is the essential issue to be 





48 Such ‘challenges’ to our agency may also be unconscious, for example, some understandings of implicit 
bias. 
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Contemporary Responses to the Free Will Problem 
 





Introducing Part I, Chapter 1 outlined the ideas of some important philosophers and 
writers on human freedom. Reflection on freedom essentially seeks to answer two 
questions; is free will possible, and if it is, what is its nature? The possibility of free will 
and freedom of action is usually considered together with, or despite of, forms of 
determinism such as those described, the prophecies of the Oracles of classical antiquity, 
physical causation or psychological determining factors. Critical examination attempts 
to understand if and under what circumstances there could be compatibility between 
apparently inconsistent concepts of freedom and forms of determination. In this chapter 
I will outline responses to the free will problem expressed in terms of claims and 
arguments about compatibility or incompatibility of freedom and material determinism 
(as outlined, for example, by Parks and Manzotti (2020) on page 32), and implications 
for the vital notion of moral responsibility. I will briefly describe the main positions and 
arguments concerning compatibility of freedom and determinism, (the possibility and 
nature of free will), before concentrating in Chapter 3 on the semicompatibilist position. 
Recall, the phenomenon of implicit bias challenges the semicompatibilist position if 
issuing behaviour is found to be immune from the type of control needed for 
responsibility (guidance control) in the presence of substantial evidence and argument 
supporting the claim that agents are responsible. Investigating the nature of this possible 
threat is the essential research activity within this Thesis. 
 
49 The Life of Samuel Johnson (Boswell 1998). 
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Before looking at compatibility issues and various free will positions in more 
detail, I will mention three basic concepts employed extensively throughout the free will 
debate. The Introduction to Four Views on Free Will  claims ‘perhaps the three most 
important concepts in philosophical work on free will are free will, moral responsibility, 
and determinism’ (Fischer et al. 2007:1). First, Robert Kane in the Introduction to The 
Oxford Handbook of Free Will describes our sense of free will when 
 
we think of ourselves as capable of influencing the world in various ways. Open 
alternatives seem to lie before us. We reason or deliberate among them and 
choose. We feel it is ‘up to us’ what we choose and how we act; and this means 
that we could have chosen or acted otherwise … the origins or sources of our 
actions lie in us and not in something else over which we have no control - 
whether that something else is fate or God, the laws of nature, birth or 
upbringing, or other humans. (2012: 4) 
 
Kane’s quotation covers the key points concerning what it feels like from the inside to 
have freedom of will and action.50 However, there is unfortunately no single and agreed 
understanding of free will or the free will problem. There are 
 
[…] a range of problems … a troubling entanglement of our concepts, an 
entanglement that seems to lead to contradictions … to settle the problem  -  to 
disentangle the set  -  we must either reject some concepts, or instead, we must 
demonstrate that the set is indeed consistent despite its appearance to the 
contrary. (McKenna and Coates 2015a) 
 
The concepts that are rejected or shown to be (in)consistent, despite appearances to the 
contrary, define positions within the free will debate. This is important and may be 
developed using what is often referred to as the Classical Formulation of the free will 
problem (McKenna and Coates 2015a): 
 
1. Some agents, at some time, could have acted otherwise than she did. 
2. Actions are events. 
3. Every event has a cause. 
4. If an event is caused, then it is causally determined. 
 
50 See also Thomas Nagel Freedom (2003) for further description of our sense of freedom from the inside. 
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5. If an event is an act that is causally determined, then the agent of the act could not 
have acted otherwise than in the way that she did. 
 
From the Classical Formulation distinct positions within the free will debate emerge. 
There are six concepts; an agent, action, could have done otherwise, event, cause and 
causal determination. There is also a mutually inconsistent set of propositions, yet each 
one seems rooted in our contemporary conception of the world: Proposition (1) is 
grounded in a conception of agency (free agency) as an ability to select among different 
possible courses of action. This idea is sometimes described by analogy between 
alternative possibilities and a Garden of Forking Paths, whereby an agent’s future is the 
result of ongoing choices between alternative forking paths that branch off from a single 
past; from a single past, there is for the agent more than one possible path into the 
future. 51  Proposition (2) identifies actions with events. Proposition (3) is a 
presupposition of natural science. Indeterminacy and uncaused events will be mentioned 
later. Proposition (4) has historically been a working assumption of the natural sciences. 
Proposition (5) arises from a common-sense understanding of what it means to claim 
that an event is causally determined  -  given the antecedent causal conditions for the 
event, it was not possible for it not to have occurred (following closely McKenna and 
Coates 2015a). With respect to this formulation, compatibilists deny (5), but 
incompatibilists claim free will and determinism are incompatible and support (5). Note, 
there is no commitment yet as to the truth of determinism or alternatively that anyone 
has free will, what McKenna calls an agnostic incompatibilism. An incompatibilist hard-
determinist thesis does commit to the claim that no person has free will and determinism 
is true. Finally, the incompatibilist libertarian accepts the truth of free will and denies the 
truth of determinism. In terms of the Classical Formulation, libertarians may deny (3) 
claiming that causation is indeterministic or deny (4) claiming if events are caused then 
such causation is not deterministic. Clearly (1) is fundamental and controversial, a central 
issue within virtually any discussion of free will. 
Responsibility, the second basic concept, is linked to others such as desert, 
accountability, blameworthiness and praise. The term responsibility may be used in the 
 
51 The origin of this term is The Garden of Forking Paths, a 1941 short story by Argentine writer and poet 
Jorge Luis Borges. 
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sense of an obligation, but it is the sense of responsibility and its connection with praise 
and blame that is important here (Fischer et al. 2007: 2). As McKenna points out: 
 
A person who is a morally responsible agent is not merely a person who is able 
to do moral right or wrong … she is accountable for her morally significant 
conduct. Hence, she is, when fitting, an apt target of moral praise or blame, as 
well as reward or punishment. (added emphasis McKenna and Coates 2015a) 
 
The claim that for an agent to be morally responsible it is necessary to have the ability to 
make free decisions is widely held and intuitively plausible, but it is far from universally 
agreed. Some philosophers express the connection between responsibility and freedom 
from a different point of view, using the ability to take genuinely responsible decisions 
and actions as a benchmark or defining factor for freedom. For example, McKenna offers 
a definition of free will as ‘the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their 
conduct in the manner necessary for moral responsibility’ (McKenna and Coates 2015a). 
When free will is considered in this way, if responsibility could legitimately be present in 
the absence of alternative possibilities, then perhaps free will (at least in some important 
sense, for example, semicompatibilism) could also exist without alternatives, (in this 
‘strong’ sense), available to the agent; a situation that may initially seem implausible. 
However, arguments have been developed, (the most well-known and perhaps most 
important by Harry Frankfurt), that claim an agent may be responsible for their actions 
even in the absence of alternative possibilities. Arguments of this type are now generally 
referred to as Frankfurt-type examples or Frankfurt-style examples and will be discussed 
shortly. Frankfurt-type examples will be seen to be very important as a major motivator 
of the semicompatibilist free will position. 
The third basic concept, determinism, is essentially the thesis that at any time the 
universe has exactly one physically possible future. Something is deterministic if it has 
one physically possible outcome given a particular set of starting conditions and fixed 
causal laws, usually referred to as ‘the laws of nature’ (following Fischer et al. 2007: 2). 
The well-known argument for incompatibility, the consequence argument, can help to 
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1. There is nothing we can now do to change the past. 
2. There is nothing we can now do to change the laws of nature. 
3. There is nothing we can now do to change the past and the laws of nature. 
4. If determinism is true, our present actions are the necessary consequences of the past 
and the laws of nature. (That is, it must be the case that, given the past and the laws 
of nature, our present actions occur). 
5. Therefore, there is nothing we can now do to change the fact that our present actions 
occur. 
 
Forms of determinism threaten free will by taking away the key element of ‘up to us’ 
when apparently (from the agent’s perspective) choosing from alternative possibilities 
since only one alternative is actually possible. The Classical Incompatibilist Argument 
below (McKenna and Coates 2015a), shows, if determinism is true, there is no access to 
alternatives as illustrated by the Garden of Forking Paths: 
 
1. If a person acts of her own free will, then she could have done otherwise. 
2. If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one does. 
3. Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will. 
 
An alternative argument that shows the apparently controlling or freedom denying 
nature of determinism is expressed in terms of the idea that for an action to be free it 
must originate entirely from within the agent. McKenna (2015a) calls this the Source 
Incompatibilist Argument: 
 
1. A person acts of her own free will only if she is its ultimate source. 
2. If determinism is true, no one is the ultimate source of her actions. 
3. Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will. 
 
The idea of ‘ultimate source’ is interesting and important. Proposition (1) seems initially 
reasonable, fitting well with intuitive notions of free will, but how is the ultimate source 
‘she’ to be understood? Reflection quickly identifies how difficult it is to describe, 
understand or imagine an aspect of our nature that could exist independent of external 
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causation or influence and yet be causal within the world.52 Perhaps such difficulties are 
resolved if ‘we really are souls, immaterial and immortal clumps of God stuff that inhabit 
and control our material bodies … ’ (Dennett 2003: 1), but this is scarcely an 
uncontroversial claim. The notion of agent causation is a fundamental issue within the 
free will debate and will be discussed again. The main positions within the free will 
debate, distilled into a few words, are shown in Fig 2.1 (Fischer et al. 2007: 4). See also 
Daniel Dennett and Gregg Caruso’s clear and concise comparison of the main 

















Do we have 
free will? 
Libertarianism Yes No No Yes 
Compatibilism Yes 
Yes, although a 
semicompatibilist 
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Revisionism No 
Yes, but only 
with revision to 
our self-image 
Yes 
Yes, or close 
enough 
 





52 See description and discussion of emergence and agent causation in Appendix B. 
 
53  This may appear confusing; semicompatibilism ‘puts to one side’ the question of the truth of 
determinism. Even if determinism is true, an agent has freedom/responsibility, but 
freedom/responsibility as defined within semicompatibilism, not necessarily freedom in the ‘Forking 
Paths’ sense, see Chapter 3 Semicompatibilism, for a more detailed explanation. 
Title: Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position on Free Will and Responsibility? 
Chapter 2 




Incompatibilists, as the name suggests, believe free will and determinism are 
incompatible. Libertarian incompatibilists claim that we do have free will and thereby 
claim determinism to be false. In other words, incompatibilists 
 
believe free will and determinism are incompatible. If incompatibilists also 
believe that an incompatibilist free will exists, so that determinism is false they 
are called libertarians about free will. (Fischer et al. 2007: 7) 
 
However, if our actions are not determined, at least in some sense, the alternative world 
of undetermined actions seems a strange and unrecognisable place where notions of free 
will and responsibility continue to challenge understanding, because undetermined 
actions seem random and spontaneous, and therefore are not responsible actions. If 
libertarians are correct when claiming free will exists and is incompatible with 
determinism then what is the source, if any, of actions and how is responsibility to be 
understood and justified? As Randolph Clarke and Justin Capes comment in their 
introduction to Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will ‘the task of providing 
an incompatibilist account is not an easy one’ (Clarke and Capes 2017). 
To give an account of any position that tries to show compatibility or 
incompatibility between determinism and free will is not easy. However, Robert Kane 
does offer a detailed and persuasive incompatibilist libertarian argument. Kane argues 
that any defence of the libertarian position must show (i) free will really is incompatible 
with determinism, and (ii) libertarian free will requiring indeterminism can be intelligible 
and compatible with current scientific knowledge. In other words, both elements of the 
libertarian position must be covered, incompatibility and the existence of free will. Kane 
discusses the previously mentioned consequence argument (Fischer et al. 2007: 10): 
 
1. There is nothing we can now do to change the past. 
2. There is nothing we can now do to change the laws of nature. 
3. There is nothing we can now do to change the past and the laws of nature. 
4. If determinism is true, our present actions are the necessary consequences of the past 
and the laws of nature. (That is, it must be the case that, given the past and the laws 
of nature, our present actions occur). 
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5. Therefore, there is nothing we can now do to change the fact that our present actions 
occur. 
 
After a detailed and careful analysis Kane shows potential problems with this argument. 
The past and laws of nature cannot be changed, (surprisingly, a claim not universally 
accepted), but does such powerlessness thereby transfer to actions that are willed and are 
within our power, (actions that are not logically or physically impossible), to perform 
today? Arguments are ongoing about the legitimacy of the consequence argument, but 
Kane presents an alternative position based on ‘ultimate responsibility’. For an agent to 
be ultimately responsible they must be responsible for anything that is a sufficient cause or 
motive for the action to occur; cause or motive that may originate from within their own 
character: 
 
If … an agent’s choice issues from, and can be sufficiently explained by, an 
agent’s character and motives (together with background conditions), then to be 
ultimately responsible for the choice, the agent must be at least in part responsible 
by virtue of choices or actions voluntarily performed in the past for having the 
character and motives he or she now has. (added emphasis Fischer et al. 2007: 
14)  
 
The vital point is that ultimate responsibility does not entail that we could have done 
otherwise for every act that is performed. However, such ultimate responsibility must 
entail an undetermined choice that is incompatible with determinism, a freedom worth 
wanting with respect to some acts in our past that form our present character. Kane calls 
these earlier acts by which we formed our present character ‘self-forming actions’ 
(Fischer et al. 2007: 14). Brief reflection on the idea of ‘self-forming actions’ and Kane’s 
related notion of ‘will-setting actions’ suggests a clear regress problem; self-forming 
actions and will-setting actions occurring in the context of earlier self-forming actions 
regressing to infancy. At some point, for ultimate responsibility to make sense, there 
must be at least one undetermined choice. How can the idea of an undetermined choice 
be understood, as to be undetermined is surely to be arbitrary and so the entire process 
of character formation begins grounded on luck? Kane claims otherwise, saying it is “a 
mistake, (in fact, one of the most common in debates about free will), to assume that 
‘undetermined’ means ‘uncaused’ or ‘merely a matter of chance’ ”(Fischer et al. 2007: 
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31). Kane argues that the effort of the agent and the important element of indeterminism 
are fused, not something separated in time. It is the effort of the agent; hence the outcome 
may quite legitimately be said to be the agent’s responsibility. The role of indeterminism 
is seen as a hindrance or resistance54 that ‘paradoxically opens up the genuine possibility 
of pursuing other purposes – of choosing or doing otherwise in accordance with, rather 
than against, our wills (voluntarily) and reasons (rationally)’ (Fischer et al. 2007: 39). 
Concerned that lingering doubts remain about indeterminism having a legitimate role in 
free will, Kane agrees that self-forming actions do have an element of arbitrariness but 
believes this shows something important about free will. Every self-forming free choice 
is in some sense an experiment that looks to the future for justification and cannot be 
explained fully in terms of past events. 
 There are, of course, many and varied arguments supporting, developing and 
raising objections against libertarianism. Just one supporting argument has been 
sketched here, but one that is influential and developed by Robert Kane, probably the 
leading libertarian within the current free will debate. 
 
2.2 Compatibilism 
Many philosophers argue that even though it may initially appear impossible, 
determinism does not in fact threaten free will; certainly any form of free will ‘worth 
wanting’ (Dennett 1984). As described, scholarship relating to free will generally and 
compatibilism in particular is vast, therefore summarising such a variety of positions is 
challenging, but Michael McKenna’s historical overview is a good starting point: 
 
A useful manner of thinking about compatibilism’s place in contemporary 
philosophy is in terms of at least three stages. The first stage involves the classical 
form defended in the modern era by the empiricists Hobbes and Hume and 
reinvigorated in the early part of the twentieth century. The second stage involves 
three distinct contributions in the 1960’s, contributions that challenged many of 
the dialectical presuppositions driving classical compatibilism. The third stage 
 
54 Kane uses an image from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason to help explain the idea of indeterminism as a 
positive resistance or hindrance; the image of a bird that is ‘upset by the resistance of the air and the 
wind to its flight and so imagines that it could fly better if there were no air at all to resist it. But of 
course, the bird would not fly better if there were no air. It would cease to fly at all. So, it is with 
indeterminism with free will. It provides resistance to our choices, but a resistance that is necessary if we 
are to be capable of true self-formation’ (Fischer et al. 2007: 40). 
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involves various contemporary forms of compatibilism, forms that diverge from 
the classical variety and that emerged out of, or resonate with, at least one of the 
three contributions found in the second transitional stage. (McKenna and Coates 
2015a) 
 
The First Stage - Classical Compatibilism. Classical compatibilism essentially claims that 
to be free is to have the power or ability to do what one wills to do, free of constraints 
that would prevent acting following what is willed. If determinism is true, it does not 
entail that the will or action is impeded or compelled in a relevant way; free will can be 
simply expressed as the unencumbered ability to do what one wants.55 If determinism is 
true, no encumbrance to action is thereby created. If the classical compatibilist’s wants 
and actions are determined yet physically unencumbered then the agent, based on an 
unrefined account of determinism, cannot actually do otherwise; while the classical 
compatibilist’s condition for free will may be satisfied, the impossibility to act otherwise 
runs counter to currently held notions of what it is to act freely. 
 
The Second Stage – Three Major Contributions. Three major contributions during the 
1960’s radically changed the free will debate. McKenna claims ‘No account of free will, 
compatibilist or incompatibilist, is advanced today without taking into account at least 
one (if not more) of these three pieces’ (2015a: Section 4): 
(i) The incompatibilist argument developed by Carl Ginet, known as the Consequence 
Argument, described on page 37.  
(ii) Harry Frankfurt’s argument, contra the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), that 
an agent unable to do otherwise may nevertheless be morally responsible. While looking 
at responsibility, I noted that if it could be shown that responsibility could legitimately 
be present in the absence of alternative possibilities, then perhaps a substantial, 
meaningful, sufficient human freedom, (such as expressed by semicompatibilism), could 
also exist without alternative paths being available to the agent. I will describe how Harry 
Frankfurt pushed back against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, a central idea in 
the free will debate and a principle commonly employed in the wider community. 
Appearing in The Journal of Philosophy, under the title ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral 
 
55 For detailed discussion of the related subject of duress see Carla Bagnoli, Claiming Responsibility for 
Action Under Duress (2018). 
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Responsibility’ (1969), Harry Frankfurt’s hugely important argument, or thought 
experiment, counters the plausible claim that an agent is morally responsible for what 
they have done only if they could have done otherwise (PAP). Frankfurt’s argument 
typically proceeds as follows: Assume that a controller has power over an agent’s actions, 
perhaps by direct control of the agent’s brain. The controller will not intervene if the 
agent is going to do on her own what the controller wants. Frankfurt argues that if the 
controller does not intervene because the agent performs the desired action entirely on 
her own, the agent can be morally responsible for what she does (since the agent acted 
on her own and the controller was not involved), even though the agent literally could 
not have done otherwise, because the controller would intervene and not allow it 
(following Kane 2012). So, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities seems to have been 
countered with respect to responsibility.56 To be clear, Frankfurt style examples describe 
an agent who is morally responsible even though it is impossible for the agent to do 
otherwise than they actually did. From the agent’s point of view, actions are chosen freely 
even though, unknown to the agent, there are no actual alternative possible actions. The 
controller of the Frankfurt example is always present but passive while the agent is doing 
what the controller wants and active only if the agent begins to stray off course.57 The 
agent’s position bears some similarity to the sleeping man, in John Locke An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, (Book II, Chapter xxi, item 10), unaware that his room 
has been locked from the outside during the night. In the morning he decides to remain 
in the room, still unaware that his room is locked. Although he cannot leave the room, 
unaware of his true condition, he believes (he feels) that he is free to remain or leave. 
Obviously, Lock’s sleeping man will realise his true situation when trying to leave, 
whereas Frankfurt’s agent presumably remains unaware of the Controller’s presence or 
intervention. 
A great deal of energy and ink has been devoted to analysis of Frankfurt-type 
examples, a trend that will continue to some small extent within this Thesis. Clearly, the 
 
56 Frankfurt offers an alternative version of PAP that considers objections raised earlier within Alternate 
Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: ‘a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it 
only because he could not have done otherwise’ (1969: 838). 
 
57 For detailed discussion of possible meanings of ‘begins to stray off course’ see Living Without Free Will 
(Pereboom 2003: 28-33). 
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role of Frankfurt’s Controller cannot simply be read across to the role of implicit bias, 
but there is perhaps some small similarity between implicit bias and the Controller as an 
unknown behaviour determining factor that becomes active in particular 
circumstances.58 
(iii) P. F. Strawson’s important and influential defence of compatibilism invites both 
compatibilists and incompatibilists to attend more carefully to the central role of 
interpersonal relationships and the reactive attitudes in understanding the concept of 
moral responsibility59 (following McKenna and Coates 2015a).  
 
The Third Stage - Contemporary Forms of Compatibilism. Before looking at some 
specific contemporary forms of compatibilism, (sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.5), after a brief 
introduction I consider the opposing incompatibilist position in more detail and then 
give a brief overview of how compatibilists have responded to some difficult challenges. 
I will also describe an important challenge to compatibilism, usually referred to as the 
manipulation argument.  
The compatibilist position is a broad church. Quoting Galen Strawson, Pereboom 
illustrates the diversity of positions within compatibilism, where supporters can believe 
any of at least the following (Pereboom 2003: xvi): 
 
o That determinism (D) is true, that D does not imply that we lack the free will required 
for moral responsibility (F), that we in fact lack F. 
o That D is true, that D does not imply that we lack F, that it has not been shown 
whether (or not) we have F. 
o That D is true, and that we have F. 
o That D is true, that we have F, and that our having F requires that D be true. 
o That D may or may not be true (i.e., we do not know whether D is true), but in any 
case, we have F. 
o That D is not true, that we have F, and would have F even if D were true.  
 
58 Recall earlier description of freedom within the limitations imposed by God’s foreknowledge and 
situations where agents act freely in the sense that their actions are what they want to do but are 
nonetheless ultimately in accord with God’s will, Oracles and so on. 
 
59 See P. F. Strawson’s seminal Paper, Freedom and Resentment (1962). 
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o That D is not true, that we do not have F, that F is nonetheless compatible with D. 
 
It is worth noting that confusion may arise concerning the terms compatibilist and 
compatibilism. Compatibilism can be considered as a purely metaphysical problem 
concerning the compatibility of free will and determinism independent from any view 
or argument about moral responsibility and moral obligation. From this perspective the 
outcome of the free will – determinism problem has obvious relevance for moral 
philosophy, but the compatibility problem is positioned strictly within metaphysics. By 
contrast, ‘compatibilist’ is often used in ways that only include the moral issue of 
responsibility and determinism; essentially, it is important to be clear about what is 
included within any compatibility claim and what is excluded. Note how Galen Strawson 
defines (F) in the first item above. 
It was noted on page 40 that the compatibilist’s essential task of defending some 
form of compatibility between free will and determinism is not easy. By contrast, 
describing challenges faced by compatibilists can be relatively straight forward. For 
example, from the perspective of freedom and physical determinism, typically a 
challenge can be expressed as follows.60 If human beings inhabit the world and consist 
of common materials arranged in complex ways that form our physical structure, then it 
appears reasonable and plausible to claim that what is true of the rest of the world is also 
true of human beings. Given the world is characterised by a multitude of 
physical/mechanical causal relationships that are predictable and consistent, allowing 
science and technology to flourish, it seems rational to claim that human beings also 
follow such predictable and consistent behaviour, acting in accordance with the laws of 
nature. If this is not the case, and we are not held within a chain of cause and effect, then 
something unique, something specific to humans, (and probably many animals), must be 
present or some additional consideration available, (such as the notion of agent 
causation), to explain how humans are fundamentally different from everything else that 
we currently know exists, by virtue of exemption from the constraints of general 
 
60 Thomas Nagel expresses this point eloquently at the beginning of his article Freedom, Oxford Readings 
in Philosophy; Free Will (2003: 229). 
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mechanical/physical causation.61 We feel we act freely,62 that freedom is an essential part 
of what it is to be human but if this is true it raises obvious questions regarding how 
such freedom is possible. In a world of pervasive determinism how can a fragment or 
flicker of freedom be found, enabling freedom and/or moral responsibility to exist?  
Recall, the issue may be expressed succinctly in terms of incompatibility between 
propositions of the Classical Formulation (McKenna and Coates 2015a):  
 
1. Some agents, at some time, could have acted otherwise than she did. 
2. Actions are events. 
3. Every event has a cause. 
4. If an event is caused, then it is causally determined.  
5. If an event is an act that is causally determined, then the agent of the act could not 
have acted otherwise than in the way that she did. 
 
From earlier discussion, this is familiar territory; to respond to this apparently 
inconsistent, yet individually plausible, set of propositions the compatibilist must 
develop a position that counters or responds appropriately to proposition 5. For 
example, by cultivating a more nuanced understanding of determinism and/or acting 
otherwise. If the above set of propositions are simplified (McKenna and Coates 2015a) 
the basic incompatibilist challenge becomes very clear:  
 
1. If a person acts of her own free will, then she could have done otherwise. 
2. If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does. 
3. Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will.63 
 
61 Susan Wolf expresses a similar point, (more succinctly), see Freedom Within Reason (1993: 70). 
 
62 For information concerning the construction and validation of a psychometric tool for measuring 
beliefs about free will and related concepts see The Free Will Inventory: Measuring Beliefs about Agency and 
Responsibility (Nadelhoffer et al. 2014). 
 
63 There are two fallacies to keep in mind when talking about free will and responsibility: First, the ethical 
fallacy, that free decisions must be moral decisions. While it is arguably true that free decisions are 
necessary to be held morally responsible, they do not of themselves necessarily lead to moral behaviour. 
Second, the rational fallacy, that a free choice must be a rational choice. Further, as described in Chapter 
1 determinism takes different forms and sight must not be lost of determinism’s wider perspective 
beyond physical determinism. Additional information regarding the ethical and rational fallacy may be 
found at; 
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Having described some difficulties raised against the compatibilist position by 
incompatibilist arguments, how does the compatibilist respond? Michael McKenna and 
Justin Coates offer a working definition of free will as ‘the unique ability of persons to 
exercise control over their conduct in the fullest manner necessary for moral responsibility’ 
(added emphasis 2015a). (Recall my important comment (page 37) concerning inclusion 
of moral responsibility within the definition of free will). This leads to two possible facets 
of control.  
The first facet is control in the sense of being able to select sufficiently freely 
between alternative courses of action. While this form of control is often considered to 
be regulative control, following John Martin Fischer (2013), it will be seen that sufficient 
control may not have to be as ‘strong’ as regulative control to bring about agent 
responsibility. The compatibilist must give a convincing account of agent control 
concerning choice between alternative actions that is substantial enough to satisfy, for 
example, McKenna and Coates’ (and many others) requirement of moral responsibility 
for that choice. John Martin Fischer develops such a model of control, (guidance control), 
within his free will semicompatibilist position. 
 An incompatibilist challenge may also be made based on the consequence 
argument, a very compelling and difficult argument for the compatibilist to counter. 
Recall, that assuming determinism is true: 
 
1. No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature. 
2. No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail 
every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true). 
3. Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future. 
 
Pushing back against the consequence argument appears to be particularly difficult if the 
chosen target is premise 1. Surely it is the case that this premise is impervious to counter 
argument? However, subtle discussion and interesting arguments64 have been developed 
 
The Information Philosopher <http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/ethical_fallacy.html> 
and <http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/rational_fallacy.html>. 
 
64 See for example, John Turk Saunders, The Temptations of ‘Powerlessness’ (1968), Wesley Holliday, Freedom 
and the Fixity of the Past (2012) and David Lewis, Are We Free to Break the Laws? (1981). 
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that challenge or at least raise questions concerning this premise. For example, by 
developing the ‘difference between a person in the present who has the ability to act in 
such a way that she alters the past, as opposed to a person who has the ability to act in such 
a way that, if she did so act, the past would have been different’ (McKenna and Coates 2015a). It 
is beyond the scope of this Thesis to critique these very nuanced and difficult challenges 
to the fixity of the past and laws of nature, but it should be noted that even such 
apparently uncontroversial claims as premise 1 continue to be subject to intense scrutiny. 
Another possibility for the compatibilist to push back is based on the claim that 
while premise 1 and 2 concern matters that have nothing to do with a person’s agency, 
premise 3 does relate to individual agency. It has been argued that the inference from the 
unavoidability within premises 1 and 2 to the unavoidability of actions by the agent 
within conclusion 3 is incorrect, (see John Turk Saunders, The Temptations of ‘Powerlessness’ 
(1968), for detailed discussion of fallacies, mistakes and confusion concerning proofs of 
powerlessness. Also, Patrick Grim Free Will in Context: A Contemporary Philosophical 
Perspective, Sections 3 and 4 (2007) for discussion of inference mistakes in arguments of 
this form). The term ‘every fact’ within premise 2 seems to counter this claim, however, 
it is acknowledged that such a brief look does not provide a sufficiently full or fair 
account of these fine-grained responses to the consequence argument. It is worth noting 
that even if a compatibilist were to successfully refute the consequence argument, or any 
incompatibilist argument, a full explanation requires a positive account of, or response to, 
determinism and control such as semicompatibilism, developed by John Martin Fischer 
in Four Views on Free Will (2007: 44), My Compatibilism (2013: 296-317) and particularly, 
Deep Control (2015). 
The second facet is control in the sense of the agent’s self or real/deep self as the 
ultimate source of action or behaviour. This second facet, source control, requires the 
compatibilist to describe the nature of a ‘real self’ that is sufficiently causally isolated 
from the determined world and yet able to be the agent’s ultimate source of causation 
and action within the world. So, the second facet, requiring agent isolation in some form 
or degree from pervasive determinism (yet causally active in the world), and the presence 
within the agent of a source of behaviour that is truly ‘their own’ is considered sufficient 
to ensure responsible behaviour. This topic is discussed in greater detail in Part II in the 
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context of control of implicit bias related behaviour, also in Appendix B Agent 
Causation. 
Responding to some incompatibilist challenges, when free will is defined as ‘the 
unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in the fullest manner 
necessary for moral responsibility’ (McKenna and Coates 2015a), the two forms of 
control mentioned above, (guidance control and source control), will be discussed again 
in much greater detail in later chapters. 
Concluding this brief description of some of the major challenges for the aspiring 
compatibilist, I will describe a form of argument known as the manipulation argument. 
Manipulation arguments are generally of the following form: an incompatibilist presents 
a state of affairs that (it is claimed) satisfies stated sufficient compatibilist conditions for 
moral responsibility (and freedom), but crucially, the incompatibilist then describes how 
this exact state of affairs could have been brought about through some form of agent 
manipulation. Being manipulated in this way suggests the agent is in fact not responsible, 
therefore such compatibilist conditions are (at least) insufficient for moral responsibility 
(and freedom). In other words, an incompatibilist manipulation argument (following 
McKenna and Coates 2015b) maintains that an agent so manipulated is not free or 
morally responsible despite satisfying pertinent compatibilist-friendly conditions of 
responsibility and freedom. Further, any agent who is determined to perform X is not 
different in any relevant respect from an agent manipulated into performing X. 
Therefore, when compatibilist’s conditions are satisfied in cases of manipulation they 
could equally well be satisfied under conditions where determinism is true; therefore, 
such conditions are not sufficient to guarantee independence from possible determinism 
with associated freedom and responsibility. More succinctly, ‘ … regarding moral 
responsibility, there is no important difference between various cases of manipulation in 
which agents who A are not morally responsible for A-ing and ordinary cases of A-ing 
in deterministic worlds’65 (Mele 2005: 75). As expected, running together manipulation 
 
65  Perhaps the most well-known expression of the manipulation argument is presented by Derk 
Pereboom, often referred to as the Four Case Argument (2003: 112). This argument has been described 
as ‘a kind of litmus test for the credibility of a compatibilist theory’, concluding that the ‘source of the 
agent’s actions can be traced back in their entirety to originating conditions that were completely beyond 
her control’ (McKenna and Coates 2015b). For a critique see Alfred R. Mele A Critique of Pereboom’s ‘Four-
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and determinism as described has been challenged, essentially by claiming a distinction 
between modes of causation that undercut responsibility and freedom and others that 
do not. In the next chapter it will be seen that semicompatibilists argue their 
comprehensive conditions for guidance control and so responsibility are not satisfied in 
cases of manipulation. 
Having described challenges to the compatibilist position and the compatibilist 
response, I will continue with the third stage of Michael McKenna’s (2015a) historical 
overview, discussion of some contemporary forms of compatibilism, including the 
freedom to do otherwise, hierarchical compatibilism, the reason view, reasons-
responsive compatibilism and Strawsonian compatibilism. 
 
2.2.1 Freedom to do Otherwise  -  Dispositionalism 
Positive compatibilist accounts of determinism and regulative control, in the sense of 
being able to select freely between alternative courses of action, have been developed 
that respond to premise two of the classical formulation; if determinism is true, no one 
can do otherwise than one actually does. The difficulty here is plain to see, given the 
uncompromising requirement of such regulative control. Dispositionalism is an attempt 
to offer what appears to be impossible, a positive account of ‘can do otherwise’ in a 
world where determinism may be true. An account of Dispositionalism is given by Kadri 
Vihvelin in her clear and eloquent book Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism 
Doesn’t Matter (2013: 171). It is claimed that ‘we have the free will we think we have by 
having some bundle of narrow abilities and by being in suitably friendly surroundings; 
when this is so we have not only the narrow but also the wide ability to do otherwise’ 
(2013: 167). Narrow ability is intrinsic and shared by most human beings, enabling 
decisions to be made based on reasons and having the intrinsic power or agency to act 
otherwise, based on such decisions. Narrow abilities are like intrinsic dispositions of 
objects; dispositions such as fragility, elasticity, solubility, and so on. Wide abilities are 
those abilities by virtue of having narrow abilities, together with further facts about 
surroundings. It is relatively easy to change someone’s wide abilities by changing their 
surroundings, (such as locking a door), but removing someone’s narrow abilities requires 
 
Case Argument’ for Incompatibilism (2005) also Mele’s vital Paper Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral 
Responsibility (2008). 
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an intrinsic change be made to the person; even if determinism is true there is no reason 
to believe that narrow abilities are threatened. Further, the possible truth of determinism 
does not entail that surroundings are always hostile towards narrow abilities. So, 
determinism does not threaten narrow or (in some cases) wide abilities that constitute 
our freedom of will and action. A positive claim for free will is made based on possession 
of a bundle of intrinsic dispositions by creatures with minds and the ability to move their 
minds and bodies in goal-directed and other intelligent ways within surroundings that 
do not physically constrain actions (following Vihvelin 2013: 170 and 178). 
 Does Vihvelin make a compelling positive compatibilist case? The above is a 
sketch of arguments that take place over approximately two hundred and eighty pages66 
described by Vihvelin as ‘ … long, complicated, and indirect’ (2013: 21). The key issue 
is whether such a model provides a convincing account of regulative control in addition 
to guidance control of conduct in a situation (world) where determinism happens to be 
true.67 I am not going to attempt an analysis of Vihvelin’s arguments, except to say that 
narrow abilities as bundles of dispositions do appear to be immune from determinism: 
‘No one thinks an unstruck match lacks the disposition to light simply because 
determinism is true’ (Franklin Evan 2013). A threat to free will occurs when the wide 
ability to do otherwise is impacted by obstacles preventing exercise of our narrow 
abilities. Determinism is not considered to be an obstacle, even though its role appears 
to be the same as an obstacle i.e., preventing attempts to do otherwise from being 
successful. There are two issues here; the whole notion of narrow abilities as bundles of 
dispositions, but perhaps more important, (following closely Franklin Evan 2013), is the 
assumption that while a feature that prevents attempting to do otherwise from being 
successful is an obstacle, a feature that prevents even an attempt to do otherwise 
(determinism) is not considered to be an obstacle. I cannot discern from Vihvelin’s text 
an explanation for this apparent problem. 
 
 
66 I have not mentioned Vihvelin’s arguments and discussion relating to (i) what a successful defense of 
compatibilism entails, (ii) agent causation, and importantly, (iii) the claim that Frankfurt style cases are 
not genuine counter examples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. 
 
67 See Vihvelin and Fischer’s discussion of this question in the 2008 edition of the Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy (Vihvelin 2008) and (Fischer 2008a) and for a more general critique see (Franklin 2013) or 
(Sartorio 2014). 
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2.2.2 Hierarchical Compatibilism 
Part of Vihvelin’s project within Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn’t 
Matter (2013) is a detailed critique of the claim that Frankfurt style cases offer genuine 
counter examples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, (see Chapter 2, page 43, for 
a brief description of Frankfurt’s argument presented in Alternate Possibilities and Moral 
Responsibility (1969)). It is appropriate to continue by looking at hierarchical 
compatibilism via an aspect of Harry Frankfurt’s compatibilism, his notion of freely 
willed actions originating from desires that mesh with important parts of a person’s 
psychology, parts that are ordered or ranked in a hierarchical structure. This is a source 
model of control, whereby actions emanate from the agent rather than from any ‘external’ 
influence or control.68 First, some essential concepts developed by Frankfurt: 
First order desire: A desire to perform an action, i.e., a desire to go to the cinema. 
Will: A first-order desire which is effective, i.e., that causes someone to do what they 
desire to do. A desire to go to the cinema is a person’s will, in Frankfurt’s sense, if that 
desire brings that person to actually go to the cinema. 
Second-order desire: A desire to have a certain desire. A desire to go to the theatre (to 
see a culturally significant play) rather than the cinema (to see a trashy film) is an example 
of a second-order desire, (arguably, to fulfil a third-order desire, i.e., self-improvement). 
Second-order volition: For someone to desire that a certain desire be their will, i.e., a 
desire that a certain desire brings a particular action. In terms of the above example, to 
have a second-order volition is to desire not just to have the desire to go to the theatre, 
but that the desire to go to the theatre rather than the cinema be effective in bringing 
about going to the theatre rather than the cinema.69 
Frankfurt begins to describe his conception of free will in Part III of Freedom of 
the Will and the Concept of the Person using the concepts of first order desires, second order 
desires and particularly second-order volitions, (considered essential for personhood), 
claiming that ‘it is only because a person has volitions of the second order that he is 
 
68 See also Appendix B Agency for further discussion of Agent causation. 
 
69 The ‘cinema’ example is from Jeff Speaks, Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, 
Frankfurt's Compatibilist Theory of Free Will, 19th March 2009. For a full explanation of the terms mentioned 
here see Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person (1971: 1-14). 
Title: Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position on Free Will and Responsibility? 
Chapter 2 
Contemporary Responses to the Free Will Problem 
 
54 
capable both of enjoying and of lacking freedom of the will’ (1971: 14), (another 
distinguishing mark of the human condition). Although the notion of being free as 
‘doing what one wants’ is unclear in terms of the meaning of ‘doing’, ‘wanting’ and the 
relationship between these terms, Frankfurt does say something true about acting that is 
captured by this description. Freedom of will and freedom to act are separate in the 
sense that if an agent is deprived of the freedom to act (knowingly or unknowingly) the 
will to act is not thereby affected. Frankfurt describes freedom of the will as freedom 
‘… to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants’ (1971: 15). Willing freely 
happens when the will and a second-order volition are aligned.70 
 Earlier, a third-order desire of self-improvement was mentioned. Criticism of this 
model has been made based on ever-increasing levels of desires becoming too complex 
to be meaningful. Frankfurt recognises this point, saying common sense would prevail 
in terms of a self that would naturally limit the levels of active desire and volition. More 
convincing perhaps is the idea of a ‘decisive’ desire that ‘rules them all’ so no further 
questions and levels arise beyond the second level. Frankfurt makes some interesting 
comments about second-order volitions, essentially, they may not be deliberately 
formed, and the agent does not necessarily have to struggle to ensure they are satisfied. 
Frankfurt says:  
 
Examples such as the one concerning the unwilling addict may suggest that 
volitions of the second order, or of higher orders, must be formed deliberately 
and that a person characteristically struggles to ensure that they are satisfied. But 
the conformity of a person’s will to his higher-order volitions may be far more 
thoughtless and spontaneous than this. Some people are naturally moved by 
kindness when they want to be kind, and by nastiness when they want to be nasty, 
without any explicit forethought and without any need for energetic self-control. 
Others are moved by nastiness when they want to be kind and by kindness when 
they intend to be nasty, equally without forethought and without active resistance 
to these violations of their higher-order desires. The enjoyment of freedom 
comes easily to some. Others must struggle to achieve it. (1971: 17) 
 
 
70 A clear and succinct description of this form of freedom is given by Daphne Brandenburg Implicit 
Attitudes and the Social Capacity for Free Will  (2016: 1216). 
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Such comments clearly resonate with implicit bias, particularly ‘… without any explicit 
forethought and without any need for energetic self-control.’ 
 On Frankfurt’s account of freedom of the will and concept of a person, an agent 
acts freely when they do what they want to do and are free to want what they want to 
want. On this basis an agent having their own will experiences ‘all the freedom it is 
possible to desire or to conceive’ (1971: 17). How does this account relate to 
determinism, responsibility and the familiar claim that human freedom entails an absence 
of causal determination? An example of free action in a determined world is described 
based on the motion of a person’s hand; when a person moves their hand, it is the 
outcome of a series of physical causes, but some event in this series, perhaps one of 
those that took place within the brain, was caused by the agent and not by any other 
event, (a source-compatibilist model). A free agent has, therefore, a ‘God-like’ quality, 
whereby they act as a prime mover unmoved (following Frankfurt 1971: 18). The idea 
of humans with ‘God-like’ qualities seems implausible and Frankfurt counters such a 
response by pointing out there is no difference between the experience of a man who 
miraculously initiates a series of causes when he moves his hand and a man who moves 
his hand without any such breach of the normal causal sequence. If there is no difference 
in experience, then there appears to be no reason to prefer being an unmoved-mover agent 
rather than a determined agent. Frankfurt essentially leaves the issue at this point and 
moves to a brief discussion of responsibility. 
 When discussing Compatibilism, (Chapter 2, page 42), a brief description was 
given of Frankfurt’s argument against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) based 
on his 1969 Paper Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility (1969). Frankfurt’s later 
Paper Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person (1971) also discusses PAP and for 
completeness I will briefly outline this discussion, containing the well-known ‘willing 
addict’ example of responsible action in the absence of alternatives. Frankfurt’s ideas are 
relevant as they form part of what motivates John Martin Fischer’s development of 
semicompatibilism. 
Noting the historical link between theories of the freedom of the will and 
conditions of moral responsibility, and the recent approach whereby freedom of the will 
is considered in terms of what is entailed by the assumption that an agent is morally 
responsible, Frankfurt says: 
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It is not true that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if his 
will was free when he did it. He may be morally responsible for having done it 
even though his will was not free at all. (1971: 18) 
 
In other words, this claim runs counter to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) 
expressed in moral terms; that a person is morally responsible for their action if and only 
if that person could have done otherwise. Frankfurt’s argument for this position is as 
follows. Suppose that an agent has freedom of action and freedom of the will, they are 
free to do what they want to do and free to want what they want to want. In other words, 
the agent could have chosen otherwise when deciding what they want to want. Frankfurt 
admits it is a ‘vexed question just how “he could have done otherwise” is to be 
understood in contexts such as this one’ (1971: 19), but claims this question is irrelevant 
when considering moral responsibility because, as claimed above, an agent may be 
morally responsible for an action even though their will was not free in the sense that 
alternatives that the agent opted against were not actually available. To illustrate an agent 
may be morally responsible for an action even though their will is not free in the above 
sense, Frankfurt uses the uncommon example of a willing addict, someone who would 
not change their situation and in the unlikely event of their addictive desire for drugs 
declining would take positive steps to mitigate the decline. The willing addict is not free, 
in that alternative drug-free lifestyle choices are not available because their addiction 
related desire and will to take drugs is present, active and irresistible whether or not they 
want this desire to constitute their will. The willing addict takes drugs freely and so 
responsibly in the sense that the action is supported by second-order desires and volition 
even though alternative choices are not actually available due to the irresistible force of 
addiction. Frankfurt describes this situation as an overdetermination of a first-order 
desire to take drugs: ‘His will is outside his control, but, by his second-order desire that 
his desire for the drug should be effective, he has made this will his own. Given that it 
is therefore not only because of his addiction that his desire for the drug is effective, he 
may be morally responsible for taking the drug’ (Frankfurt 1971: 20). Using a hierarchical 
mesh of first and second order desires and Frankfurt style scenarios (FSC), Frankfurt 
claims to show the possibility of freely willed (in the described sense) and morally 
responsible behaviour, even though the agent could not have done otherwise, hence 
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refuting the traditional presentation of PAP. As noted previously (page 44, Footnote 56), 
Frankfurt offers an alternative version of PAP, taking into account issues raised earlier 
within Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility; ‘a person is not morally responsible for 
what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise’ (1969: 
838).71 The importance of ‘only’ within this revised formulation is important in light of 
the ‘willing addict’ scenario, where responsibility is assigned on the basis that it is not only 
because of addiction that the willing addict takes drugs. 
 It is now approximately fifty years since the publication of Alternate Possibilities 
and Moral Responsibility and discussion of Frankfurt’s arguments continues virtually 
unabated. I will note just two general responses that essentially claim that FSC’s do not 
refute PAP because FSC’s are not in fact cases where an agent is morally responsible for 
what they did and could not have acted otherwise. These responses are quite subtle and 
focus on the ‘he could not have acted otherwise’ part of the FSC. The first response is 
usually referred to as the flicker strategy because it is argued that within the FSC the 
agent does (must) experience a flicker of freedom to do otherwise. This flicker of 
freedom occurs at the instant before the controller reacts, or does not react, depending 
on whether the agent intends to act against or following the controller’s wishes. The 
controller must receive by some means a sign that the agent intends or in some sense 
will try to act otherwise. There must be a moment when the possibility of acting otherwise 
triggers the controller’s counter measure; the process of controller counter measure is at 
the heart of FSC. A simple FSC quickly shows the general problem: During a driving 
lesson I approach a particularly tight right-hand bend unaware that if I panic and begin 
to turn the steering wheel to the left by mistake the instructor will intervene. I panic, and 
in the instant before the instructor intervenes, I turn to the left by just the smallest 
degree, acting in a way that the instructor/controller is committed to prevent. In other 
words, it seems that I am not totally compelled (by the instructor), hence casting doubt 
 
71 Frankfurt’s model within a world where determinism is true seems to me far less assured. For example, 
Frankfurt says; ‘My conception of the freedom of the will appears to be neutral regarding the problem 
of determinism. It seems conceivable that it should be causally determined that a person is free to want 
what he wants to want. If this is conceivable, then it might be causally determined that a person enjoys 
a free will’ (1971: 20). It is difficult to fully understand how this is possible, but it should not be 
overlooked that this account is essentially agent-source compatibilist in nature and further reflection on 
this basis may result in greater clarity. 
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on the legitimacy of the FSC and thereby its counter to the PAP. A reasonable response 
to this strategy is to say that while there may be such a flicker of freedom the agent does 
not (and cannot) actually act otherwise, (did my minute turn to the left or movement of 
my left hand constitute a turn or was it indicative of what I was about to do?), and so 
the flicker strategy is perhaps too weak to counter FSC.72 As John Martin Fischer says, 
‘such a mere flicker of freedom would be too thin a reed to support the superstructure 
of moral responsibility’ (2010a: 234). 
The dilemma defence (DD) is the second argument designed to cast doubt on 
FSC as a legitimate counter to PAP. It is helpful perhaps, to keep sight of the bigger 
picture, to confirm the relevance of PAP and FSC to compatibilism, particularly 
semicompatibilism: It is good for compatibilists if FSC are resilient to DD73, (or any 
counter), because if alternative possibilities are unnecessary for an agent  
 
to be morally responsible, then, arguments about whether causal determinism 
excludes the freedom to do otherwise, though perhaps interesting, become less 
important and even irrelevant to the question of whether causal determinism 
excludes moral responsibility. Even if causal determinism excludes the freedom to 
do other-wise, an agent might still be morally responsible because alternative 
possibilities are not necessary for moral responsibility (PAP is false). (added 
emphasis Widerker and Goetz 2013) 
 
The DD argument will be outlined following a FSC created by John Martin Fischer 
(2010b: 319-320). Assume causal determinism does not obtain in a sequence of events 
that ends at t2 with the agent Jones casting his vote. At an earlier time t1 while reflecting 
on how to vote, Jones involuntarily shows a particular sign, such as a furrowed brow. 
When Jones furrows his brow in this way at t1 he will reliably choose to vote Democrat 
at t2. However, in a situation where determinism does not prevail, although voting 
Democrat reliably follows the earlier furrowed brow, given prevailing indeterminism, it is 
 
72 For an appropriately detailed discussion of these issues see, for example, Eleonore Stump, Alternative 
Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: The Flicker of Freedom (1999) and from Justin Capes, The Flicker of 
Freedom: A Reply to Stump (2014). 
 
73 For further discussion see David Widerker, Stewart Goetz, John Martin Fischer Against the Dilemma 
Defence: The Defence Prevails (2013), John Martin Fischer The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories (2010b), 
John Martin Fischer Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism (2003) and David Palmer Deterministic Frankfurt Cases 
(2014). 
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possible that at t2 Jones votes Republican. Black, the controller, makes no intervention, 
because the prior sign at t1 leads Black to believe that Jones will vote Democrat as Black 
wants. It is argued that Jones could and did act otherwise even in the presence of Black. 
In other words, it is not true that Jones could not fail to vote Democrat, (he had an 
alternative possibility and took it by voting Republican), so this scenario does not 
counter PAP. Now, assume causal determinism does obtain in the sequence of events, 
independently of any intervention by Black. Within such a deterministic scenario it 
would surely be incorrect to claim that Jones acted responsibly on the basis that Black 
did not intervene; it would beg the question to assume that causal determinism is true 
and hold that it is uncontroversial to claim that Jones is morally responsible for his choice 
and action. Thus, again, the FSC counter to PAP is claimed to have failed as it does not 
present a convincing case of a morally responsible individual in the absence of alternative 
possibilities (following closely Fischer 2010b: 319-320). 
 The Dilemma Defence (DD) of PAP has generated much detailed and subtle 
debate. The very complexity of the DD detracts from its plausibility as a counter to 
FSCs. What exactly does ‘reliably follows’ mean? The introduction of prior-signs and the 
notion of early decisions by Black at t1 concerning possible intervention, are clearly very 
inventive, but do not I believe, lead to a plausible and robust counter to FSC’s.74 75 
 
2.2.3 The Reason View 
In Chapter 5 (page 144), referring to Susan Wolf, Freedom within Reason (1993), I briefly 
discuss the notion of ‘who the agent is’ in the context of Ecological Control, whereby 
implicit attitudes are regarded as part of an agent’s character, part of ‘who the agent is’, 
and hence subject to moral evaluation. Wolf presents in Freedom within Reason a mesh 
theory between an agent’s actions and their values. Here, an agent’s actions are freely 
willed if they are in accordance with the True and the Good. As Michael McKenna and 
Justin Coates note, ‘Because the conditions of Wolf’s mesh theory require an anchor 
external to the agent’s internal psychological states (the True and the Good), unlike 
 
74 For further discussion of the Dilemma Defence and other objections to Frankfurt Style Cases see 
Pablo Rychter Does Free Will Require Alternative Possibilities? (2017: 134-139). 
 
75  Clearly, inventiveness, for example, thought experiments involving brains in vats or asking the 
question what is it like to be a bat? can lead to great insights! 
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Frankfurt’s, hers is not a real self-theory’ (2015a). Following Wolf, explanation of the 
Reason View is helped by comparison with the Autonomy View and the Real Self View. 
The essential claim of the Reason View is that to act responsibly, (in significantly moral 
ways), an agent must act following reason rather than acting autonomously or in 
accordance with their Real Self. 
 Acting Autonomously and so responsibly is to act in a metaphysically distinctive 
way from the rest of nature. It is to act with the possibility to do otherwise, not 
determined, for example, by causal sequences beyond the agent’s influence. The Reason 
View denies that responsibility rests on the possibility to do otherwise, to choose one 
action from several possible actions. Rather, it rests on the ability to act following reason, 
an ability that declares only one possible action and is not considered to metaphysically 
distinguish us from everything else in nature. We act responsibly by exercising our ability 
to reason, thereby recognising the True and the Good and then acting accordingly. 
 Followers of the Real Self View also claim that to act responsibly requires the 
ability to act in one way based on one principle, not considered to metaphysically 
distinguish us from everything else in nature; that principle is the ability to act following 
deep-seated values that are an expression of the agent’s Real Self. Note the absence of 
ultimacy within these two views; it is the basis of control, reason or real self, which is 
fundamental. So, an agent acting following the Real Self View is responsible iff their 
actions reflect their substantial values. This is also true of those who support the Reasons 
View but with the added requirement that values are formed based on what is True and 
Good.  
 The Reasons View, by introducing value criteria into the definition of 
responsibility, (doing the right thing for the right reason), moves the focus away from 
problems inherent in the other two views, i.e., the metaphysical distinctness requirement 
of autonomy and the influence of external forces beyond the agent’s control on the 
formation of the agent’s real self that bring into question agent responsibility. (Problems 
associated with formation of the agent’s real self are discussed later in the context of 
moral luck). Further, the Reasons View claims that the ability to do otherwise is 
unnecessary for moral praise and Wolf cites a supporting example of someone who sees 
a book for sale they know their friend would like; ‘I had to buy it’ they say, (doing the 
right thing, acting in accordance with the True and the Good, for the right reason), but 
Title: Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position on Free Will and Responsibility? 
Chapter 2 
Contemporary Responses to the Free Will Problem 
 
61 
such a comment does not lesson, and may actually increase, the recipient’s positive 
feelings towards their friend (1993: 83). This account of responsibility raises many 
questions, for example, there is an issue of asymmetry within this model of freedom and 
responsibility. Praiseworthy conduct does not require the freedom to do otherwise (in 
that sense, it requires guidance control) but blameworthy behaviour does (regulative 
control) (Wolf 1993: 79). This apparently curious outcome of the Reasons View 
resonates with an idea first mentioned in Chapter One, that freedom is possible within 
a determined world by surrender of the will or aligning the will in some sense with the 
divine or the good. Here, the idea is expressed in terms of the agent acting in accordance 
with the True and the Good; if the agent is psychologically determined to act in 
accordance with the True and the Good, (the defining feature of freedom and 
responsibility), then being unable to act otherwise, (than in accordance with the True 
and the Good), does not threaten the sort of freedom that a morally responsible agent 
needs. If the agent is psychologically determined not to act in this freedom and 
responsibility characterising way, then being unable to act as reason requires would seem 
to rule out any blame for such actions. Wolf offers an explanation for this apparent 
asymmetry paradox (1993: 80), but there are more fundamental aspects of the Reasons 
View to consider; the Reasons View and determinism, and the nature of the True and 
the Good. 
 Using a story to develop and illustrate the relationship between the Reason View 
and determinism, Wolf concludes the ability of an agent that is necessary for 
responsibility is not as such incompatible with physical (or divine) determinism. Being 
physically impossible that an agent A perform an action X ‘does not imply that A lacks 
the ability to do X, that A cannot do X, in any sense relevant to the assessment of X’s 
responsibility’ (Wolf 1993: 114). The foundation upon which this claim is built is a 
claimed distinction between physical determinism and psychological determinism; an 
agent is not determined at a psychological level, having the ability to choose one way 
rather than another, (for example, choice based on reason), with attendant responsibility. 
Essentially, the idea that physical determinism must interfere with psychological freedom 
is a mistake, or at least doubtful. As the Reasons View brings into play new and detailed 
ideas about objective moral values, free will, moral responsibility and God’s 
foreknowledge an appropriate response would be quite extensive. Nevertheless, one 
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important issue should be mentioned; on the Reasons View it is not completely clear 
how the agent is immune from artificial manipulation 76  in a way that undermines 
responsibility, (see Chapter 2, page 50). However, Wolf does address this point generally 
at the conclusion of the final chapter of Freedom Within Reason (1993: 142-147). 
 The Reasons View argues that responsible agents’ actions are governed by 
reasons and knowledge of the world, where those reasons have as their locus agents’ 
values, shaped by the True and the Good. True and good in the sense of clear, open-
minded perception of the world that leads to true beliefs and good values rather than 
bad ones. The problem of objectivity of values is recognised, but Wolf makes the point 
that there are alternatives to established absolutist positions; what is claimed by the 
Reasons View is close to assumptions within ordinary moral conversations. The Reasons 
View takes an essentially objective position on values but, as suggested by the description 
Normative Pluralism, one that is clearly not absolutist, described by Wolf as ‘objective 
enough’ and ‘partially objective’ (1993: 126). 
 John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza comment ‘Wolf’s book is highly 
intelligent, original, and provocative’ (1992: 389). An appropriately detailed criticism of 
the Reasons View is not possible here, but two issues suggest further reflection. First, 
the precedence of psychological explanation and psychological ability over physical 
determination when deciding if an agent could do otherwise in the relevant sense (with 
associated responsibility). Are psychological abilities of the sort described sufficient for 
freedom to do otherwise in the sense of guidance or regulative control and a convincing 
counter to incompatibilists like van Inwagen? In other words, the issue of ultimacy still 
seems to haunt this view, even though addressed by Wolf during the first three chapters 
of Freedom Within Reason (1993). Second, the asymmetry thesis is very counter intuitive. 
Recall, praiseworthy conduct does not require the freedom to do otherwise (guidance 
control) but blameworthy behaviour does (regulative control) (Wolf 1993: 79). As 
suggested by Michael McKenna and Justin Coates, the regulative control feature could 
 
76 Any agent who is determined to perform X is not different in any relevant respect from an agent 
manipulated into performing X. Therefore, when compatibilist’s conditions are satisfied in cases of 
manipulation they could equally well be satisfied under conditions where determinism is true; such 
conditions then are not sufficient to guarantee independence from possible determinism with associated 
freedom and responsibility, (see Chapter 2, page 50). See also John Martin Fischer, How Do Manipulation 
Arguments Work? (2016). 
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perhaps be dropped as a condition of blameworthiness. Frankfurt-type examples are 
possible for cases of blameworthy action that seem to support this idea, i.e., neither 
praiseworthiness or blameworthiness require regulative control and so there is no 
asymmetry between the conditions of appropriate praise and blame. Preserving the 
asymmetry thesis requires regulative control for blameworthy conduct, with all of the 
issues that entails (following McKenna and Coates 2015a). 
 
2.2.4 Reasons-Responsive Compatibilism 
Regulative control allows the agent to regulate between different alternatives, by 
contrast, an agent acting with guidance control guides or brings about conduct, even if 
there are no other alternatives to the course taken. When used in the normal Fischer-
Frankfurt sense, only guidance control is necessary for moral responsibility. Restating a 
key point, on this model, claims of compatibilist freedom do not include regulative 
control as illustrated by the Garden of Forking Paths. Other compatibilists may retain 
the classical compatibilist commitment to show that determined agents can act with 
regulative control (following McKenna and Coates 2015a: Section 5). John Martin 
Fischer’s reasons-responsive compatibilism, semicompatibilism and implicit bias will be 
examined in Part III with the research aim of determining if behavioural expression of 
implicit bias is subject to the control conditions sufficient for an agent to assert guidance 
control i.e., is the issuing behaviour part of the agent’s own moderately reasons-
responsive actual-sequence mechanism? If behaviour that has implicit bias as its source 
is subject to guidance control, then the agent is responsible for such behaviour. If implicit 
bias related behaviour is ‘beyond’ guidance control, then the agent is not responsible. 
Reasons-responsive compatibilism will be described in greater depth in the next Chapter, 
Semicompatibilism. 
 
2.2.5 Strawsonian Compatibilism 
Strawson’s Freedom and Resentment (1962) is mentioned in Footnote 59, page 45. In the 
following section Strawsonian compatibilism will be outlined with reference to this 
famous and influential Paper. At the heart of this compatibilist position is the notion of 
the moral community as the source of what it means to be an agent and whether agents 
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are responsible for an act or behaviour. As McKenna and Coates describe, this is an 
‘anti-metaphysical reading’ of the compatibilist position in the sense that 
 
it is the community that constructs a set of standards for freedom and responsibility 
that could be satisfied even in a determined world. Given that the conditions are 
constructed, they need not be constrained by prior metaphysical questions 
concerning the nature of the persons alleged to possess free will. (2015a) 
 
In this radical approach, expressed simply, it is the community that decides what free 
will is, not something driven by metaphysical issues concerning the agent or the world 
generally.77 
 Strawson reminds us of the importance we attach to the perceived attitudes and 
intentions of other people when deliberating on how we feel about them. Our attitude 
towards others may be reactive, for example, resentment, or objective. An objective 
attitude is formed when, taking a step back from initial reactions, a better understanding 
of the situation is possible, for example, on reflection it is clear that harm was caused 
accidentally, or mental illness was instrumental in bringing about the harm. Strawson 
asks a question and develops an answer that summarises a significant part of his position:  
 
What effect would, or should, the acceptance of the truth of a general thesis of 
determinism have upon these reactive attitudes? (2008: 11) 
 
For it is not a consequence of any general thesis of determinism which might be 
true that nobody knows what he’s doing or that everybody’s behaviour is 
unintelligible in terms of conscious purposes or that everybody lives in a world 
of delusion or that nobody has a moral sense, i.e. is susceptible of self-reactive 
attitudes, etc. (2008: 19) 
 
So, if determinism were shown to be an intrinsic part of our world should (rationally) 
the reactive attitudes be abandoned? No, because such reactive attitudes are too deeply 
ingrained within our humanity, and further, if it were possible to have a choice in this 
matter, then we ‘could choose rationally only in the light of an assessment of the gains 
and losses to human life, its enrichment or impoverishment; and the truth or falsity of a 
 
77 See Gary Watson’s exceptionally clear and concise description of Strawson’s argument in Responsibility 
and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme (2013: 85). 
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general thesis of determinism would not bear on the rationality of this choice’(Strawson 
2008: 14). That determinism is true is quite compatible with the existence of free will 
because free will is conferred by our reactive attitudes towards others. 
 There is a view (McKenna and Coates 2015b) that questions this model of 
compatibilism on the basis that it includes metaphysical considerations and assumptions. 
For example, it must be the case, it is claimed, that some metaphysical assumptions are 
made concerning the nature of agents that make them proper objects of our reactive 
attitudes and in an important sense make legitimate the position of those members of 
the moral community who display such attitudes. This view tends to push metaphysical 
issues of agency back towards centre stage. Strawson, I believe, would robustly resist this 
tendency, perhaps by emphasising and expanding on at least two points made within 
Freedom and Resentment. First, ‘our practices do not merely exploit our natures, they express 
them’ (2008: 27), and second, ‘the existence of the general framework of attitudes itself 
is something we are given with the fact of human society. As a whole, it neither calls for, 
nor permits, an external “rational” justification’ (2008: 25). 
In this section I have described various Compatibilist positions: hierarchical 
compatibilism, the Reason View and Strawsonian compatibilism. 
 
2.3 Hard Incompatibilism 
Recall that essentially the libertarian position affirms that free will and determinism are 
incompatible and since human beings do have free will then determinism is false. 
However, the incompatibilist position also finds expression in denial of free will and 
acceptance of determinism. Such a position is usually referred to as hard determinism. 
This can be initially confusing; fundamentally, incompatibilism either denies 
determinism and asserts free will (libertarian), or denies free will and accepts 
determinism (hard determinism), (following Doyle 2017). In other words, determinism 
and free will cannot both be true at the same time. There is a further distinction to be 
made between soft and hard determinists. While both agree that our behaviour is 
determined, soft determinists are compatibilists, (in the sense that determinism does not 
undermine free will or responsibility worth having), whereas hard determinists are 
incompatibilists, (as described, determinism is true and free will does not exist in the 
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sense required for genuine responsibility, accountability, blameworthiness, or desert) 
(following Kane 2012). 
 Bob Doyle, harshly perhaps, describes incompatibilism as a ‘tortured and 
muddled concept […] a tar pit of confusion’ (2017).78 Doyle justifies his claim as follows: 
 
To be sure, libertarians have always denied the nonsense of compatibilism, and 
accepted the idea that free will is incompatible with determinism (and we have free 
will). Simple enough. But there is another view, that of determinists who agree that 
determinism is incompatible with free will. So, there are two kinds of 
incompatibilists, those who deny human freedom (usually called ‘hard’ 
determinists), and those who assert it (often called voluntarists, free willists, or 
metaphysical libertarians - to distinguish them from political libertarians). As a 
result, incompatibilism is a very confusing term in the free will debates. (added 
emphasis). (2017) 
 
To arrive at hard incompatibilism consider the traditional and essential claims of hard 
determinism: 
 
1. Free will is incompatible with determinism. 
2. Free will does not exist (because) 
3. Determinism is true. 
 
Kane believes that today because of particular advances in theoretical physics 
commitment to proposition 3 has, to a large extent, fallen away and the incompatibilist 
position is now supported by proposition 1 and 2, described as the ‘kernel of traditional 
hard determinism’ (2015). Derk Pereboom calls this position hard incompatibilism; 
incompatibilist by proposition 1 and ‘hard’ by proposition 2. This section concludes with 
Derk Pereboom’s description of hard incompatibilism. It is quite subtle, addresses 
several issues and is difficult to adequately summarise, hence reproduced in full: 
 
… I am agnostic about the truth of determinism. I contend, like Spinoza, that we 
would not be morally responsible if determinism were true, but also that we 
would lack moral responsibility if indeterminism were true and the causes of our 
actions were exclusively states or events. If the causes of our actions were 
 
78 A tar pit forms when subterranean bitumen leaks to the surface and creates a large and often deep area 
of natural viscous asphalt from which escape is usually impossible. 
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exclusively states or events, indeterministic causal histories of actions would be 
as threatening to moral responsibility as deterministic histories are. At the same 
time, I think that if we were undetermined agent-causes – if we as substances had 
the power to cause decisions without being causally determined to cause them – 
we might well then have the sort of free will required for moral responsibility. 
However, although agent causation has not been ruled out as a coherent 
possibility, the claim that we are agent-causes is not credible given our best 
physical theories. Thus, we need to take seriously the prospect that we are not 
free in the sense required for moral responsibility. I call the resulting view hard 
incompatibilism. In addition, I argue that a conception of life without this sort of 
free will would not be devastating to morality or to our sense of meaning in life, 
and in certain respects it may even be beneficial. (Fischer et al. 2007: 85)79 
 
Finally, in the next section, revisionism will be described. 
 
2.4 Revisionism 
In a nutshell, revisionism is the view that what we ought to believe about free will 
and moral responsibility is different than what we tend to think about these 
things. (Fischer et al. 2007: 127) 
 
Revisionism about free will is the view that an adequate philosophical account of 
free will requires us to jettison some aspects of our common sense thinking about 
it. On this view, free will is like a host of other concepts, including scientific, 
moral, and conventional concepts which we have revised to more accurately 
reflect our understanding of the world. (Vargas 2008: 1) 
 
Revisionism in the general historical sense is understood as rejection of traditionally held 
beliefs about a particular historical event or events (Collins online Dictionary 2020). The 
quotations above, from Manuel Vargas, loosely describe his revisionist position in the 
context of beliefs about free will.80 Vargas’ position is developed while looking at free 
will and responsibility from the point of view of common-sense intuitions and more 
rigorously by philosophical consideration; ‘ … our concepts of free will and moral 
 
79 See also Derk Pereboom Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2016), Living without Free Will (2003) and 
The Significance of Free Will (2000). 
80 See also Manuel Vargas Revisionism about Free Will: A Statement and Defense (2008). As noted in the 
Abstract of this Paper, Vargas ‘summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position put forth in 
Four Views on Free Will (Fischer et al. 2007) and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John 
Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna.’ 
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responsibility should be revised in a way that renders them compatible with the natural 
physical order, even a deterministic one’ (Fischer et al. 2007: 204). Vargas concludes that 
possession of free will, or acting from or with free will, occurs when an agent ‘has the 
capacity to detect moral considerations and can govern him or herself (in the) appropriate 
way in light of those moral considerations’ (Fischer et al. 2007: 160). In other words, to 
support responsibility an agent’s freedom is sensitive to moral considerations and allows 
self-governance in light of such considerations. Free will exists in the satisfaction of these 
conditions. On his revisionist account Vargas says ‘there is always more philosophical 
work to be done’ (Fischer et al. 2007: 162) and continues, admitting some scepticism 
about being able to provide an account of a mechanism or faculty ‘involved in the 
detection of moral considerations’ and ‘there being a single or general capacity for self- 
governance’. That said, as a revisionist account, a detailed case is made for addressing 
free will along ‘leaner, revised lines’ that offers the significant benefit of doing the work 
we require without the disconcerting difficulties entailed by the common-sense picture’ 
(Fischer et al. 2007: 161). 
 
2.5 Summary 
I have briefly described the main contemporary positions and arguments concerning 
compatibility of freedom and determinism, giving further context and preparation for 
the next chapter and Part III. At the time of writing (September 2017), the web site ‘Phil 
Papers’ (<http://philpapers.org/>) holds over four thousand Papers within the 
category ‘Theories of free will’, (and there are twenty-two additional free will related 
categories), indicating the ever-growing volume and breadth of scholarship currently 
available. Although brief and descriptive in nature, the intention of this chapter has been 
to give some reference points, context and definitions that will be important when 
completing the main objective; to look at the meaning and impact of implicit bias on the 
semicompatibilist position.81 In the next chapter I look specially at semicompatibilism. 
 
81 Excellent comparison of the main contemporary free will positions may be found in Four Views on Free 
Will (Fischer et al. 2007), where Fischer, Kane, Pereboom and Vargas describe their own positions and 
comment on their cowriters’ contributions. 










We live in the heroic age of free will philosophy.  




This chapter describes semicompatibilism in sufficient detail to take forward into Part 
III where the essential question, does implicit bias threaten the semicompatibilist 
position on free will and responsibility? will be addressed. Why choose 
semicompatibilism as the free will position to be examined in light of implicit bias? 
Semicompatibilism is probably the most popular compatibilist free will position, and its 
detailed arguments and claims invite an implicit bias centred critique that is missing from 
current literature. Another important reason is that John Martin Fischer’s 
semicompatibilism is particularly important within contemporary discussion of free will. 
Introducing a special issue of The Journal of Ethics (Speak 2008) devoted to John Martin 
Fischer’s My Way (2006a), Daniel Speak says ‘John Martin Fischer’s prolific work on the 
philosophical problems of free will and moral responsibility now spans three decades 
and its influence on these debates can properly be described as seminal […] his work 
has, after all, justifiably shaped the contemporary discussion of free will … ’ (2008:123). 
In harmony with John Martin Fischer, Speak points out the assumption of personal 
moral responsibility is an essential feature of a person’s self-image while living a normal 
moral life within society and should be resilient to how certain facts about the world 
turn out (2008:123). Given the importance, resilience, detailed exposition and, (perhaps 
most important), plausibility from a personal point of view, semicompatibilism is, I 
believe, the natural compatibilist choice for examination, in light of a possible threat 
from implicit bias. A challenge that in Part III semicompatibilism will be shown to resist. 
 
82 Free Will and Moral Responsibility: The Trap, the Appreciation of Agency, and the Bubble (Smilansky 2012: 212).  






John Martin Fischer’s semicompatibilism has been described as ‘the gold standard for 
cutting edge defenses of compatibilism’ (McKenna and Coates 2015a); the 
semicompatibilist claims moral responsibility is compatible with the possible truth of causal 
determinism, even if causal determinism threatens regulative control (Fischer 2007: 71). 
John Martin Fischer develops two forms or types of control; guidance control that 
preserves moral responsibility (whether or not determinism is true) and regulative 
control: 
 
The semicompatibilist denies that the value of our free agency – or the basis of 
our moral responsibility – is the power to make a difference (to have regulative 
control). […] It may be that, just as there is a single line that connects the past to 
the present, there is only a single line into the future: a single metaphysically 
available path that extends into the future. In this case, what matters is how we 
proceed – how we walk down that path, (guidance control). […] For the 
semicompatibilist the basis of our moral responsibility is not selection in the 
Garden of Forking Paths, (regulative control), but self-expression in writing the 
narrative of our lives. (my additions are shown in parentheses). (Fischer 2007: 82) 
 
There are many key works by John Martin Fischer, few better in terms of clarity than 
Chapter 2 of Four Views on Free Will (Fischer et al. 2007: 44-84), but to begin an outline 
of the basic argument and structure of John Martin Fischer’s reasons-responsive 
compatibilism two précis by the original authors are useful concise sources; Précis of 
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Fischer and Ravizza 2000)83 and 
Précis of My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (Fischer 2010a).84 
 First principles; moral responsibility is intrinsically linked with control. As 
described, there are two distinct types of control. Regulative control involves choice 
between alternative possibilities, guidance control does not. Frankfurt type cases present 
examples of how these two forms of control are separate and distinct; an agent can assert  
guidance control whether or not regulative control is possible. Importantly, although it 
is a plausible and widely held view that moral responsibility requires regulative control, 
Fischer and Ravizza argue that moral responsibility for actions, omissions, and 
 
83 Complete Work Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Fischer and Ravizza 1998). 
 
84 Complete Work My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (Fischer 2006a). 





consequences requires only guidance control. Moral responsibility does not require 
alternative possibilities, however, the traditional association of moral responsibility with 
control, albeit guidance control, is retained. The behaviour of an agent when acting with 
guidance control is via a reasons-responsive mechanism that is owned by the agent. It is 
claimed that ‘an agent is morally responsible for an action, on our account, to the extent 
that this action issues from the agent’s own, reasons-responsive mechanism’ (Fischer 
and Ravizza 2000: 441). Immediately, the question arises, what exactly is a ‘reasons-
responsive mechanism’ owned by the agent? Taking the second part first, ‘owned by the 
agent’ is defined as ‘taking responsibility for behavior that issues from that kind of 
mechanism’ (Fischer and Ravizza 2000: 441). More detail is provided by Fischer and 
Ravizza, who distinguish two kinds of context in which an agent might take 
responsibility for the kind of mechanism that leads to their behaviour. The formation of 
nonreflective and reflective attitudes are described that resonate with material within 
Chapter 4, particularly material relating to Dual Process/System theories of cognition. 
Nonreflective attitudes develop when a child is subject to reactive attitudes, education, 
parental guidance and perhaps punishment. The child naturally begins to have a sense 
of their own agency and to take responsibility for exercising that agency through 
mechanisms that deliver behaviour, including non-reflective habits. Greater reflection 
may lead an agent to question whether particular reactive attitudes are fair, even though 
society may consider them appropriate. The essential claim here is that an agent makes 
the mechanism that delivers their behaviour their own, (not as a result of manipulation 
for example), by taking responsibility for it (2000: 443). Précis of My Way: Essays on Moral 
Responsibility (2010a) improves the clarity of this concept, describing how     
 
one’s mechanism becomes one’s own in virtue of one’s having certain beliefs 
about one’s own agency and its effects in the world, that is, in virtue of seeing 
oneself in a certain way. … On my view, an individual becomes morally 
responsible in part at least by taking responsibility; he makes his mechanism his 
own by taking responsibility for acting from that kind of mechanism. In a sense, 
then, one acquires control by taking control. (2010a: 237) 
 





As mentioned, guidance control has two components: the mechanism that issues in 
action or behaviour must be the agent’s own mechanism85 and the mechanism must be 
suitably reasons responsive. A particular version of reasons responsiveness is developed 
by John Martin Fischer called moderate reasons-responsiveness. The agent must be able 
to recognise reasons, some of which will be moral reasons, and react to reasons that are 
sound and sufficient for action. Further, it must be the actual sequence mechanism that 
is reasons-responsive for genuine moral responsibility.86 Todd R. Long (2004: 151-172) 
summarises in a more formal way the notion of moderate reasons-responsiveness, 
reproduced below with minor changes in presentation: 
 
An agent’s responsibility relevant mechanism K is moderately reasons-responsive iff: 
 
(1) K is regularly receptive to reasons, some of which are moral. This requires;  
(a) That holding fixed the operation of a K-type mechanism, the agent would recognize 
reasons in such a way as to give rise to an understandable pattern from the viewpoint of 
a third party who understands the agent’s values and beliefs.87 
(b) That some of the reasons mentioned in 1(a) are moral reasons.  
 
85  It is especially important to note that Fischer and Ravizza’s concept of moderate reasons-
responsiveness that issues in action is always via a different mechanism from one that would operate if the 
agent’s brain were manipulated in some way, for example by implants within the brain, where the agent 
is no longer morally responsible for the issuing actions because the mechanism is not their own. So, ‘a 
brain-implanted mechanism that issues in an action would always constitute a different mechanism from 
an ordinary practical reasoning mechanism (owned by the agent) that issues in an action’ (with my 
addition Long 2004: 151-172). 
 
86 John Martin Fischer clarifies; ‘The actual sequence and the alternative scenario involve intuitively 
different kinds of mechanisms: in the actual sequence, there is the normal operation of the human capacity 
for practical reasoning, whereas in the alternative scenario there is significant and direct electronic 
stimulation of the brain by the neurosurgeon. Even though it is difficult to provide a general account of 
mechanism individuation, it is (in my view) intuitively clear that different kinds of mechanisms operate 
in the actual and alternative sequences of the Frankfurt-cases. Further, it seems to me that what grounds 
the moral responsibility of the agent in such cases are features of the actual-sequence (added emphasis) 
mechanism – properties of the path that actually leads to the behavior in question’ (Fischer et al. 2007: 
78). 
 
87 I believe this point addresses situations where ‘weak reasons-responsiveness obtains by virtue of the 
agent’s responsiveness to a bizarre reason, even though the agent is not responsive to a wide array of 
relevant reasons’ (Fischer 2006a: 81). 





(2) K is at least weakly reactive to reasons; this requires that the agent would react to at 
least one sufficient reason to do otherwise, (in some possible scenario), although it does 
not follow that the agent could have responded differently to the actual reasons.88 
(3) K is the agent’s own; being the agent’s own means ‘taking responsibility’ for K. This 
requires that the agent;  
(a) Sees herself as the source of her behavior (which follows from the operation of K). 
(b) Believes that she is an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes that result from how 
she exercises her agency in certain contexts.89 
(c) Views herself as an agent with respect to 3(a) and 3(b) based on her evidence for 
these beliefs. 
 
It is possible to accept the conclusion of the Consequence Argument and accept that all 
causally deterministic sequences rule out regulative control, however, not all causally 
deterministic sequences pose problems for guidance control and therefore moral 
responsibility (following Fischer et al. 2007: 80). At the heart of this approach is the 
claim that the actual-sequence mechanism that issues in behaviour must be the agent’s 
own and be moderately reasons-responsive; metaphysical issues about determinism are 
‘side stepped’. Crucially, moral responsibility is possible whether or not determinism is 
true. 
In Part III, John Martin Fischer’s reasons-responsive compatibilism will be 
studied with implicit bias to answer the question; is behaviour that originates or issues 
from implicit bias subject to all the control conditions that are necessary and sufficient 
for the agent to assert guidance control i.e., is the issuing behaviour part of the agent’s 
own moderately reasons-responsive actual-sequence mechanism? Simply expressed, if 
behaviour that has implicit bias as its source is subject to guidance control, then the agent 
 
88  Item 2 is perhaps elusive to grasp; an example from John Martin Fischer helps: ‘Consider my 
commendable act of working this afternoon for the United Way (see Footnote 124). Even though I 
would do so anyway, even if I had a publication deadline, I certainly would not work for the United Way 
if to do so I would have to sacrifice my job. Thus, the actual mechanism issuing in my action is weakly 
reasons-responsive’ (2006a: 69). I believe this example and others from Chapter 3 of My Way ~ Essays 
on Moral Responsibility help to clarify. 
 
89 The ‘reactive attitudes’ reference relates to P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment (1962), where 
Strawson calls the attitudes involved in moral responsibility the ‘reactive attitudes’. See Section 2.2.5 
Strawsonian Compatibilism, page 63. 





is responsible for such behaviour. If implicit bias related behaviour is in some sense 
‘beyond’ guidance control, then the agent is not responsible. Guidance control bypasses 
various metaphysical issues concerning the compatibility of moral responsibility with 
causal determinism. However, does the notion of guidance control and 




John Martin Fischer’s semicompatibilism is a reasons responsive compatibilism that 
rejects the key premise of the Classical Incompatibilist Argument (see page 38), that a 
freedom relevant condition for moral responsibility is the ability to do otherwise 
(regulative control). Sufficient freedom for moral responsibility is provided by guidance 
control. Guidance control requires the mechanism that issues in behaviour be the agent’s 
own. It is an actual-sequence, mechanism-based, reasons-responsive form of 
responsibility enabling control. This actual sequence approach does not include any form 
of control involving genuine access to alternative possibilities during formation of the 
agent’s character, the performance of actions by the agent (or choosing not to act) or 
bringing about consequences. 
Incompatibilist manipulation cases challenge this (and some other) compatibilist 
positions, seeking to show manipulation of an agent’s reasons responsive mechanism 
leads to their freedom and responsibility being plausibly undermined. It is argued that if 
this is possible, then determinism as manipulator also undermines an agent’s freedom 
and responsibility. The semicompatibilist responds to the manipulation challenge in 
several ways, most effectively and fundamentally by arguing that a manipulated 
mechanism that leads to behaviour is not the agent’s own, because they have not taken 
responsibility for it in the relevant way. 90  In Chapter 6 another possible control 
undermining problem will be discussed, the role of luck in the formation of an agent’s 
mechanism. 
In this chapter I have endeavoured to describe semicompatibilism in sufficient 
detail to take forward into Part III.  
 
90  See, for example, John Martin Fischer’s Paper Responsibility and Manipulation (2004) for detailed 
discussion of semicompatibilism, responsibility and manipulation. 






3.3 Summary of Part I 
Chapter 1 aimed to answer the question, what is the (free will) problem? I believe, 
following Nagel (2003), ‘the problem’ is in essence the tension between, looking inwards 
at our self-image as agents in control of our lives, making responsible rational decisions 
and choices in a way that makes us feel like things are, in an important sense, ‘up to us’, 
and awareness of various challenges to such feelings of agency. Chapter 1 described how 
challenges to human freedom have taken many forms over time; the irresistible hand of 
fate and God’s foreknowledge, science and the sense of an external world characterised 
by deterministic laws of nature. If ‘the problem’ is a clash of internal and external 
perspectives, then clearly one solution would be a decisive argument, proof or validation, 
that our sense of agency is in fact true, even considering so many sceptical challenges. 
Of course, an alternative solution would be a convincing argument or proof that human 
beings do not in fact enjoy such freedom, that our sense of agency and responsibility is 
an illusion. (The consequences of agency and responsibility being an illusion are 
controversial and the subject of much philosophical reflection). As well as these binary 
positions, there are clearly many others, such as compatibilism and its variations that 
seek to show freedom (in clearly defined forms) is compatible with the sceptical 
challenge of, for example, determinism. Some responses to ‘the problem’ are outlined in 
Chapter 2. The ‘free will problem’ connects with a large mesh of related issues, the most 
obvious and pervasive being moral agency, (human and nonhuman agency as a general 
concept), responsibility, praise and blameworthiness. There are other equally important 
connections too, for example, with political theory, psychology, criminal liability and 
punishment, philosophy of religion and metaphysical issues such as determinism.  
From a broad consideration of historical responses to the free will problem 
attention focused on semicompatibilism, the free will position associated with John 
Martin Fischer. Chapter 3 explored semicompatibilism in more detail, with the aim of 
having sufficient clarity to take forward into Part III for critical examination considering 
the phenomenon of implicit bias. The reasons why semicompatibilism has been chosen 
as the free will position to be examined were described; essentially, because 
semicompatibilism is especially important, resilient and plausible. Semicompatibilism,  
described as the gold standard compatibilist position, captures our intuitions about 





agency and offers a rich and plausible model of our place in the world. John Martin 
Fischer believes his ‘theory is cooler than some salient rivals’ (Fischer 2012: 139) by 
sustaining our sense of moral responsibility and status as persons whether or not it 
happens to be the case that determinism, or indeterminism, is true. John Martin Fischer 
argues that semicompatibilism has the advantage of no hierarchical structures of 
consciousness with their associated difficulties and the ability to deal with more complex 
moral situations such as cases of weak will. 
 In summary, I believe Part I provides an outline of free will and 
semicompatibilism in sufficient detail for later critique as described. The way forward in 
Part II is to develop a similar understanding and presentation of implicit bias. 
 
Having completed Part I and with a good sense of the aim of Part II, in 
anticipation of Part III, I will describe the possible outcomes of the exploration of 
implicit bias issuing behaviour and guidance control, confirming the way forward and 
destination of this Thesis. If implicit bias related behaviour is shown to be subject to 
guidance control, then implicit bias related actions are like other actions in the sense that 
we act freely and responsibly within the terms defined by semicompatibilism. On this 
outcome, findings are in harmony with the models of implicit bias developed in Part II, 
based on evidence and argument supporting agent responsibility for implicit bias related 
actions. If implicit bias related behaviour is shown not to be subject to guidance control, 
then such actions are not freely and responsibly conducted, in conflict with the 
developed models of implicit bias. Such conflict would show something is wrong, 
perhaps a deficiency within semicompatibilism that must be addressed. This is the 
essential activity of Part III. Careful examination of semicompatibilism and implicit bias 
will ultimately show that implicit bias related behaviour is subject to guidance control 
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The Origin and Meaning of Implicit Bias 
 
Implicit bias is not a new way of 
calling someone a racist. In fact, 
you don’t have to be a racist at 
all to be influenced by it. 
Implicit bias is a kind of 
distorting lens that’s a product 
of both the architecture of our 
brain and the disparities in our 
society.  




The opening sentences of Professor Gregg D. Caruso’s Paper Consciousness Free Will, and 
Moral Responsibility (2016) from the Routledge Handbook of Consciousness, position the role 
of implicit bias within the free will debate as very much a live concern: 
 
In recent decades, with advances in the behavioural, cognitive, and 
neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behaviour may ultimately be due 
to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and 
renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. [...] Are agents morally 
responsible for actions and behaviours that are carried out automatically or 
without conscious control or guidance? (2016: 1) 
 
The recent phenomenon of implicit bias in some important circumstances appears to 
threaten claims that human beings act freely and so responsibly. Under the influence of 
implicit bias an agent’s actions in ethically relevant circumstances are influenced by 
factors widely claimed to operate below the radar of consciousness.92 If an agent is 
 
91 Biased (Eberhardt 2019: 6). 
 
92 Possible meanings of ‘below the radar of consciousness’ will be examined later in this chapter. See also 
Greg Caruso Précis of Neil Levy’s Consciousness and Moral Responsibility (2015). 
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unaware of influencing bias and prejudice it is argued that some actions are thereby not 
freely chosen because the agent is not consciously aware of all relevant factors affecting 
their decision-making; the agent lacks control in important responsibility reducing ways. 
It is commonly claimed that almost all of us to a greater or lesser extent are influenced 
by implicit bias manifest as ‘automatic associations that influence decision-making often 
in negative ways, particularly judgment and evaluation of existing stereotypes or 
stigmatized groups’ (Brownstein and Saul 2016a: 1).93 
That inequalities exist within our society, perhaps all societies, is clear. The 
reasons are varied and often controversial; historical legacy, cultural, occupational, legal 
and explicit prejudice to name a few. This is a particularly poignant reality given that 
concepts of fairness, justice and the basic egalitarian principles of equality, equal rights 
and opportunities are held in high esteem by most of the population within liberal 
democracies. Such principles and beliefs are genuinely held and questioning their 
authenticity would probably cause great offence. However, as Michael Brownstein and 
Jennifer Saul point out, recent psychological research has shown that most people 
possess implicit biases that run counter to some of their explicitly held egalitarian 
principles (2016a: 1). For the majority, who believe they act following strongly held 
principles, it is shocking to hear that in practice their actions are, to a greater or lesser 
extent, influenced by ideas largely outside of conscious awareness and control, ideas that 
are explicitly rejected in conscious deliberation and conversation.94  
 
 
93 Implicit Bias and Philosophy in two volumes, edited by Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul (2016a and 
2016b) provide perhaps the most substantial single source of implicit bias related material within 
philosophy. 
 
94 Speaking on NPR (a U.S. multimedia news organization) Mahzarin Banaji, co-author with Anthony 
Greenwald of Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good People (Banaji and Greenwald 2013), describes the theory 
they worked on in the 1990’s known as implicit bias. During the interview transmitted on the 17th 
October 2016 Mahzarin Banaji describes the moment she realised that our decisions are guided by forces 
we are not aware of: ‘So just to go back a little bit to the beginning, in the late 1990’s I did a very simple 
experiment with Tony Greenwald in which I was to quickly associate dark-skinned faces - faces of black 
Americans - with negative words. I had to use a computer key whenever I saw a black face or a negative 
word, like devil or bomb, war, things like that. And likewise, there was another key on the keyboard that 
I had to strike whenever I saw a white face or a good word, a word like love, peace or joy. I could do 
this very easily. But when the test then switched the pairing and I had to use the same computer key to 
identify a black face with good things and white faces and bad things, my fingers appeared to be frozen 
on the keyboard’ (NPR 17th October 2016). 
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Considering Freud and others, the idea that unconscious factors influence 
behaviour is not new or expected to generate heated debate, however, the claimed 
pervasiveness, and more importantly, the disturbing nature and impact of implicit bias, 
is understandably an emotionally charged and hugely concerning issue.95  
The vital question to be addressed in this chapter is what is the nature of implicit 
bias? I will begin with some foundations on which to build a response to this question. 
Beginning with description of the Implicit Association Test (IAT), I will then examine 
Dual Process and Dual System theory and cognitive models as an attractive explanatory 
paradigm for the influence of implicit bias in daily life.96 Following these preliminaries, I 
will investigate implicit bias in terms of its nature and in Chapter 5 the importance of 
implicit bias within the free will and control debate will be considered. 
 
4.1 The Implicit Association Test (IAT) 
It is reasonable to ask, what is the evidence for the important and controversial claims 
described in the introduction to this chapter? Michael Brownstein describes as ‘… 
profoundly new … the ability to measure them (hidden prejudices) scientifically’ (added 
emphasis 2016a: 3). Such methods are designed to avoid problems caused by asking 
 
 
95 Concern and practical response to implicit bias is manifest within Education, Criminal Justice, Health 
Care and Industry. For example, at the time of writing (May 2018), Starbucks US will close 8,000 coffee 
shops at 14.30 on the 29th May for an afternoon of anti-bias training for 175,000 employees in response 
to what is generally considered to be a racially motivated incident and the arrest of two customers in 
Philadelphia US.  
See The Telegraph on line <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/05/29/starbucks-close-
8000-coffee-shops-us-racial-bias-training/> Telegraph Media Group Limited 2018. For US media 
comment on Starbuck’s initiative see for example <https://www.vox.com/science-and-
health/2018/4/19/17251752/philadelphia-starbucks-arrest-racial-bias-training>. Also Jennifer 
Eberhardt’s discussion of this event in the context of implicit bias, Biased (Eberhardt 2019: 276).  
The case of Jahi McMath and the death of George Floyd on the 25th of May 2020 in Minneapolis, 
takes consideration of implicit bias into quite a different and tragic realm. They are tragic examples of 
possible implicit bias within American Health Care, described by Michele Goodwin in her Paper Revisiting 
Death: Implicit Bias and the Case of Jahi McMath (2018), and possible implicit bias influenced behaviour of 
American Police Officers during an arrest for allegedly using a counterfeit bill. 
 
96 There is an obvious danger of circularity that should be kept in mind, in the sense that while the Dual 
System cognitive model appears a very appealing foundation upon which to build a description of 
implicit bias, any chosen model must of course be justified, as the form of model will have an impact on 
final conclusions about the nature of implicit bias that could be interpreted as being supportive of the 
Dual System model upon which such conclusions are based. 
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participants direct, often controversial, questions about their attitudes, for example, on 
ethnicity and gender issues. The goal of indirect methods is not to alert or inform the 
participants of what is being measured hence countering reflective responses and so (it 
is intended) accessing ‘deeper’ implicit attitudes. The IAT is designed to by-pass what 
participants believe they should say (self-presentation strategies), what is considered 
socially acceptable or conventional and what they believe they believe to reveal deeper 
attitudes that may be hidden from conscious awareness.97 During the test the participant 
or subject is presented with a carefully developed series of images displayed on a 
computer screen that look typically as shown in Figure 4.1 A conventional keyboard is 




Press key A to classify as Black or 5 to classify as White 
 
Figure 4.1 A typical IAT image from Sequence 1 
 
A complete IAT schedule showing information about each sequence of images is shown 
below (Figure 4.2), reproduced from Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The 
Implicit Association Test, by Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee and Jordan L. K. 
Schwartz (Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz 1998). 
 






















•  BLACK 
WHITE  • 
 
•  Pleasant 
Unpleasant  • 
 
 
•  BLACK 
•  Pleasant 
WHITE      • 
Unpleasant  • 
 
BLACK  • 
•  WHITE 
 
 
BLACK   • 
•   Pleasant 




97 For a detailed description of this point and IAT’s generally see A Practical Guild to IAT’s and Related 
Tasks (Teige-Mocigemba, Klauer and W. Shermen 2010: 117). 
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MEREDITH  o 
o   LATONYA 
o  SHAVONN 
HEATHER   o 
o    TASHIKA 
KATIE          o 
BETSY          o 
o       EBONY 
 
o     Lucky 
o    Honor 
Poison   o 
Grief      o 
o       Gift 
Disaster  o 
o   Happy 
Hatred   o 
 
o   JASMINE 
o      Pleasure 
PEGGY       o 
Evil              o 
COLLEEN  o 
o       Miracle 
o  TEMEKA 
Bomb          o 
 
o  CORTNEY 
o        STEPH 
SHEREEN o 
o             SUE 
TIA             o 
SHARISE    o 
o     MEGAN 
NICHELLE o 
 
o       Peace 
LATISHA o 
Filth           o 
o LAUREN 
o   Rainbow 
SHANISE o 
Accident    o 
o   NANCY 
 
Figure 4.2 A Complete IAT Schedule 
 
The A-key is pressed using the left hand to select the upper left category or the 5-key 
using the right hand to select the upper right category. For example, in Sequence 1 
choices are made by this method between Black (upper LHS) or White (upper RHS) 
known as the target concepts. Choices are made in response to a sequence of names, for 
example, Shavonn, Heather, Tashika or Katie. The correct categorisation is shown by an 
open dot to the right or left of the name in the schedule, (see Figure 4.2). There are five 
sequences, a solid dot shows the category appearing at upper LHS of the displayed image 
and likewise a solid dot to the right of the category appearing at upper RHS. Crucially, 
the time taken for the subject to press the chosen key after each of the images is 
presented is recorded. In Sequence 3 and 5 the target-concepts Black and White are 
presented together with the attributes Pleasant and Unpleasant, following the solid dot 
LHS – RHS convention. A typical image from sequence 3 is shown in Figure 4.3 Note 
the ‘or’ between Black and Pleasant on the LHS and between White and Unpleasant on 
the RHS. The subject must decide if the sample stimuli ‘Latonya’ a typically black African 
American name (from circa 1998) is associated with Black or Pleasant, or, White or 







Press key A to classify as Black or 5 to classify as White 
 
Figure 4.3 A typical IAT image from Sequence 3 
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The complete test, Sequence 1 through to 5, is conducted as follows: 
Sequence 1: Introduction of target-concept discrimination.98 This first discrimination 
distinguishes first names that are (United States circa 1998) recognizable as Black or 
African American from names recognizable as White or European American. 
 Sequence 2: Introduction of the attribute dimension, also in the form of a two-category 
discrimination. The attribute discrimination is an evaluation, categorizing words as 
having a generally pleasant or unpleasant meaning. 
Sequence 3: After introduction of the target discrimination and the attribute dimension 
the two are superimposed in the third step in which stimuli for target and attribute 
discriminations appear on alternate trials. Figure 4.2 quickly clarifies. 
Sequence 4: In the fourth step the respondent learns a reversal of response assignments 
for the target discrimination. 
Sequence 5: The fifth and final step combines the attribute discrimination (not changed 
in response assignments) with this reversed target discrimination. Again, easy 
clarification may be found with reference to Figure 4.2 
  The objective of the IAT is to ‘assesses the association between a target-concept 
discrimination and an attribute dimension’ (Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz 1998: 
1465). At the heart of the test is the principle that if the target categories are differentially 
associated with the attribute dimension, the subject should find one of the combined 
tasks (the third or fifth step) to be considerably easier and hence completed faster than 
the other. 99  Further, and perhaps most important, the measure of this difficulty 
difference provides the measure of implicit attitudinal difference between the target 
categories (Greenwald et al. 1998: 1466). For example, for White subjects raised in a 
culture where anti-Black discrimination persists, the subject is expected to find choosing 
‘Black or Pleasant’ harder (slower) than choosing ‘White or Pleasant’, see Figure 4.3. 
Attitudes are claimed to be revealed because associations running without active thought 
 
98 Clearly, the term ‘discrimination’ is used here in the sense of recognition and understanding of the 
difference between one thing and another, specifically, the ability to distinguish between different stimuli. 
 
99  Gaertner and McLaughlin’s Racial Stereotypes: Associations and Ascriptions of Positive and Negative 
Characteristics (1983) is regarded by some as the first article to claim demonstration of implicit 
stereotyping. This Paper argues that unrelated to their degree of explicit prejudice, subjects ‘responded 
reliably faster when positive attitudes were paired with Whites than with Blacks or with Negroes’ (1983: 
23). 
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(automatically) relatively help performance in one of the IAT’s two combined tasks. 
Participants in the IAT experience a higher, (conscious, controlled, explicit, reflective, 
analytic, rational), level of mental operation when trying to overcome the effects of 
automatic associations (Greenwald et al. 1998: 1466). The level of mental operation is 
reflected proportionally in the response time to each image, example results are shown 







This Figure is available from Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit 







Figure 4.4 Response Times for each IAT Sequence100 
 
Greenwald and his team were confident that their experimental data 
 
clearly revealed patterns consistent with the expectation that White subjects 
would display an implicit attitude difference between the Black and White racial 
categories. More specifically, the data indicated an implicit attitudinal preference 
for White over Black, manifest as faster responding for the White + Pleasant 
combination (white bars above) than for the Black + Pleasant combination (black 
bars). (1998: 1474) 
 
100 Information is presented in a ‘box plot’ format. This format usually depicts groups of numerical data 
through their quartiles. The lines extending vertically from the top of the boxes (whiskers) show the 
maximum values. There are numerous web sites that describe box plot theory, for example Simple 
Psychology <https://www.simplypsychology.org/boxplots.html> or in greater detail, Towards Data Science 
<https://towardsdatascience.com/understanding-boxplots-5e2df7bcbd51>. (The sequence in Fig 4.4 
does not follow that of Fig 4.2 but the argument is not affected by this discrepancy).  
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The IAT is an indirect measure intended ‘to reveal implicit attitudes which are 
hypothesised to underpin discriminatory behaviours’ (Holroyd and others 2017: 2). As 
expected, there is much critical comment concerning the IAT in terms of its method and 
principle. 101  I describe the IAT because it is the leading, most well-known, implicit 
attitude evaluation procedure and naturally introduces exploration of models of 
cognition where differential speeds of response suggest distinct modes of information 
processing. Models that offer explanatory paradigms for the presence of attitudes 
developed in response to experience, no longer available to conscious memory, that 
continue to influence behaviour (Following Brownstein and Saul 2016a: 8). 
 
4.2 Duality of Mind: Dual Process and Dual System Models of Cognition 
There is strong, many would say irrefutable, evidence that unconscious bias significantly 
influences important decisions for many people (J. A. Bargh 1999). During earlier 
discussion of implicit bias, the expression ‘operating under the radar of consciousness’ 
was used, but loose description of this kind must be clarified in terms of the nature of 
human cognitive architecture that engenders or allows phenomena such as implicit bias 
to be present and influential. Mandelbaum expresses a similar point; ‘The study of 
implicit bias is deeply intertwined with questions of how learning interacts with cognitive 
structure’ (2016: 1). Dual Process and Dual System models offer such a rich descriptive 
paradigm of human cognition. While such theories of cognition look attractive, there 
must be careful investigation into the legitimacy of associating implicit bias and this type 
of model. 
There is a vast body of work available on Dual Process and Dual System models, 
therefore selecting Papers within a brief overview inevitably omits some important 
material. However, to engage appropriately with implicit bias it is necessary to give a 
limited introduction to Dual Process and Dual System models. The order and titles of 
the Papers listed below indicate the shape and content of what is to follow: 
 
o The Duality of Mind: An Historical Perspective (Evans and Frankish 2012). 
o Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge (Reber 1989). 
 
101 There is a considerable body of critical work concerning the IAT. For examples, see Strong Claims and 
Weak Evidence: Reassessing the Predictive Validity of the IAT (Blanton et al. 2009) and A Closer Look at the 
Discrimination Outcomes in the IAT Literature (Carlsson and Agerstrom 2015). 
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o Evolutionary Versus Instrumental Goals: How Evolutionary Psychology Misconceives Human   
Rationality (Stanovich and West 2003). 
o Heuristics and Biases; The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement (Gilovich, Griffin, and 
Kahneman 2002). 
o Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). 
o Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition (Evans 2008). 
o Dual Process Theories (Gawronski and Creighton 2013). 
o Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components (Devine 1989). 
o A Perspective on Judgment and Choice (Kahneman 2003). 
o The Nature of Intuitive Thought (Jarvilehto 2015). 
 
Dual Process and Dual System models and their related theories are based on the 
essential claim that the mind processes information in a way that is either102 (i) fast, 
automatic, nonconscious, associative, responsive to experience and slowly acquired by 
social conditioning (Type One process), or (ii) slow, controlled, conscious, rule governed 
and capable of learning in response to explicit tuition (Type Two process), (following 
Brownstein and Saul 2016a: 10). Description of this paradigm of cognition begins with 
reference to In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond (Evans and Frankish 2012). The first 
chapter presents a strikingly clear and detailed historical perspective of duality of mind. 
First, it is important to clarify the terms Dual Process and Dual System. From the 1970’s 
Dual Process theories have been developed that focus on various aspects of human 
psychology, for example, deductive reasoning, decision making and social judgment. The 
common feature of these theories is the presence of two distinct processing mechanisms 
for each task that may yield different, and sometimes conflicting, results. As Evans and 
Frankish note, ‘typically, one of the processes is characterized as fast, effortless, 
automatic, nonconscious, inflexible, heavily contextualized and undemanding of 
working memory, and the other as slow, effortful, controlled, conscious, flexible, 
decontextualized, and demanding of working memory’ (2012: 2). More recently, much 
 
102 There are many different models, many considerably more sophisticated than this binary structure. 
See for example, Dual Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition (Evans 2008), Dual-
Process Models in Social and Cognitive Psychology: Conceptual Integration and Links to Underlying Memory Systems 
(E. Smith and De Coster 2000) and particularly Automatically Minded (Fridland 2017). Fridland argues in 
Section 3 that ‘at least some automatic processes are likely cognitively penetrable’, see also Fig 4.5 below. 
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effort has been made to unify such Dual Process theories into a theory of mental 
architecture whereby human central cognition is composed of two multi-purpose 
reasoning systems, usually referred to as System One and System Two (Evans and 
Frankish 2012: 2), (Gawronski and Creighton 2013: 296). The former having fast-
process characteristics, variously described as effortless, automatic and nonconscious, 
the latter a slow-process system, described typically as requiring greater mental resources, 
voluntary and conscious. Such unified architecture, forming System One and System 
Two, is unsurprisingly often referred to as a Dual System theory, in contrast to more 
localized Dual Process theory. 
A history of the idea of the mind as divided in function or nature begins as early 
as Plato, where soul (or mind) is divided into three parts: reason, spirit, and appetite, 
each having an ability to influence action according to their own goals and powers.103 
While it is tempting to detour into description of how ideas of duality of mind have 
developed since Plato, (the well-known dual mind theorist Sigmund Freud was 
mentioned briefly in Chapter 1), this outline will be restricted to later developments of 
Dual Process and System approaches as presented within some key Papers. To confirm, 
processes characterised as either fast and automatic (Type 1) or slow and deliberative 
(Type 2) may be unified within Dual System theories that attribute the origin of these 
processes to two distinct cognitive systems. Frankish shows accumulated characteristics 
of each System gathered from various writers and reproduced below in Figure 4.5 (2012: 
21), crediting A. S. Reber, particularly his 1989 Paper Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge 










103  See particularly Book IV of the Republic, where Socrates and his interlocutors, Glaucon and 
Adeimantus, try to answer the question, does the soul consist of one part or several parts? 
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Figure 4.5 Accumulated characteristics of System One and System Two 
 
Reber’s Paper extends and develops conclusions of his earlier work104 arguing that 
 
implicit learning is characterized by two critical features: (a) It is an unconscious 
process, and (b) It yields abstract knowledge. Implicit knowledge results from the 
induction of an abstract representation of the structure that the stimulus 
environment displays, and this knowledge is acquired in the absence of conscious, 
reflective strategies to learn. (1989: 219) 
 
In the 1989 Paper, Reber looks at empirical data gathered since earlier publications of 
the mid 1960’s and presents an ‘overview of this new evidence and attempts to extend 
the general concepts to provide some insight into a variety of related processes such as 
arriving at intuitive judgments … ’(1989: 219). This Paper reemphasises the claim that 
 
… a considerable portion of memorial content is unconscious, and, even more 
important, a goodly amount of knowledge acquisition takes place in the absence 
to the intent to learn. (1989: 230) 
 
 
104 See for example Reber’s 1965 unpublished M.A. Thesis Implicit Learning of Artificial Grammars, (while 
at Brown University) and the 1967 article Implicit learning of artificial grammars from the Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior, Volume 77, pages 317-327. (Both of these Works are cited within Implicit 
Learning and Tacit Knowledge). 
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Reber continues, arguing that unconscious cognitive processes should receive more 
attention, that focus on the conscious over the unconscious is to incorrectly prioritise 
what is most important, noting in evolutionary terms that consciousness is ‘a late arrival 
on the mental scene’ (1989: 230). The essential claim is that unconscious mental 
processes form the crucial foundation upon which conscious processes emerge, 
however, with the emergence of consciousness the capacities of the unconscious are in 
no sense diminished. This raises the obvious but unanswered question; how do these 
modes of cognition interact, for example, does one mode have ultimate control over the 
other? 
Interestingly, Reber defines two subcategories of the unconscious: the primitive and 
the sophisticated. Operations of the primitive unconscious concern the most 
fundamental necessities for survival of living nonvegetative organisms. Operations 
within the realm of the sophisticated unconscious depend upon knowledge acquired 
without conscious awareness by primitive processes and act causally ‘to control 
perception, affective choice and decision making independently of consciousness’ (1989: 
232). This is a large claim and is followed by another; that sophisticated systems are 
available to consciousness. This is a confusing claim, as earlier both ‘primitive’ and 
‘sophisticated’ systems were described as subcategories of the unconscious. I believe 
Reber’s text to be unclear on this point, but suggest the point being made is that while 
such sophisticated knowledge is acquired and forms the basis of some actions 
unconsciously, the subject is in an undefined way aware of such knowledge. This is 
markedly different to implicit bias (as widely presented105) where the subject strongly and 
truthfully denies any knowledge (awareness) of, for example, negative beliefs about 
particular ethnicities, religious communities and so on. The whole confusing and 
controversial issue of implicit bias as possible knowledge, belief, attitude, or intuition 
will be considered later in this Chapter. Reber concludes by summarising along lines 
already described, remarking that the key problem, one that is also of immense 
importance in the context of implicit bias, is to 
 
 
105 Bertram Gawronski comments, when endorsing An Introduction to Implicit Bias (Beeghly and Madva 
2020) ‘The science of implicit bias is rather complex – much more complex than suggested by the 
dominant polarized views in the public discourse.’  
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specify, as clearly as possible, the boundary conditions on the process of implicit 
learning, that is, to outline the circumstances under which it emerges and those 
under which it is suppressed or overwhelmed. (1989: 233) 
 
The terms ‘implicit learning’ and ‘implicit knowledge’ used by Reber and elsewhere must 
be considered carefully when used during discussion of implicit bias. It is not the purpose 
of Reber’s Paper to be involved in a philosophical discussion of the nature of knowledge 
and implicit bias cannot be regarded as knowledge when understood in terms of the 
classic conditions of justified true belief. In fact, implicit biases may be considered 
‘always epistemically bad if we adopt a fog metaphor’ (Beeghly 2020: 77) and their 
badness is multidimensional. Importantly, ‘Biases are widely thought to articulate false 
or misleading claims about groups, which - once internalized - taint perceptual and 
cognitive judgments about individuals’ (Beeghly 2020: 81). 
 
Returning to discussion of the development of Dual Process and System models, 
Keith Stanovich and Rich West’s Paper Evolutionary Versus Instrumental Goals: How 
Evolutionary Psychology Misconceives Human Rationality (2003) 106  is a challenging and 
important work. It is important in the context of this Thesis because it presents a clear 
argument supporting a Dual System paradigm of cognition, significantly, a paradigm that 
appears to offer an attractive explanatory model of implicit bias.  
I will now describe the Development of a unified Dual System model, beginning 
with Stanovich and West and their argument 
 
that Dual Process107 models of cognitive functioning provide a way of reconciling 
the positions of the evolutionary psychologists and researchers in the heuristics 
and biases tradition. (2003: 2) 
 
To see how this argument develops, a brief explanation of the heuristics and biases 
tradition and the evolutionary psychologist position is needed. For insight into the 
 
106  Page numbers within citations for this work refer to the Paper available on web page  
<https://semioticon.com/virtuals/imitation/kstanovich_paper.pdf> rather than Chapter 7, Evolution 
and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate, edited by D. E. Over. 
 
107 As described, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between Dual Process and Dual System. 
Although Stanovich and West use the term Process here, it will be seen that reconciliation is achieved by 
a Dual System approach. 
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heuristics and biases tradition there is probably no better source than Heuristics and Biases: 
The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin and Daniel 
Kahneman (2002) and the earlier Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases by Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974).108 The Introduction to Heuristics and Biases: The 
Psychology of Intuitive Judgement describes the ‘central idea of the “heuristics and biases” 
program’ as follows. Judgements made ‘under uncertainty often rest on a limited number 
of simplifying heuristics rather than extensive algorithmic processing’ (Gilovich et al. 
2002: 1). The influential work Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases argues that 
the processes of intuitive judgement are not just simpler than those of rational models 
but are categorically different. Three heuristics are proposed that under uncertainty 
would be used to make intuitive judgements. Although categorically different such 
heuristics ‘piggyback’ (using Gilovich and Griffin’s expression) basic evolved mental 
processes. Each heuristic has an associated set of biases that function as markers, 
showing that a certain heuristic has been used.  
An example from Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases illustrates the 
point with reference to a particular heuristic and bias. Questions raised in everyday life 
are often of the form, what is the probability of an object A belonging to a class B? The 
heuristics and biases paradigm would describe responses to such questions as ‘typically 
relying on the ‘representativeness heuristic’ where probabilities are evaluated by the 
degree to which A is representative of B’, the degree to which A resembles B. If A closely 
resembles members of class B, then it is thought to be highly and decisively probable 
that it is a member of class B. If someone is described by terms such as tidy, shy, helpful 
with a need for order and structure, how would the probability of being engaged in a 
particular occupation be assessed from a list of possibilities that include pilot, farmer, 
sales representative or librarian? From the Heuristics and Biases account it is highly likely 
that the representativeness heuristic would be employed. The highest probability would 
in most cases be assigned to the occupation of librarian, the assessment made by the 
degree to which the subject is representative of, or like, the librarian stereotype. 
However, judgements made about probability using similarity or representativeness 
 
108 See also Heuristics and Biases: Beyond Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) Judgment under Uncertainty (Fiedler and 
Sydow 2015) for a critique of Tversky and Kahneman’s Paper. 
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often led to serious errors because similarity, or representativeness, is not influenced by 
factors that should be considered when assessing probability. Tversky and Kahneman 
describe one such factor as ‘insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes’ (1974: 1124). 
This is easily understood with reference to the current example; there are more farmers 
than librarians within the population and this should be considered when estimating the 
probability that the subject is a librarian, rather than a farmer. Prior probability of 
outcome does not affect the similarity of the subject to the stereotypes of librarian, or 
farmer.  
Other heuristics and associated biases have been proposed and have generated 
much critical literature.109 Due in large part to the brevity of the above description the 
heuristics and biases model may not appear particularly revolutionary, perhaps just an 
expression of common sense. However, as Gilovich and Griffin point out, the heuristics 
and biases paradigm questioned the adequacy of ideal models of judgement that describe 
rational people making choices based on sound assessment of the probability of 
alternative outcomes, the utility derived from each and combining these assessments in 
the decision-making process. The heuristic and biases model challenges the idea of the 
ideal rational agent, raising doubts about the competence of agents to make complex 
entirely rational calculations. The model of the rational agent was pervasive, particularly 
within the discipline of economics and casts a large shadow over any discussion of the 
modern history of research on everyday judgements 110  (Gilovich et al. 2002: 1), 
(Kahneman 2003: 702), (Kahneman 2003: 705). 
A brief explanation of the heuristics and biases tradition and an outline of the 
evolutionary psychologist’s position is necessary to show how Dual System models of 
cognitive function offer reconciliation of these two positions, forming the dominant 
 
109  See also Sarah-Jane Leslie’s fascinating Paper, The Original Sin of Cognition: Fear, Prejudice, and 
Generalization. While not a heuristic, our primitive tendency to quickly generalise strikingly negative 
information across members of highly essentialized groups, leading to prejudice and serious errors of 
judgement, does resemble the operation of heuristics (2017: 421). 
 
110 Considering the central theme of this Thesis, there is a particularly interesting comment in the 
Introduction to Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement. Discussing how various factors 
came together to boost interest in Heuristics and Biases, Gilovich and Griffin comment, ‘… the greatest 
fascination for social psychologists has always been the combination of stereotyping, prejudice and 
discrimination, topics to which the heuristics and biases agenda was seen as highly relevant’ (Gilovich et 
al. 2002: 7). 
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model of cognitive architecture. So, turning now to the evolutionary psychologist’s 
position, this can be framed as a criticism of the heuristics and biases model. Gilovich 
and Griffin (2002: 9) call this criticism the ‘people are not that dumb’ critique, based on 
the claim that the heuristics and biases model is too pessimistic in its account of an 
agent’s competence to make sound judgments. The evolutionary psychologist is 
sympathetic to this criticism in the sense that competence to make sound judgments is 
believed to be absolutely necessary for survival, hence evolution acts as an effective 
driver towards the ability to make sound, error free, decisions. The extent and diversity 
of human achievement shows quite obviously our ability to make good judgements. 
However, as Gilovich and Griffin point out, although initially appearing to be a sound 
claim, this argument on further reflection does not deliver a decisive blow to the heuristic 
and bias model. While ‘evolutionary pressures lead to adaptions that are as good or better 
than a local rival they do not lead to adaptions that are globally optimal’ (2002: 9). In 
other words, evolutionary pressures are not able to shape mental ability to the extent 
that error or bias free judgements are guaranteed. 
As Gilovich and Griffin note, the heuristic and bias model has weathered several 
critiques and remains vigorous in part due to its relationship with psychology, particularly 
the great interest in ‘automatic’ mental processes. Dual Process and Dual System model 
development is linked with developments in the field of heuristics and biases, suggesting 
a symbiotic relationship between the disciplines. It is suggested this close relationship is 
more than a mutually beneficial development; the heuristic and bias model may usefully 
be expressed and discussed in the language of System One and Two architecture and 
Gilovich and Griffin offer good explanations of heuristics in terms of the System One 
and Two model (2002: 17). 
 
Having made some brief explanatory notes on claims relating to heuristics and 
evolutionary psychology I will return to Evolutionary Versus Instrumental Goals: How 
Evolutionary Psychology Misconceives Human Rationality (Stanovich and West 2003) and the 
idea that Dual System models of cognitive function offer reconciliation of the 
evolutionary psychologist and heuristics traditions, (note Footnote 107). The heuristics 
tradition understands the results of many empirical demonstrations as evidence of 
human cognition characterised by systematic irrationalities. However, various 
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evolutionary psychologists have interpreted these results quite differently, as indicating 
‘an optimal information processing adaptation on the part of the subjects’ (Stanovich and 
West 2003: 1). How is this opposing interpretation to be understood? Stanovich and 
West bring to our attention the hypothesis that the driving force behind the development 
of primate intelligence was the need to master the social world.111 The essential and 
important claim is that social interaction engenders a particular form of intelligence that 
acts as a foundation upon which ‘future evolutionary and cultural developments in 
modes of thought are overlaid’ (Stanovich and West 2003: 4). The social orientation 
toward problem solving is always available, it has not diminished over time and acts as a 
default resource. This leads to a key point in the developing argument; it is this long-
standing foundation or substrate of social intelligence that responds when judgements 
are needed, providing the modal responses associated with the heuristics and biases 
model. Further, Stanovich and West argue, supported by substantial empirical data, that 
common (modal) responses based on judgement employing heuristics are often different 
to the judgements made by more cognitively able subjects. Less able subjects base their 
judgement on social cues, linguistic cues and background knowledge rather than the 
abstract reasoning of their peers. Importantly, such empirical data suggested to 
Stanovich and West that evolutionary rationality, based on social intelligence, is divided 
or separated from rationality employed by subjects that have higher cognitive ability, 
characterised by the ability to decontextualize and depersonalize problems, seeking out 
underlying principles and dealing with problems without the need for social content or 
conversational relevance.  
Reconciliation of evolutionary and heuristic paradigms is brought about under a 
unified Dual System Model: System One; highly contextualized, personalized and 
socialized. The notion that evolutionary social intelligence will provide responses based 
upon heuristics that incorporate important relevant conversational cues and assumptions 
based on experience, and System Two; more controlled processes serve to 
decontextualize and depersonalize problems, displaying what has been described as 
analytic intelligence (following Stanovich and West 2003: 9). The obvious and important 
 
111 Reference is made to The Social Function of Intellect, an article by Nicholas Humphrey first published by 
the Cambridge University Press in 1976 and part of the collection Growing Points in Ethology edited by 
P.P.G. Bateson and R.A. Hinde. 
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question concerning the exact nature of the interaction between the two systems is still 
(temporally) unanswered. This is clearly an important issue in the context of implicit 
bias, as the possibility of overriding the influence of implicit bias, with associated 
implications for responsibility, appears to rely on System Two processes having some 
form of executive control of over-learned social norms characterised as being within the 
System One domain. Responsibility seems to be a function of the extent that System Two 
processes ultimately control behaviour. Such matters are clearly important and will be 
considered in detail shortly.  
Before engaging in detail with control issues, I will give further confirmation of 
the relevance of Dual Process and System ideas to implicit bias and a summary of the 
way forward. This section on Duality of Mind began with reference to In Two Minds: 
Dual Processes and Beyond by Jonathan Evans and Keith Frankish and it is with reference 
to another work by Jonathan Evans, Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and 
Social Cognition (2008), that the vital link between models of human cognition and implicit 
bias may be clearly seen. The importance of Dual Process and System theories of social 
cognition and implicit bias related issues, (stereotyping and attitude change disassociated 
from explicit beliefs and conscious processing), is expressed by Jonathan Evans: 
 
Dual process theories of social cognition emerged in the 1980’s and developed 
in popularity to form the dominant paradigm for the past 20 years or more. 
Contemporary work particularly concerns the automatic and unconscious 
processing of social information in such domains as person perception, 
stereotyping, and attitude change and its apparent dissociation from explicit beliefs and 
conscious processing. The proposal of new accounts or at least new labels for Dual 
Processes in social cognition has reached near epidemic proportions … . (2008: 
268)112 
 
As the title of Evans’ Paper suggests, there are related but different Dual Process theories 
of cognition depending on which domain is considered; (i) reasoning, (ii) judgment and 
decision making, (iii) social cognition; essentially how individuals construe the social 
world and the processes that underlie social judgement and behaviour.113 Evans points 
 
112 I have removed Evans’ detailed referencing and added my own emphasis. 
 
113 From UCL University guide (2018), MSc Degree, Social Cognition: Research and Applications. 
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out there are differences of emphasis between the different fields of research; in general, 
‘social cognition literature is less concerned with issues about cognitive architecture and 
evolution and more focused on issues concerning consciousness, free will, and the 
implications for moral and legal responsibilities of individuals’ (added emphasis) (2008: 
268). While noting Evans’ comment about responsibility within the social domain, it will 
be recalled that within the judgment and decision-making domain, the idea of fast System 
One heuristic processes that cue default intuitive judgments endorsed by analytic System 
Two processes, also has implications for responsibility. 
 
 At this point it is useful to take stock and confirm the way forward within this 
chapter and the next. From consideration of the IAT, description of Dual Process and 
Dual System approaches to cognition naturally followed. Social cognition and the unified 
Dual System approach have been described and description of two particular Dual 
System models will follow shortly, together with further discussion concerning the 
possibility of overriding or moderating the influence of implicit bias. In the next chapter 
this theme will continue with description of a unified Dual System model of social 
cognition that will be used during critique of semicompatibilism in Chapter 6.114  
 
While considering the possibility of overriding or moderating the influence of 
implicit bias related behaviour, (with implications for responsibility), two Dual System 
models will be described with reference to Bertram Gawronski and Laura A. Creighton’s 
Paper, Dual Process Theories (2013). There is much to consider in this Paper, but attention 
will focus on Dual System theories/models that seek to describe the mechanisms that; 
(i) enable attitudes to guide behaviour, and (ii) may account, from a social cognition point 
of view, for only a moderate reduction in racial conflicts, against a background of 
declining negative evaluations of racial minority groups in public opinion polls. 
 
114 As mentioned in Footnote 107, the distinction between Dual Process and Dual System should always 
be kept in mind  -  there is the possibility of confusion as ‘social cognition’ seems to relate to a domain 
specific Dual Process rather than the more inclusive Dual System model. However, I believe that the 
complexity of social cognition is such that the description Dual System is considered appropriate. 
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Two models are described by Gawronski and Creighton under item (i). First, the 
Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants (MODE) model115 developed by Russell 
Fazio. Attitude is considered as the mental association between an object and the agent’s 
evaluation of that object. Assume a situation where association is strong, an immediate, 
good and established attitude is experienced towards a particular person when they are 
seen. In this case the spontaneous good attitude will guide behaviour without the 
individual necessarily being aware of the attitude’s influence. Alternatively, if a strong 
attitude has not been previously established, an individual may examine specific 
attributes of a person (or object) and the situation, but this activity relies on motivation 
and opportunity (adequate time and cognitive resources) to engage in effortful 
information processing. If motivation and/or opportunity is low, automatically activated 
attitudes may guide behaviour based on spontaneous inference or interpretation of the 
situation. However, if both motivation and opportunity to engage in effortful processing 
are high, the impact of automatically activated attitudes on behaviour will be moderated 
and behaviour will be subject to consideration of the situation, including specific attributes 
of the person or object. In other words, there are two distinct processes that are guiding 
behaviour, one essentially based on spontaneous processes (System One) and the other 
on deliberative processes (System Two); the process (implicit or explicit social cognition) 
that will become active is determined or moderated by the agent’s motivation and 
opportunity to engage in deliberative processing.  
 The second model, to be mentioned briefly, is the Dual Attitude Model 116 , 
developed by Timothy D. Wilson, Samuel Lindsey and Tonya Y. Schooler. This model 
differs in the sense that 
 
previous approaches adopted a ‘between - subjects approach’, whereby different 
individuals with different kinds of attitudes are said to act differently. Our 
approach is ‘within – subjects’ in that the same individual can have both an 
 
115 See also Russell Fazio, Multiple Processes by which Attitudes Guide Behavior: The MODE Model as an 
Integrative Framework (1990), cited by Gawronski and Creighton. 
 
116 See Timothy D. Wilson, Samuel Lindsey and Tonya Y. Schooler, A Model of Dual Attitudes (Wilson, 
Lindsey, and Schooler 2000). See also the work of Anthony Greenwald, for example, A Unified Theory of 
Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-esteem, and Self-concept (Greenwald et al. 2002). 
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implicit and explicit attitude, which predict different kinds of behaviours. (2000: 
121) 
 
The notion of one individual with implicit and explicit attitudes that influence various 
kinds of behaviour is at once relevant to the subject matter of implicit bias, while keeping 
in mind that characterising or describing implicit bias as an ‘attitude’ is not universally 
accepted. 
 Turning to item (ii) above, Gawronski and Creighton’s discussion of prejudice 
and stereotyping from a social cognition point of view begins with the observation of a 
moderate reduction in racial conflict when negative evaluations of racial minority groups 
in public opinion polls was in marked decline. It is believed the essential reason for this 
apparent inconsistency is change in the way racial prejudice is manifest, while clearly not 
abandoned. As an example of work inspired by this change, Gawronski and Creighton 
cite Patricia G Devine’s influential Paper117 Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and 
Controlled Components (1989). The primary goal of Devine’s three reported studies is to 
‘examine how stereotypes and personal beliefs are involved in responses toward 
stereotyped groups’ (1989: 6). The central claim of this exceptionally interesting and 
essentially optimistic118 Paper is that a distinction should be made between knowledge of a 
social stereotype and belief in the accuracy of that stereotype. This dissociation model 
assumes that when an agent encounters an object or person, automatic stereotype 
activation occurs, equally strong and inescapable for both high prejudice and low 
prejudice individuals. However, the two groups differ significantly in that low prejudice 
individuals can intervene, replacing automatically activated stereotypes with 
nonprejudicial beliefs (following Gawronski and Creighton 2013: 288). With time and 
 
117 Devine’s Paper Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components received the Scientific 
Impact Award from the respected and influential Society of Experimental Social Psychology. The award 
recognized that the Paper would have a lasting impact and had fundamentally altered and would inspire 
the future landscape of prejudice and stereotype research. 
 
118 See for example the following extract from the General Conclusions as evidence of an essential 
optimism: ‘(It has been argued by others that) … inconsistency sometimes observed between expressed 
attitudes and behaviors that are less consciously mediated is evidence that (all) White Americans are 
prejudiced against Blacks and that nonprejudiced responses are attempts at impression management. 
[…] In the context of the present model in which automatic processes and controlled processes can be 
dissociated, I disagree fundamentally with this premise’ (Devine 1989: 15). 
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intention, it is possible to change personal attitudes and beliefs, but sometimes effort 
may be lacking, and this can contribute to the often-observed inconsistency between 
expressed attitudes and seen behaviour. The claim that change is possible is worth 
reemphasising; the question is not if but how change is to be made. 
To clarify the difference between the dissociation model and the MODE model; 
the dissociation model locates extrinsic social influences, that over a long-time feed into 
development of stereotypical models, at the level of automatic processes. The 
individual’s authentic self is placed at the level of controlled processes that potentially 
mitigate behaviour originating from acquired stereotypes. The MODE model locates an 
individual’s authentic self at the level of automatic processes and extrinsic social influences 
at the level of controlled processes. The moderate reduction in racial conflicts when 
negative evaluations of racial minority groups in public opinion polls was in decline is 
not mentioned within Devine’s Paper specifically. One possibility, (a too obvious 
interpretation perhaps), is that in harmony with the dissociation model, where the 
individual’s authentic self is placed at the level of controlled processes that potentially 
mitigate behaviour originating from acquired stereotypes, opinion polls give greater 
opportunity for reflection and evaluation of racial stereotypes. This would lead to a 
thoughtful assessment before expressing an anonymous opinion. Compare such 
anonymity with emotional and public conflict that ‘flares up’ almost spontaneously. It is 
possible to think carefully, calmly, rationally about what we say in an opinion poll, while 
in a conflict situation response is automatic, perhaps unconscious and it is this type of 
behaviour that is not influenced by increased conscious awareness and egalitarian ideas.  
Clearly, the MODE model is also suggested by the comment that opinion polls give 
greater opportunity for reflection. This matter clearly requires thorough analysis to arrive 
at any meaningful conclusions, but there is value in noting the potential usefulness of 
such models when investigating these issues.   
Some general and concluding remarks on the Dual System model can be made 
with reference to Daniel Kahneman’s Paper A Perspective on Judgment and Choice, Mapping 
Bounded Rationality (2003). The contribution of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
towards the understanding of intuitive judgment and decision making has been immense. 
This Paper is based on the author’s Nobel Prize lecture, delivered at Stockholm 
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University on the 8th of December 2002. The key claims made from a System One and 
Two point of view are as follows (2003): 
 
The (System One and Two) model suggests five ways in which a judgment or 
choice may be made: 
1. An intuitive judgment or intention is initiated, and 
(a) Endorsed by System Two, or 
(b) Adjusted (insufficiently) for other features that are recognized as relevant, or 
(c) Corrected (sometimes overcorrected) for an explicitly recognized bias, or 
(d) Identified as violating a subjectively valid rule and blocked from overt expression. 
 
2. No intuitive response comes to mind, and the judgment is computed by System Two. 
 
Casual observation suggests that Cases 1(a) and 1(b) are the most common and that Case 
1(d) is exceedingly rare. This ordering reflects two major hypotheses about the role of 
intuition in judgment and choice. The first is that most behaviour is intuitive, skilled, 
unproblematic, and successful. The second is that behaviour is likely to be anchored in 
intuitive impressions and intentions even when it is not completely dominated by them. 
 
3. Another testable119 hypothesis is that intuitive judgments that are suppressed by System Two 
still have detectable effects, for example, in priming subsequent responses (added emphasis). 
 
4. An intuitive judgment will be modified or overridden if System Two identifies it as 
biased. This argument is not circular because a great deal is known about the conditions 
under which corrections will or will not be made and because hypotheses about the role 
of System Two can be tested. In the context of an analysis of accessibility, the question 
of when intuitive judgments will be corrected is naturally rephrased: When will corrective 
thoughts be sufficiently accessible to intervene in the judgment? 
 
5. The evaluation of stimuli as good or bad is a particularly important natural assessment. 
The evidence, both behavioural and neurophysiological is consistent with the idea that 
 
119 Daniel Kahneman’s Paper A Perspective on Judgment and Choice, Mapping Bounded Rationality (2003) 
presents detailed description of test methods, substantial analysis and presentation of resulting data. 
Title: Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position on Free Will and Responsibility? 
Chapter 4  
The Origin and Meaning of Implicit Bias 
 
101 
the assessment of whether objects are good (and should be approached) or bad (and 
should be avoided) is conducted quickly and efficiently by specialized neural circuitry. 
 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to look in detail at the above claims and conclusions 
from Daniel Kahneman’s Paper, however, a vital point must be noted, that an essentially 
optimistic outlook is presented in the sense of the executive role of System Two 
managing and monitoring behaviour. This appears to be at the heart of the matter; if the 
source of implicit bias influenced behaviour is located within System One processes then 
clearly the possibility of System Two control (even degrees of control) of the 
‘manifestations of System One activity’ (Evans and Frankish 2012: 28) is crucially 
important, not least because of the implications for responsibility. That intuitive 
judgment may be modified, moderated or overridden if System Two identifies it as biased 
strongly suggests control and responsibility. One of the widely assumed characteristics 
of implicit bias, mentioned many times, is absence from conscious awareness in thought 
and action and so unavailable for scrutiny and intervention by System Two processes. 
The above claims from Daniel Kahneman’s Paper and much of what has been discussed 
in this chapter so far push back against this pervasive view and show the possibility of 
System Two control and responsibility. The subtle nature of implicit bias will be 
examined further, and in Chapter 5 control will be seen to be possible, for example, from 
the perspective of control asserted by the true self. 120  Given that it can be argued 
successfully that control in some significant sense is possible, this suggests that implicit 
bias may not be threatening to certain positions, such as semicompatibilism, within the 
free will debate. There are several aspects of control; control over acquisition of implicit 
biases, control in the sense of eliminating biases from our cognitive processes and 
control of behaviour that has implicit bias as part of its determination. Consideration of 
freedom should include all these areas, at least, where implicit bias is active; it is however 
control of influenced behaviour that will be the main but not exclusive area of interest. 
 
120 See also Systems and Levels: Dual-System Theories and the Personal—Subpersonal Distinction (Frankish 2012). 
The possibility of ‘true self’ control is a popular claim, suggested indirectly, for example, in the well-
respected Implicit Bias Review. In this particular quotation, the possibility of controlling implicit bias 
influenced actions via our ‘true intentions’ is thought to be problematic; ‘We act on our implicit biases 
without awareness, thus, they can undermine our true intentions’ (Staats et al. 2016: 14). 
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Dual System models attract criticism, 121  usually based on the difficulties 
experienced when trying to decide exactly what sort of empirical evidence could disprove 
such claims and the lack of empirically testable predictions. However, as Bertram 
Gawronski and Laura A. Creighton conclude, ‘[…] despite such criticism of Dual 
Process and Dual System theorizing, it seems highly unlikely that this influence will 
dissipate in the near future’ (2013: 308).  
The Nature and Freedom of Intuitive Thought and Decision Making (Jarvilehto 2015), 
particularly Chapter Two, has much to say about Dual Systems. It is however the notion 
of a third system and its relevance to implicit bias, in terms of the crucial role of the 
environment in bias formation and ongoing influence, that suggests mention here. To 
understand behaviour, the environment in which that behaviour takes place must be 
considered. This seems entirely obvious, but when framed in terms of System One, Two 
and Three, where System Three is responsible for generating the context for action, an 
interesting model of cognition within an environment can be developed, as reproduced 
in Fig 4.6 (Jarvilehto 2015: 51). The three systems form a nested structure with the 
conscious agent at the centre. The agent acquires information from the non-conscious 
System One, which in turn is constantly influenced by events and changes in the 
environment, System Three. There is no representation of environmental input directly 
into System Two processes, but this is surely the case. This model raises several such 
questions, but there is value in mentioning such a descriptive model of cognitive 
processes and environment, particularly considering the huge importance of 












121 See for example, David Sorensen’s Thesis, The Unity of Higher Cognition: The Case Against Dual Process 
Theory (2016). For a general defence of Dual Process and Dual System models against five lines of critique 
see Evans and Stanovich Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate (2013). 
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This Figure is available from The Nature and Freedom of Intuitive Thought and Decision Making 








Fig. 4.6 Three Nested Systems: System One Non-conscious, System Two Conscious and 
System Three Environment. (Jarvilehto 2015: 51) 
 
System One is shown in Fig 4.6 differentiated according to ontogenetic and phylogenetic 
processes, where ontogenetic processes are acquired through experience and practice, 
for example, skills and decision-making heuristics. Phylogenetic processes have their 
origin in, what Jarvilehto calls, the biologically evolved environment, for example 
protective parental behaviour and fight or flight. System Three is shown differentiated 
into the culturally evolved and biologically evolved environments and System Two 
shows a differentiation between the algorithmic mind, (slow thinking and computation) 
and the reflective mind. 122  Although clearly very brief, mention of a third system 
representing the environment highlights and formalises in some sense the obviously 
connectedness of environment, modes of cognition and the agent. Such connections will 
be explored in much greater depth in the following section where the focus will be the 
nature of implicit bias.123 
 
122 For an appropriate treatment of System Three and associated ideas see Keith Stanovich, Distinguishing 
the Reflective, Algorithmic, and Autonomous Minds: Is it time for a tri-process theory? (Stanovich 2009: 55). 
 
123 See also Clark’s description of ecological control Soft Selves and Ecological Control (2006) in the next 
Chapter, Implicit Bias and Control, and An Introduction to Implicit Bias (Beeghly and Madva 2020) that 
includes several Papers discussing the crucial role of the environment in bias formation and ongoing 
influence. 
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 Much ground has been covered in this section. It is important to make a summary 
and clarify the relevance to what will follow. The IAT, (controversially), is a rigorous 
method of testing for the presence and degree of implicit bias based on measured time 
differences between more or less automatic responses to a carefully developed set of 
images that have, for example, racial and evaluative content. This led naturally to 
discussion of Dual Process and Dual System models of cognition. Dual System models 
offer a ‘rich descriptive paradigm’ of implicit bias, learning and cognitive structures. How 
evolutionary and heuristic paradigms were reconciled by introducing a unified Dual 
System model was described. Social cognition was mentioned, including the MODE and 
dissociation model. Implicit bias and Dual Process/System models of cognition are 
significantly entwined, as suggested by Devine’s important Paper Stereotypes and Prejudice: 
Their Automatic and Controlled Components (1989). The purpose of this section has been to 
give context and prepare for the introduction of the model of implicit bias to be 
described shortly; to give necessary background in a comparable way to the opening 
chapters of Part I. 
 
4.3 The Origin of Implicit Bias 
It is sobering to reflect on one person’s experience of racial bias and reconfirm the real-
world implications of this phenomena. A poignant memory is described by Laurie A. 
Rudman at the beginning of her Paper Social Justice in Our Minds, Homes, and Society: The 
Nature, Causes, and Consequences of Implicit Bias (2004): 
 
In 1964, when I was 10 years old, my dad drove off with my older sister, Carol. 
When he returned, my parents announced she would not be coming back. She 
wanted to marry Lenny — a young African American she had met in college. I 
couldn’t understand what the problem was. The one time he came to our house, 
I sat on his lap and was thrilled with the way he laughed at my jokes. He was 
generous and kind and, in fact, years later, he would head the United Way in 
Chicago124 My father had taken Carol to Northeast Minneapolis and told her to 
 
124 The United Way of Metropolitan Chicago is a non-profit organization and a branch of the United 
Way of America (now United Way Worldwide). The United Way of Metropolitan Chicago serves the 
city of Chicago and its surrounding suburbs, allocating funding to other charitable organizations, 
especially those that provide needed healthcare, education and income services to underserved 
communities. (From Wikipedia United Way of Metropolitan Chicago 2017). 
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make a choice. It was either ‘those people’ or her family. My sister got out of the 
car. (2004: 129) 
 
What is it that has the power to cause125 such extreme behaviour and upset within a 
family; how can implicit bias be understood? 126  The widely perceived attributes of 
implicit bias have been mentioned: pervasive, unconscious and involuntary, where bias 
‘denotes a displacement of people’s responses along a continuum of possible judgments’ 
(Greenwald and Krieger 2006: 950) and may tend towards a favourable or unfavourable 
assessment. How such bias is formed is controversial but obviously important not least 
in terms of developing and implementing prevention and mitigation strategies. 
The main question raised at the beginning of this chapter concerned the nature 
of implicit bias.127 It is the widely held view of implicit bias as nonconscious and source 
of involuntary behaviour that first suggests possible threats to free will, control and 
responsibility. 128  Expressed in terms of the semicompatibilist model, can behaviour 
influenced by implicit bias issue from the agent’s own reason-responsive mechanism 
when the agent is not consciously aware of possessing or being influenced by implicit 
bias? The attributes of nonconscious and involuntary will be considered, within a larger 
group129 of implicit bias related issues, ideas and concepts. 
To be explored in this section: Attitude and belief, association and stereotype, 
and the propositional structure of implicit bias. Responsiveness to reason is particularly 
 
125 It should be noted that describing implicit bias as ‘causing’ behaviour is not universally accepted. See 
for example Implicit Attitudes and the Ability Argument (Buckwalter 2018). 
 
126  For powerful description of the psychological damage caused by colonialism and racism see 
particularly Black Skin, White Mask (Fanon 2007). 
 
127 Implicit bias related research has been recently subject to various forms of criticism. Three leading 
academics and researchers in the field, Michael Brownstein, Alex Madva and Bertram Gawronski 
respond in their Paper Understanding Implicit Bias: Putting the Criticism into Perspective (2019). 
 
128 See for example Consciousness, Implicit Attitudes and Moral Responsibility (Levy 2014a), Implicit Attitudes and 
the Ability Argument (Buckwalter 2018) and Implicit Bias, Responsibility, and Moral Ecology (Vargas 2017). 
 
129 There is diversity in the way the actual term Implicit Bias is used. See Jules Holroyd and Joseph 
Sweetman’s discussion of ‘the important functional differences between phenomena identified as 
instances of implicit bias’, The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias (2016: 80). 
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important in assessing whether implicit bias is subject to the sort of control (guidance 
control) sufficient for responsibility within the semicompatibilist model.  
Social psychologists define an attitude as an evaluative disposition, the tendency 
to like or dislike, or to act favourably or unfavourably toward someone or something. 
Explicit expression of attitudes happens often, either verbally, by action, or both means 
of expression working together. A social stereotype is a mental association between a social 
group or category and a trait. It may be the case that a group or category display a certain 
characteristic, (basketball players display physical stamina), however it is not always the 
case that every member of a group must display a certain characteristic for a stereotype 
to be formed. If a small minority (10-15%) of drivers over seventy-five years old drive 
twenty miles per hour under the speed limit then it may come to serve as a default 
assumption that any elderly person is likely to drive slowly (following closely Greenwald 
and Krieger 2006: 949). Groups having no statistically meaningful tendency towards a 
particular trait may still be subject to stereotype association, either favourable or 
unfavourable, caused by untruthful representation by, for example, the media and/or 
distorted or manipulated historical narrative. A stereotype is the association of a 
particular trait with a particular group. An attitude is the association of a particular 
evaluation, such as good, honest, untrustworthy, with a particular group. Implicit biases 
are discriminatory biases based on implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes (following 
Greenwald and Krieger 2006: 951).130 
From the beginning of this chapter association has been the central explanatory 
paradigm of implicit bias, discussion began with the IAT, a test predicated, (together 
with the notion of differential processing speeds), on a model of association between 
negative attitude and concept. Eric Mandelbaum notes the central and pervasive role of 
 
130 An alternative account is given by Kang, who uses the term ‘schema’ to describe a wide range of 
information about the attributes of a concept under one heading (2005: 1498). A schema is a prototype 
or template for a class of objects, ‘a mental shortcut that allows quick assignment of objects, processes 
or people into categories. For example, people may be placed into categories based on traits such as age, 
race, gender, and the like’ (Kang cited in Staats 2013: 11). When a category has been assigned to a person 
all the attributes associated with that category become associated with that person. It is not difficult to 
see how this idea works for racial schemas. Kang suggests the law, culture and society generally are the 
source of racial categories into which individual human being are mapped. ‘Once a person is assigned to 
a racial category, implicit and explicit racial meanings associated with that category are triggered’ (2005: 
1499). 
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association, claiming ‘the overwhelming majority of those who theorize about implicit 
biases posit that these biases are caused by some sort of association’ (2016: 1), where 
‘saying that two concepts are associated amounts to saying that there is a reliable, 
psychologically basic causal relation that holds between them’ (2017). On this view, 
implicit biases have an associative structure, enter into associative transitions and do not 
enter into logical ones, (following Mandelbaum 2016: 6). Mandelbaum continues, 
claiming that associative structures may only be broken by repetitive presentation of one 
of the objects between which a relation is said to hold without the other or by the 
counter-conditioning effect of a repeated valence change relating to one of the objects. 
If rational argument is seen to have an impact on implicit attitudes, then implicit attitudes 
cannot have a completely associative structure because associative structures simply do 
not respond to logical arguments. Having the right position on this matter is obviously 
important when developing mitigation plans, from a personal and from wider 
perspectives such as education, employment, healthcare and justice. 
 Mandelbaum challenges the ubiquitous association model, beginning with a 
description of an alternative explanatory paradigm, the structured belief hypothesis. As 
the name suggests, implicit biases are sustained by unconscious beliefs, not associations, 
beliefs that are ‘propositionally structured mental representations that we bear the belief 
relation to’ (2016: 7). This clearly runs counter to conventional, pervasive, purely System 
One based explanations of implicit bias that deny the possibility of unconscious 
structured representations entering logical relations with one another. A key claim here 
is structured beliefs can be reason-responsive and if implicit biases are sustained by 
structured beliefs, they will also be reason-responsive. If true, this has especially 
important implications for implicit bias mitigation, responsibility and ultimately 
discussion of personal freedom. Having suggested an alternative to pervasive 
association-based models of implicit bias, Mandelbaum challenges associationism from 
several perspectives. I will describe one perspective, beginning with an outline of the 
essential argument, as mentioned above.  
The structure of Mandelbaum’s argument is straight forward, beginning with a 
statement of the associationist hypothesis that implicit biases have associative structure, 
enter into associative transitions and do not enter into logical ones, (Associative Implicit 
Bias, AIB). If this hypothesis is true, then reliable and successful intervention can only 
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take the form of an ‘extinction process’, i.e., multiple presentation of just one (the 
Conditioned Stimulus) of the associated elements, or counterconditioning, where the CS 
is presented together with a ‘reinforcer’ that has an opposite valence to the one the CS 
currently has. If intervention by rational argumentation (or any logical or evidential 
intervention) is found to reliably counteract implicit bias and ‘if these interventions are 
not reducible to extinction or counterconditioning, then we have evidence that the 
structure of implicit bias is not, after all, underwritten by associations’ (Mandelbaum 
2016: 9). 
Mandelbaum presents such evidence from various perspectives to support the 
claim that implicit attitudes have more structure than mere associations, believing that 
‘we have a handle on what structure that is: mental representations with propositional 
structure that function as unconscious beliefs’ (2016: 18). I will briefly describe the first 
perspective.  
Mandelbaum describes as ‘a venerable social psychological hypothesis’ (2016: 10) 
the well-known idea that the enemy of our enemy is our friend, discussed formally by 
Fritz Heider as Balance Theory, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (Heider 1958). See 
also Eva Walther, Guilty by Mere Association: Evaluative Conditioning and the Spreading Attitude 
Effect (2002). 
Mandelbaum argues if mental transitions are merely associative, (not inferential), 
evidence of normal second-order conditioning effects would be expected, contra to what 
is predicted by Balance Theory. Mandelbaum’s example clarifies the point. The 
associationist predicts that if I have a negative association with Assad who I know has a 
negative association with Szymborska, this should lead, on the associationist account 
(and contra to Balance Theory), to a negative association with Szymborska, for 
Szymborska has been paired with two negative stimuli. If evidence is available that shows 
a subject responding in a way that supports Balance Theory, (the enemy of our enemy 
is our friend), then such evidence gives confidence to the claim that implicit attitudes are 
not purely associative processes but ‘have some sort of logic operating over them’ (2016: 
10). Expressed in terms of negatives and positives, such evidence would show two 
negatives making a positive; ‘if someone has been mean to you, you will tend to like 
people who are mean to your antagonizer’ (2016: 10). 
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Gawronski and colleagues Cognitive Consistency and the Formation of Interpersonal Attitudes: 
Cognitive Balance Affects the Encoding of Social Information present from their first experiment, 
empirical evidence that does show two negatively valenced implicit attitudes leading to a 
positive evaluation (2005: 619-622). Gawronski’s method and results from Experiment 
1 are summarised below: 
 
o Introduction of subjects to a photo of an unfamiliar individual (CS1). 
o CS1 paired with statements either consistently positive or consistently negative, thus 
conditioning the subjects to respond to the CS1 with the designated evaluation.  
o CS2 was introduced and subjects were told whether the CS1 liked or disliked the CS2. 
o The subjects’ implicit attitudes toward both the CS1 and the CS2 were assessed. 
o The procedure was then replicated for five other novel CS1 and CS2 pairs. 
 
Gawronski’s results support Heider’s Balance Theory predictions and, importantly, do 
not support the predictions of the AIB model; ‘A negatively valenced CS1 who disliked 
a CS2 caused the subjects to like the CS2. In other words, if you were originally taught 
that a person was bad and subsequently learned that this person dislikes another person, 
you then would like that second person’ (Mandelbaum 2016: 11). On Mandelbaum’s 
view, two such negatives making a positive shows a propositional, and not an associative, 
process is present and active.  
In summary, data and conclusions from Gawronski’s first experiment (2005: 619-
622) are central to Mandelbaum’s argument that implicit attitudes have neither 
associative structure nor enter into associative transitions (contra AIB). Further, on this  
view, the data demands propositional processes and inferential structures, this lends 
support to a Structured Belief-type view (following Mandelbaum 2016: 12). 
As mentioned, the claim of the reason-responsiveness of implicit attitudes is of 
considerable importance at least in terms of mitigation of implicit bias. Such critical 
review of associationism is extended by Mandelbaum towards Dual System models 
within the discipline of social psychology. It will be recalled that typically System One 
processes are described as fast, automatic, intuitive, non-rational, unconscious and 
associative. The essential criticism is that it is wrong to infer from any System One 
property to another. If a process is automatic, it is not necessarily non-rational or 
heuristic. If it is unconscious, then it is not necessarily associative. The theme of 
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Mandelbaum’s argument, contra to most Dual Process theories, is that propositional 
structures do inhabit the System One domain and System Two processes are present and 
active within the supposedly exclusive world of System One. Deconstruction of the 
pervasive System One and Two model is completed by Mandelbaum claiming that 
‘propositional processes and structures not only affect unconscious states, but the 
propositional structures can be unconscious states and their corresponding logical 
processes can operate unconsciously’ (2016: 19). 
Structured belief as a foundation for implicit bias is not without problems. While 
Dual Process/System theories can explain how implicit attitudes and explicit attitudes 
often differ, it is not clear how structured belief can accommodate this familiar claim. 
However, an explanation is available, based on the idea of fragmented beliefs. 
Fragmented beliefs, as the name suggests, are causally isolated from each other, hence 
able to exist simultaneously within one mind. There is no single consistent set of beliefs, 
fragmented beliefs may be in some cases contradictory. An alternative perspective is the 
introduction of a situation-specific dimension within the description of an attitude. Irene 
V. Blair (2002: 256) describes this idea, quoting from Abraham Tesser’s article Self-
Generated Attitude Change: 
 
An attitude at a particular point in time is the result of a constructive process ... 
And, there is not a single attitude toward an object but, rather any number of 
attitudes depending on the number of schemas available for thinking about the 
objects. (Tesser 1978: 297) 
 
Some key terms within the implicit bias debate have been described, i.e., attitude, belief, 
association and stereotype. An important alternative to the widespread associationist 
model has also been described based on structured beliefs, developed considering the 
claimed ineffectiveness of counterconditioning to change implicit attitudes. 
Mandelbaum’s structured belief hypothesis offers the particularly important possibility 
of mitigating implicit bias by rational intervention and argument, as structured beliefs, 
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Recalling the question raised at the beginning of this chapter; what is the nature of 
implicit bias? After introducing implicit bias, the IAT was described, the most well-
known testing model for implicit bias, more important, it was noted that the test is based 
on the pervasive view that association is at the heart of the implicit bias process. This 
led to description of Dual Process and Dual System models of cognition whereby 
differential response speeds, essential measurements within the IAT, are explained in 
terms of implicit bias as a System One process. If implicit bias is essentially a System 
One nonconscious associative process, then control or override by System Two 
conscious rationality seems problematic. Eric Mandelbaum challenges the associative 
model using experimental data and a structured belief hypothesis where implicit biases 
are sustained by unconscious beliefs that are propositionally structured mental 
representations that can be reason-responsive. 131  Clearly, the notion of control, (for 
example by conscious System Two processes), that originates from rational 
responsiveness to argument from others, and within the agents’ own internal 
deliberation, is surely vital if implicit biases are to be managed at a personal or 
institutional level. Such rational responsiveness described by Eric Mandelbaum is clearly 
suggestive of the notion of reasons-responsiveness within John Martin Fischer’s 
semicompatibilism. 
 If the existence of implicit bias and its influence on behaviour are not easy, in 
some cases perhaps impossible, to discern consciously, then it is unsurprising that 
behaviour as a manifestation of implicit bias is also difficult to control and mitigate at a 
personal and corporate level.132 However, there is clearly ‘a world of difference between 
 
131 See Keith Frankish Systems and Levels: Dual-System Theories and the Personal — Subpersonal Distinction 
(2012). On this account, at the subpersonal level there exists hybrid systems having some System One 
properties and some System Two properties. Personal reasoning constitutes a distinct level of mental 
activity, which can be clearly distinguished from the lower, subpersonal one. Also, Frankish Playing Double 
- Implicit Bias, Dual Levels, and Self-Control (2016). This wide-ranging Paper concludes that to suppress 
implicit bias it is not sufficient to have explicit unbiased belief and a desire to act accordingly. In addition, 
the agent must have a strong implicit desire to make those explicit propositional attitudes effective in 
reasoning and action; strength of will (2016: 42). 
 
132 For example, see Why Diversity Programs Fail from the July/August 2016 issue of the Harvard Business 
Review. 
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being difficult and impossible to control’ (Madva 2018: 62). It is argued within this Thesis 
that empirical evidence supports the former claim, that controlling implicit 
discrimination can be difficult, taxing, demanding but is possible (following Madva 2018: 
62). In the next chapter, an interactive Dual System, developed by Deutsch and Strack, 
Building Blocks of Social Behaviour (2010), will be described that shows control of implicit 
discrimination is possible. 
I agree with Levy that an agent is morally responsible for an attitude or an action 
iff it is appropriately attributable to the agent (Levy 2017: 4), where the condition 
‘appropriately attributable’ is satisfied in cases where the agent should be aware of their 
implicit bias.133 134 Mandelbaum’s claim that ‘propositional processes and structures not 
only affect unconscious states, but the propositional structures can be unconscious states 
and their corresponding logical processes can operate unconsciously’ (2016: 19) is clearly 
important not only because such a view presents a robust alternative to the widely held 
associationist/Dual System/Dual Process view, but also offers positive grounds for an 
understanding of implicit bias as reason responsive and subject to control and 
responsibility. 
This chapter began with a brief and uncritical look at the IAT. As previously 
noted, this set the scene for discussion of implicit bias within the context of the Dual 
System model of cognition. It is beyond the scope of this Thesis to appraise apparently 
conflicting empirical data135 concerning reason-responsiveness of implicit attitudes or 
propositions, however, at the time of writing (June 2018) it is generally accepted that 
 
133 For example, a hiring committee has a responsibility to be at least minimally aware of fundamental 
advances in bias and prejudice scholarship. Responsibility is characterised as a ‘function of the external 
context and wider social circumstances’ inhabited by the agent. Ignorance of implicit bias is not 
necessarily an exculpating condition of responsibility for behaviour where implicit bias is the source 
(Washington & Kelly 2016: 24). 
 
134 It is recognised that ‘should be aware’ is problematic and will be mentioned again during later 
discussion of awareness and responsibility within earlier cultures that supported behaviour now 
considered to be wrong. 
 
135 As an example of conflicting positions, refer to The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice (Blair 
2002), where the idea that behaviour influenced by implicit bias is automatic hence inevitable and nearly 
impossible to avoid is challenged by the conflicting position ‘ … that the perceiver's focus of attention 
can influence the automatic operation of stereotypes and prejudice, as well as more controlled processes’ 
(added emphasis) (Blair 2002: 251). 
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implicit bias is malleable (Cheryl Staats 2013: 53), although this claim is controversial and 
complex, see for example, Easier Done than Undone: Asymmetry in The Malleability of Implicit 
Preferences (Gregg A, Banaji M, Seibt B 2006). Further, there is no clear winner in terms 
of a mitigation strategy, and medium to long term effectiveness continues to be a 
problematic.136 
Having looked at the associationist model of implicit bias and a radically different 
perspective developed by Mandelbaum, the next chapter looks at implicit bias and 
control; a model of implicit cognition to be used in Part III will be developed that accepts 
a greater or lesser degree of conscious awareness and includes a reflective component, 
facilitating control of the behavioural expression of implicit bias and so responsible 
behaviour. This is obviously important because absence of control strongly suggests an 
absence of agent responsibility for issuing behaviour. Further, moving towards a clear 
position on control and responsibility for implicit bias related behaviour is necessary 
preparation for addressing the main question, does implicit bias threaten the 







136 See State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review 2013, particularly Chapter 8, Debiasing (Cheryl Staats 2013: 
53). 
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Implicit Bias and Control 
 
Implicit biases aren’t just coloring our 
thoughts, perceptions, and actions from 
behind the locked door of the unconscious 
but are themselves palpably present (or at 





At the beginning of the previous chapter, the apparent threat to free will posed by 
implicit bias was simply expressed in terms of the influence of implicit bias on behaviour 
without agent awareness, removing the possibility of agent intervention or conscious 
choice and so removing the possibility to act in available alternative ways. In other words, 
an absence of control and hence, it is commonly claimed, an absence of responsibility for 
issuing actions. On this view, an agent is, using Madva’s (2018: 66) term, ‘exonerated’ 
from responsibility by absence of awareness of their implicit biases or implicit bias 
influenced actions. In the absence of conscious awareness, responding to reasons and 
making rational alternative choices seems impossible. This can be framed in terms of a 
simple Dual Process model whereby behaviour issuing from implicit bias is the outcome 
of automatic System One processes, not subject to System Two conscious control or 
mediation. However, it will be recalled that Eric Mandelbaum developed a challenge to 
the often-discussed associative and Dual Process models of implicit bias using 
experimental data and a structured belief hypothesis where implicit biases are sustained 
by unconscious beliefs that are propositionally structured mental representations that can 
be reason responsive (page 107). 
 
137 Implicit Bias (Madva 2020: 387). See also Madva Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility (2018: 70). 
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In the Introduction to the important Paper Attributionism and Moral Responsibility 
for Implicit Bias (2016a), 138  Brownstein clearly expresses the issue of implicit bias, 
awareness, control and responsibility, and encouragingly supports implicit bias as a test 
case for theories of moral responsibility: 
 
What we know about implicit attitudes suggests they do not easily fit into 
traditional philosophical approaches to theorizing about moral responsibility. For 
example, in the empirical literature, ‘implicit’ typically means outside of conscious 
awareness or control. Philosophers who think that moral responsibility hinges on 
agentive control over, or awareness of, one’s attitudes may take this usage to 
suggest that people are not responsible for their implicit biases. […] Implicit bias 
is therefore a good test case for theories of moral responsibility that aim to accommodate 
the messy reality revealed by contemporary sciences of the mind. (added 
emphasis Brownstein 2016a: 766) 
 
On Brownstein’s view, people are often aware of the content of their implicit attitudes 
but often unaware of the effects their implicit attitudes have on their behaviour. 
Interestingly, Brownstein differentiates implicit from explicit attitudes by virtue of their 
insensitivity to what is explicitly taken to be true or good (2016a: 770).  
At the end of the last chapter it was stated, rather vaguely, that behaviour as a 
manifestation of implicit bias is difficult to control and mitigate at a personal and 
corporate level. Given such a range of positions, opinions and arguments, the aim now 
is to look deeper and consolidate what has been said so far, working towards a final 
unambiguous position on implicit bias in terms of control of issuing behaviour. 
This chapter considers essentially two approaches to implicit bias, control and 
responsibility. The first is based around Wesley Buckwalter’s Paper Implicit Attitudes and 
the Ability Argument (2018), followed by Holroyd and Kelly Implicit Bias, Character, and 
Control (2016). Buckwalter’s Paper gives structure to the first investigation; the ‘ability 
argument’ critiqued by Buckwalter provides a convenient and more formal expression 
of the simply expressed popular claim that an agent is not responsible for actions that 
issue from implicit bias. This is important because ultimately the question to be answered 
 
138  In this Paper Brownstein argues ‘that agents are morally responsible for actions that reflect upon 
what they care about, in the sense that these actions open them to being evaluated as moral agents. […] 
in paradigmatic cases, behavioural expression of  implicit biases reflect upon agents’ cares’ (2016a) and 
so is legitimately subject to moral evaluation.  
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is, does implicit bias threaten semicompatibilism in the particularly important area of 
responsibility? If argument and empirical data convincingly conclude that an agent is 
responsible for behaviour issuing from implicit bias, and later (Chapter 6) such 
behaviour is shown not to be subject to guidance control and agent responsibility, as 
defined by the semicompatibilist model, then semicompatibilism is threatened in the 
sense that its response to control of implicit bias influenced behaviour appears to be 
incorrect. Under such circumstances something is wrong; either the characterisation of 
implicit bias or the semicompatibilist model, or perhaps both, require revision. It is 
semicompatibilism that is under investigation, so initially the model of implicit bias will 
be held fixed, unless convincing evidence emerges that revision is necessary. So, the aim 
within the next part of this chapter is to finalise the characterisation of implicit bias to 
be taken forward.  
 
5.1 Implicit Bias and Control 
The question is, are agents morally responsible for behavioural expression of their 
implicit attitudes and biases? Buckwalter’s Paper Implicit Attitudes and the Ability Argument 
(2018) is essentially a critique of a particular response to that question i.e., the claim that 
an agent is not morally responsible for actions that issue from implicit bias. The claim 
that lack of control of implicit attitudes and behaviour entails an absence of 
responsibility for such behaviour. Buckwalter expresses the claim to be critiqued 
formally using the ‘ability argument’ (2018: 4): 
 
1. S does not have the ability to control implicit attitude p 
2. Implicit attitude p causes action Ø, therefore, S does not have the ability to control 
action Ø (by the Transfer of Responsibility Principle) 
3. If S is morally responsible for Ø, then S has the ability to control Ø 
4. Therefore, S cannot be morally responsible for Ø 
 
Contrast the above with Holroyd and Kelly (2016), to be considered later; 
 
1. If an agent has the relevant control and responsibility for implicit bias, then implicit 
bias reflects an agent’s character. 
2. Individuals do have relevant control/responsibility for implicit bias. 
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3. Therefore, implicit bias reflects an agent’s character, (and can legitimately be morally 
appraised). 
 
Considering the key concepts of control, causation and responsibility, Buckwalter’s 
Paper tries to refute the ability argument; that agents are not responsible for actions 
issuing from implicit bias. Buckwalter attacks the argument on all fronts, claiming all the 
premises are incorrect, and even if they were correct the argument is invalid. At the 
outset Buckwalter flags an issue with the ability argument because it invokes the 
questionable Principle of Transfer of Powerlessness (see page 41), whereby lack of 
control by S of p is transferred to lack of control of Ø. While initially plausible, this 
principle has issues that will be discussed later, for the moment I will look at the premises 
of the argument.139 140 
Consider Premise 1 and 2, both involving the notion of control; that S does not 
have the ability to control implicit attitude p and S does not have the ability to control action 
Ø caused by implicit bias. 
Buckwalter claims with respect to the first premise ‘ … current evidence appears 
to point in the opposite direction’ (2018: 5) and the substantial Paper Meta-Analysis of 
Procedures to Change Implicit Measures (Forscher et al. 2019) is cited as supporting this claim, 
(together with Papers by other leading authorities in the field, for example, Blair, 
Dasgupta, Greenwald and Frankish). Forscher’s recent (2019) eighty-four-page analysis 
of over eighty thousand participants across three hundred articles published during the 
last twenty years concludes ‘implicit measures141 can be changed, but there is little evidence 
that changes in implicit measures translated into changes in explicit measures and 
 
139 See Fischer and Ravizza (1998: 18), Ravizza (1993) and Carlson (2003) for detailed discussion of the 
Principle of Transfer of Responsibility. 
 
140 See also An Argument for Incompatibilism (van Inwagen 2003). 
 
141 Implicit tasks assess associations through behavior that does not require deliberate retrieval of the 
target association. Explicit tasks assess associations through behavior that requires deliberate retrieval 
(e.g., answers to a questionnaire). Tasks are procedures designed to generate behavioural responses for 
data analysis. Tasks are distinguished from measures, which are defined as the outcome of a data-analytic 
technique applied to behavioural responses. On an implicit task, comparisons between responses that 
result from pairings between one set of concepts relative to responses from a different pairing is referred 
to as an implicit measure of response bias. Similar comparisons on an explicit task are referred to as an 
explicit measure of response bias (Forscher et al. 2019). 
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behavior, and we observed limitations in the evidence base for implicit malleability and 
change’ (Forscher et al. 2019: 44). So, very measured support for the possibility of change 
of implicit attitudes. Buckwalter makes a much more positive interpretation, saying ‘the 
principle finding of this research was to confirm that implicit attitudes can change and to 
identify which procedures were effective at changing them over others …’ (2019: 5). 
Many examples of implicit bias mitigating strategies and studies are given by Buckwalter 
claimed to support the view that implicit biases are changeable. At this point, it seems 
reasonable to agree there is some measured support for the view that implicit biases are 
changeable, however, changeable and controllable (rejected by the first premise) are clearly 
not simply interchangeable terms.142  
The change – control issue is not addressed, and Buckwalter continues, 
describing indirect responsibility, where it is reasonable to expect an agent to deliberately 
take earlier actions to be able to act well in the future, for example, a doctor keeping up 
with current research to ensure they act in the best possible interests of their patient 
later, (a reasonable assumption by the patient). Direct responsibility is also described, 
where control, responsibility and action occur at the same time. With respect to the first 
premise of the ability argument, (S does not have the ability to control implicit attitude 
p), from his reading of Forscher’s Meta-Analysis of Procedures to Change Implicit Measures 
(2019), Buckwalter believes there is insufficient evidence available to counter his claim 
that such indirect and direct control (and so responsibility for implicit bias related 
behaviour) is possible (2018: 4). In other words, Buckwalter claims the first premise of 
the ability argument is not supported by sufficient evidence or good argument; there is 
no meaningful counter available to the claim that control and responsibility for implicit 
bias (and related behaviour) is possible.143 
 
142 When considering implicit bias and change, the issue of awareness is never far away - without 
awareness of bias how is change, or control, of bias possible? Because of its importance, awareness is 
discussed at several points within this Thesis. 
 
143 John Martin Fischer offers, as part of his guidance control model, the notion of ‘tracing’ whereby 
moral responsibility for an act at T requires the actual operation of a reasons-responsive mechanism at 
T or some suitable earlier time (1998: 50). For a detailed discussion of tracing see The Place of the Trace: Negligence 
and Responsibility (Murray 2019) and The Truth about Tracing  (Fischer and Tognazzini 2009). This has clear 
implications for implicit bias related behaviour and is explored in Part III. 
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I will return to Buckwalter and conclude discussion of the second premise of the 
‘ability argument’ 144  but first, further examination of change in terms of implicit 
measures and their translation into change in explicit measures and behaviour, and 
introduction of Deutsch and Strack’s Model of mechanisms that may mediate the 
influence of implicit social cognition (attitudes, stereotypes, self) on behaviour.  
 
The Deutsch and Strack Model 
As the title of this chapter confirms, control of implicit attitudes and their influence on 
behaviour is clearly a central concern, and I will approach it with further observations 
on Forscher145 and change. This is especially relevant, as considering how changes in 
implicit measures translate into changes in explicit measures and behavior will suggest a 
model developed by Deutsch and Strack (2010) that will be used extensively in Part III. 
This model describes the mechanisms that mediate the influence of implicit social 
cognition (attitudes, stereotypes, self) on behaviour. Sometime will be taken to describe 
this essential model and the control and responsibility implications for agents’ behaviour 
expressed by their implicit biases. Forscher says that ‘the results of the current meta-
analysis do not lend themselves to a single interpretation’ (2019: 45) and suggests 
possible explanations for implicit measures’ relationship with explicit measures and 
behaviour.146 However, Forscher concludes that the results of his analysis present a 
theoretical and empirical puzzle (2019: 44) and further work is believed to be necessary 
to understand the relationship between changes in implicit measures and changes in 
explicit measures and/or behaviour. The meta-analysis is ultimately inconclusive 
regarding whether implicit measures can be changed, and after repeated careful reading 
of Forscher’s Paper it remains unclear how implicit bias active within a System One 
 
144 Discussion of Buckwalter and the second premise of the ‘ability argument’ continues page 125. 
 
145 Authors contributed equally to this manuscript and the order of the names decided by coin flip; 
Patrick S. Forscher, Calvin K. Lai, Jordan R. Axt, Charles R. Ebersole, Michelle Herman, Patricia G. 
Devine and Brian A. Nosek. 
 
146 The fourth possible explanation is particularly interesting, the possibility that automatically retrieved 
associations are causally inert. This is mentioned because if automatically retrieved associations are 
causally inert then basic assumptions of current research in implicit social cognition would have to be 
completely revised. There is, of course, considerable support for the position that implicit biases are 
causally linked to discriminatory outcomes as previously described at some length. 
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domain could affect explicit System Two deliberative behaviour. It is unclear how 
‘changes in implicit measures mediate changes in explicit measures and behavior’ (2019: 
38) is to be understood. 
Within their discussion of associative versus propositional processes Deutsch and 
Strack (2010: 65) present an explanation of the interaction of System One and System Two 
processes, an explanation that will form the basis of the chosen model of mechanisms 
that mediate the influence of implicit social cognition (attitudes, stereotypes) on 
behaviour; a model that includes the possibility of control of behaviour. For Deutsch 
and Strack, associations have no claim to truth, no factual link necessarily exists between 
the associated elements, being formed ‘on the bases of temporal contiguity and 
frequency of pairing’ (2010: 65) within an impulsive system, (System One). By contrast, 
propositional representations and assessments of truth function within a reflective 
system, (System Two), taking some working ‘data’ from associative memory. Indirect 
measures such as the IAT address processes within the impulsive system and direct 
measures address processes within the reflective system. These are familiar ideas from 
Chapter 4, but Deutsch and Strack continue, claiming there is evidence that such clean 
demarcation is not the case; the two systems interact, impacting each other as described, 
for example, by Strack and Deutsch’s Reflective-Impulsive Model (2004) and Gawronski 
and Bodenhausen’s Associative-Propositional Model (2006). On this view, there is a 
substantive theoretical and evidential basis for the claim that ‘Propositional reasoning … 
is assumed to be capable of altering associative representations under specific conditions’ 
(Deutsch and Strack 2010: 65), and propositional representations and assessments of 
truth function within a reflective system, (System Two), taking some working ‘data’ from 
associative memory. (Recall also, Mandelbaum’s earlier argument, that propositional 
structures do inhabit the System One domain and System Two processes are present and 
active within the supposedly exclusive world of System One). Such interaction is surely 
suggestive of reasons-responsiveness within the semicompatibilist model and will be 
considered in Part III. Further, such interaction between System One and System Two 
processes suggests how changes in implicit measures can translate into changes in explicit 
measures and behaviour. So, importantly, Strack and Deutsch present a model that 
enables understanding of the relationship between changes in implicit measures and 
changes in explicit measures and/or behaviour. 
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I will describe the mechanisms that can mediate the influence of implicit social 
cognition within the Strack and Deutsch interactive model. The Handbook of Implicit Social 
Cognition (Gawronski and Payne 2010), Chapter Four, Building Blocks of Social Behaviour 
(Deutsch and Strack 2010), specifically addresses the impact of implicit social cognition 
on behaviour (2010: 62). To really understand the nature of possible control of implicit 
bias related behaviour it is necessary to understand and connect the elements or 
mechanisms that together mediate the influence of implicit social cognition on behaviour. 
Such elements or mechanisms are represented in Fig 5.1 reproduced from Building Blocks 
of Social Behaviour (Deutsch and Strack 2010: 66). In harmony with Buckwalter’s rejection 
of the first premise of the ability argument, it is possible to understand Fig 5.1 as 
essentially a model of control of behaviour, intuitively very plausible and supported by 
credible theoretical and practical research. This model integrates impulsive and reflective 
determinants that lead towards greater or lesser deliberative or reflective control of 
behaviour. Deutsch and Strack, at the outset, note the whole ‘ … paradigm of implicit 
social cognition rests on the notion that attitudes, prejudice, stereotypes, and the self 
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The main question addressed by Deutsch and Strack is, what are the mechanisms that 
facilitate, that mediate, the expression of such attitudes, prejudices and so on, in 
behaviour? Here, implicit social cognition is linked to basic ideas and assumptions 
already mentioned at some length (see Chapter 4); the idea of cognitive processes being 
subdivided into at least two groups, (implicit and explicit), that implicit social cognition 
research is generally based on indirect measures such as the IAT and finally, indirect and 
direct measures not only differ in procedure, but address different processes or systems. 
Further, as mentioned, the nature of implicit processes captured by indirect measures 
are usually considered associative in terms of underlying representations and activated 
automatically.147 Recall, as discussed in Chapter 4, this view is not universally held; 
Deutsch and Strack (2010: 64) agree there are ambiguities concerning automaticity, such 
as reports of research participants able to control their immediate stereotypical 
responses.148 Such ambiguities support the idea of an integrated reflective – impulse 
model, whereby reflective elements receive data from associative mechanisms of 
mediation, and also influence associative mechanisms. 
A central requirement of semicompatibilism is moderate reasons-responsiveness 
so it is important to look further at the role of reason and reflection within this model 
of implicit bias / implicit social cognition. Further to discussion in Chapter 4, particularly 
Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias (Mandelbaum 
2016), I will make some points concerning association and propositional representations 
and then mention some of the mechanisms that  mediate the influence of implicit social 
cognition shown in Fig 5.1. As noted, on one hand, association does not have any truth 
value, no true state of affairs is inherent within the association itself, no factual link. 
 
147 If behavior issuing from implicit bias is substantially controllable then the moral distinction between 
behaviour originating from implicit attitudes and explicit attitudes appears to be failing. Clearly, if such 
behavior is substantially controllable then the first premise of the ability argument is undermined. This 
is contrary to considerable and credible counter opinion. For example, The Kirwan Institute for the 
Study of Race and Ethnicity is very clear concerning key characteristics of implicit bias (Staats 2013): 
 
o Unconscious and automatic: They are activated without an individuals’ intention or control. 
o Pervasive: Everyone possesses them, even those avowing commitments to impartiality.  
o Do not always align with explicit beliefs: Implicit and explicit biases are generally regarded as related 
but distinct mental constructs. 
 
148 For detailed discussion of automaticity see Automaticity: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis (Moors 
and De Houwer 2006). 
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Rather, association is formed and sustained by ‘temporal contiguity and frequency of 
pairing’ (Deutsch and Strack 2010: 65). Propositional activity takes place within the 
reflective system and subject to direct measures. On the other hand, Mandelbaum argues 
that implicit attitudes have more structure than (mere) associations; implicit attitudes are 
mental representations with propositional structure that function as unconscious beliefs 
(2016: 18). There is evidence supporting both positions and it is impossible within the 
limits of this Thesis to resolve this matter. That said, interaction under certain conditions 
between propositional and associative processes, rather than isolated operation, 
integrating impulsive and reflective determinants, is intuitively very plausible and 
importantly grounded in credible theoretical and practical research (Strack and Deutsch 
2004; Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2006; Deutsch and Strack 2010: 65). Here, 
associative representations function as inputs to propositional processes and, (not 
shown in Fig 5.1), propositional reasoning can alter associative representations under 
certain conditions. This is an integrated approach in the sense that reflective and 
impulsive determinants work together, even though conflict may be present. See 
Appendix A, where these important issues are explored further. Next, I will look at some 
of the elements within the integrated model, mechanisms that may mediate the influence 
of implicit social cognition; motivation, opportunity to engage in reflective behaviour 
and construal of situations, (see Fig 5.1). 
When lacking motivation and/or opportunity, the processes usually associated 
with indirect measures are particularly influential in determining behaviour, for example, 
habits, Schemas and Heuristics. Generally, when motivation and opportunity are 
present, processes associated with explicit measures have greater authority over 
behaviour, but the influencing bias of stereotypes and associations still exerts some 
pressure on an agent to act perhaps contrary to more reflective intentions. Influenced 
by implicit cognition, a possibly biased construal of a situation is available to various 
behavioural mediators together with direct connection to the influences of implicit 
cognition (see Fig 5.1). Implicit cognition thus has an indirect (via construal) and direct 
influence on behavioural mediators. One of the features of implicit bias that is often 
mentioned is dissonance between explicit views and beliefs, typically a sense of having 
liberal, egalitarian attitudes, and behaviour that issues from implicit attitudes such as a 
tendency to employ on the basis of gender rather than suitability. Deutsch and Strack 
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(2010: 70) call behaviour that issues from implicit attitudes irrational149 and essentially 
associate it with impulsive System One processes. In terms of control, if impulsive 
determinants of behaviour have completely the ‘upper hand’ in certain situations, bypassing 
controlling/reflective/rational mechanisms, then there would be absence of control. 
While the integrative model of Deutsch and Strack (2010: 66) includes the possibility of 
reflective behaviour, there can be circumstances such as stress or tiredness (so lack of 
motivation) where this is almost impossible. However, tentatively, if implicit attitudes 
do have inherently more structure than (mere) associations, then responsiveness to 
reason and reflection may be more resilient to difficult (stress or tiredness) 
circumstances, within the Deutsch and Strack model. 
The integrative approach concerning reflective and impulsive mechanisms 
evolves from and generally runs in harmony with Dual Process/System models 
described earlier (Chapter 4). However, importantly, for Deutsch and Strack reflective 
and impulsive systems ‘operate interactively, serve different functions and have different 
conditions for optimal functioning’ (2010: 72); impulsive systems (IS) are considered to 
drive implicit social cognition, whereas reflective systems (RS) complement IS, providing 
propositional representations based on what is active within IS, and importantly, have 
(unless the agent is under high stress), an executive function generating judgements and 
decisions that result in controlled behaviour. 
 To summarise, change in the sense of mitigating or perhaps eliminating implicit 
bias and control in the sense of exercising direct influence over biases and issuing 
behaviour, are different concepts. Buckwalter’s references to changing implicit bias 
when control is the real issue, although I believe to be incorrect, has directed attention 
to the work of Strack and Deutsch, who propose an interactive unified System One and 
System Two model, important in understanding implicit attitudes and the mechanisms 
that mediate the influence of implicit social cognition (attitudes, stereotypes) on 
behaviour. Importantly, a model that offers the possibility of control of behaviour. This 
plausible and credible interactive model effectively closes down simplistic claims that S 
does not have the ability to control action Ø caused by implicit bias, because this model 
 
149 I believe ‘irrational’ is the correct description, rather than ‘nonrational’, as it captures that aspect of  
behavior that deviates from action that would be chosen rationally. 
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has as part of its structure mediating and reflective elements that have a controlling 
function on behaviour issuing from implicit attitudes. On the interactive view, within the 
mechanisms that determine behaviour are those providing rational executive control. 
While being ‘within’ and being active-within a mechanism are not necessarily the same 
thing, I believe the unified interactive model, incorporating reflective and mediating 
elements plausibly shifts the burden of proof very substantially towards those who claim 
an agent does not have the ability to control action Ø caused by implicit bias and so is 
not responsible. 
 
Having covered much important ground since leaving Buckwalter and the ability 
argument, I will now continue, with discussion of the second premise; implicit attitude 
p causes action Ø. Buckwalter claims that current empirical evidence for a causal link 
between implicit attitude and behaviour is mixed; some studies show a modest 
relationship or no relationship, others claim implicit attitudes do make a unique 
contribution to predicting behaviour (2018: 8). But predicting behaviour and showing a 
causal link are clearly different matters; from Buckwalter there does not appear to be a 
definitive conclusion on the causal nature of implicit bias, other than the claim that there 
are currently doubts that implicit attitudes are a significant cause of behaviour, and so 
the second premise is not adequately supported, but future research may completely 
change this situation (2018: 11). To consider this question further and reach a clearer 
understanding of implicit bias in terms of its possible causal relationship with behaviour 
as reflected by premise 2 of the ability argument, (implicit attitude p causes action Ø), it 
is necessary again to look deeper into the nature of implicit attitudes and behaviour.  
To look with particular interest at causation, I refer to two texts that together 
offer a comprehensive and very credible exploration of this aspect of implicit cognition: 
Then a Miracle Occurs: Focusing on Behaviour in Social Psychological Theory and Research (Agnew 
et al. 2010) and The Implicit Mind: Cognitive Architecture, the Self, and Ethics (Brownstein 
2018). 
 From Then a Miracle Occurs: Focusing on Behaviour in Social Psychological Theory and 
Research, Chapter 6, Unconscious Behavioral Guidance Systems (2010: 1-36), Bargh and 
Morsella argue that within the unconscious, causation is active and ‘there are a multitude 
of behavioral impulses generated at any given time from our unconsciously operating 
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motives’ (2010: 17). Description of the unconscious as a behaviour guidance system and 
source of action is plausible, for example, in an evolutionary context where the 
unconscious acts as source and guidance system for fast approach or avoidance. The 
essential and unequivocal claim expressed by Bargh and Morsella is that ‘Social cognition 
research over the past quarter century has confirmed … unconscious processes for 
adaptively guiding human behavior existed prior to the advent of consciousness and 
continue to generate behavioral tendencies today’ (2010: 16). A further point is made, that 
‘ … evaluation and attitude activation, social perception, and goal pursuit (have) been 
found to be directly connected to behavioral tendencies, without any need for conscious 
intention or awareness in the production of these adaptive behaviors’ (added emphasis 
2010: 16). The claim that there are causal links between largely unconscious processes 
and behaviour is plainly made, but with one necessary clarification. Bargh and Morsella 
do not take evaluation out of the process that leads to behaviour, rather situate this activity 
in the unconscious rather than the conscious reflective domain shown in Fig 5.1. While 
it is difficult to understand how this could be possible, nevertheless, in terms of causation 
there is in Bargh and Morsella’s opinion, no doubt that there is a link between 
unconscious processes and behavioural tendencies. 
The Implicit Mind: Cognitive Architecture, the Self, and Ethics (Brownstein 2018) is 
described by Neil Levy ‘… as not the last word on the topic, but … the state of the art 
today’ (2018). In light of Brownstein’s reputation in the field of implicit cognition, for 
example, as joint editor and contributor to Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 1 and 2 
(Brownstein and Saul 2016a and 2016b) and author of Implicit Bias (2016b), the claims 
and arguments relating to causation and implicit bias expressed within The Implicit Mind: 
Cognitive Architecture, the Self, and Ethics are clearly important and relevant within this 
discussion. This work is substantial, complex and subtle, developing a description of 
implicit attitudes ‘that deserve to be considered a unified and distinct kind of mental 
state’ (Brownstein 2018: 98), distinct from reflexes, mere associations, beliefs, 
dispositions and aliefs. 150  In terms of causation, I believe there is no doubt that 
Brownstein considers implicit attitudes have causal properties. Towards the end of 
 
150 For a detailed description of ‘aliefs’ see Implicit Attitudes and the Architecture of the Mind (Brownstein 2018: 
85). 
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Chapter 3, Brownstein describes negative and positive outcomes of implicit attitudes 
whereby implicit attitudes can ‘go awry from the perspective of moral or rational 
normativity’ as in the case of implicit bias that manifests in irrational and immoral ends. 
However, sometimes implicit attitudes get it ‘right’ by providing action guidance in ways that 
our reflective beliefs and values do not, such as spontaneous reactions and decisions in 
athletic and artistic domains (following Brownstein 2018: 97). The notion of guidance is 
integral to, perhaps at the heart of, this model of implicit attitude. For example, when 
describing the difference between aliefs and implicit attitudes Brownstein says ‘… 
implicit attitudes have a pro tanto151 guiding function … signalling to the agent to continue 
to attend or behave in some particular way’ (Brownstein 2018: 94). Is the meaning of 
‘guiding’ in this context the same as ‘causing’? The term ‘causes’ within Premise 2, 
(Implicit attitude p causes action Ø), concedes no other necessary factors; implicit 
attitudes are sufficient for action Ø to happen and it will happen. Guidance, help and 
advice can be ignored or accepted, along with other factors that (may) result in action. 
The conclusion to be drawn from Bargh and Morsella and Brownstein is that there is a 
causal connection between implicit attitude p and action Ø, however, the nature of that 
connection should not be expressed simply as implicit attitude p causes action Ø. The 
previously mentioned model shown as figure 5.1 is an example of the complexity of 
interaction between implicit attitude and behaviour; that there are causal links between 
largely unconscious processes and behaviour seems irrefutable, but the nature of such 
causal links is an ongoing subject of empirical work and scholarship. Certainly, the nature 
of the complex link between implicit attitudes and behaviour is such that Premise 2 
insufficiently describes the mechanism whereby implicit attitudes exercise their influence 
on behaviour. However, it is correct to say, I believe, that based on Bargh and Morsella 
and Brownstein, implicit attitudes are in certain circumstances a vital element in the 
causal process that leads to behaviour. Described in Appendix B (page 258), an 
alternative position is expressed by O’Connor; implicit bias is a contributor to a 
collection of motivators, but not in a direct causal role. Such motivational states could 
 
151 If a reason favours my doing something, then I have a ‘pro-tanto’ reason to do it; it is pro tanto to that 
extent right for me to do it. 
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include sufficient reasons for acting ‘of which I am entirely unconscious’ (O’Connor 2013: 
235)).  
The third premise from the ability argument, (if S is morally responsible for Ø, 
then S has the ability to control Ø), continues to be the subject of considerable debate 
and scholarship, for example, recall the important work of Frankfurt from Chapter 2, 
where agent responsibility is plausibly present without control in the broader regulative 
sense of making a choice between genuine alternative possibilities. This premise also 
recalls the plausible and well-known claim that ought implies can. For an agent to be 
morally responsible for an action, they must be able to fulfil (or to decline to fulfil) that 
action. In terms of the third premise, S is responsible for Ø implies S has sufficient 
control of the relevant circumstances relating to Ø to fulfil Ø. Buckwalter’s critique of 
the third premise of the ability argument, that if S is morally responsible for Ø, then S 
can control Ø, is in the form of examples, where there is absence of ability but plausibly 
there is responsibility. The cases involve the familiar situation of an agent deliberately 
taking an action that knowingly will remove their ability to perform a particular task in 
the future. For example, deliberately leaving home late to avoid a meeting, so at the time 
the meeting should start it is beyond the ability of the agent to attend. At the later time, 
the agent through their own deliberate action does not have direct control or direct 
responsibility, but clearly because their earlier action was an expression of indirect control 
the agent now has indirect responsibility for absence. Such examples claim to show, 
contra the third premise, the possibility of moral responsibility for actions that are 
beyond an agent’s direct control, by virtue of being indirectly responsible. Buckwalter 
claims it is likely that agents are responsible for their implicit bias related actions in the 
sense that they are at least indirectly responsible, for example, by failing to be sufficiently 
aware of implicit bias issues, even though such information is readily available.  
The claim that failing to be sufficiently aware of implicit bias issues when such 
information is readily available (possible culpable ignorance) can lead to indirect 
responsibility for behaviour appears very plausible, but to what extent are we morally 
responsible for investigating (and eradicating) our biases? I will describe an approach to 
this question, comment on the unlikely case of an agent who is completely unaware of 
implicit bias and therefore takes no prior action, look at the transfer of responsibility 
principle and then conclude discussion of the third premise (page 132). 
Title: Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist on Free Will and Responsibility? 
Chapter 5 
Implicit Bias and Control 
 
129 
Recall Erin Beeghly, Bias and Knowledge Two Metaphors (2020: 77-98). This Paper 
begins with the question,  ‘if you care about securing knowledge, what is wrong with 
being biased?’ The answer is developed using, (as the title suggests), two metaphors, bias 
as fog and bias as shortcut. It is impossible to adequately summarise Erin Beeghly’s far-
reaching and essential Paper. Erin Beeghly argues clearly and persuasively that we are 
deeply morally responsible for investigating (and eradicating) our biases from the 
perspective of justice, but what particularly resonates in this Paper is the need to ‘look 
out’ into the world at the social dimensions of bias in terms of privilege and oppression 
that do not receive appropriate attention when internal cognitive processes, motivation 
and cognitive overload are the main focus.  
Lindsey and Bradley Rettler in their significant Paper Epistemic Duty and Implicit 
Bias (2019) argue that people have an epistemic duty to eradicate at least some of their 
implicit biases. Moral duties and epistemic duties are clearly different, but Lindsey and 
Bradley Rettler look carefully at the close parallels between them. Implicit biases are 
epistemically harmful because they interfere with, or block, other epistemic duties such 
as having opinions and views that are true, based on clear and good reasoning. Given 
that implicit biases affect our ability to achieve other epistemic duties they should be 
eradicated. There is a clear parallel with moral duty; 
 
1. We ought to fulfil our moral duties. 
2. Having implicit biases prevents us from fulfilling our moral duties, so  
3. We ought not harbour implicit biases.  
4. If we can eradicate our implicit biases, then we (morally) ought to. 
 
The moral and epistemic arguments have the same structure. Both rely on the 
connection between implicit biases and other things - moral or epistemic duties (2019: 
8). Looking at Lindsey and Bradley Rettler’s argument in a little more detail, it is argued 
that agents have an epistemic duty to eradicate implicit biases that have negative epistemic 
impact; for example, when implicit biases get in the way of knowing the truth or having 
correct beliefs about something. Agents have such a duty if they have the right kind of 
control over implicit biases and blameworthy if having such control, they do not eradicate 
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them. The right kind of control is available and referred to as indirect reflective control.152 
The argument runs like this: Implicit biases can have a negative epistemic impact, for 
example, when they cause formation of false and unjustified beliefs, they function as 
knowledge blockers or by preventing other epistemic duties such as believing what is 
true and rejecting what is false (Rettler and Rettler 2019: 8). Implicit biases lead to bad 
outcomes but are also epistemically bad in themselves; they may be simply incorrect 
(assuming implicit biases are truth apt) or call up false associations. What is meant by 
‘the right kind of control over implicit biases’? Without the right kind of control there is 
no duty to eradicate implicit bias. The popular view of implicit bias as ‘below the radar 
of consciousness’ suggests as discussed, that control is impossible; Rettler and Rettler, 
while accepting the claim that direct control of implicit bias is impossible, maintain that 
indirect control is available and sufficient, granting the right kind of responsibility to an 
agent who is subject to legitimate blame when failing in the duty to eradicate implicit 
bias. Indirect control of beliefs is described as having ‘control over whether she believes 
that p iff she can actively engage in critical reflection that causally influences whether or 
not she holds the belief that p’ (Rettler and Rettler 2019: 13); reflecting on the reasons 
for believing p and changing our beliefs as necessary, considering such reflection. For 
implicit biases, Rettler and Rettler argue that the necessary indirect control is ‘even more 
indirect than our control over belief’ (2019: 14) in the sense that eradicating implicit bias 
is more successful when, for example, reflecting on positive arguments that support efforts 
to recruit more women into academic philosophy rather than reflecting on reasons not 
to have implicit bias concerning women philosophers. Alternatively, Holroyd (2012: 288) 
argues manifestation of implicit bias is influenced by explicit beliefs. Reflecting on explicit 
beliefs and values has an indirect influence on implicit values and biases. There are other 
indirect ways to control implicit bias described shortly.  
 
152 There are two ways in which we have indirect reflective control over whether we harbour implicit 
biases. One is that we can actively engage in reflection on particular arguments, as well as various beliefs 
and values that we hold, and this reflection causally influences whether we harbour various implicit 
biases. The other is that we can actively engage in reflection on various techniques that help eradicate 
implicit biases, and this reflection makes a difference to whether we engage in these activities, which in 
turn makes a difference to whether we harbour various implicit biases. Again, it’s not that agents have 
to actually reflect in these ways to be said to have indirect reflective control; but rather it’s that agents 
are capable of such active reflection (Rettler and Rettler 2019: 17). 
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So, agents have an epistemic duty to eradicate implicit biases that have negative 
epistemic impact if they have the right kind of control; to the extent that indirect 
reflective control is lacking, an agent is not blameworthy for failing in their duty to 
eradicate implicit bias. There is a moral duty to eradicate implicit biases that are blocking 
our ability to fulfil other moral duties. If the right kind of control is possible then, as in 
the case of epistemic duty, we ought to exercise this control or be subject to blame. 
What if an agent is completely unaware of implicit bias issues and therefore takes 
no prior action (or inaction) that would make later responsibility plausible? In such 
circumstances surely there cannot be responsibility for their implicit bias related actions? 
Buckwalter highlights the difference between assessing moral responsibility and 
assessing blame. It is suggested that an agent acting in complete ignorance may be 
responsible for implicitly caused behaviour while leaving open the question of blame 
given such excusing circumstances. The third premise is revised; for S to be morally 
blameworthy for Ø, then S must have the ability to control Ø. This appears at first look to 
be a difference without great substance, the notion of blameworthiness now carries all 
the moral weight. Buckwalter points out, in terms of implicit bias related behaviour, 
accepting there is responsibility while keeping open discussion of the more emotive 
allocation of blame may be helpful, for example, in public implicit bias mitigation 
strategies (2018: 17). That said, Buckwalter’s distinction between responsibility and 
blameworthiness does not illuminate anything significant, such as interesting new insights 
or directions of argument. Madva presents a nuanced position on this issue in Section 6 
Conclusion of Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility (2018): 
 
While I agree that we should not necessarily saddle individuals with ‘-ist’ labels 
that portray them as horrible people for possessing and expressing implicit biases, 
it is a mistake to conflate sanctimonious name-calling with the view that implicit 
discrimination is often worthy of blame, broadly construed. Blame is not so blunt 
an instrument. We can acknowledge the failings of others and ourselves to live 
up to our commitments without calling the sincerity of those commitments into 
question. In many cases, we can insist that individuals bear a legitimate degree of 
responsibility and blame, even if they lack perfect awareness of what they do. If 
it is ever strategically unwise to lay blame, then the upshot is not to jettison 
implicit bias from the sphere of moral responsibility; the upshot is to take great 
care in locating it properly within that sphere. (2018: 71) 
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If lack of ability to perform an action or to refrain from an action mitigates blame then 
what is the meaning, role or definition of responsibility? An alert, competent and sober 
driver will feel extremely responsible for harming a pedestrian who suddenly steps into 
the road even though it was not their fault, and they were not blameworthy. This issue 
is considered later during discussion of moral luck where it is suggested that the driver 
experiences a feeling of profound regret rather than responsibility. It is unlikely that 
separation of often emotive and controversial concepts of responsibility and blame 
could be sustained, particularly when discussing or implementing implicit bias mitigation 
strategies, a topic inherently emotive in the sense that participants may already be feeling 
hostile to the suggestion that they have implicit bias that requires mitigation.153 
 
Concluding discussion of the third premise, if S is morally responsible for Ø, then 
S has the ability to control Ø. This is essentially a sound claim if ‘control’ is understood 
as guidance control, so actual alternative pathways need not be available, the truth of 
determinism left as an open issue and moral responsibility retained. Buckwalter’s critique 
of the third premise in terms of direct and indirect responsibility is noted but I do not 
believe it has a significant impact, for example, on John Martin Fischer’s discussion of 
tracing as an integral and important part of the historical notion of guidance control and 
responsibility (1998: 195), paying careful attention to cases where responsibility is 
intuitively very questionable, such as compulsive behaviour (1998: 48). As mentioned, 
these themes are present in the development of semicompatibilist control and 
responsibility, discussed in Chapter 3. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section (page 128), to complete discussion 
of Buckwalter and the ability argument I will look at the transfer of responsibility 
principle, or control transfer principle (CTP): 
 
CTP:  If p causes Ø then the inability to control p entails the inability to control Ø. 
 
Buckwalter interestingly reformulates the CTP in terms of behaviour and implicit 
attitudes, calling the reformulation the implicit control transfer principle (ICTP): 
 
 
153 See also Responsibility for Implicit Bias (Holroyd 2012: 298) for detailed discussion of blaming and holding 
responsible. 
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ICTP:  If implicit attitude p causes Ø then the inability to control p entails the inability 
to control Ø. 
 
Buckwalter rejects the ICTP; the transfer of lack of control of implicit attitudes to lack 
of control of behaviour, for three reasons. First, the claim that inability to control p 
entails the inability to control Ø when Ø is caused by p is not universally accepted. 
Second, more importantly, there is insufficient supporting evidence for the claim that 
implicit attitudes are uncontrollable and ‘ … it is unlikely … that implicitly biased agents 
lack so-called “responsibility-level control” of their behaviour’ (2018: 20). (It is also 
suggested that if implicit attitude p causes Ø, implicit attitudes make only a small 
contribution to behaviour and so are not important).154 Finally, rejection of ICTP is 
based on the claim that ‘controllable behaviour can follow from uncontrollable states’ 
(2018: 22). 
Summarising, the ability argument maintains implicit attitudes cannot be controlled 
and are a source of discriminatory behaviour that, based on the implicit control transfer 
principle, are not subject to agent control, or responsibility. 
 
1. S does not have the ability to control implicit attitude p. 
2. Implicit attitude p causes action Ø, therefore, S does not have the ability to control  
action Ø (by the Transfer of Responsibility Principle). 
3. If S is morally responsible for Ø, then S has the ability to control Ø. 
4. Therefore, S cannot be morally responsible for Ø. 
 
Conclusions so far, taking each premise in turn;  
 
1. S does not have the ability to control implicit attitude p. There is insufficient 
supporting evidence for the claim that implicit attitudes cannot be controlled. From 
Deutsch and Strack (2010), an interactive model incorporating reflective and mediating 
elements provides rational executive control, and as a minimum, plausibly shifts the 
 
154 An interesting point is suggested here - the idea of a causal link that makes only a small contribution to 
behaviour. How is this to be understood? Surely, even if the ‘amount’ of behaviour issuing from an implicit 
attitude is relatively small, this does not thereby make such a causal implicit attitude any less important, 
given the sorts of areas where implicit attitudes and bias are often expressed. 
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burden of proof very substantially towards those who claim an agent does not have the 
ability to control action Ø caused by implicit bias and is so not responsible. 
2. Implicit attitude p causes action Ø. There does not appear from Buckwalter to be a 
definitive conclusion on the causal nature of implicit bias. However, on further 
consideration based on Agnew et al. (2010) and Brownstein (2018) the complex link 
between implicit attitudes and behaviour is such that Premise 2 although essentially true, 
is an insufficient description of the mechanism whereby implicit attitudes exercise their 
influence on behaviour. However, I believe, based on Bargh and Morsella and 
Brownstein, it is correct to say that implicit attitudes are in certain circumstances a vital 
element in the causal process that leads to behaviour. 
3. If S is morally responsible for Ø, then S has the ability to control Ø. Buckwalter 
presents cases where an agent acts to ensure at a later time control is impossible, yet still 
plausibly retains responsibility. The premise, if S is morally responsible for Ø then S has 
the ability to control Ø is revised; for S to be morally blameworthy for Ø, then S must 
have the ability to control Ø. The third premise is essentially sound. (It is understood 
that Frankfurt type examples could be presented to counter this claim). While 
Buckwalter’s critique of the third premise in terms of direct and indirect responsibility is 
noted, I do not believe that it changes the way forward within the overall discussion of 
control and responsibility; these issues are discussed in greater depth in other areas of 
the Thesis.  
The validity of the ability argument is challenged by disputing the Control 
Transfer Principle; if p causes Ø then the inability to control p entails the inability to 
control Ø. Various challenges are presented, perhaps most plausible is the claim that 
based on counter examples ‘controllable behaviour can follow from uncontrollable 
states’ (Buckwalter 2018: 22). 
4. Therefore, S cannot be morally responsible for Ø. Buckwalter comprehensively 
challenges the truth of the premises and validity of the ability argument, concluding that 
‘Pending future evidence, the rejection of these premises undermines the ability 
argument against moral responsibility (for implicit attitudes and related behaviour) (my 
addition 2018: 23). 
The title of this chapter is Implicit Bias and Control, therefore, to be clear, 
drawing on Buckwalter (2018) and Deutsch and Strack (2010), the first premise, that S 
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does not have the ability to control implicit attitude p, is rejected. Further, a contrary 
position is posited, that an agent can control implicit attitudes and related behaviour. 
Central to this claim is the interactive model (Fig 5.1), a configuration that is plausible 
and supported by significant empirical and theoretical research. There is behavioural 
decision-making present within this model, the possibility of responsiveness to reasons, 
(essential to control and responsibility within the semicompatibilism of John Martin 
Fischer). While not explicit within the model outline, there is interaction present in both 
‘directions’ in the sense that Reflective and Impulsive Systems influence and are 
influenced by each other (Deutsch and Strack 2010: 73). Such interaction suggests an 
integrated implicit bias mitigating strategy based on reason and argument and positive 
association could be particularly effective. 
 
The Holroyd and Kelly Approach 
I will now consider Holroyd and Kelly’s (2016) alternative approach to implicit bias and 
control. Is the disposition to behave in ways influenced by implicit bias part of a person’s 
character and so subject to moral evaluation? Responding to this question Holroyd and 
Kelly believe it is necessary to consider if an agent can control, (in some clearly defined 
way), such behavioural dispositions.155 Clark’s ‘ecological control’ is said to provide the 
necessary control, supporting the claim that character-based evaluation of such 
behavioural dispositions is justifiable. So, individuals have relevant control and 
responsibility for implicit bias, where implicit bias and the disposition to act in 
accordance with its influence are unified within character and can be legitimately morally 
appraised. In other words, implicit bias is an expression of our true self and something 
to be appropriately controlled by our true self. Clearly, this challenges popular and some 
expert opinion, i.e., that individuals do not have control of behaviour that takes place 
because of the influence of implicit bias. Holroyd and Kelly’s approach will be described 
along with five forms of control. The claim that implicit bias reflects an agent’s character 
and thereby can be legitimately morally appraised may be expressed as follows; 
 
 
155 Recall the distinction between direct and indirect control should be noted; direct control at the point 
of behaviour and indirect control, as suggested, for example, by Clark’s ecological control, at a time prior 
to the point of behaviour. 
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1. If an agent has the relevant control and responsibility for implicit bias, then implicit 
bias reflects an agent’s character. 
2. Individuals do have relevant control/responsibility for implicit bias. 
3. Therefore, implicit bias reflects an agent’s character, (and can legitimately be morally 
appraised). 
 
Crucially, what is the nature of the ‘relevant control’ over implicit bias that sanctions 
evaluation of an agent’s character and what is the role and implications of luck in 
formation of character? Jules Holroyd and Daniel Kelly suggest there are five forms of 
control to consider; direct (see also page 128), unified agency and reflective, alienation 
and evaluative, intervention, and ecological (2016: 108). It will be seen that ecological 
control offers the necessary means whereby an agent can take ownership of implicit bias 
as part of their character. I will now look briefly at each of these forms of control. 
 
Direct control 
Direct and immediate control of bias by the agent on becoming aware of certain 
behaviour is impossible under the basic associationist model; breaking associations that 
have built up over perhaps many years takes time. By contrast, a rational-responsive 
concept of implicit bias suggests that direct and fast control should be possible,156 but, 
as Eric Mandelbaum asks, ‘… if evidence can flip implicit attitudes, why don’t aversive 
racists drop their implicitly biased attitudes?’ (2016: 23). Mandelbaum offers an 
explanation, while retaining a rational-responsive concept of implicit bias, suggesting 
that when unconscious attitudes change it is clearly not a straightforward process; ‘the 
more important the content is, the more beliefs and connections it will have. To overturn 
implicit biases, it will be necessary to tackle all of these (many) different representations 
…’ (2016: 23). On this account, the notion of direct control does not seem attractive as 





156 See also Levy, Implicit Bias and Moral Responsibility: Probing the Data. For example, ‘The causal processes 
whereby implicit attitudes modulate behavior and decision-making are opaque to introspection, ensuring 
that we lack insight into what influence they have on our perceptions and judgments, and that there are 
no reliable means of modulating or inhibiting this influence’ (2017: 5). 
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Unified agency and reflective control  
In Part III (see page 197) Levy’s classic Paper Implicit Bias and Moral Responsibility: Probing 
the Data (2017) is discussed in terms of the nature of implicit bias and moral luck. At this 
point I will refer to Levy’s Paper in terms of its exposition of the central issues of 
responsibility and implicit bias, including detailed consideration of control and reasons-
responsiveness. Levy concludes that implicit attitudes ‘are not beliefs but patchy 
endorsements: endorsements because they have sufficient propositional structure to 
have truth conditions, but too patchy to be genuine beliefs’ (2017: 8). Levy argues that 
such patchiness undermines patterned reasons-responsiveness, control and 
responsibility. That responsibility is so undermined seems to Levy to be counterintuitive, 
implausible, and so continues by describing an alternative approach referred to as the 
attributability view. On this view, ‘agents are responsible for attitudes that properly 
belong to them, and for actions caused by such attitudes’ (Levy 2017: 18). However, 
after much consideration Levy says: 
 
It seems that on the attributability account,157 agents can’t be morally responsible 
for actions caused by their implicit attitudes when those actions have a moral 
character that diverges from the character they would have had were their explicit 
attitudes controlling their behavior – for under those conditions implicit attitudes 
do not belong to the real self. (added emphasis 2017: 14) 
 
In other words, implicit attitudes do not sufficiently belong to agents such that they are 
part of their real selves. It should be noted that the concept of ‘real self’ is problematic 
in the sense previously noted, that to a greater or lesser extent the real self is constituted 
by luck and the environment generally and so not under our full control. Therefore, 
behaviour that has the true self as source is not fully under agent control and so not fully 
responsible behaviour. Levy’s overall account is considerably more nuanced than such brief 
description allows, but the conclusion is clear; ‘if control, or attributability, or both, are 
necessary conditions of moral responsibility, agents are not directly responsible for 
 
157 Moral responsibility is usually framed in terms of control or attributability. An agent is morally 
responsible for an action, or for the consequences of an action, iff they exercise ‘freedom-level’ control, 
(deliberate control, exercised in the service of an explicit intention). Or, framed in terms of attributability, 
where an agent is morally responsible for an attitude or an action iff it is appropriately attributable to the 
agent (following Levy 2017: 4). 
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actions that have a moral character due to their implicit attitudes’ (2017: 14). Levy’s 
argument is based on the claim that the nature of explicit attitudes (generally) is such that 
they form a coherent whole that retains a reasonable degree of continuity over time, by 
contrast implicit associative attitudes are not overall coherent and not controllable in a 
way that allows unification of agency and expression of who the agent is. Hence, implicit 
associative attitudes are not the proper objects of moral assessment. Jules Holroyd and 
Daniel Kelly disagree for two reasons: 
 
First, we see no reason to suppose that implicit, associative processes in general, 
as a kind of mental structure, cannot help contributing to the unification of an 
agent. […] Second, even if we accept Levy’s claim that such states disrupt or fail 
to contribute to unified agency, this does not entail that such states are not 
candidates for moral evaluation in an agent who meets some threshold of unity 
by other means. (Holroyd and Kelly 2016: 113) 
 
On Holroyd and Daniel Kelly’s view, even if it is accepted that implicit associations are 
not unified within an agent, this does not entail implicit associations contribute nothing 
to who the agent is or cannot be to that extent subject to evaluation. Referring to 
Moskowitz and Peizhong’s Paper Egalitarian Goals Trigger Stereotype Inhibition: A Proactive 
Form of Stereotype Control (2011), Holroyd and Kelly argue there is evidence that automatic 
implicit processes, outside of the awareness of reflective agency, do work towards bringing 
behaviour into line with explicit values; they act in a unifying way, not alien to the self 
or character. Moskowitz and Li conclude; ‘It (stereotype control) is something we 
proactively158 engage, outside of conscious awareness, to help produce desired cognition 
in the first place, even inhibiting unwanted thoughts before they occur’ (2011: 115). 
Moskowitz and Li’s Paper presents fascinating conclusions relating to this unifying 
aspect of implicit cognition that merits full presentation; the essential claim is that ‘An 
individual can control stereotyping without knowing a stereotype or a goal exists. 
Conscious awareness of goals is not required. One’s wants, even implicit wants, can 
direct thoughts’ (2011: 114). This sounds too good to be true, but Moskowitz and Li 
present substantial and compelling empirical and theoretical supporting evidence. 
 
158 The term ‘proactive’ as used here means ‘Control … exerted on stereotype activation at the first step of 
the process. This is a proactive strategy of control, one focused at the level of basic social - cognitive 
functioning … ’ (Moskowitz and Peizhong 2011: 104). 
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Essentially, it is claimed there will always be a problem trying to inhibit stereotypical 
responses based on a Dual System model of conscious processes. Attempts to stop 
already activated stereotypes from influencing behaviour contrary to an agent’s explicit 
goals by System Two intervention are not effective. Simply expressed, by the time 
System Two processes intervene it can be, and often is, too late. Based on their 
substantial empirical work, Moskowitz and Li describe a more successful strategy, a 
proactive form of control that prevents a stereotype from ever being retrieved from 
memory, even though perceivers have categorized a person to a social group. Moskowitz 
and Li claim that ‘Control can be exerted on stereotype activation at the first step of the 
process. This is a proactive strategy of control … arguing that (appropriately set) goals 
disrupt the activation of stereotypes’ (2011: 104). It is claimed that goals are not always 
consciously selected and given that cognitive processes serve a goal, whether stereotype 
activation occurs is thus dependant on what goal the individual is implicitly pursuing. A 
nonconscious goal to be egalitarian directs selective attention to goal relevant stimuli in 
the environment that an individual is not consciously able to detect. Goals incompatible 
with stereotyping can be primed and held by the individual outside of their awareness.159 
(following very closely Moskowitz and Peizhong 2011: 104 - 105).  
It should be mentioned again that, although not described here, these theoretical 
claims and discussion are based on and supported by empirical work detailed within 
Moskowitz and Peizhong’s Paper. The fundamental conclusion is that automatic implicit 
processes are working in a unifying role, bringing behaviour into line with explicit values. 
This sense of unity whereby implicit bias, the disposition to act in accordance with its 
influence and the implicit countering tendency to bring behaviour into line with explicit 





159 The obvious question arises, how can a person adopt a goal to inhibit a stereotype-based response, 
(without awareness or conscious intent to inhibit the stereotype at the time such inhibition occurs); how 
is it possible to acquire an implicit goal that is consistent with an explicit, (for example, egalitarian), 
World view? The experimental methods of Moskowitz & Peizhong describe how under lab conditions 
this is facilitated, but it is not clear how this would be achieved outside such controlled conditions. 
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Alienation and evaluative control 
The term alienation is used to describe implicit bias and its claimed unresponsive nature to 
an agent’s explicit evaluative attitude. The agent is said to be alienated from their implicit 
attitudes. From this idea, various positions emerge, for example, that implicit biases are 
not part of the real self and are exempt from moral assessment. Alternatively, from 
Glasgow’s160 account, implicit biases while not part of an agent’s moral character due to 
alienation, or lack of evaluative control, nonetheless influence the moral evaluation of 
an agent and their actions (Brownstein and Saul 2016b: 37-61). Holroyd and Kelly (2016: 
114) agree that alienation does not entail any reason to exempt an agent from evaluation 
of their alienated attitudes and biases but disagree that alienation entails that implicit 
biases are not part of who the agent is.161 
 
Intervention control 
If an agent cannot inhibit or intervene in implicit bias influenced actions due to simply 
being unaware of their presence, as noted previously, this naturally raises considerable 
doubts over granting control, attributability and responsibility to that agent. Intervention 
control occurs when an agent inhibits or redirects their own behaviour when it is sensed 
that it is deviating from explicitly held views and commitments. Holroyd and Kelly agree 
that agents often cannot assert this type of control over implicit bias related behaviour. 
However, such a limited concept of control, where an agent ‘steps in’ quickly to inhibit 
or redirect their own behaviour, bringing into line perhaps with explicitly held views and 
commitments, is surely a too exacting requirement. Ecological Control provides a 
significantly more nuanced approach offering a plausible, perhaps compelling, 
description of unifying control that supports the idea that implicit biases are part of an 




160  See Joshua Glasgow, Alienation and Responsibility, Implicit Bias and Philosophy Volume 2: Moral 
Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics  (Brownstein and Saul 2016b: 37-61) for comprehensive 
treatment of this idea. 
  
161 Recall earlier comments concerning the concept of ‘real self’ as potentially problematic in the sense that 
it is arguably to a greater or lesser extent constituted by luck and environment generally and so not under 
our full control. 
Title: Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist on Free Will and Responsibility? 
Chapter 5 




Andy Clark’s description of ecological control (2006) is subtle and quite radical in its 
approach. Indicative of Clark’s general position is the following:  
 
There is no self, if by self we mean some central cognitive essence that makes me 
who and what I am. In its place there is just the ‘soft self’: a rough-and-tumble 
control-sharing coalition of processes – some neural, some bodily, some 
technological – and an ongoing drive to tell a story, to paint a picture in which ‘I’ 
am the central player. (2006: 23) 
 
The notion of the mind having a fluid boundary, not coinciding with the biological 
boundary of the organism, appears at first glance to be from the realm of science fiction 
rather than philosophy, but Clark argues convincingly that particularly human beings 
incorporate, draw in and unify, features of the environment and themselves when acting 
and problem solving, describing human beings as ‘ecological controllers’ (2006: 5). 
Ecological control is a top-level control, not the micromanaging of finer operating details 
of a system. Holroyd and Kelly summarise Clark’s position:  
 
… one central feature of human agency involves supplementing the internal sub-
personal mechanisms that guide behaviour by engineering their world, calibrating 
‘external’ sub-personal structures so that they help simplify cognition and bring 
out the kinds of behaviours and outcomes to which they aspire. (2016: 118) 
 
How does this idea of ecological control connect with mitigation of implicit bias? While 
agents probably lack direct intervention control over implicit biases, it is plausible that 
some degree of malleability of implicit bias attitudes is possible (Devine 1989), (Blair 
2002), (Moskowitz and Peizhong 2011). If it is accepted that change is possible, then 
Clark’s model of ecological control can be helpful in framing some of the change 
motivating options available to the agent. For example, using environmental props to 
guide cognitive processes such that implicit biases are weakened. This could take the 
form of counter conditioning, such as thoughtful exposure of agents to positive images 
of admired black celebrities around the work-place, where the work-place on Clark’s 
account is an extended cognitive field (2006: 25). The essential point from Holroyd and 
Kelly, based on Clark’s account, is that features of the environment can be managed to 
influence cognitive processes in predetermined ways, including automatic features of our 
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mental processes. If such influencing effects of the environment are potentially available 
for positive manipulation, it seems a very plausible claim that an agent’s implicit biases 
are at least to this extent under their control, with attendant responsibility. (On page 118, 
it was noted that changeable and controllable are not simply interchangeable terms. 
Here, the subtle and detailed approach by Andy Clark counters any notion of simplicity 
and obvious concerns of change of implicit attitudes as a form of control). The agent 
must be aware of implicit bias and have some knowledge of ecological control, control 
that in many cases can take the form of quite straight forward strategies. Holroyd and 
Kelly describe ecological control as ‘the structuring of one’s environment and cognitive 
habits such that autonomous processes and sub-systems can effectively fulfil one’s 
person-level goals’ (2016: 130). It is claimed that ecological control offers the possibility 
of character-based evaluation of the agent’s implicit attitudes because in this important 
ecological sense the agent can have control over such mental states. Not by direct 
intervention into the automatic process as conventionally understood, but with a broader 
notion of control by purposefully manipulating an agent’s environment.162 163 
Summarising the above greatly condensed description of Holroyd and Kelly’s164 
Paper: (i) There is an important sense in which individuals have control over implicit 
biases. Such control is commonplace in our exercise of agency. (ii) Ecological control is 
the structuring of one’s environment and cognitive habits such that autonomous 
 
162 In their short, intense and very interesting Paper, Phia Salter, Glenn Adams and Michael Perez Racism 
in the Structure of Everyday Worlds: A Cultural-Psychological Perspective (Salter, Adams, and Perez 2018), argue that 
to understand racism a cultural-psychology framework is necessary. This Paper is difficult to summarise, 
but an essential point is the importance of culture in a wide variety of aspects that reinforces racists attitudes 
that in turn facilitate a racist culture. Relating to Ecological Control, although not mentioned explicitly 
within the text, the authors conclude that ‘rather than attempt to control expression of culturally 
constituted, individual bias, a more effectual use of personal agency may be to reconstruct worlds that 
promote antiracist tendencies’ (added emphasis 2018: 153). See also Ayala-López and Beeghly, Explaining 
Injustice: Structural Analysis, Bias, and Individuals, An Introduction to Implicit Bias (2020: 211-232). 
 
163 Such indirect intervention, control, and so responsibility (or any intervention) surely depends on at 
least some meaningful awareness of implicit bias. A response to this objection may be found in 
Responsibility for Implicit Bias (Holroyd 2012: 292). Essentially, it is argued that ‘it is not a necessary 
condition for responsibility that individuals are aware of the influence of certain cognitive states on their 
decisions and actions’ (2012: 294). 
 
164 With minor changes, my summary is based on Holroyd and Kelly’s Paper, Section 5.6, Concluding 
Remarks (2016: 130).  
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processes and sub-systems can effectively fulfil one’s person-level goals. There are two 
central implications of this claim: If agents have this kind of control, (and so 
responsibility, then subject to other necessary conditions being met, discussed below), 
implicit attitudes can be an appropriate target of character-based evaluation. If agents 
exercise this form of control, (and so responsibility, then subject to other necessary 
conditions obtaining), implicit attitudes can be properly regarded as part of ‘who the 
agent is’  -  part of her character, which is as a whole subject to moral evaluation (2016: 
130). 
There is an important point to note. The argument that an individual can take and 
exercise ecological control over implicit biases is vulnerable to the following objection. 
 
… whether, for any individual, she can in fact exercise ecological control depends 
on whether she is aware of these possibilities (and indeed, aware of the 
phenomena of implicit bias, and that she may be affected by it). So the mere 
possibility of having ecological control is not sufficient for implicit biases to be 
considered as ‘part of the agent’ and hence morally evaluable. In addition to the 
control conditions, epistemic conditions must also be met as well. (added emphasis 
Holroyd and Kelly 2016: 127) 
 
Holroyd and Kelly accept that ecological control can permit moral evaluation only if other 
conditions obtain, however it is claimed such an objection can be moved to the side. 
The vital claim and supporting argument are that implicit biases are part of who the 
agent is, and agents can be evaluated for being influenced by them because the agent has 
control over such mental entities. Holroyd and Kelly identify an important sense in 
which agents can have control (ecological control) over such mental entities (following 
closely Holroyd and Kelly 2016: 175). 
Following some brief comments on the notion of ‘who the agent is’ I will bring 
together and summarise the ideas relating to implicit bias so far discussed, together with 
some additional points, in preparation for Part III. 
The idea of ‘who the agent is’ or the notions of ‘real self’ and ‘deep self’ offer a 
perspective from which important issues such as agency, responsibility, free will and 
autonomy are obviously connected. Claims of responsibility, with associated praise or 
blame, are usually based on some notion of autonomy. It is intuitively felt that to act 
responsibly it is necessary to act autonomously; clearly without coercion, but also in 
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some sense as an uncaused cause, whereby actions originate from ‘within’ the self and 
without any overriding ‘external’ influences. The notion of the self as an ‘uncaused cause’ 
is clearly problematic, not least because without a cause or influence at some stage it 
seems that actions occur randomly and so preclude responsibility. Typically, the cause, 
or agent causation, is understood as an emergent human (and some nonhuman animal) 
property, that while still ontologically physical, has the capacity to initiate causal chains 
in a top-down direction to lower levels of the body’s hierarchical structure and so into 
the world. If responsibility does not entail autonomy, then how is responsibility and free 
will to be understood, if at all? Alternatively, if responsibility is to be meaningful then 
how is autonomy to be understood? From earlier discussions,165 this is familiar territory, 
but as Susan Wolf notes,166 within the free will debate focus is usually on determinism of 
some form rather than the connection between free will and personal autonomy (1993: 
24). The essential objective noted at the beginning of Freedom Within Reason (Wolf 1993) 
is to understand and describe a sense of autonomy that would give necessary freedom 
of will and action to agents such that responsibility, with associated praise and blame, 
could legitimately be assigned. The problem is to identify and convincingly describe a 
self, (perhaps in terms of deeply held values), that, as suggested, is in some sense 
‘uncaused’ (autonomous) and yet be a source of sequences of causation.167 How is it 
possible or meaningful to say that a real or deep self exists exempt from external causal 
influences from the environment, from genetic determination or simply from luck? To 
be influenced by these things, in ways that shape behaviour is, it seems, potentially to 
relinquish autonomy in ways that could be relevant when assigning responsibility. At this 
point, the ontology of such a self remains obscure and mysterious. 168  For further 
 
165 See particularly David Hume page 19, Determinism page 37 and Wolf (1993: 27) page 59. 
 
166 Freedom Within Reason (Wolf 1993), particularly Chapter Two, presents a superbly clear development 
and critique of the real self-view. 
 
167 For detailed expression of these issues see Galen Strawson The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility (G. 
Strawson 1994), Clarke On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility (2005) and Hartman 
Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson’s Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility (2018), also available 
from <www.robertjhartman.com>. 
 
168 The hugely influential philosopher and historian Michel Foucault rejected fixed essence as personal 
identity. Foucault argued that the self is defined by a continuing discourse in a shifting communication of 
oneself to others. The classical view of identity is something that is inherent and fixed in some way or 
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discussion of this key issue see Appendix B Agent Causation, where agent causation and 
other models of agency are described in greater depth. 
 
5.2 Summary 
The aim of this chapter was to formulate a description of implicit bias to take forward 
into Part III. Recall that Part III considers whether behavioural expression of implicit 
bias is such that it is (or is not) subject to guidance control and hence whether the agent 
acted freely and responsibly (as those terms have been developed within the 
semicompatibilist model). If examination shows that issuing behaviour of implicit bias 
is not subject to guidance control, then the agent does not act freely and responsibly as 
articulated by John Martin Fischer’s semicompatibilism. Such a conclusion would be 
contra to what has now been developed within Part II where compelling arguments 
show agents are responsible for behaviour that issues from implicit bias. If such a conflict 
occurs this is suggestive of a problem with the semicompatibilist model, and it may be 
possible to propose amendments or revisions to John Martin Fischer’s 
semicompatibilism to take account of the issues brought to light by implicit bias. 
 Two important approaches to implicit bias and responsibility have been 
considered with reference to; Implicit Attitudes and the Ability Argument (Buckwalter 2018), 
The Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition (Gawronski and Payne 2010), Chapter Four, 
Building Blocks of Social Behaviour (Deutsch and Strack 2010) and Implicit Bias, 
Character, and Control (Holroyd and Kelly 2016). From examination of Buckwalter’s 
critique of the premises of the ability argument I worked towards description of a 
plausible interactive Dual System model based on Deutsch and Strack (2010), a 
configuration that includes decision making and mechanisms that mediate the influence 
of implicit social cognition on behaviour. From Holroyd and Kelly I described a model 
of individual control over implicit bias and influenced behaviour: Ecological control 
requires creating an environment and forming (proactive) habits that facilitate processes 
to achieve our goals. Such control is an integral part of the view that implicit attitudes 
can be properly regarded as part of an agent’s character that in every respect is 
 
part. Foucault’s idea of practices increases the ways that the individual can be constituted in and 
through culture, (<http://changingminds.org/explanations/identity/foucault_identity.htm>) 
(following Foucault and Identity 2020). 
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legitimately subject to moral evaluation (following Holroyd and Kelly 2016: 130). There 
is harmony between these two approaches in terms of agent responsibility and at the 
point of goal setting the proactive engagement of implicit processes to achieve explicit 
goals. 
 The model of implicit bias taken forward into Part III will be interactive as 
described. This credible mainstream approach is in harmony with Dual Process/System 
models and is proportionate with semicompatibilism in terms of its importance and 
credibility. While it is principally the interactive model that will be taken forward, there 
is, as noted, agreement between this model and the approach of Holroyd and Kelly in 
terms of agent responsibility. Regarding responsibility for actions that have as their origin 
implicit bias, Holroyd and Kelly’s conclusion is clear; ‘ … there is an important sense in 
which individuals have control over implicit biases’ (2016: 130) and with control comes 
responsibility. While greater understanding is necessary concerning the reflective and 
impulsive processes that mediate between implicit social cognition and explicit 
behaviour within the interactive model (Deutsch and Strack 2010: 73), there is no doubt 
that control in an important sense, and so responsibility, is intrinsic to this model. 
 
5.3 Summary of Part II 
Chapter 4 describes implicit bias and the IAT, leading naturally to a description of Dual 
Process and Dual System models of cognition. If implicit bias is a System One 
nonconscious associative process, then control or override by System Two conscious 
rationality appears problematic and without control, responsibility is also problematic.  
Chapter 5 considered essentially two approaches to implicit bias and 
responsibility with the aim of finalising a position on implicit bias. An interactive model 
was described based on the work of Deutsch and Strack (2010) together with the 
contrasting approach of Holroyd and Kelly (2016), an approach in accord with Deutsch 
and Strack’s model; importantly, both approaches express individual responsibility for 
overt behaviour having implicit cognition as its source.169 
 
169 Encouragement for this approach can be found in An Introduction to Implicit Bias (G. M. Johnson 2020), 
where it is noted that ‘As methods for studying bias become more sophisticated, so too does our 
understanding of how bias operates in the minds of individuals. Given the variety, readers might be 
sceptical that there is even a unified phenomenon to be studied under the heading of implicit bias 
research. If this is right, it would explain why some data surrounding implicit bias operation just can’t be 
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 Before leaving Part II, some broader comments on the idea mentioned above 
under the heading ecological control, whereby features of the environment can be 
managed to intentionally influence cognitive processes in particular ways, including 
automatic features of our mental processes, so allowing indirect control and mitigation 
of implicit bias related attitudes. While ‘Implicit biases are typically thought to reside 
“inside our heads” ’ (Ayala-López and Beeghly 2020: 215) implicit or explicit biases may 
be described in terms of absorbed controlling images and ideas that originate from 
within social structures that are made manifest by agents (Ayala-López and Beeghly 2020: 
216). While within this Thesis there is emphasis on ‘psychological’ bias, it is essential to 
confirm the importance of structural and environmental factors cannot be overstated. 
Structuralist accounts position external factors such as inequality as the cause of explicit 
and implicit bias not the outcome. Clearly, such a view has vital implications for bias 
mitigation; structural change must precede psychological programs that target individual 
bias directly (following Ayala-López and Beeghly 2020: 211-232) not least because to 
 
… endorse an analysis of injustice that prioritizes individuals (and especially their 
mental states) … we are encouraging theorists to remain at the periphery of social 
problems, ethically and politically speaking, rather than getting to their core. 
(Ayala-López and Beeghly 2020: 221) 
 
Ayala-López and Beeghly develop an account of implicit bias, inequality and injustice 
that includes structural and individualistic approaches that motivate a more 
comprehensive and deeper understanding of social injustice; ‘both approaches are 
necessary to explain what’s wrong with injustice, why inequalities occur, and how to 




explained using one, monolithic psychological explanation. Instead, we would need a variety of different 
theories. The purpose of psychological theorizing around implicit bias, then, would be to search for 
different explanations, describing in what instances they’re apt, investigating what, if anything, unifies 
them, and, importantly, doing all this while ensuring that such explanations are genuinely explanatory’ 
(Johnson 2020: 35). 
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Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist 
Position? 
 
There are two sources of the metaphysical 
conundrum of human existence. The first is 





Why is semicompatibilism chosen as the free will position to be examined? Recall the 
summary of Chapter 3, where it was noted that semicompatibilism is the gold standard 
compatibilist position, capturing our intuitions about agency and offering a rich and 
plausible model of our place in the world. Semicompatibilism sustains our sense of moral 
responsibility and status as persons whether it happens to be the case that determinism, 
or indeterminism, is true. John Martin Fischer’s semicompatibilism can accept the 
consequence argument and accommodate the incompatibilist’s claim that determinism 
rules out the type of freedom that allows choice between truly open and available 
alternatives (regulative control). Motivated by Frankfurt examples, such regulative 
freedom is claimed to be unnecessary for moral responsibility; guidance control is 
sufficient to ensure agent responsibility. Part III examines implicit bias and 
semicompatibilism, seeking to understand if an agent’s implicit bias related behaviour is 
subject to guidance control and therefore performed freely and responsibly, as those 
terms have been defined within the semicompatibilist model. As noted, on the 
semicompatibilist view, metaphysical problems arising from an insistence on regulative 
control (usually as a condition for individual responsibility) together with the truth of 
causal determinism are avoided. Guidance control gives the agent the kind of freedom 
 
170 Modern Philosophy, An Introduction and Survey (Scruton 2012: 227). 
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sufficient for responsibility whether or not determinism is true. If issuing behaviour of 
implicit bias is shown not to be subject to guidance control, then the agent does not act 
freely and responsibly as articulated by the semicompatibilist model. If issuing behaviour 
is not subject to guidance control and yet there are sound and compelling arguments for 
agent responsibility for behaviour issuing from implicit bias, as described in the previous 
chapter, then there is surely a deficiency or problem with the semicompatibilist model. 
If this is the case, it may be possible to suggest amendments or revisions to the 
semicompatibilist model to take account of the issues brought to light by implicit bias. 
This is at the heart of the research within this Thesis and a contribution to knowledge 
within this field. Essentially, Chapter 6 is in two parts. The first and major part examines 
implicit bias and guidance control, the second part looks at semicompatibilism, luck and 
implicit bias. Luck is perhaps the major threat to compatibilism. A defence of 
semicompatibilism from the luck problem will be examined in light of implicit bias. 
Implicit bias appears to be a paradigm example of a source of behaviour that is formed 
and often continually reinforced by factors that are subject to luck within an agent’s 
behaviour issuing mechanism. 
 In this chapter I will show the semicompatibilist position on free will and 
responsibility, developed by John Martin Fischer, is not threatened by the challenge of 
implicit bias. Implicit bias related behaviour is shown to be subject to guidance control 
and so agent responsibility in harmony with the models of implicit bias developed in 
Part II. I will also argue that Cyr’s defence of semicompatibilism from the luck problem 
is not affected when considering the interactive model of implicit bias (Fig 5.1) where 
implicit attitudes are included within an agent’s deliberative standpoint. However, 
compatibilism is still threatened by the luck problem in the context of implicit bias as 
characterised by Levy. 
 
6.1 Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position? 
Part I presented an overview of free will, including a description of semicompatibilism. 
Part II considered implicit bias, arriving at a particular characterisation described as 
interactive Dual System, developed in detail by Deutsch and Strack, Building Blocks of 
Social Behaviour (2010). The essential objective so far has been to understand these 
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concepts, one almost as old as philosophy itself, the other relatively modern. To begin 
Part III the central idea of guidance control will be explored considering implicit bias.  
 
6.1.1 Implicit Bias and Guidance Control 
Given the model of implicit bias developed in Part II, is implicit bias related behaviour 
subject to guidance control and so appropriate for moral appraisal? Consider the four 
necessary171 aspects of guidance control172 outlined below: 
 
1. An agent has guidance control in so far as their deliberation mechanism is 
appropriately responsive to reasons (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 41-46). 
2. The appropriate way is moderate reasons-responsive (Chapter 3, page 72):  
An agent’s responsibility relevant mechanism K is moderately reasons-responsive iff: 
a. K is regularly receptive to reasons, some of which are moral. This requires;  
i. That holding fixed the operation of a K-type mechanism, the agent 
would recognize reasons in such a way as to give rise to an 
understandable pattern from the viewpoint of a third party who 
understands the agent’s values and beliefs. 
ii. That some of the reasons mentioned in (2.a) are moral reasons. 
b. K is at least weakly reactive to reasons; this requires that the agent would react 
to at least one sufficient reason to do otherwise, (in some possible scenario), 
 
171 Todd Long’s Paper Moderate Reasons-Responsiveness, Moral Responsibility, and Manipulation (2004) was very 
helpful in preparing this summary. 
 
172  John Martin Fischer, Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value, makes a clear summary of 
semicompatibilism: ‘Semicompatibilism is the view that causal determinism is compatible with moral 
responsibility, quite apart from whether causal determinism rules out regulative control. 
(Semicompatibilism is officially agnostic about whether causal determinism does rule out regulative 
control.) Thus, a Semicompatibilist might accept the conclusion of the Consequence Argument, but still 
hold that causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. A Semicompatibilist can thus 
accommodate a kernel insight of the incompatibilist but also embrace the attractive features of 
compatibilism, most notably, the resiliency of our fundamental views of ourselves (with respect to certain 
abstract scientific theories). Of course, a Semicompatibilist need not accept the conclusion of the 
Consequence Argument. It is no part of the essence of Semicompatibilism that causal determinism is 
incompatible with regulative control; rather, the fundamental idea is that moral responsibility depends 
on how the actual sequence unfolds, not on whether the agent has access to alternative possibilities. 
Semicompatibilism is, as I have emphasized, an “actual-sequence” model of moral responsibility’ 
(Fischer 2015a: 17). 
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although it does not follow that the agent could have responded differently 
to the actual reasons.  
c. K is the agent’s own; being the agent’s own means ‘taking responsibility’ for 
K. This requires that the agent; 
i. Sees herself as the source of her behavior (which follows from the 
operation of K). 
ii. Believes that she is an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes that result 
from how she exercises her agency in certain contexts. 
iii. Views herself as an agent with respect to (c.i) and (c.ii) based on her 
evidence for these beliefs (1998: 62-91, 243-244). 
3. To be morally responsible is to be an apt candidate for reactive attitudes (1998: 7). 
4. An epistemic condition; to be praiseworthy or blameworthy an individual must 
know, or be reasonably expected to know, what they are doing (1998: 12). 
 
These are the necessary and sufficient ingredients for an agent to affirm guidance 
control. With focus on the integrative model of implicit bias, I will consider the question 
carefully, exploring implicit bias and semicompatibilism step by step. Before looking at 
the elements of guidance control, an appropriate starting point is John Martin Fischer’s 
concluding remarks from Four Views on Free Will: 
 
When we walk down the path of life with courage, or resilience, or compassion, 
we might not (for all we know) make a certain sort of difference, but we do make 
a distinctive kind of statement. For the semicompatibilist, the basis of our moral 
responsibility is not selection in the Garden of Forking Paths, but self-expression 
in writing the narrative of our lives: it is not that we make a difference, but that 
we make a statement. In writing the stories of our lives, we connect the dots in a 
way that gives our lives a signature kind of meaning. Even if the name is 
unexciting, the idea is beautiful. (2007: 82) 
 
John Martin Fischer is clearly concerned with issues that are broader than those explored 
in this chapter, relating his notion of freedom to questions about the meaning and value 
of life, rather than focusing on the specific issue of responsibility. I have included this 
quotation because some of the analysis of semicompatibilism and implicit bias will be 
detailed, exacting and in an important sense theoretical. I believe it is good to confirm 
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at the beginning that these issues ultimately concern ‘our deepest and most basic views 
about our agency – our freedom and moral responsibility … ’ (Fischer et al. 2007: 81). 
Our views on agency, freedom and moral responsibility have direct consequences for 
broader considerations of the meaning and value of our life; there are strong links 
between all these issues. 
I will look at each of the characteristics of guidance control beginning with 
moderate reason-responsiveness.  
 
Moderate Reason-Responsiveness  
There are three aspects of moderate reason-responsiveness, a, b and c. Each aspect and 
its subsections, i, ii and iii will be examined, described, for example, as (2.a), or (2.a.i). 
Then, item 3 moral responsibility and the reactive attitudes, and finally item 4 the 
epistemic condition will be examined. Additional subsections will be needed and 
explained as necessary.  
 
To begin then, with item (2.a) K is regularly receptive to reasons, some of which are moral. 
 
1. An agent has guidance control as far as their deliberation mechanism is appropriately 
responsive to reasons.  
 
2. The appropriate way is moderate reasons-responsive:  
An agent’s responsibility relevant mechanism K is moderately reasons-responsive iff: 
a. K is regularly receptive to reasons, some of which are moral. This requires;  
i. That holding fixed the operation of a K-type mechanism, the agent 
would recognize reasons in such a way as to give rise to an 
understandable pattern from the viewpoint of a third party who 
understands the agent’s values and beliefs. 
ii. That some of the reasons mentioned in (2.a) are moral reasons. 
 
The essential question is, considering the integrative model of implicit cognition, is it the 
case that an agent is receptive to reasons in the sense described under (2.a)? From the 
outset, this is not a straightforward question. The integrative model includes a 
behavioural decision-making component that is receptive to reasons and so plausibly 
leads to responsible behaviour, as previously discussed. However, it is not immediately  
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clear how implicit bias related behaviour could form an understandable pattern from the 
viewpoint of a third party who understands the agent’s values and beliefs as item (2.a.i) 
requires. Such an understanding would clearly depend on how well the third party 
understood the agent, but it seems initially unreasonable to expect a third party to be able 
to fully understand an agent’s implicit biases and their effect on behaviour considering 
an agent’s likely claims of contrary values and beliefs. A third party would likely see 
inconsistency between an agent’s explicit claims and their implicit bias influenced 
behaviour, not an overall understandable pattern. 
 To reach a position on this question I will look at John Martin Fischer’s 
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (1998: 71-73). Here, the role of 
the ‘third party’ is described in more detail. An imaginary interview is conducted by a 
third party where the agent is asked to give reasons for their actions in actual and 
hypothetical scenarios. The third party considers this information and their background 
knowledge of the agent, seeking to understand if there is a pattern in their set of reason 
recognition. John Martin Fischer describes regular reasons-receptivity as ‘reasons-
receptivity that gives rise to a minimally comprehensible pattern, judged from some 
perspective that takes into account subjective features of the agent, (i.e., the agent’s 
preferences, values, and beliefs), but is also not simply the agent’s point of view … and 
is minimally grounded in reality’ (1998: 71-73). The position so far is that for implicit 
bias issuing behaviour there is an understandable pattern, minimally grounded in reality, in 
the sense that a third party, not the agent, could see patterns of consistent behaviour 
even if there is inconsistency between agent reported values and beliefs and those 
reflected in actual behaviour, (in particular circumstances). Consistency of outcome is 
present (with stress level and cognitive load fixed) within the integrative model of 
implicit bias, there is regularity, as essentially required for guidance control. 
 However, while it is possible that a third party could recognise a pattern of agent 
behaviour, condition 2.a.i requires the agent to recognize reasons in such a way as to give 
rise to an understandable pattern. Is it possible for an agent to recognise reasons in the 
case of implicit bias? While a third party may recognise a pattern in behaviour, 
inconsistent with declared values, if the agent is unaware of (is not receptive to) reasons 
for such behaviour then John Martin Fischer’s condition is not fully satisfied. Consider 
the following example. If someone has an implicit bias against a particular racial group 
Title: Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position on Free Will and Responsibility? 
Chapter 6 
Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position? 
 
155 
and as a result does not employ members of that group, yet when this is brought to their 
attention, they take steps to correct their behaviour, then it can be plausibly claimed the 
agent is responsive (receptive and reactive) to reasons. Their behaviour may also be part 
of a recognisable pattern in the sense that whenever their bias is highlighted, they take 
corrective steps. However, in this example, being receptive to reasons, crucially, is not 
taking place at the time of the biased behaviour. If an agent is not receptive to reasons 
at the time the biased behaviour takes place and is not alerted later when receptivity to 
reasons (provided by a work colleague perhaps) may be active, in such cases, it seems the 
agent cannot be said to be responsive to reasons (receptive or reactive) and therefore 
cannot assert guidance control or be responsible.173 
John Martin Fischer responds to problems of this form by invoking the notion 
of nonreflective behaviour (1998: 85) and the tracing principle. Nonreflective behaviour 
relates to actions for which agents are responsible that do not issue from an exercise of 
practical reason, the capacity for deciding what to do by reflection and deliberation. 
Examples are given of nonreflective behaviour, such as a woman who automatically 
holds the door open for a stranger entering after her; ‘ … actions that arguably proceed 
not from deliberation (and thus not from a mechanism of practical reason), but rather 
from something like habit, character, or instinct’ (1998: 85). Moderate reason-
responsiveness seems to need deliberation; being receptive and reactive to reasons looks 
very much like an activity requiring reflection and deliberation. However, John Martin 
Fischer does not want cases of nonreflective behaviour to be excluded from guidance 
control and responsibility, as this would be, in John Martin Fischer’s view, an 
unacceptable, (and incorrect), limitation of the semicompatibilist position. It is 
implausible to suggest that all nonreflective actions are unworthy of praise or blame, that 
a lifeguard is in a moral sense not responsible and praiseworthy for a spontaneous and 
dangerous rescue. The integrative model of mechanisms such as attitudes, stereotypes 
and prejudice that mediate the influence of implicit social cognition on behaviour (see 
Fig 5.1) has a component of behavioural decision making and associated reflection. 
Therefore, the integrative model of implicit bias does allow the possibility of reflection 
 
173 I am grateful to my Supervisor Dr. Nash for highlighting this issue and suggesting the illustrative 
example. As discussed within this Thesis, whether implicit biases respond to reasons is far from 
universally agreed. Under high stress deliberation would certainly be impaired.  
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and so is not entirely subject to John Martin Fischer’s concerns unless the agent is under 
high stress and/or cognitive load. Under cognitive load, (during an IAT for example), 
or a particularly emotional construal of a situation, issuing behaviour may be very close 
to an impulsive response with increasing absence of reflection. It is possible that reflective 
behaviour within the chosen model of implicit bias could become compromised or even 
impossible. It is important therefore to understand if and how moderate reason-
responsiveness could function if conscious reflection became impossible. Importantly, 
John Martin Fischer responds, that nowhere in the description of moderate reason-
responsiveness is it required that this kind of mechanism be ‘practical reasoning’ (1998: 
86) and offers examples to show why ‘practical reasoning’ is unnecessary. 
The first example describes a driver who, as a matter of habit and without 
deliberation, always takes a particular turning to arrive at their chosen destination. Surely, 
there is no absence of responsibility in this scenario. In the next example the usual 
turning is blocked and the driver, again without deliberation, takes the next available turn 
and continues their journey to the same destination by a slightly longer route. 
Responsibility is assessed by holding fixed the relevant mechanism, the actual-sequence 
mechanism, and asking whether there are possible scenarios in which certain things are 
different and the agent acts differently. In the second example certain things are different, 
the agent acts differently and the agent’s actual sequence that issues in action is from a 
nonreflective mechanism. John Martin Fischer suggests this helps to show that such a 
nonreflective mechanism is very plausibly still moderately reasons-responsive (1998: 86); 
an alternative route was taken to the desired destination. 
 So, does the requirement of reasons recognition rule out moral responsibility for 
actions that issue from a clearly nonreflective mechanism? John Martin Fischer claims it 
does not, arguing essentially that recognition of reasons does not entail that an agent 
deliberates on such reasons in terms of what to do, for example, how to solve a problem 
such as a blocked turning when driving towards a place of work. Reasons-recognition 
and a nonreflective mechanism are compatible and the agent retains moral responsibility 
for actions that issue from an explicitly nonreflective mechanism (1998: 87, Fischer and 
Tognazzini 2009). 
 If it is assumed that nonreflective behaviour is such that even recognition of reasons 
is ruled out, then moderate reason-responsiveness of the actual operative mechanism 
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would likewise be ruled out. However, John Martin Fischer ingeniously responds to this 
difficulty by invoking the tracing principle whereby moral responsibility may exist now 
due to guidance control operating at some appropriate point in the past, prior to the 
action, when the reason for the action was formed. The general principle may be shown 
by example; a driver, so intoxicated that reason recognition is impossible, had at an 
earlier time active guidance control when the decision to begin drinking was made, while 
knowing that driving would take place later. The driver is responsible for an accident 
now, even though not moderately reason-responsive, due to behaviour in the past when 
guidance control was active (1998: 89).174 John Martin Fischer acknowledges this is not 
an exhaustive response to the ‘problem’ that moderate reason-responsiveness must be 
receptive and reactive to reasons; given a ‘strong’ understanding of nonreflective 
behaviour, where the mechanism that produced it is incompatible even with the 
recognition of reasons, there are still cases where agents are plausibly responsible. 
It has been important to consider guidance control, particularly moderate reason-
responsiveness, in light of the possibility of nonreflective behaviour because although 
the adopted integrative model of implicit bias includes reflective processing, as 
mentioned, under pressure this could be compromised; ‘straining the capacities of 
reflective processing decreases self-control … ’ (Deutsch and Strack 2010: 71) and in the 
limit eliminates it completely. John Martin Fischer shows that reason receptivity, the vital 
ingredient of moderate reason-responsiveness, is not adversely affected by nonreflective 
behaviour; the issuing mechanism is still the same. The ‘stronger’ interpretation of 
nonreflective behaviour is not completely resolved, i.e., when recognition of any reasons is 
 
174 A fictional, but plausible, example of a life or death outcome that essentially depends on acceptance 
or rejection of a philosophical position or claim, in this case the issue of ‘tracing’, (responsibility for an 
action now, although an agent is not currently reason-responsive due to behaviour in the past when 
control was active), is provided by Series 9, Episode 7 of the T.V. show Law and Order: Special Victims 
Unit, Blinded, first shown on November 13th 2007. In this episode the contentious issue is the nature of 
the guilt of a ‘murderer’ who has committed several crimes due to an earlier decision, when considered 
to be sane, to stop taking behaviour controlling prescribed medication. The position taken on the 
strength or legitimacy of the tracing principle in this example has life or death implications; criminal 
responsibility for recent actions because of the earlier decision to quite medication would probably lead 
to trial and execution, alternatively, if it is decided that the murderer acted while lacking responsibility at 
the time of the crime when not in control due to mental illness and earlier rational decisions were 
irrelevant, then the outcome would be transfer to a psychiatric hospital. 
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completely ruled out, but tracing, as described, suggests one way of incorporating such 
cases within the guidance control model.  
 The discussion above is motivated by the question, can implicit bias provide a 
reason to act? This question is clearly important because it is condition 2.a.i of guidance 
control; an agent must recognize reasons in such a way as to give rise to an understandable 
pattern of behaviour. John Martin Fischer shows that reason receptivity, is not adversely 
affected by nonreflective behaviour. If implicit bias is considered as the source of 
nonreflective behaviour, then John Martin Fischer’s arguments are not affected. 
Requirement 2.a.i of guidance control, (that an agent would recognize reasons in such a 
way as to give rise to an understandable pattern from the viewpoint of a third party who 
understands the agent’s values and beliefs), has been challenging to analyse considering 
implicit bias. I believe it is reasonable and defensible to conclude this requirement of 
guidance control, and hence responsibility, is satisfied (while noting some limitations of 
tracing) when behaviour is initiated by implicit bias within the operating mechanism. To 
sum up, John Martin Fischer’s semicompatibilism accommodates situations that have a 
nonreflective mechanism, but complete absence of receptivity to reasons is, (not 
surprisingly), problematic. In the case of implicit bias influenced actions, in a stressful 
situation, there may only be the possibility of minimal reflection. However, for an agent 
to act in ways that reflect biases there must be some reason that initiates such behaviour, 
even though the reason is not consciously recognised. In this sense the agent must be 
receptive to reasons and importantly, semicompatibilism accommodates this form of 
nonconscious reason receptivity and behaviour mechanism. In the earlier example, the 
driver’s action and awareness of the reason to act may not be conscious, but the action 
must be the result of being receptive to a reason (the blocked exist), otherwise no action 
would take place. 
 It has been argued (Holroyd 2012: 295) that implicit biases are responsive to (bad) 
reasons in the sense that implicit associations are formed in response to, for example, 
pervasive stereotypes; their existence is in response to reasons (even if they are marginal 
or incorrect reasons). While arguably responsive to reasons in their formation, implicit 
bias considered as an automatic process also responds to reasons when manifest in 
action. Similar examples to those above are given supporting this claim, examples of 
automatic processes, (such as playing a good tennis shot under pressure), that are clearly 
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responsive to reasons and lead to responsible action. The form of indirect control over 
implicit bias manifestation, (ecological control), described earlier, is an example of 
managing the environment to make the agent (more) responsive to good reasons.  
 
2. The appropriate way is moderate reasons-responsive:  
An agent’s responsibility relevant mechanism K is moderately reasons-responsive iff: 
a. K is regularly receptive to reasons, some of which are moral. This requires;  
ii. That some of the reasons mentioned in (2.a) are moral reasons. 
 
Exploration of the three aspects of moderate reason-responsiveness, (2.a, 2.b and 2.c), 
continues, looking at item (2.a.ii), that some of the reasons mentioned in (2.a) are moral 
reasons. Implicit bias related behaviour is clearly charged with moral content. Implicit 
(or explicit) attitudes toward particular social groups, for example, frequently include 
morally relevant qualities such as untrustworthy, cowardly and so on (often referred to 
as prejudices), (Eberhardt 2019: 31). It seems the requirement of guidance control, that 
an agent recognizes reasons some of which are moral reasons, is straight forwardly 
satisfied in the case of implicit bias and related behaviour. Implicit biases very often have 
at their heart negative moral evaluation of particular groups, see for example Jennifer 
Eberhardt (2019: 23). There will be more to say about ‘some of the reasons mentioned 
in (2.a) are moral reasons’ later (page 179).  
 
2. The appropriate way is moderate reasons-responsive (Chapter 3, page 72):  
An agent’s responsibility relevant mechanism K is moderately reasons-responsive iff: 
b. K is at least weakly reactive to reasons; this requires that the agent would react 
to at least one sufficient reason to do otherwise, (in some possible scenario), 
although it does not follow that the agent could have responded differently to 
the actual reasons. 
 
K is at least weakly reactive to reasons; this requires that the agent would react to at least 
one sufficient reason to do otherwise, (in some possible scenario), although it does not 
follow that the agent could have responded differently to the actual reasons. 
There are three conditions associated with strong reasons-responsiveness: (i) The agent is 
strongly receptive to reasons, where receptive means the capacity of an agent to recognize 
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the reasons that exist. (ii) The agent is strongly reactive to reasons, where reactive means 
an agent has the capacity to translate reasons into choices, (and then subsequent 
behaviour). (iii) The agent produces actions that are in accord with choice. A mechanism 
moves from being strongly reasons-responsive to being weakly reasons-responsive (or 
not responsive at all) because of a ‘deficiency’ in any of these three areas. 
Reactivity to reasons and receptivity to reasons that constitute the responsiveness 
relevant to guidance control and moral responsibility are asymmetric; a very weak sort 
of reactivity is all that is required, whereas, a stronger sort of receptivity to reasons is 
necessary for this kind of responsiveness (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 69). To be (very) 
weakly reactive to reason, the agent (when acting from the relevant mechanism, the 
actual-sequence mechanism that leads to the action), must simply display some reactivity. 
Some reactivity gives plausibility to the agent’s actual mechanism having ‘executive 
power’ to react to the actual incentive to do otherwise, but note, there is not a demand 
for regularity with respect to reactivity and there is not an explicit requirement for reactivity 
to moral reasons (1998: 79). There is a further point; receptive and reactive aspects of 
reason responsiveness are a general capacity of the agent’s mechanism, rather than a 
particular ability of the agent in the sense of possessing alternative possibilities - the 
freedom to choose and do otherwise (1998: 75).175 
How does this complex aspect of guidance control relate to implicit bias 
characterised by the integrative model? Specifically, is implicit bias, reason responsive in 
the sense that issuing behaviour is weakly reactive to reason? The answer appears to be 
yes, as straightforward and plausible examples can be given of an agent whose implicit 
bias related behaviour is weakly reactive to reasons. The actual mechanism issues in the 
agent doing A in the actual world; on being told by telephone that intruders have entered 
their home, acting impulsively, the agent under stress takes a lift home from a young 
rather than elderly driver because of implicit bias relating to elderly drivers based on a 
stereotype of older drivers as indecisive and making only protracted progress when fast 
progress is needed. However, ‘there is some possible world with the same laws of nature 
in which a mechanism of this kind is operative in this agent and there is a sufficient 
reason to do otherwise, the agent recognizes this reason, and the agent does otherwise 
 
175 The preceding description in this section follows closely John Martin Fischer as cited. 
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for this reason’ (Fischer 2015b: 188). Continuing with this example, with the small 
capacity for deliberation available, the agent in some possible world remembers that 
younger drivers may not have sufficient experience to make safe judgements when 
driving under pressure and so chooses what could be a slightly slower but more assured 
journey home to confront the intruders. This example turns on the agent recognizing 
this reason in some possible world. If the level of stress is such that only impulsive 
reactions are possible then recognizing reasons is impossible, but recall John Martin 
Fischer’s argument described above, that nonreflective recognition of reasons (and 
reaction to reasons) is accepted and does not entail that an agent deliberates on such 
reasons in terms of what to do. 
 To summarise, when the requirements for moderate reason-responsiveness, that 
K is regularly receptive to reasons, (some of which are moral), and K is weakly reactive to 
reasons, are considered in the context of implicit bias, I believe it is reasonable to claim  
that issuing behaviour of implicit bias is moderately reason-responsiveness in terms of 
these requirements, supporting the view that an agent is morally responsible for their 
actions. A conclusion in accord with the integrative model of implicit bias. 
 
2.c. K is the agent’s own; being the agent’s own means ‘taking responsibility’ for K. 
This requires that the agent; 
i. Sees herself as the source of her behaviour (which follows from the operation 
of K). 
ii. Believes that she is an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes that result from 
how she exercises her agency in certain contexts. 
iii. Views herself as an agent with respect to (2.c.i) and (2.c.ii) based on her 
evidence for these beliefs. 
 
(2.c.i) Sees herself as the source of her behaviour (which follows from the operation of 
K). Item (2.c) is the third of the general requirements for the mechanism that issues in 
behaviour to be reason-responsive in the appropriate sense, and is the most challenging 
to analyse: ‘Taking responsibility’ is one of the ways that a mechanism that leads to action 
becomes the agent’s own (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 207). At first sight, items (i – iii) 
appear completely at variance with the pervasive idea that an agent is unaware of their 
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implicit bias related behaviour. On this popular account, the possibility of seeing oneself 
as the source of such behaviour (2.c.i) appears remote.176 However, recall that John 
Martin Fischer during discussion of nonreflective behaviour (page 155) is keen to show 
that the semicompatibilist/guidance-control model accepts that an agent can take 
responsibility in an implicit, nondeliberative way: 
 
This process (taking responsibility) may involve conscious and deliberate 
reflection, but it need not. Just as a person who acts for a reason need not 
explicitly formulate the reason or consciously invoke it as an action guide, so a 
person can take responsibility in an implicit, nondeliberative way. (Fischer and 
Ravizza 1998: 214) 
 
While this is helpful in supporting the view that agents may still be responsible for 
actions that are conducted in a nondeliberative way, for example, (following the popular 
view), actions of an agent unaware of their implicit bias related behaviour, it does not 
get to the heart of the issue, that of seeing herself as the source of her implicit bias issuing 
behaviour. Where ‘source’ is the perception of oneself as the cause of events in the world, 
originating from desires, beliefs and intentions, not the result of an accident or the 
intentions and actions of others. Drawing on the broader characterisation of implicit 
bias described during discussion of Holroyd and Kelly (2016) it seems reasonable to 
suggest that the requirement of ‘taking responsibility’ by seeing ourselves as the source 
of our behaviour appears sufficiently close to Holroyd and Kelly’s description of implicit 
attitudes as part of who the agent is, part of character and source of behaviour, which as a 
whole is subject to moral evaluation.177 I am suggesting the requirement of guidance 
control, that an agent takes responsibility by seeing themselves as the source of their behaviour, 
 
176 Implicit attitudes and awareness are discussed later in this chapter. Two particularly relevant Papers 
are Implicit Attitudes and Awareness (Berger 2018) and Are ‘Implicit’ Attitudes Unconscious? (Gawronski, 
Hofmann, and Wilbur 2006). 
 
177 One of the four necessary aspects of guidance control is the epistemic condition, discussed later in 
this Chapter. There are, as would be expected, similarities between the epistemic condition relating to 
guidance control and ecological control; ‘whether an agent can exercise ecological control, (a form of 
control that individuals have with respect to implicit bias), depends on whether she is aware of these 
possibilities (and aware of the phenomena of implicit bias, and that she may be affected by it). The mere 
possibility of having ecological control is not sufficient for implicit biases to be considered as ‘part of 
the agent’ and hence morally evaluable. In addition to the control conditions, epistemic conditions must 
also be met as well’ (Holroyd and Kelly 2016: 127). 
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is satisfied in the case of implicit bias related behaviour when, (following Holroyd and 
Kelly),  implicit attitudes are considered part of who the agent is, part of character and a 
source of behaviour which as a whole is subject to moral evaluation. However, there are 
issues with this approach. First, the requirement for guidance control is to see herself as 
the source of her behaviour and this has not yet been addressed. More troubling, there 
is a sense of circularity. Recall the argument from Chapter 5 (page 136):   
 
1. If an agent has the relevant control and responsibility for implicit bias, then implicit 
bias reflects an agent’s character. 
2. Individuals do have relevant control/responsibility for implicit bias. 
3. Therefore, implicit bias reflects an agent’s character, (and can legitimately be morally 
appraised). 
 
That implicit bias reflects an agent’s character is a conclusion based on premises 
concerning control, that individuals do have relevant control/responsibility for implicit 
bias. I then use the conclusion that implicit bias reflects an agent’s character (and a source 
of behaviour) to make claims about a type of control, i.e., guidance control; this is an 
unsatisfactory approach. 
Consider the question from a different perspective; the popular idea of the 
nonconscious nature of implicit bias and issuing actions has much counter empirical 
evidence and supporting scholarship. On the basis of such evidence the model of 
implicit bias employed to critique semicompatibilism and guidance control contains 
reflective behaviour decisions.178 Actions that result from individual control and reflective decision 
making seem quite naturally ‘assignable to individual agents as sources’ (Nagel 2003: 229) 
and this is the natural internal sense of our own freedom and agency. With control and 
reflective decision making179 there must surely be a sense of being the source of issuing 
 
178 It may be helpful at this point to reiterate the overall objective of the Thesis. The chosen implicit bias 
model includes the conclusion that agents are responsible for issuing behaviour. Does this model satisfy 
the conditions for guidance control and so responsibility? Both approaches should reach the same 
conclusion, if this is not the case then some form of amendment or further consideration is necessary 
with respect to the semicompatibilist/guidance-control model, (or the implicit bias model, or both, but 
it is semicompatibilism that is the target here, with the chosen characterisation of implicit bias held fixed, 
as reflected in the title of the Thesis). 
 
179 See also later discussion of the epistemic condition for responsibility. 
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behaviour. To make reflective behaviour decisions is surely to see yourself as the source of 
such decisions. While seeing oneself as the source of implicit bias related behaviour is 
contrary to the popular conception of implicit bias as essentially unconscious, I believe 
that the chosen model, that includes an element of reflective decision making and 
control, allows the agent to take responsibility by ‘allowing an agent to see herself as the 
source of her behaviour’. The issue of awareness of implicit bias is a constant theme 
throughout Part II and III; the position settled on is that agents are aware of and 
responsible for their implicit biases and related behaviour, but such awareness and 
responsibility is not binary but expressed in degrees. There is further discussion of 
awareness shortly, at the beginning of the discussion of the third and final requirement 
of ‘taking responsibility’ (2.c.iii). 
 To close this section (2.c.i), significantly, Brownstein comments that empirical 
literature is quite mixed concerning conclusions about awareness of implicit attitudes 
and whether their influence can be controlled (2016a: 770), but after reviewing the 
empirical data Brownstein concludes that agent awareness of the content of implicit 
attitudes is often the case, but awareness of the influence of implicit attitudes on 
behaviour is less so. However, it is clear from Brownstein’s comments that agent 
awareness of the influence of implicit attitudes on behaviour is possible, but there is 
some uncertainty over the extent of awareness. Brownstein points out that agent 
awareness of the influence of their explicit attitudes on behaviour is equally problematic, 
(see also  Gawronski, Six Lessons for a Cogent Science of Implicit Bias and Its Criticism (2019: 
578) where a similar point is made).  
Examination so far has shown that from two different perspectives, (guidance 
control and the integrated model), implicit bias and issuing behaviour are subject to 
legitimate moral appraisal; the nature of implicit bias, as characterised, is subject to 
guidance control, the freedom and responsibility defining condition, not subject to the 
truth or falsity of determinism or the exercise of regulative control.  
 
Next, I will look at the second condition for ‘taking responsibility’; an agent’s belief that 
she is an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes that result from how she exercises her 
agency in certain contexts, (2.c.ii). 
 
Title: Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position on Free Will and Responsibility? 
Chapter 6 
Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position? 
 
165 
2.c.  K is the agent’s own; being the agent’s own means ‘taking responsibility’ for K. 
This requires that the agent;  
ii. Believes that she is an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes that result 
from how she exercises her agency in certain contexts. 
 
The model of implicit bias developed in Chapter 5 does not explicitly consider the 
reactive attitudes. However, I do not see dissonance between an agent’s belief that she 
is an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes that result from how she exercises her agency 
in certain contexts and ecological control, a key component of Holroyd and Kelly’s 
(2016) approach and an important element in the characterisation of implicit bias. It is 
reasonable then to construe the reactive attitudes as potential props, (to use Holroyd and 
Kelly’s expression), part of an individual’s wider strategy to take ecological control. This 
is tentative, but in terms of the second condition for ‘taking responsibility’, that an agent 
should believe that she is an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes, no obvious or 
significant omissions or problems with semicompatibilism or guidance control are 
revealed in light of implicit bias as it has been characterised. 
 
The third and final requirement of ‘taking responsibility’ (2.c.iii). 
 
2.c. K is the agent’s own; being the agent’s own means ‘taking responsibility’ for K. 
This requires that the agent; 
iii. Views herself as an agent with respect to (2.c.i) and (2.c.ii) based on her 
evidence for these beliefs. 
 
Before addressing the third and final requirement of ‘taking responsibility’ I will make 
some further comments on agent awareness of implicit attitudes and offer further 
support for the chosen model of implicit bias. This is beneficial before considering an 
agent’s awareness of themselves as an agent and taking responsibility for behaviour. A 
robust position on implicit bias is necessary in order that the critique of 
semicompatibilism be as compelling and sound as possible. The proposed view of 
implicit bias, based on Holroyd and Kelly (2016) and Deutsch and Strack (2010), 
concludes that agents are essentially responsible for issuing behaviour, based essentially 
on considerations of character from Holroyd and Kelly and the possibility of reflective 
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behavioural decision making from the Deutsch and Strack perspective. At an individual 
level, a situation can be imagined, where, after completing an IAT the candidate 
comments, ‘I am not aware of this, surely there must be a mistake, my beliefs are not 
like this at all.’ It is the stark contrast between ‘Sees herself as the source of her 
behaviour’ (2.c.i) and the surprise and disbelief experienced by many after completing 
an IAT and exposure of ‘hidden’ attitudes contrary to explicit beliefs that calls for further 
mention before returning to complete consideration of ‘taking responsibility’ item 
(2.c.iii). 
 The pervasive popular view concerning explicit and implicit attitudes is that 
agents are aware of explicit attitudes, which are conscious and unaware of unconscious 
implicit attitudes. This provides a fairly straightforward explanation of the observation 
that agents ‘readily articulate their explicit attitudes, but rarely if ever report - and often 
deny - their revealed implicit ones. A natural explanation of this observation is that 
individuals are aware of the former but not aware of the latter’ (Berger 2018: 2). There is, 
of course, a counter position to this view, expressed within a significant number of 
Papers, for example, the excellent Are ‘Implicit’ Attitudes Unconscious?  (Gawronski, 
Hofmann, and Wilbur 2006). I will look at this Paper together with What is Implicit Bias?  
(Holroyd, Scaife, and Stafford 2017), adding clarity to the conscious/nonconscious 
distinction, plus generally improving intelligibility and defence of the chosen model of 
implicit bias. 
 Holroyd, Scaife and Stafford (2017), (henceforth Holroyd), ask what is ‘implicit’ 
and what is ‘bias’? The form the answer takes depends on the ambition of the enquirer. 
An account of implicit bias hopes to achieve one or several of the following desiderata; 
 
D1:  Distinguish implicit from explicit mental states or processes. 
D2:  Capture interesting cases of dissonance between agents’ professed values and the 
cognitions driving responses to these measures. 
D3:  Formulate interventions for changing bias or blocking discriminatory outcomes. 
D4:  Accommodate or explain the full range of the phenomena captured by indirect 
measures. 
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D5:  Gain traction in addressing problems of marginalisation and under 
representation, and draw attention to complicity in these problems (Following 
Holroyd and others 2017). 
 
The task now is to look more carefully at implicit bias in terms of unconscious implicit 
attitudes and conscious explicit attitudes. Using unconscious and conscious attitudes to 
distinguish implicit from explicit mental states or processes (D1) appears to run well 
with the observation previously mentioned that many find the outcome of indirect 
measures such as the IAT surprising, even shocking, something that did not make itself 
known to conscious awareness (D2). But what is the agent unconscious of? There are at 
least three aspects of an attitude that could be considered unconscious (Gawronski and 
others 2006: 487), (Holroyd and others 2017: 4): (i) Source awareness  -  an agent is 
unaware of the cause of an attitude towards an object. Gawronski points out, ‘both self-
reported and indirectly assessed attitudes may be characterized by a lack of source 
awareness (2006: 489). (ii) Content awareness - an agent is unaware of the attitude itself. 
Low correlation between self-reports and indirectly assessed attitudes is often suggested 
as empirical evidence for an unconscious characterisation of implicit bias. (iii) Impact 
awareness - an agent is unaware of the influence a given attitude has on other 
psychological processes. Considering only item (ii) content awareness, Gawronski says, 
 
in contrast to this conclusion, (that participants are generally unable to report 
certain attitudes because they are unconscious), there is now accumulating 
evidence that self-reported attitudes are systematically related to indirectly assessed 
attitude. Moreover, the relative size of the correlation between self-reported and 
indirectly assessed attitudes seems to depend on a variety of different variables 
related to basic psychological as well as methodological factors. (added emphasis 
2006: 489) 
 
On Gawronski’s account; (i) self-reported and indirectly assessed attitudes are 
systematically related, (ii) such findings are in contrast to the widespread assumption that 
people generally have no conscious access to indirectly assessed attitudes, (iii) it seems 
that people are consciously aware of the attitudes assessed by indirect measures, (iv) 
whether or not these attitudes are reflected in self-report measures depends on a variety 
of factors pertaining to cognitive, motivational and methodological variables, (v) it seems 
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that people do have introspective access to their attitudes, as they are reflected in indirect 
attitude measures. However, these attitudes may not be reflected in self-reported 
evaluations when cognitive, motivational, or methodological factors undermine their 
impact on explicit self-reports. (following closely Gawronski and others 2006: 490). This 
recalls the discussion of Deutsch and Strack, Building Blocks of Social Behaviour (2010), 
where mechanisms that mediate the influence of implicit social cognition (for example,  
motivation), were shown as a unified system of related elements, (Fig 5.1). 
 Is the property of being an unconscious attitude useful in distinguishing implicit 
from explicit mental states or processes (D1) and does it capture interesting cases of 
dissonance between agents’ professed values and the cognitions driving responses to 
these measures (D2)? Holroyd concludes it does not. Based on various sources of 
empirical data, Holroyd believes ‘the evidence suggests […] individuals have some 
awareness of the cognitions revealed on such (indirect) measures’ (added emphasis 2017: 
4). Essentially, it is argued the notion of implicit as unconscious is not supported by 
available empirical evidence vis-à-vis the actual awareness of agents and does not 
unequivocally distinguish implicit from explicit states. 
The above, I suggest, supplies added justification for the chosen model of implicit 
bias, in the sense that, having conscious awareness180 within a model of implicit bias is 
shown again to have credible theoretical and empirical support. It is clearly important, 
as previously mentioned, to have a robust model of implicit bias in order that the 
semicompatibilist position be challenged in a meaningful and defensible way. 
 
Returning to moderate reasons-responsiveness, that an agent’s responsibility 
relevant mechanism K is moderately reasons-responsive iff K is the agent’s own, where 
being the agent’s own means ‘taking responsibility’ for K. This requires, in addition to 
(2.c.i) and (2.c.ii) previously considered, that an agent views herself as an agent with 
 
180 There is much debate about the nature of awareness. For example, Jacob Berger claims there is ‘much 
evidence that we can be aware of implicit attitudes, it is plausible that we are not aware of them in the 
same subjectively unmediated way that we are aware of our explicit attitudes. […] An attitude is implicit 
just in case one is not aware of it in a subjectively unmediated way’ (2018: 20). I have not argued for any 
specific conception of awareness within my model of implicit bias, other than an awareness that gives the 
possibility of reflection as shown within Fig 5.1. 
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respect to (2.c.i) and (2.c.ii) based on evidence for these beliefs (2.c.iii).181 John Martin 
Fischer includes this item to address a particular form of manipulation whereby an 
agent’s responsibility is somehow (electronically) implanted. In other words, the 
individual’s view of herself as an agent and an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes is 
electronically implanted. John Martin Fischer says, quite reasonably, such a view ‘is not 
formed in the appropriate way. But the relevant notion of appropriateness must remain 
unanalyzed’ (1998: 236). The comment ‘must remain unanalyzed’ is puzzling because 
John Martin Fischer takes time to explain how mechanisms become the agent’s own, 
giving examples of the appropriate way that agents can and do take responsibility. What 
sort of evidence leads an agent to view herself as an agent with respect to (2.c.i) and 
(2.c.ii)? The personal sense of having ongoing acceptance and participation within a moral 
community that believes responsible agents are the source of their behaviour and 
candidates for the reactive attitudes is perhaps sufficient evidence for the agent. 
However, this has a sense of circularity and is not entirely convincing.  
With respect to the basic question, is issuing behaviour of implicit bias subject to 
guidance control, where item (2.c.iii) is part of the characterisation of guidance control, 
there appears no obvious problem for an agent to view themselves as an agent with 
respect to (c.ii), (an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes), based on evidence for such a 
belief. Reactive attitudes in response to our behaviour may be accepted, countered 
strongly or rejected entirely by an agent, but as a member of a moral community it is 
accepted that expression of reactive attitudes is appropriate and to be expected. Where 
such behaviour may include implicit bias issuing behaviour. Such a claim may seem 
unrealistic, in that ‘appropriate and to be expected’ does not reflect accurately all 
reactions to praise and particularly blame. However, even when blame is not well 
received, the right to blame, (if expressed in a reasonable way and without blatant double 
standards), is not in principle usually contested. 
An agent’s evidence for believing herself to be an agent with respect to (2.c.i), as 
the source of implicit bias related behaviour, could be gained from measuring, observing 
or in some way checking the outcome of ecological control. Clearly, an important part 
 
181 For further discussion see Reasons-Responsiveness and Ownership-of-Agency: Fischer and Ravizza's Historicist 
Theory of Responsibility, Section 3 Evidence Sensitivity in Psychological Development, Sub Section 3.1 In 
owning one’s self-conceptions (Zimmerman 2002: 219). 
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of working towards reducing/eliminating bias and influenced behaviour when 
employing ecological control is (if possible) confirming that improvements are being 
achieved. Measurable improvement in implicit bias related behaviour, caeteris paribus, 
would tend to support the validity of ecological control and provide perhaps supporting 
evidence for its methods and claims; that implicit attitudes can be properly regarded as 
part of ‘who the agent is’, part of character, which is as a whole subject to moral 
evaluation182 (Holroyd and Kelly 2016: 130). Taking ecological control and reflecting on 
evidence of personal achievement in mitigating implicit bias related behaviour surely 
supports a sense of personal agency, of being in an important sense the source of 
behaviour, (and as a source, an apt candidate for reactive attitudes). 
 
Moral Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes  
Item 3, to be morally responsible is to be an apt candidate for reactive attitudes, has been 
discussed under item (2.c.ii) above. I will now look at item 4, John Martin Fischer’s 
epistemic condition. 
 
The Epistemic Condition 
4. An epistemic condition; to be praiseworthy or blameworthy an individual must 
know, or be reasonably expected to know, what they are doing (Fischer 1998: 
12). 
 
The epistemic condition is essentially the intuitively reasonable and plausible condition 
that ‘an agent is responsible only if he knows the particular facts surrounding his action, 
and, acts with the proper sort of beliefs and intentions’ (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 13). 
Using John Martin Fischer’s expression of the epistemic condition, the relevant question 
becomes, is an agent aware of ‘particular facts surrounding an action’ and do they act 
with ‘the proper sort of beliefs and intentions’ (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 13) when 
actions are influenced by implicit bias? John Martin Fischer makes it clear at the outset 
 
182 Holroyd and Kelly claim that it is possible for individuals to exercise ecological control over implicit 
biases. ‘But whether, for any individual, they can in fact exercise it depends on whether they are aware 
of these possibilities (and aware of the phenomena of implicit bias, and that they may be affected by it). 
So, the mere possibility of having ecological control is not sufficient for implicit biases to be considered 
as “part of the agent” and hence morally evaluable. In addition to the control conditions, epistemic 
conditions must also be met as well’ (2016: 127). Recall the discussion on page 143. 
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that the epistemic condition is not something he will focus on, rather, his attention will 
focus on the freedom-relevant condition for moral responsibility. It may be noted that 
attention is again on awareness; the first part of the epistemic condition above requires 
awareness by the agent of particular facts surrounding an action. While John Martin 
Fischer does not dwell on the epistemic condition, further reading is suggested (1998: 
13); Joel Feinberg The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 3: Harm to Self (1989). 
Feinberg’s Paper is clear and interesting, but does not help to respond to the 
question, is the agent aware of ‘particular facts surrounding an action’ and do they act 
with ‘the proper sort of beliefs and intentions’ (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 13) when 
actions are directly influenced by implicit bias? To move the investigation forward it is 
necessary to look at these epistemic conditions in more detail, as outlined below: 
 
(i) Describe the essential features of the epistemic condition debate. 
(ii) Consider what John Martin Fischer says about the epistemic condition and guidance 
control by looking in more detail at ‘particular facts surrounding an action’ and ‘the 
proper sort of beliefs and intentions’.  
(iii) Consider if issuing behaviour of implicit bias satisfies John Martin Fischer’s 
epistemic condition of guidance control and responsibility. The moral sense, and 
responsibility for an action when completely unaware of its moral significance will also 
be discussed. 
 
While discussing the above I will draw on the following; Responsibility: The Epistemic 
Condition (Wieland 2017), Culpable Ignorance (Smith 1983) and The Epistemic Condition for 
Moral Responsibility (Rudy-Hiller 2018). 
 
(i) Describe the essential features of the epistemic condition debate. 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states the epistemic condition is usually considered 
to have four epistemic requirements: ‘awareness of action, moral significance, 
consequences, and alternatives’ (Rudy-Hiller 2018). Briefly expanding each requirement. 
Awareness of action straightforwardly means that for the agent to be directly responsible 
they must be aware of what they are doing, aware of performing the action under 
consideration. Using an example from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Rudy-Hiller 
2018), the ‘action under consideration’ is John’s movement of a switch that he believes 
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will turn on the light but actually starts a treadmill on which Mary is standing, who falls 
and is injured; it seems John cannot be blamed for the fall because he is unaware of the 
action under consideration, the action that unknowingly started the treadmill. If John’s 
ignorance of the actual function of the switch is culpable, for example, because of lack 
of attention during a safety briefing or some other negligence, then there are compelling 
arguments for blaming John for Mary’s injury. Such consideration opens a substantial 
debate that seeks to answer general questions such as can ignorance (culpable or 
otherwise) provide a moral excuse?183 In the context of implicit bias, questions could be 
of the form, does ignorance of a tendency to act in a biased way make the action less 
culpable (or even excused), and what are the implications for blame and responsibility? 
 The second epistemic requirement for direct responsibility, awareness of moral 
significance, simply stated means that for an agent to be blameworthy they must be aware 
of the moral significance of their action; what it is about the action that gives it a moral 
dimension. If John intended to switch on the treadmill but was unaware, (due to, for 
example, upbringing or culture), that causing foreseen harm to Mary was wrong, then, 
(controversially), such ignorance could be claimed to eschew blame. 
 Third, the requirement of awareness of consequences. Continuing with the 
example of John, Mary and the treadmill; for John to be considered blameworthy he 
must hold a belief that at the time the switch was moved there was a reasonable 
possibility that the treadmill would move, and Mary would fall. There is controversy 
concerning how detailed and/or certain the belief must be to satisfy this requirement. 
For example, is the belief that Mary could-just-possibly fall sufficient for 
blameworthiness or is the stronger reasonable foreseeability needed for 
blameworthiness? 
 Fourth, the awareness of alternatives requirement. This requirement obviously 
touches much earlier discussion. Suffice at this point to say that an agent would be 
considered blameworthy, (for Marty’s fall), if they believed that at least one alternative 
action was available and understood the consequences of that action, (that Mary would 
not fall).  
 
183 See Holly Smith’s Paper Culpable Ignorance (1983) for very comprehensive consideration of this point.  
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 The above introduces four epistemic requirements for moral responsibility in 
terms of the contents of awareness, but what kind of awareness is involved, what sort of 
mental states? The term ‘epistemic’ suggests that the kind of awareness involved should 
be described as knowledge. John would be clearly responsible and blameworthy if he 
knew the function of the switch and the consequences of switching. However, some 
philosophers argue that knowledge in the full sense is not required for blameworthiness, 
claiming that true belief, (rather than justified true belief) is required (Peels 2014: 493). 
For others, simply acting on the belief that the action is wrong is sufficient for 
blameworthiness (Levy 2011: 142). From this consideration the question arises, how are 
these beliefs, of whatever structure, to be characterised such that the agent has awareness 
appropriate for responsibility and blame or praise? There are two main options; either 
occurrently (Levy 2011: 141) or dispositionally (Levy 2014b: 34). 184  Essentially, the 
occurrent position reflects the initially plausible position that to be blamed or praised, 
(and satisfy the epistemic condition), for an action the agent must at the time of the action 
consciously believe that the action is wrong or right, and consciously consider some of 
the action’s consequences. If these conditions are satisfied, then praise or blame is 
appropriate. However, consider the issue of culpable ignorance; John simply does not 
bother to understand the switch layout, even though he knows that understanding is an 
important safety requirement, leading to John’s incorrect action and the harmful 
consequence of Mary’s fall. If John at the time of the action consciously believed his action 
to be correct and consciously considered some of the action’s consequences, then the 
action on the basic occurrent account would not be blameworthy. This is clearly 
implausible and so arises the idea of culpable ignorance and the notion of 
blameworthiness tracing back to previously blameworthy actions by the agent. 
 The disposition perspective concerning how beliefs are to be characterised 
essentially argues that the occurrentist position does not identify as blameworthy those 
agents who very plausibly deserve to be subject to reactive attitudes. This is particularly 
 
184 Following closely The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Rudy-Hiller 2018). It is interesting to note, 
Gregg Caruso describes Neil Levy Consciousness and Moral Responsibility (2014b) as ‘the most 
comprehensive and clear-headed examination of the relationship between consciousness and moral 
responsibility in the literature to date’ and continues by providing a clear and concise summary of Levy’s 
arguments in defence of the ‘consciousness thesis’, i.e., that ‘consciousness of some of the facts that give 
our actions their moral significance is a necessary condition for moral responsibility’ (Caruso 2015). 
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the case if an occurrentist position is adopted whereby the requirement of (mistaken) 
belief that the action is a right action is not included; there is no consideration of 
rightness or wrongness at all. For example, in cases of forgetting that lead to harmful 
consequences there is no consideration of rightness or wrongness, or consequences by 
the agent at the time of the failure to act, hence on the occurrentist account there is 
implausibly no attribution of blame. These considerations lead to a revised 
characterisation of awareness within the dispositionalist account whereby ‘tacit, 
dormant, dispositional or unconscious beliefs can … amount to the kind of awareness 
that is required for moral responsibility’ (Rudy-Hiller 2018). 
 Concluding (i) describing the essential features of the debate concerning the 
epistemic condition, there are essential agreements among participants of the debate to be 
noted, described by Jan Willem Wieland (2017: 10) as ‘the orthodoxy’. The focus here is 
culpable ignorance and following Holly Smith’s (1983: 547) terminology the intention is 
to describe the relationship between the act or omission that leads to culpable factual or 
moral ignorance (the benighting act A1) and the later act carried out in culpable 
ignorance by an agent S (the unwitting act A2). It is claimed that ‘all agree that an excuse 
by ignorance can render an agent blameless’ (Wieland 2017: 10). However, when S is 
ignorant that A2 is wrong due to an absence of factual or moral information, then it is 
assumed by most participants that; (i) S is blameworthy for A2 only if S is blameworthy 
for being ignorant that A2 is wrong, and (ii) S is blameworthy for being ignorant that A2 
is wrong iff S is blameworthy for a benighting act A1 that led to A2 (following closely 
Wieland 2017: 10). While described as the orthodoxy, there are several dissenting voices 
that argue, for example, that S is only responsible and blameworthy for the benighting act 
A1 that leads to A2, not A2 itself. 
 The above briefly describes aspects of the landscape within which discussion of 
the epistemic condition takes place. Discussion, for example, concerning how 
blameworthy overall is the culpably ignorant agent when the unwitting action does occur 
(A1 then A2) and when the unwitting action does not occur (A1 only), a situation that 
may be the result of luck alone. 
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(ii) Consider what John Martin Fischer says about the epistemic condition and guidance 
control, looking at ‘particular facts surrounding an action’ followed by, do they act with 
‘the proper sort of beliefs and intentions’.  
I believe that Fischer and Ravizza’s characterisation of the epistemic condition is not 
sufficiently detailed in the context of implicit bias and the questions raised by this Thesis. 
For example, Fischer and Ravizza’s characterisation does not consider an important 
issue within the epistemic debate, one familiar and relevant during discussion of implicit 
bias; ‘are ignorant agents morally responsible for their conduct?’ (Wieland 2017: 2). 
Mention of  insufficiency is clearly not a criticism of John Martin Fischer’s account of 
guidance control, as previously noted, it is the control or freedom condition that is the 
focus of Responsibility and Control (1998), not the epistemic condition.  
To examine the epistemic condition for guidance control in the context of 
implicit bias, I propose to employ a more comprehensive and detailed characterisation 
of the epistemic condition than agent awareness of ‘particular facts surrounding an 
action’ (Fischer 1998: 13). I believe it is reasonable to expand John Martin Fischer’s basic 
epistemic requirement for guidance control, that an agent be aware of the ‘particular 
facts surrounding an action’ in terms of the four requirements given above; awareness 
of action, moral significance, consequences, and alternatives (Rudy-Hiller 2018). 
Similarly, I propose that John Martin Fischer’s epistemic requirement for guidance 
control for agents to act with ‘the proper sort of beliefs and intentions’ be expanded and 
clarified using the ideas introduced above during discussion of the kind of awareness 
required by the epistemic condition. If it is found that implicit bias does not satisfy some 
aspect of the expanded epistemic conditions for guidance control, then clearly this will 
be looked at very carefully.  
 To summarise so far, it is the fourth aspect of guidance control, the epistemic 
condition, that is currently being considered. The essential features of the debate 
concerning the epistemic condition have been described and John Martin Fischer’s 
position has been noted and a reasonable expansion proposed and described. I will now 
look at item (iii) using John Martin Fischer’s expanded epistemic condition. 
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(iii) Consider if issuing behaviour of implicit bias satisfies John Martin Fischer’s 
expanded epistemic condition, (hereafter ‘expanded’ will be assumed), for guidance 
control and responsibility.  
First, I will examine the requirement that an agent be aware of the ‘particular facts 
surrounding an action’ now considered to be made up of four parts; an agent must be 
aware of (a) the action, (b) it’s moral significance, (including comments on the moral 
sense and responsibility while unaware of the moral significance of reasons), (c) the 
consequences of the action, and (d) available alternative actions.  
Second, attention will then turn to the epistemic requirement for guidance control that 
agents act with ‘the proper sort of beliefs and intentions’ using the ideas introduced 
above during discussion of the kind of awareness required by the epistemic condition.  
To begin the first task, each of these aspects of John Martin Fischer’s epistemic 
condition will be examined to confirm if implicit bias issuing behaviour is such that the 
epistemic condition is satisfied.  
(a) An agent must be aware of the action. Awareness, responsibility and implicit bias 
have been discussed previously at some length. The discussion concluded that there are 
substantial and compelling arguments and empirical evidence that support the claim that 
agents are to a greater or lesser extent aware of implicit bias issuing behaviour. As this is 
such a fundamental point I will reinforce it with reference to Bertram Gawronski Six 
Lessons for a Cogent Science of Implicit Bias and Its Criticism (2019). Gawronski’s Paper 
responds to increased scrutiny, sometimes scepticism, of the explanatory value of the 
implicit bias model, suggesting six ‘lessons’ for an informed science and critical debate 
of implicit bias. The first lesson discusses the claim that ‘there is no evidence that people 
are unaware of the mental contents underlying their implicit biases’ (2019: 575).185 There 
 
185 Gawronski develops an important point at the outset of this section; implicit measures, in contrast to 
explicit measures, do not require that participants are aware of the to-be-measured mental contents, 
however, ‘it is often assumed, on the basis of this methodological difference, that explicit measures capture 
conscious biases, whereas implicit measures capture unconscious biases’. Gawronski continues, ‘Because 
implicit measures do not require awareness of the to-be-measured mental contents, they certainly have 
the potential to capture unconscious mental contents that evade assessment via explicit measures. 
However, this possibility does not imply that people are unaware of the mental contents underlying their 
responses on implicit measures. Any such claim is an empirical hypothesis that has to be evaluated on 
the basis of relevant evidence. Indeed, a closer look at the available evidence raises serious doubts about 
the veracity of this hypothesis’ (Gawronski 2019: 575). 
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are three conclusions: (i) Statements about unawareness should be treated as hypotheses 
that require empirical evidence. Implicit biases have multiple aspects that could be 
outside of awareness, therefore it is essential to clearly specify which aspect is assumed 
to be outside of awareness.186 (ii) Counter to a widespread assumption in the literature, 
there is currently no evidence that people are unaware of the mental contents underlying 
their responses on implicit measures. The available evidence suggests that people are 
aware of the mental contents underlying implicit measures, which allows them to predict 
their implicit-bias scores with a high degree of accuracy.187 (iii) The same conclusion 
applies to claims about lack of source awareness and lack of impact awareness, which 
should be assessed with appropriate designs and reliable measures of awareness. At this 
point, the available evidence suggests that people can be unaware of the origin of their 
implicit biases, but the same is true of explicit biases. Moreover, the preliminary evidence 
that implicit, but not explicit, biases influence judgments and behaviour outside of 
awareness is rather weak and prone to alternative interpretations. (2019: 578) 
 Based on Gawronski’s conclusions (i), (ii) and (iii) above and earlier discussion, 
is it reasonable to claim that the epistemic condition of awareness of action is satisfied 
when an agent acts as a result of implicit bias? It is surely reasonable to continue, as a 
minimum, with the assumption of content and impact awareness by the agent. Following 
conclusion (iii), source awareness, the origin of the underlying mental contents, will be 
left as an open issue for the moment. 
 
(b) An agent must be aware of an action’s moral significance.  
Confirming the way forward, in this section I will look at item (b), followed by some 
comments on the moral sense and its response to immoral practice within an endorsing 
 
186 Recall from page 167 (a) Content awareness; the mental contents underlying responses on implicit-
bias measures, (b) Source awareness; the origin of the underlying mental contents, or (c) Impact 
awareness; effects of the underlying mental contents on judgments and behaviour. 
 
187 Please note: The essential arguments and conclusion of this Thesis, (i.e., from the semicompatibilist 
perspective, agents are responsible for their behavioural expression of implicit biases), do not depend on 
the truth or falsity of agent awareness of the mental contents underlying implicit measures. This is 
supported, for example, by Deutsch and Strack’s confirmation that ‘the partition of the reflective–
impulsive model (as adopted within this Thesis) into two systems is not based on the presence or absence 
of conscious awareness’ (added addition and emphasis Strack and Deutsch 2004: 238). 
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culture based on Blame and Moral Ignorance (Sher 2017).188 Then, I will comment on the 
question, is it possible to be considered responsible for an action and be unaware of its 
moral significance? These issues cannot be explored in depth here but are mentioned 
because they connect with aspects of implicit bias and responsibility: The possibility of 
the moral sense189 as a response to instances of implicit bias influenced behaviour within 
an endorsing culture, and responsibility for an action when unaware of its moral 
significance clearly links with the epistemic condition to be blameworthy an agent must 
be aware of the moral significance of their action. After completing, I will return to the 
remaining epistemic conditions; (c) the consequences of the action, and (d) available 
alternative actions. When all of these items are complete it will be possible to briefly 
summarise findings concerning the condition ‘an agent is responsible only if he knows 
the particular facts surrounding his action. Attention will then turn to the second main 
task, examining the epistemic requirement for guidance control that agents act with ‘the 
proper sort of beliefs and intentions’ (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 13) using the ideas 
introduced above during discussion of the kind of awareness required by the epistemic 
condition. After making further comments on implicit bias and degrees of awareness 
and responsibility it will be possible to make an overall assessment of all the requirements 
of guidance control in light of implicit bias. Finally, I will explore moral luck and 
semicompatibilism, an issue touched upon during discussion of the formation of an 
agent’s operating mechanism and moral sense. 
So, to continue, item (b), moral reasons, as a necessary part of guidance control, 
has been mentioned during discussion of John Martin Fischer’s second condition for 
guidance control (2.a.ii.).190 Commenting on this condition I said that implicit bias is 
 
188 See also Elinor Mason and Alan T. Wilson Vice, Blameworthiness, and Cultural Ignorance (2017). This 
Chapter, from Robichaud and Wieland ed. book Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition, argues ignorance 
can be culpable even in situations of widespread cultural ignorance. 
 
189 See Cudworth (1996) and Hutcheson (2017) for detailed discussion of the moral sense. Also, Paul 
Russell’s vital Paper, Moral Sense and the Foundations of Responsibility The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: 
Second Edition (2011: 199-220); a critical assessment of Strawson’s project and the role of the moral 
sentiments or reactive attitudes (2011: 200). 
 
190 Item (2.a) of John Martin Fischer’s requirements for guidance control states: K is regularly receptive 
to reasons, some of which are moral. This requires; (i) That holding fixed the operation of a K-type 
mechanism, the agent would recognize reasons in such a way as to give rise to an understandable pattern 
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clearly charged with morally related content, including morally relevant qualities such as 
untrustworthiness, cowardice and so on (Eberhardt 2019: 31). This comment still stands, 
but there is a further point to make; being receptive to reasons some of which are moral 
(2.a.ii) and being aware of the moral significance of such reasons, having ‘a belief about the 
presence of whatever features make the action wrong’ (Rudy-Hiller 2018), are not the same 
thing. The epistemic condition of being aware of the moral significance of such reasons 
requires understanding by the agent of what makes particular actions right or wrong. At 
the higher levels of the chosen model of implicit bias there is awareness and reflection 
(see Fig 5.1 and related discussion), with greater or lesser agent responsibility for issuing 
actions. However, is the level of moral awareness experienced by the agent when actions 
are influenced by implicit bias sufficient to meet the requirements of guidance control? 
Guidance control requires the agent to be receptive to reasons, some of which are moral 
(2.a.ii), but the epistemic condition (item 4) in its expanded form calls for more 
substantial awareness of the moral significance of such reasons. How is this to be 
reconciled? A further question is also suggested, is it possible to be considered 
responsible for an action and be completely unaware of its moral significance? Exploring 
these questions will be the next task and, as mentioned above, will include consideration 
of the ‘moral sense’. 
Implicit bias is often described in terms such as operating beneath our awareness 
(Eberhardt 2019: 170), (Staats, Cheryl and others 2017: 10) but a model of implicit bias 
has been presented having varying degrees of awareness and reflection by the agent of 
the content and impact of behaviour. Given a level of awareness, implicit bias related 
actions, like other actions, take place within the context of the agent’s background moral 
beliefs. Typically, such beliefs include ‘the moral importance of truth-telling and 
promise-keeping, treating others fairly, not harming, and providing aid when it can be 
done at acceptable cost and risk’ (Sher 2017: 112). It is reasonable then, to claim the level 
of moral awareness experienced by an agent when actions are influenced by implicit bias 
varies according to the character and sophistication of the agent, (and the degree of stress 
and environmental factors affecting the agent). Given there is a degree of moral 
 
from the viewpoint of a third party who understands the agent’s values and beliefs, and (ii) That some 
of the reasons mentioned in (2.a) are moral reasons. 
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awareness relating to behaviour, (depending on character and so on), I do not see a 
distinction here between implicit bias influenced behaviour and behaviour originating 
from other sources. Take, for example, the general claim that if a morally ignorant 
wrongdoer satisfies all non-epistemic conditions for blameworthiness, he is 
blameworthy for acting wrongly if, but only if, he was at least in a position to recognize 
that his act was wrong when he performed it (Sher 2017: 102); such a claim is equally 
appropriate for implicit bias related behaviour and behaviour originating from other 
sources. When a level of content and impact awareness is admitted for implicit bias, then 
moral awareness is surely common across sources of behaviour for everyone. Consider 
Levy’s point when he says, ‘In order for an agent to be morally responsible for an action, 
it is not sufficient that the mechanism causing his action is sensitive to a broad range of 
reasons; it had better be sufficiently sensitive to the kind of reasons that give to his 
actions their moral character’ (2017: 17). Sensitivity to the kind of reasons that give (to 
his) actions their moral character is present within the model of implicit bias for 
behaviour influenced by implicit bias and other sources. 
The ‘depth’ of moral awareness varies according to the character and 
sophistication of the agent and the degree of stress and environmental factors affecting 
the agent. But understanding the moral significance of reasons (or actions) is not all or 
nothing and variation in understanding is perhaps reflected (along with other 
considerations) in the degree of agent responsibility. While some agents may have the 
capacity for deep reflection on the moral significance of  reasons, I believe John Martin 
Fischer’s relatively ‘simple’ statement, that a responsible agent must be (at least)  
receptive to reasons, some of which are moral reasons, to be sufficient; there is a moral 
dimension or moral consideration within the reasons responsive mechanism.191 Some 
agents may have the capacity to reflect on the deeper significance of moral reasons, but 
as stated, I believe to be receptive to moral reasons is sufficient to act with guidance 
control and so responsibility. Further, the ‘receptive to reasons, some of which are moral 
 
191 It is tempting to try to frame differences between awareness of moral significance and being receptive 
to reasons in terms of a de re / de dicto distinction. In general terms, de re: a desire to act on actual, correct, 
moral principles and to do what is in fact the right thing, and de dicto: a concern for doing what one feels 
or believes that one morally ought to do. See George Sher, Blame and Moral Ignorance (Sher 2017: 103) for 
discussion of Quality of Will theories and a thorough description of de re / de dicto. 
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reasons’ requirement could be framed in terms of agents’ moral sense in situations 
where, for example, implicit bias is influential. Of course, there are issues concerning the 
formation of the agent’s moral sense, how the sensitivity for what is right or wrong or 
what one feels or believes one morally ought to do has been formed, and continues to be 
formed, over time. More specifically, formation of the moral sense is surely not immune 
from the very cultural influences that probably contribute to the formation of implicit 
biases? Considering past cultures that embraced a morality allowing, (perhaps 
endorsing), behaviour that today is considered wrong, is it reasonable or possible that an 
agent’s moral sense should or could have responded? This is an important point, and I 
will briefly make some comments on the moral sense in the context of immoral practice 
within an endorsing culture. The important general problem of luck, particularly 
constitutional luck and the threat to semicompatibilism/guidance control will also be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
I will continue with some ideas about the moral sense and immoral practice within 
an endorsing culture, where behaviour was based on values that today are considered 
wholly in error. How reasonable is it to expect those living within such cultures to 
recognise moral errors, (relative to absolute or our contemporary cultural values), and 
do something about it? George Sher (2017: 113) makes the point that given an agent is 
reflecting on some form of activity within their society, any thoughts that such activity 
could be wrong may be opposed by pervasive counter opinion. It would be unreasonable 
for the agent to ignore the opinions of members of their society, particularly if such 
opinions are in the majority, held by many who are both intelligent and widely respected 
and/or supported by ideologies or religious doctrines (following Sher 2017: 113). Sher 
sees the reflective process in terms of weighting; the balancing of reasons, some of which 
are prevailing attitudes. Sher continues interestingly as follows; Over time the weight an 
agent attaches to the significant opinion of others within their society declines. 
Importantly, Sher suggests there are certain beliefs and values that everyone holds, for 
example, that it is wrong to deprive others of their liberty or lives, even in societies that 
allow or require slavery.192 This is certainly a controversial claim; it just seems to be the 
 
192 See also the Journal article Historical Roots of Implicit Bias in Slavery (Payne, Vuletich and Brown-Iannuzzi 
2019). This article explores an interpretation of implicit bias as the cognitive residue of past and present 
structural inequalities. Specifically, the article investigates the historical persistence of implicit bias, 
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case that some people truly believe, for example, that certain races have natural 
ascendancy and have sought to prove their beliefs to be objectively true using pseudo-
scientific methods (Eberhardt 2019: 133). However, given there are values that everyone 
holds, it is suggested the agent will always question, to a greater or lesser extent, why the 
majority do not respond to these common values and will assume there must be another, 
more important, reason that has greater weight that supports and justifies the actions 
and beliefs of others apart from their pervasive nature. As time passes no such reason 
becomes visible and the agent assigns greater weight to their own sense of wrong. A 
tipping point is reached where the agent’s own sense of wrongness is in the ascendancy; 
the balance of reasons becomes such that objectionable aspects of the agent’s society are 
rejected. Using a Jo Jo type example (Wolf 2003: 379), someone who from childhood 
has been indoctrinated such that they hold the worst kind of beliefs and values, Sher 
asks whether such a person could ever have access to reasons for rejecting or even 
questioning their beliefs, and concludes the answer is yes. This conclusion is based on 
the claim that even in extreme cases people have access to the requirements of ‘common-
sense morality’ (Sher 2017: 114), (although the term ‘common’ can seem questionable in 
this context). Importantly, Sher notes the distinction between reflecting on the 
wrongness of various actions and actually progressing such reflection into action due to  
‘ … social pressure, personal advantage, intellectual laziness, fear, and simple inertia …’ 
(Sher 2017: 114). An agent on Sher’s account does have access to reasons for rejecting or 
questioning their beliefs; for Sher, the epistemic condition of the agent is such that they 
are culpable for their wrong behaviour even within a culture that supports such 
wrongdoing. The issue of culpability here seems to rest on whether environmental 
conditions can eliminate the possibility of an agent accessing fundamental values and 
reasons that could lead towards better behaviour. Do such ‘fundamental values’ exist in 
a real sense and why should they have a particular nature and be shared across time and 
cultures? Questions that cannot be considered here but are nonetheless clearly and 
fundamentally important. Further, is it true that reflection and reason (necessarily) lead 
to the conclusion that certain actions and behaviour are wrong? Intriguingly, Rebecca 
 
comparing levels of current implicit bias with the proportion of the population enslaved within states of 
the USA in 1860, (summary based on article Abstract). 
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Goldstein Newberger asks why Plato never questioned slavery, claiming ‘Plato, no more 
than any other ancient Greek, including his brilliant student Aristotle, never thought to 
question the institution of slavery, the whole abominable notion of one person owning 
another’ (2015). If true, this suggests the beginning of an interesting and persuasive 
counter to Sher’s argument, that reason and reflection ultimately reveal mistakes in moral 
judgement. From Sher, it seems reasonable to expect at least a far stronger reaction from 
Plato against slavery than is apparent within his Works. While the description ‘never 
thought to question the institution of slavery’ is a simplification, Benjamin Jowett does 
comment in his introduction to Laws that for Plato, slaves  
 
are to be treated with perfect justice; but, for their own sake, to be kept at a 
distance. The motive is not so much humanity to the slave, of which there are 
hardly any traces […] but the self-respect which the freeman and citizen owes to 
himself […] Plato still breathes the spirit of the old Hellenic world, in which slavery 
was a necessity, because leisure must be provided for the citizen. 193  (added 
emphasis Plato 2019: 10754) 
 
There is much that could be said concerning Plato’s position on slavery and the role of 
reason (and emotions) in moral progress, but as a minimum and contra Sher, the example 
of Plato suggests that it is not clearly the case that agents are culpable for their behaviour 
within a culture that supports (or is indifferent to) such wrongdoing, when such a claim 
is based on the availability of universal values by application of reason. When reasoning 
correctly, is it inevitable that true and real values emerge that challenge existing practices 
or is it the case that agents can reason perfectly well but based on bad influences and/or 
incorrect information reach conclusions that with the benefit of hindsight are grossly 
wrong relative to current thinking, (of particular societies, and to a greater or lesser 
extent). What can be concluded concerning independence of the moral sense from 
cultural influences? Such brief consideration here can only offer, at best, sketchy 
comments on what is, I believe, essentially a discussion of the substantial issue of moral 
realism and moral anti-realism and the extent that values are accessible to reason and 
 
193 10754 is the location reference of the quotation from the Kindle Edition of The Essential Plato 
Anthology (25 works), translated by Benjamin Jowett. 
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reflective enquiry. A realist view,194 that moral rightness or wrongness is, in an important 
sense, a claim about matters of fact which are either true or false, has great intuitive 
appeal. For example, the proposition slavery is wrong is just true, it is surely a factual 
claim. However, the question remains, by reflection and reason, is it inevitable or even 
likely that true and real and/or objective values emerge that challenge existing practices? 
From the perspective of Kant, that knowledge of moral law is accessible to every 
rational person by virtue of their rationality and applies to all rational beings in any world, 
is a striking claim considering the earlier question; do (such) ‘fundamental values’ exist 
perhaps in some real sense and why should they have a particular nature and be shared 
across time and cultures? Kant’s well-known notion of a morally permissible action 
necessarily based on a maxim that could be applied as a universal law, for example, that 
human beings should be treated as an end in themselves and not as a means to an end, is 
again striking in the context of the earlier discussion of slavery. Kantian ethics clearly 
offers a very attractive departure point for more detailed consideration of these issues. 
I believe the requirement of guidance control, being ‘receptive to reasons, some 
of which are moral reasons’ is satisfied when agents exercise their moral sense in 
situations where implicit bias could be influential. The issues concerning the formation of 
an agent’s moral sense, how concern for doing what one feels or believes one morally 
ought to do is formed and unease over moral relativism remain unsettled and 
controversial.195 The formation of an agent’s actual mechanism over time is subject to 
similar concerns, being influenced, for example, by the culture the agent happens to be 
immersed within. These matters are considered later from the perspective of moral luck. 
Given that the constitution of an agent’s mechanism is influenced to some extent by 
lucky circumstances, is there sufficient control to warrant responsibility? 
 
194 I have used the term ‘realist’ but recognise the debate concerning being realist about X, where one 
believes X is objective, and believing X is objective and yet not being realist about it. If by realist/realism 
one means something like mind independent or independent of any conceptual scheme or frame of 
reference; one might think that the rules of chess or tennis are objective, while not being real in the mind 
independent sense. In light of this, it would be more accurate to say I find an objective view very 
plausible. (Following The Electric Agora, Value and Objectivity by Daniel Kaufman (2020). 
 
195 See for example Ralph Cudworth A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality (1996) for detailed 
discussion of the principles of morality, knowledge and metaphysical realism. For an alternative 
perspective see Francis Hutcheson An Inquiry Into The Original Of Our Ideas of Beauty And Virtue (2017). 
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 Recall the outline of the way forward presented earlier (page 176); the next item 
to consider is possible responsibility for an action when an agent is unaware of its moral 
significance. 
Earlier brief discussion of the moral sense and immoral practice within an 
endorsing culture concerned an agent unaware of (or desensitised to) the moral 
significance of an action due to the concealing effect of pervasive views within their 
society that normalise and characterise morally wrong actions or behaviour as natural or 
part of a divine order.196 Is it possible that an agent could fail to recognise the moral 
significance of certain behaviour; if it is possible, then what sort of arguments, if any, 
could justify blame when an agent is just not aware that particular behaviour has a moral 
perspective? The idea that the moral perspective of particular behaviour can be 
concealed from an agent by pervasive cultural and environmental influences is essentially 
rejected by Sher (2017). On this view, universal values cannot be entirely suppressed or 
masked by culture. (That there is variation in degree of bias across a society and the extent 
that bias is manifest suggests other factors are in play, factors that could be within agent 
control such as explicit beliefs (following Holroyd 2012: 281)). More generally, values 
cannot be entirely suppressed or masked by any condition, therefore not being aware of 
a moral perspective is impossible. In the final paragraph, Sher’s position changes, 
claiming that ‘each of us is sure to have many moral blind spots that he is simply not in 
a position to identify. [ … ] we can all predict with confidence that we are likely to be 
blameworthy for many acts that we do not currently consider wrong’ (2017: 116). If 
there are ‘moral blind spots’ then surely access to at least some (universal) values is 
denied, but previously Sher argues that agents were blameworthy at the time of 
wrongdoing because such fundamental values are ultimately available to the agent and so 
potentially challenging their behaviour. Is it possible to be responsible for an action and 
be unaware of its moral significance? Being blameworthy for an action when culpably 
unaware of its moral significance is plausible. Being blameworthy for an action when 
simply unaware of its moral significance is implausible. If it is the case that moral rightness 
or wrongness is a claim about universal matters of fact, is an agent’s failure to recognise 
 
196  See Jennifer Eberhardt (2019: 133) for discussion of the role of nineteenth century science in 
promoting the view that inferiority of certain races, and so their treatment, was part of the natural 
(created) order, confirmed by false scientific methods. 
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(and act on) such facts culpable? If it is, (following Sher’s main argument) an agent would 
be considered blameworthy for related behaviour. However, if an agent has a ‘blind spot’ 
for a particular moral value, then being simply unaware of the moral significance of the 
related action surely leads to behaviour that is not blameworthy. So, is it possible to be 
responsible for an action and be unaware of its moral significance? Yes, if unawareness is 
culpable because of, for example, laziness or self-interest. Also, yes, if an agent has 
through an earlier benighting act failed to seek out relevant challenging universal values 
available through reflection. 
I do not believe it is necessary to reach a conclusion on these many points to 
respond to John Martin Fischer’s epistemic condition, that (to be subject to guidance 
control) an agent must be aware of an action’s moral significance. John Martin Fischer 
does not talk about an action’s moral significance in relation to universal or contemporary 
values, simply an awareness, (of an action’s moral significance). John Martin Fischer’s 
second epistemic condition does not take a position on the moral realism – relativism 
debate, so this substantial, important and difficult problem can be respectfully moved to 
one side; John Martin Fischer only requires that an agent must be aware of an action’s 
moral significance in the context of their society’s value conventions or perhaps some 
objective standard. When reflecting on a possible action an agent will surely be at least 
aware, and would probably consider, the action and associated values, norms and 
conventions of their society. While an agent may choose to ignore such conventions in 
their decision making, it seems implausible that they would be unaware of their own 
society’s essential value conventions. In the unlikely event that an agent was unaware, (of 
an action’s moral significance), then following John Martin Fischer’s condition, they 
would not be responsible, unless unawareness was culpable. 
Concluding section (b), that an agent must be aware of an action’s moral 
significance, clearly as noted, implicit bias is charged with morally related content, 
including morally relevant qualities, but is the level of moral awareness experienced by 
the agent when actions are influenced by implicit bias sufficient to meet the requirements 
of guidance control? The requirements of guidance control were found to be unclear in 
terms of ‘receptive to reasons some of which are moral’ or the more substantial 
awareness of the ‘moral significance of reasons’. It was concluded that while some agents 
may have the capacity for deeper reflection on the moral significance of reasons, 
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(perhaps suggesting a greater degree of responsibility), John Martin Fischer’s relatively 
‘simple’ statement, that a responsible agent must be (at least) receptive to reasons, some of 
which are moral reasons, is at least sufficient as a foundation of agent responsibility. Is 
the level of moral awareness experienced by the agent when actions are influenced by 
implicit bias sufficient to meet the requirements of guidance control? The adopted model 
of implicit bias includes the possibility of reflection, awareness and so responsibility. 
Moral awareness, and being receptive to moral reasons, is naturally integrated with this 
model of mechanisms that mediate the influence of implicit social cognition on 
behaviour (fig 5.1). The moral sense, and responsibility in the absence of awareness of 
moral significance were discussed, as they are both issues connected with implicit bias 
and responsibility. In the unlikely event that an agent is truly unaware, not having even a 
flicker of comprehension within their construal of a situation (of an action’s moral 
significance), then following John Martin Fischer’s condition, they are not responsible, 
(unless unawareness was culpable). 
I will now turn to John Martin Fischer’s other epistemic conditions; that an agent 
must be aware of; (c) the consequences of the action, and lastly (d) available alternative 
actions. 
 
(c) An agent must be aware of the consequences of the action. It seems correct to say 
that to be responsible for the outcome of an action an agent must have held at the time a 
belief about the possibility of that outcome occurring as a consequence of that action, (or 
be culpable in some sense for not holding that belief). As referred to earlier, there is 
some dispute concerning how detailed the belief must be. In the earlier example, to be 
responsible, does John at the time of the action have to believe it reasonably foreseeable that 
Mary may be hurt, or to be responsible is a more specific belief required, such as a belief 
that her arm may be broken?197 When discussing tracing, Fischer and Tognazzini express 
the point, ‘ … there will be a range of specifications, each more coarse-grained than the 
previous, and while some will not have been reasonably foreseeable, others will (2009: 
537). 
 
197 See Fischer and Tognazzini The Truth about Tracing (2009) for similar discussion. 
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How is a belief about the possibility of an outcome with implicit bias as its source 
to be understood? From everything that has been discussed concerning awareness, 
implicit bias and issuing behaviour, the idea of having belief about the possibility of 
outcomes with implicit bias as the source seems reasonable and plausible. Given a 
reflective element within the model of issuing behaviour, it is difficult to understand how 
belief about possible outcomes could fail to be a part of such reflection. The 
responsibility endorsing epistemic condition of awareness of the consequences of an 
action, where an agent must hold at the time a belief about reasonably foreseeable 
outcomes of an implicit bias issuing action, I believe is plausibly satisfied. Even limited 
reflection on actions must surely include some beliefs about possible future outcomes. I 
will now turn to the fourth and final condition, item (d). 
 
(d) An agent must be aware of available alternative actions. Initially, this seems a 
reasonable condition; unaware of alternative actions an agent surely cannot be blamed 
for taking what is believed to be the only course available, (assuming taking no action is 
impossible)? However, there is more to consider before leaving this item. This condition 
evokes earlier discussion of responsibility, determinism and the whole idea of 
responsible action if it happens to be the case that alternative paths are not available. In 
a previous example, an agent believed alternative actions were available, when in fact 
there were no alternatives; unaware that the door of their room had been locked, they 
just happened to choose to stay in the room. Crucially in this case the agent was 
responsible for the act of staying in their room as this action took place via the agent’s own 
responsibility relevant mechanism. The state of being (in fact) unable to do otherwise 
did not mitigate responsibility; the agent believed (assumed) alternative actions were 
available but chose not to take them and fully endorse the action that was chosen. If an 
agent believes no alternative action is available, (whether a true belief or not), yet endorses 
that action, making it their own, then the agent is responsible for that action. If an agent 
believes that no alternative action is available, (whether a true belief or not), and does not 
endorse that action, feeling coerced or forced in some way to act, (assuming taking no 
action is not an option), then responsibility for that action (other than in a minimal sense) 
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becomes very questionable.198 John Martin Fischer supports this claim, listing ‘force’ as 
the ‘second type of excusing condition’ (1993: 7). Iff an agent owns the action via their 
own responsibility relevant mechanism does the agent become responsible for that action.  
So, an agent is responsible for their actions if aware of available alternatives they 
make and endorse a choice, making it their own, and if not aware of alternative actions, 
an agent takes the only action available while endorsing it as their own. This clearly 
suggests a point to be made concerning the above requirement for a responsible agent 
to ‘believe in or be aware of available alternative actions’. If an agent owns the action’s 
delivery mechanism, (and has ‘put to the side’ any doubts about their responsibility 
establishing agency  (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 62-91, 243-244)), then awareness of or 
belief in possible alternative actions is not required. 
The expanded version of John Martin Fischer’s epistemic condition is plausible, 
and this additional point does not undermine or effect any earlier conclusions or 
discussion and does not cause a problem. It happens to be the case that John Martin 
Fischer’s guidance control condition of owning and taking responsibility for the issuing 
mechanism confers responsibility whether alternative actions are actually available or 
believed to be available. The control condition (owning and taking responsibility for the 
issuing mechanism) is the essential requirement; John Martin Fischer makes it clear that 
actual or believed access to available alternative actions is an unnecessary condition for 
guidance control, it may be ‘put to the side’. There is no intention to undervalue the 
sense that from the inside ‘alternative possibilities seem to lie open before us … and one 
of the possibilities is made actual by what we do’ (Nagel 2003: 232). This is the reality of 
our experience of the world, and as Nagel describes, part of the problem when trying to 
understand autonomy and responsibility. 
The situation may be summarised in quite a straightforward way; the adopted 
model of implicit bias facilitates agents’ varying degrees of awareness and reflection 
concerning (actual or illusionary) alternative actions and choices, our sense that from the 
inside alternative possibilities appear to lie open before us. However, for guidance 
 
198 An agent’s beliefs about the implications of the truth of determinism (availability of alternatives) is 
discussed by John Martin Fischer Responsibility and Control where it is suggested that it is ‘plausible that 
individuals can be brought to take a certain sort of stance in which metaphysical doubts are put to the 
side (practically speaking)’ (1998: 229). 
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control such awareness of alternative actions and choices is unnecessary if an agent owns 
the action’s delivery mechanism and has ‘put to the side’ any doubts about their 
responsibility establishing agency even in light of, for example, the possible truth of 
determinism.  
Briefly summing up so far, for the agent to be aware of ‘particular facts 
surrounding an action’ the agent must be aware of action, moral significance, 
consequences and alternatives’ (Rudy-Hiller 2018): (a) The action; there are substantial 
and compelling arguments and empirical evidence supporting the claim that agents are 
to a greater or lesser extent aware of implicit bias issuing behaviour i.e., the agent is aware 
of the action. (b) The action’s moral significance; moral awareness, and being receptive 
to moral reasons, are naturally integrated within the adopted model of mechanisms that 
mediate the influence of implicit social cognition on behaviour and so available as a 
component of guidance control. (c) The consequences of the action; the responsibility 
endorsing epistemic condition of awareness of the consequences of an action, where an 
agent must hold at the time a belief about reasonably foreseeable outcomes of an implicit 
bias issuing action, I believe is plausibly satisfied. (d) Available alternative actions; it has 
been argued that implicit bias issuing actions are subject to varying degrees of reflection 
and accompanying awareness of (actual or illusionary) alternative actions and choices. It 
was noted that for guidance control such awareness of alternative actions and choices is 
unnecessary if an agent owns the action’s delivery mechanism and has ‘put to the side’ 
any doubts about their responsibility establishing agency (for example, in light of the 
possible truth of determinism). From Nagel it was noted that from the ‘inside’ there is 
an important sense of alternative actions. 
 
Next, I will look at John Martin Fischer’s second general requirement, that an 
agent ‘acts with the proper sort of beliefs and intentions’ (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 13); 
does an agent act with ‘the proper sort of beliefs and intentions’ when actions are directly 
influenced by implicit bias? 
What do Fischer and Ravizza mean by ‘the proper sort of beliefs and intentions’? 
The context of this requirement is Responsibility and Control, Chapter Eight, Section II, 
Becoming a Moral Agent: 
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Parental responses to a child’s behavior, as part of the typical process of moral 
education, seek to induce the child to accept a certain view of himself as an agent. 
The relevant notion of ‘agency’ is a rather minimal notion, according to which 
the child sees himself as the source - in a specific sense - of certain upshots in the 
external world. The sense in which the child sees himself as the ‘source’ of these 
upshots is that he sees that their occurrence is caused - in a certain characteristic 
way - by him. The child is brought to see that his desires, beliefs, and intentions result 
in actions and upshots in the world; these upshots are not the results of freakish 
accidents or other agents. (added emphasis Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 208) 
 
Fischer and Ravizza’s position is that ‘moral responsibility is an essentially historical 
notion; someone’s being morally responsible requires that the past be a certain way’ 
(1998: 207). Recall the ideas introduced above during discussion of the kind of awareness 
required by the epistemic condition, particularly the characterisation of awareness within 
the dispositionalist account whereby ‘tacit, dormant, dispositional or unconscious beliefs 
can … amount to the kind of awareness that is required for moral responsibility’ (Rudy-
Hiller 2018). This runs with John Martin Fischer’s account that the past must include a 
process of ‘taking responsibility’, a necessary feature of moral responsibility. ‘It (taking 
responsibility) is part of the process by which a mechanism leading (say) to an action, 
becomes one’s own’ (1998: 207).199 Recall that taking responsibility involves three major 
ingredients: First, seeing oneself as the source of one’s behaviour in the quite minimal 
sense that one sees that one’s ‘desires, beliefs, and intentions result in actions and upshots 
in the world ... ’ (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 208). Second, one must see oneself ‘as a fair 
target of the reactive attitudes as a result of how (one) exercises this agency (1998: 211). 
Third, these views of oneself must be based on evidence (1998: 213). By ‘the proper sort 
of beliefs and intentions’ Fischer and Ravizza mean, based on appropriate evidence, self-
conception of agency that ‘involves the minimal idea that the child is an agent qua source 
of certain upshots in the external world, such that his own desires, beliefs, and intentions, 
not freakish accidents or other agents, result in actions and upshots in the world.200 The 
 
199 Questions have been raised concerning Fischer and Ravizza’s claim that moral responsibility is an 
essentially historical notion. See Review: Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Responsibility and History (Bratman 2000). 
 
200 Description of ‘the proper sort of beliefs and intentions’ is in harmony with Thomas Nagel’s Paper 
Freedom (2003); from the internal perspective, the sense of being the source of change in the world, (yet 
from the external perspective, the agent is part of the world ‘and our lives are seen as products and 
manifestations of the world as a whole’ (2003: 232). 
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reactive attitudes self-conception involves the child’s belief that he is sometimes the 
appropriate object of the reactive attitudes’ (Zimmerman 2002: 219). Initial reaction to 
this final requirement of guidance control, that an agent ‘acts with the proper sort of 
beliefs and intentions’ (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 13), is that it is both reasonable and 
straight forward. The minimal sense that our chosen actions bring changes in the world 
that may legitimately result in praise or blame from others is for most human beings an 
accepted and assumed situation. As discussed at length, from the perspective of implicit 
bias, there is controversy about whether the relevant desires, beliefs and intentions are 
his own desires, beliefs and intentions, (such questions may also be asked of desires and 
beliefs concerning many issues, from mundane to life changing). As previously 
concluded, (page 142), the desires and beliefs that issue in implicit bias related behaviour 
do belong to the agent in a responsibility enabling way: ‘If agents exercise this form of 
control, (ecological control) … then implicit attitudes can be properly regarded as part 
of ‘who the agent is’  -  part of her character, which is as a whole subject to moral 
evaluation’ (Holroyd and Kelly 2016: 130). So, it is correct to claim that an agent’s sense 
of being qua source of certain upshots in the external world that issue from their own 
desires, beliefs, and intentions, can apply to both implicit bias related actions and actions 
that have other sources. The semicompatibilist/guidance control requirement that an 
agent ‘acts with the proper sort of beliefs and intentions’ (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 13) 
may be satisfied in the case of implicit bias influenced behaviour.  
Responding to the general question raised at the beginning of this section on the 
epistemic condition for guidance control; does issuing behaviour of implicit bias satisfies 
John Martin Fischer’s epistemic condition of guidance control and responsibility? After 
detailed examination of an expanded epistemic requirement for guidance control in the 
context of implicit bias influenced behaviour it was concluded that the epistemic 
condition is satisfied. 
 
Before drawing together and presenting a summary of the conclusions of the 
investigation into implicit bias and all the requirements of guidance control (items 1 
through to 4), I will make some final comments on implicit bias and degrees of awareness 
and responsibility.  
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The argument that agents are excused blame for implicit bias related behaviour 
because implicit biases are unconscious or the result of irresistible subtle, (or less than 
subtle), cultural influences beyond the agent’s control has been discussed, including 
issues such as awareness and so possible, (but not guaranteed) control of issuing 
behaviour. In response, and generally contra201 to Levy (2014a), it is argued, for example 
by Holroyd, that ‘there is some reason to suppose that individuals are, at least sometimes, 
liable to blame for the extent to which they are influenced in behaviour and judgment 
by implicit biases’ (2012: 274). The implicit bias model described and used within this 
Thesis includes Holroyd’s general thesis and accepts a particular model of the influence 
of implicit social cognition on behaviour (Fig 5.1) acknowledging the possibility of 
reflective behaviour. However, as Alex Madva points out, ‘awareness and self-knowledge 
are often quite difficult and must draw on a rich store of observations and interpretations 
of … behaviour’ (added emphasis 2020: 390). Difficulties experienced when making 
reflective behavioural decisions, perhaps due to stress, tiredness, or general cognitive 
load, leads to consideration of moral responsibility when there is partial awareness of 
implicit bias. If awareness comes in degrees, then can (plausibly and intuitively) control, 
responsibility and blameworthiness be meaningfully said to ‘come in degrees’ (Madva 
2020: 390)?202 It is this notion of degrees of awareness and responsibility that will be 
touched upon in this next section. 
There are several reasons for mentioning degrees of awareness and responsibility. 
First, such consideration offers a way of capturing the idea that, for example, a racist 
living during the 18th Century, ‘ … while still morally responsible and blameworthy for 
their racist attitudes, is nevertheless less responsible and blameworthy for their attitudes 
than a contemporary racist … ’ (Coates and Swenson 2013: 643). Second, the idea of 
degrees of awareness and responsibility may be expressed in terms of guidance control 
because the 18th Century racist is less reasons-receptive, less aware of liberal reasons for 
 
201 This is clearly a gross simplification of the relative positions and given merely as an introduction to 
discussion of partial responsibility and blame. 
 
202 See also Madva Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility (2018) where the implications of empirical 
evidence that individuals are aware of their implicit biases in partial and inarticulate ways is explored. It 
is argued (by analogy with moods) that responsibility and awareness, (and control), come in degrees and 
partial awareness of implicit biases makes (agents) partially morally responsible for them.  
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treating persons of all races as equal (Coates and Swenson 2013: 643). Coates and 
Swenson’s Paper Reasons-Responsiveness and Degrees of Responsibility (2013) thoroughly 
develops the notion of degrees of responsibility expressed within the paradigm of 
guidance control. The authors outline the point as follows: 
 
 …the greater degree of comparative similarity that obtains between the actual 
world and the nearest possible world in which the actual sequence mechanism 
reacts to sufficient reason to do otherwise, the greater degree of responsibility. 
And correspondingly, the greater the degree of blameworthiness. Likewise, if 
there is less comparative similarity between the actual world and the nearest 
possible world in which the actual sequence mechanism reacts to sufficient 
reason to do otherwise, the agent in question is less responsible. And 
correspondingly, agents whose actions issue from such mechanism will be less 
blameworthy for their actions. (Coates and Swenson 2013: 636) 
 
Examples are given to clarify the point, but the above quotation shows the general 
argument and the intuitive idea that degrees of responsibility may be expressed within 
the semicompatibilist/guidance control paradigm. There is much that could be 
considered in Coates and Swenson’s Paper in terms of guidance control and degrees of 
responsibility that is unfortunately beyond the main objective of this Thesis. See also 
Madva (2018: 63) for contra view of Fischer and Ravizza’s position, that responsibility 
is binary even when awareness, control, blame and reason responsiveness all come in 
degrees. 
 The third and final point concerning degrees of awareness and responsibility 
returns to implicit bias, Deutsch and Strack (2010), motivation, opportunity and implicit 
and explicit measures; ‘… motivation and opportunity to engage in more complex 
reasoning processes have proven to moderate the relation between implicit and explicit 
social cognition on one hand and behaviour on the other’ (2010: 66). Motivation or 
opportunity have a decisive influence on whether processes associated with implicit or 
explicit measures have the upper hand. Concerning implicit measures, the notion of 
degrees of responsibility is reflected within the model of implicit bias (Fig 5.1), where 
important mechanisms mediate the influence of implicit social cognition, giving rise to 
behaviour that is more or less subject to reflective control for which the agent is, ceteris 
paribus, more or less responsible. Madva summarises this point ‘… individuals are 
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somewhat aware and somewhat in control of their implicit biases, and so they are 
somewhat responsible, and somewhat to blame’ (2020: 390). The intuitively correct and 
generally pervasive notion of degrees of responsibility is accommodated within the 
model of implicit bias via increasing (or deceasing) levels of reflective input into issuing 
behaviour. 
 
The main conclusions of the investigation into implicit bias and the requirements 
of guidance control (items 1 through to 4) are as follows: 
 
1. An agent has guidance control as far as their deliberation mechanism is appropriately 
responsive to reasons (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 41-46). 
 
2. The appropriate way is moderate reasons-responsiveness, described in Chapter 3.  
An agent’s responsibility relevant mechanism K is moderately reasons-responsive iff; 
  
(2.a) K is regularly receptive to reasons, (some of which are moral reasons - see item 2.a.ii). 
(2.a.i) When holding fixed the operation of a K-type mechanism, the agent would 
recognize reasons in such a way as to give rise to an understandable pattern from the 
viewpoint of a third party who understands the agent’s values and beliefs.  
It was concluded that for implicit bias related behaviour there is an understandable pattern, 
minimally grounded in reality, in the sense that a third party could see a pattern of biased 
behaviour even though such behaviour would (perhaps significantly) be contrary to the 
agent’s declared values. There is consistency of outcome within the integrative model of 
implicit bias, there is regularity, as essentially required for effective guidance control. 
(2.a.ii) It is required that some of the reasons are moral reasons. It was concluded that 
the requirement of guidance control, that an agent recognizes reasons some of which 
are moral reasons, is satisfied in the case of implicit bias related behaviour. 
 
(2.b) An agent’s responsibility relevant mechanism K must also be at least weakly reactive 
to reasons; this requires that the agent would react to at least one sufficient reason to do 
otherwise in some possible scenario. When considered in the context of implicit bias, it 
was shown that issuing behaviour of implicit bias is moderately reason-responsiveness, 
in terms of being regularly receptive and weakly reactive, supporting the view that an agent 
is morally responsible for their actions. 
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(2.c) Guidance control also requires an agent’s responsibility relevant mechanism K to 
be their own, where being the agent’s own means ‘taking responsibility’ for K.  
(2.c.i) This requires that the agent sees herself as the source of her behaviour. It was 
concluded that while seeing oneself as the source of implicit bias related behaviour is 
contra to the popular conception of implicit bias as essentially unconscious, the chosen 
model, with its element of reflective decision making and control, allows the agent to 
take responsibility by ‘allowing an agent to see herself as the source of her behaviour’. 
(2.c.ii and 3) An agent believes that she is an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes that 
result from how she exercises her agency in certain contexts. It was concluded that it 
seems reasonable to construe the reactive attitudes as potential props, part of an 
individual’s wider strategy when taking ecological control. The condition that an agent 
takes responsibility by believing it is appropriate to be an apt candidate for the reactive 
attitudes, causes no obvious or significant problems for semicompatibilism, or guidance 
control, considered in light of implicit bias as characterised.  
(2.c.iii) An agent must also view herself as an agent with respect to being a source of 
behaviour and an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes based on evidence for these 
beliefs. It was noted that taking ecological control and reflecting on evidence of personal 
achievement in mitigating implicit bias related behaviour encourages a sense of personal 
agency, of being in an important sense the source of behaviour, (and as a source, an apt 
candidate for the reactive attitudes). 
 
4. Guidance control has an epistemic condition; to be praiseworthy or blameworthy an 
individual must know, or be reasonably expected to know, what they are doing (Fischer 
and Ravizza 1998: 12). John Martin Fischer’s epistemic conditions that an agent must be 
aware of ‘particular facts surrounding an action’ and act with ‘the proper sort of beliefs 
and intentions’ (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 13) were expanded to enable a more 
comprehensive analysis. After detailed consideration of both requirements it was 
concluded that the epistemic condition for guidance control was satisfied in the case of 
implicit bias related behaviour. For the second part of the requirement, that an agent act 
with ‘the proper sort of beliefs and intentions’ it was noted that agents recognise that 
actions bring about changes in the world that may legitimately produce praise or blame 
from others and this is for the vast majority an accepted and assumed situation. This is 
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true when actions are influenced by implicit bias. Implicit bias related behaviour is 
subject to a degree of reflection and part of an agent’s character; it is reasonable that an 
agent recognises such behaviour, like other behaviour, brings about changes in the world 
that may legitimately produce praise or blame from others. The epistemic condition of 
guidance control is fundamental, evidenced by recurring discussion from the outset; 
recurring discussion also included awareness and the conscious or nonconscious nature 
of implicit bias. 
From the summary of the investigation into implicit bias and all the requirements 
of guidance control (items 1 through to 4), implicit bias related behaviour is subject to 
guidance control and so agent responsibility. This is in harmony with the characterisation 
of implicit bias developed in Part II. 
 
6.2 Semicompatibilism, Implicit Bias and Luck  
In this Section I examine semicompatibilism, luck and implicit bias. Before launching 
into detailed discussion, it is obviously important to describe the reasons for considering 
luck within the context of this Thesis and outline the way forward. So far, investigation 
has focused on issuing behaviour of implicit bias and semicompatibilism; it was 
concluded that an agent has guidance control over issuing behaviour of implicit bias and 
therefore is responsible for such behaviour. I will now examine a well-known criticism 
of compatibilism and semicompatibilism from the perspective of implicit bias. The luck 
problem for compatibilism203 has been chosen not only because it is one of the most, 
(perhaps the most), substantial problems faced by compatibilists, but importantly, 
implicit bias appears to be a paradigm example of a source of behaviour that is formed 
and often continually reinforced by factors that are to a greater or lesser extent subject 
to luck. Simply expressed, I have looked carefully at implicit bias and guidance control, 
I will now examine semicompatibilism and the luck problem in the context of implicit 
bias.  
Drawing on The Luck Problem for Compatibilists (Levy 2011b), Implicit Bias and Moral 
Responsibility: Probing the Data (Levy 2017), Semicompatibilist Options: Essays in Defense of an 
 
203 One of the most incisive descriptions of the ‘luck problem’ for compatibilists is given by Gregg 
Caruso in conversation with Daniel Dennett Just Deserts (Dennett and Caruso 2021: 15-18). Using the 
luck problem, Caruso ‘attacks’ Dennett’s compatibilist position with exceptionally clear and logical 
philosophical argument. 
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Actual-Sequence Approach to Freedom and Responsibility (T. Cyr 2018), Moral Responsibility, 
Luck, and Compatibilism (T. W. Cyr 2019), Deep Control (Fischer 2015c) and Moral Luck 
(Nelkin 2019) 204  I will describe how luck is claimed to threaten compatibilism and 
semicompatibilism. Then continue with consideration of implicit bias related behaviour 
as a possible problem for a defence of semicompatibilism from the luck problem. To be 
thorough, I will in turn adopt a position on implicit bias of agent responsibility for 
issuing behaviour and, following Levy (2017), a position that denies agent responsibility. 
The overall aim is to critically examine a defence of semicompatibilism from the luck 
problem within the context of implicit bias and so offer further comments on 
semicompatibilism itself. 
 What is the luck problem and what specifically is the moral luck problem? The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy offers a concise answer: ‘Moral luck occurs when 
an agent can be correctly205 treated as an object of moral judgement even though a 
significant aspect of what she is assessed for depends on factors beyond her control’ 
(added emphasis Nelkin 2019). This runs counter to the plausible Control Principle 
whereby agents are only responsible for actions over which they have control. Given the 
Control Principle and the significant contribution by luck in shaping behaviour, it is 
perhaps easy to become sceptical of legitimate moral assessment of almost anyone for 
anything. There are, of course, responses to such scepticism, some of which will be 
briefly mentioned, but before looking at these, it is useful for future discussion to 
 
204 John Martin Fischer is Chair and Dana Nelkin a member of the Dissertation Committee for Taylor 
W. Cyr’s PhD Thesis Semicompatibilist Options: Essays in Defense of  an Actual-Sequence Approach to Freedom 
and Responsibility. 
205 To say ‘correctly treated’ is initially puzzling. I assume the qualifier ‘correctly’ simply confirms that for 
an agent to be morally lucky or unlucky she must paradoxically be, in an important sense, a ‘legitimate’ 
object of differential moral assessment, when conventional considerations of control and responsibility 
suggest differential moral assessment is an incorrect response. For example, when a driver unavoidably 
injures a pedestrian who without warning steps on to the road, it just seems a matter of fact that we do 
make a different moral assessment of such a driver compared to the driver who, it just so happens, 
makes an uneventful journey. Although I use the term ‘correctly’ several times in this section, it is 
understood that further clarification may be required. 
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(following Nagel 1979) quickly identify and describe four kinds of luck.206 Resultant luck 
is luck in the way things actually turn out: if the outcome of the same intention held by 
two agents differs and moral assessment is correctly different, then moral luck is in play 
within the process of assessment. An example will illustrate the general idea. Two 
conscientious people (genuinely) forget to check their brakes and then experience brake 
failure. In one case a pedestrian without warning steps on to the road and is injured 
because the approaching car cannot stop in time, in the other case it just so happens that 
no pedestrian steps out and the second driver completes their journey without incident. 
Differential moral assessment is a case of moral luck. One driver will be the target of 
considerable blame and resentment, the other driver simply completes their journey 
without incident, yet all that separates them is an unlucky event, not within the control 
of either driver. Circumstantial luck or present luck is, as the name suggests, luck present 
within the circumstances in which agents find themselves that is beyond their control; 
through bad luck, being in the wrong place at the wrong time, (or good luck contributing 
to being in the right place). To make correct differing moral assessments is a case of 
circumstantial moral luck. Constitutive luck concerns luck in who we are, our attitudes 
(questionable), disposition, and so on. This includes who we are because of our genetic 
inheritance and (to a greater or lesser extent) our environment. Agents clearly do not 
control their genetic inheritance yet correctly blaming for behaviour that in some way 
originates from an agent’s genetic makeup is a case of constitutive moral luck. Finally, 
causal luck concerns something familiar, the notion that current actions are the outcome 
of causal links over which an agent has no control and hence, following the Control 
Principle, is not responsible. Differing moral appraisal of behaviours that originate in 
these ways are examples of moral luck. 
 The above touches on several types of luck that arguably diminish or remove 
agent control and so responsibility. Yet, differential moral assessment, as the example 
above suggests, is quite commonplace in everyday life. Nelkin (2019) notes, there are 
three general approaches to the problem of moral luck. First, to deny that moral luck 
 
206 Paul Russell Freewill Pessimism (Russell 2015a) describes very clearly the four forms of luck identified 
by Nagel and discusses their control limiting consequences that suggest ‘since nothing is properly and 
fully under the agent’s control, there are no suitable foundations for moral evaluation or moral 
responsibility’ (Russell 2015: 5). 
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exists, even though appearances suggest otherwise. Second, accepting that moral luck 
exists while rejecting or restricting the control principle. Third, the idea that it is 
incoherent to accept or deny the existence of some forms of moral luck, particularly with 
constitutive luck.207 It is beyond the scope of this Thesis to discuss these responses to 
moral luck in detail, rather, I will now move directly to careful consideration of the threat 
posed to semicompatibilism by luck, specifically circumstantial and constitutive luck. 
 The essential problem for compatibilists such as John Martin Fischer, who’s 
semicompatibilism is largely built on the claim that ‘moral responsibility is an essentially 
historical notion’ (1998: 170), where agents over time take responsibility for their actions 
by owning the mechanism that is the source of their actions, is the very nature 
(constitution) of the mechanism may be significantly subject to constitutive luck, 
throwing into doubt the sense that the mechanism is truly mine. (Also recall the similar 
regress problem associated with Kane’s ‘self-forming actions’ and related notion of ‘will-
setting actions’ page 41). A semicompatibilist may argue that constitutive luck can only 
excuse for so long, because over time an agent has the possibility to take responsibility 
for dispositions and values acquired through constitutive luck. On this view, agents reject 
some dispositions and accept others; an agent creates something of their own from what 
they are given. John Martin Fischer makes a similar point, using the expression ‘playing 
the cards that are dealt you’ (2015c: 164). (I will outline Fischer’s response to the luck 
problem in the concluding remarks of this section). However, if an agent’s mechanism 
is in any sense a function of luck, then to that extent it is not under their control and so 
issuing behaviour is not entirely controlled and responsibility is diminished. Levy 
expresses the idea succinctly, ‘the problem of history is a problem of luck’ (2011b: 87), 
alternatively, Dennett argues ‘Strawson may have said that “luck swallows everything” 
but if so he was wrong. Luck sets the stage …’ (Dennett and Caruso 2021: 20). Recalling 
earlier discussion of the role of culture in forming attitudes, beliefs and biases, it is easy 
to see how implicit bias engages with the luck problem in the sense of circumstantial and 
constitutional luck; the formation of biases, their nature and degree, depends (to greater 
 
207 See also Levy, Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Chapter Two, An 
Account of Luck (Levy 2011a) for discussion of this point, the four forms of luck mentioned above and a 
clear introduction to luck. 
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or lesser extent) on circumstances and an agent’s constitution, both (again, to a greater 
or lesser extent) matters of luck and, it is argued, beyond their control.   
 Criticism of the plausible idea that agents can take responsibility via an historical 
process of deliberation that mitigates, perhaps effectively eliminates, the role of luck in the 
formation of their endowment issuing behaviour, is clearly described by Levy as the ‘luck 
pincer’: 
 
In so modifying themselves, they satisfy the most demanding history-sensitive 
compatibilist ownership conditions. But the series of decisions whereby they 
supposedly took responsibility for their endowment were either expressive of that 
endowment, or subject to present luck, or expressive of their endowment as 
modified by previous actions in turn expressive of their endowment or subject to 
present luck. The solution to the problem of constitutive luck is therefore lots 
more luck. But surely, we cannot undo the freedom-undermining effects of luck 
by virtue of more luck. Iterated luck does not cease to be luck. (2011b: 96) 
 
Levy’s argument is important and persuasive; drawing on Cyr (2018) I will shortly look 
at a response to Levy. Before this, an important comment concerning implicit bias and 
luck. The luck pincer problem, whereby an agent’s deliberation cannot be free from the 
influence of luck on formation of their endowment and present circumstances, suggests 
a problem with the adopted model of implicit bias. Consider the model of mechanisms 
that mediate the influence of implicit social cognition (Fig 5.1), the model adopted to 
characterise implicit bias. I have previously argued the presence of deliberation and 
reflection within the model facilitates responsibility for issuing behaviour. However, if 
luck in various forms is present, unavoidable and influential during deliberation and 
reasoning when challenging acquired values and biases or making decisions about 
behaviour, then agent responsibility for issuing behaviour is clearly and perhaps 
significantly brought into question. The luck problem is therefore threatening to 
semicompatibilism and the characterisation of implicit bias so far presented; what 
response can be made to this challenge? 
Anticipation of Cyr’s response to elements of this threat may be found in Judith 
Andre’s short Paper Nagel, Williams, and Moral Luck (1983). In contrast with Kant,208 (that 
 
208 A clear exposition of the contrasting positions of Kant, Adam Smith, Bernard Williams and others is 
given by Simon Blackburn during his lecture ‘Moral Luck and the Peculiarity of Blame’ at The New 
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everyone as rational agents can act morally no matter what their circumstances), Andre 
describes Thomas Nagel (1979) and Bernard Williams’ (1981) position, that ‘in practice 
we evaluate actions and agents partly on the basis of circumstances beyond the agent’s 
control  -  on the basis of luck.’ This leads to ‘… inconsistency and possibly incoherence 
within the concept of morality.’ Also, ‘… Williams (argues) that rational justification 
rests partly on luck’ (Andre 1983: 202). I have emphasised ‘partly’ as this, I believe, is the 
key notion employed by Cyr in his defence of compatibilism from the luck challenge. 
 Recall, that it is claimed that an agent’s endowment, their set of values, 
dispositions and biases, to a greater or lesser extent, are subject to constitutive luck. 
Given that part of the process that leads to action is subject to constitutive luck and not 
under control by the agent, then to this extent an agent is not responsible for their 
actions. Due to the luck pincer, an agent’s endowment is claimed to be a matter of luck 
for them but following a compatibilist account such as John Martin Fischer’s 
semicompatibilism, an agent can assume responsibility over time by progressively owning 
their endowment. As noted, Levy does not accept that ownership over time is possible 
because of the luck pincer, the constant ongoing influence of present luck. Cyr disagrees, 
arguing that while agents may sometimes be presently lucky, ‘it is not the case that they are 
presently lucky in every case of taking ownership for their endowments’ (2018: 60). 
(Dennett makes the same point, claiming the actions we perform are not entirely 
dependent on luck. (Dennett and Caruso 2021: 20)). 
 Cyr’s comprehensive defence of compatibilism from present and constitutive 
luck employs one essential tactic: the notion of degrees of responsibility. Cyr argues that 
agents are not presently lucky on every occasion that an agent builds their endowment, so 
taking ownership is ultimately possible and involves agent reflection on their values and 
dispositions. While agents are not completely immune from the influence of present 
luck, there is partial responsibility for how the agent’s endowment, their values and 
beliefs, evolve over time. On this view, how an agent is, their constitution, is not wholly 
a matter of luck and issuing behaviour is to that degree the responsibility of the agent. 
 
College of the Humanities on the 26th February 2016, available on YouTube 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bRaRVx_7tVY). 
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Cyr gives further explanation of his defence, beginning with his expression of the ‘pincer 
problem’: 
 
How is it that an agent can be responsible for the evaluation and adjusting of her 
endowment, when the toolkit, so to speak, is a part of her very endowment? If 
the agent is responsible for taking ownership of her endowment because her 
history includes previous modifications to her endowment, then the problem is 
not solved but merely moved back in time to prior uses of the toolkit with which 
she has been endowed. (Cyr 2019: 13) 
 
How can an agent ‘break into’ this closed system to take ownership? Cyr does not believe 
the system is completely closed, arguing by example that on the occasion of an agent’s 
first potentially free and morally responsible action, although the agent may up to that 
point be entirely constitutively lucky, she can nevertheless be slightly responsible for her 
action, be a ‘little agent’ (following Cyr 2019: 13). The plausible notion of degrees of 
responsibility is employed to begin an explanation of how agents can, over time, begin 
to take a degree of ownership of their endowment even considering constitutive luck. It 
seems that at the point of being slightly responsible for her action, within Cyr’s idea of 
a ‘little agent’ is the notion of a ‘flicker’ of (some form of) agent causation that allows 
overtime increasing ownership by the agent of their endowment, not entirely defined by 
luck. (Appendix B describes in greater detail the concept of agent causation). 
Having looked briefly at luck, how it challenges responsibility and a brief outline 
of a defence of agent responsibility considering present and constitutive luck, I will turn 
to implicit bias; the soundness of Cyr’s defence of compatibilism against luck will be 
assessed considering two essentially different perspectives on implicit bias. 
As noted, the formation and influence of implicit bias appears a paradigm 
example of how luck shapes behaviour. Is there something special about implicit bias, as 
part of an agent’s overall endowment of beliefs, opinions and attitudes that calls for 
special consideration when thinking about defence of compatibilism from the luck 
problem? Is the overarching problem of luck for moral responsibility particularly acute 
or in some way unique for implicit bias influenced behaviour? Although it seems 
reasonable and plausible to say that Cyr’s approach to the problem of luck is relevant 
when implicit bias is included within the overall endowment of an agent, clearly this 
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must be looked at carefully. First, when issuing behaviour of implicit bias is subject to a 
degree of rational deliberation and subject to guidance control and responsibility. 
Second, when agent responsibility for behaviour is absent. The first conception of 
implicit bias has been described at length, but the second conception needs more 
explanation, and I will revisit Levy’s Paper Implicit Bias and Moral Responsibility: Probing the 
Data (2017) to give further insight, before investigating if these perspectives on the 
nature of implicit attitudes impact Cyr’s defence of compatibilism from the problem of 
luck.  
Levy (see also, page 137) says in cases in which an action (or its consequences) 
has a moral character due to the agent’s implicit attitudes, control over the action (or its 
consequences) is greatly diminished to such an extent that it is highly plausible the agent 
lacks responsibility-level control: 
 
1. Moral responsibility requires that an agent exercises responsibility-level control over 
their action or the consequences of their action (depending on whether they are 
putatively responsible for the action or for its consequences). 
2. In cases in which an action (or its consequences) has a moral character due to the 
agent’s implicit attitudes, control over the action (or its consequences) is greatly 
diminished. 
3. The decrease in control is significant enough to make it highly plausible that the agent lacks 
responsibility-level control. 
4. If control is a necessary condition of direct moral responsibility, agents are therefore 
not responsible for these actions or their consequences (added emphasis 2017: 6). 
  
This is based on the view (generally contra to that expressed within this Thesis) that the 
processes that mediate implicit attitude influenced behaviour are not available to 
introspection; ‘we lack insight into what influence they (implicit attitudes) have on our 
perceptions and judgments, and there are no reliable means of modulating or inhibiting 
this influence’ (2017: 8). That said, Levy continues by looking more critically at the type 
of control of actions that is necessary to realise responsibility-level control; even if 
control over actions is diminished, is such control still sufficient for agent responsibility? 
Following John Martin Fischer, Levy begins by discussing ‘understandable pattern(s) of 
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reasons recognition, minimally grounded in reality’ (Fischer and Ravizza 1998: 73). Levy 
suggests that sensitivity to reasons is patterned when it is continuous, broad and 
systematic209 and summarises his control condition sufficient for agent responsibility as 
follows: if an action is caused by mechanism m, and m is sensitive to reasons in a suitably 
patterned way, then m realizes control over that action (2017: 11). Having set up this 
control condition, Levy then looks at the impact on reasons-responsiveness when an 
implicit attitude is a part of the mechanism. Summarising Levy’s developing ideas: an 
associative account entails that implicit attitudes will display little reasons responsiveness, 
hence there is insufficient control over the moral character of our actions, (when this 
character is due to implicit attitudes), for us to be morally responsible for their having 
that character (following closely Levy 2017: 12). By contrast, as previously mentioned, 
(page 108), Mandelbaum considers implicit attitudes are unconscious beliefs. On this 
view, mechanisms that have implicit attitudes as components will not show any reduction 
in reasons-responsiveness. Levy does not a accept implicit attitudes are beliefs, claiming 
that while they have some propositional structure, they do not have the right kind of 
structure to underwrite continuous, broad and systematic responsiveness. Rather, they 
have a ‘patchy propositional structure, not the kind of continuous and broad 
propositional structure we rightly associate with beliefs’ (Levy 2017: 13). Levy presents 
various examples to show that such patchiness undermines patterned reasons-
responsiveness, control and responsibility. However, recognising that undermining 
responsibility does not sit well in many cases where there is insensitivity to reasons, Levy 
considers, and under specified conditions accepts, an alternative to the control condition 
 
209 ‘To say that it is continuous is to say that the relevant mechanism is sensitive to relatively fine-grained 
alterations in the parameters of a particular reason. The violinist exhibits continuous sensitivity to 
orchestral dynamics, say, when she would respond not merely to some alteration in the volume of the 
orchestra by adjusting her own volume, but when she is appropriately responsive to a (relatively) 
continuous dynamic range. To say that sensitivity is broad is to say that the relevant mechanism is 
responsive not just to a particular kind of reasons (however continuously) but to a range of different 
kinds of reasons. The violinist shows exquisite control since she is sensitive not only to orchestral 
dynamics, but to the acoustics of the room, the mood of the conductor and the audience, and so on. 
Sensitivity is systematic when the mechanism would respond to a particular kind of reason in any context 
(so long as that context does not include features that neutralize the reason). The violinist exhibits 
systematic responsiveness to dynamics when she would respond to them in a large hall or a small, with 
a full orchestra or a small ensemble, and so on’ (Levy 2017: 10). 
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approach, referred to as the attributability view. On this view, ‘agents are responsible for 
attitudes that properly belong to them, and for actions caused by such attitudes’ (Levy 
2017: 18). 
 The attributability position may be summarised as follows: Control is not a 
necessary condition of moral responsibility but may be relevant, and when it is relevant it 
is ‘because actions that are controlled by agents are typically attributable to the agent in 
a way sufficient to ground their responsibility for the action’ (Levy 2017: 18). If agents 
fail to exercise responsibility level control, (for example, because of implicit attitudes), 
they may still be responsible if implicit attitudes are deeply enough attributable to the 
agent to ground responsibility. This is essentially the attributability position; for implicit 
attitudes, agents are not responsible for issuing actions or their consequences:  
1. Agents are morally responsible for actions or the consequences of their actions when 
they are caused … by attitudes that are sufficiently deeply attributable to them. 
2. In those cases in which an action (or its consequences) has a moral character due to 
the agent’s implicit attitudes and would lack that character were the action controlled by 
their explicit attitudes, the attitude is not deeply attributable to the agent. 
3. If attributability is a necessary condition of direct moral responsibility, agents are 
therefore not responsible for these actions or their consequences (Levy 2017: 19). 
The key claim here is that implicit attitudes do not belong to an agent’s 
deliberative standpoint, an explicit and considered mesh of consistent beliefs and 
attitudes in a way that is sufficient for responsibility level attributability. However, Levy 
reminds us that implicit attitudes are patchy endorsements, and as such are not entirely 
disconnected from an agent’s deliberative standpoint. Having links with other attitudes 
that are firmly attributable to the agent suggests such links can afford some degree of 
attributability of implicit attitudes to an agent.210  
Levy does not share the conclusion adopted within this Thesis, that agents are 
responsible for implicit bias influenced behaviour, however, Levy’s two perspectives on 
implicit attitudes and responsibility, the control condition and the attributability view, 
are generally in accord with the model of implicit bias I have adopted; the interactive 
 
210 Recall Holroyd and Kelly’s view (page 138) that even if it is accepted that implicit associations are not 
unified within an agent, this does not entail implicit associations contribute nothing to who the agent is 
or cannot be to that extent subject to evaluation. 
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model, being a configuration that includes decision making and implicit social cognition 
components that are responsive to reasons and Holroyd and Kelly’s (2016) approach, 
where implicit bias is considered part of a person’s character. 
In contrast to the model of implicit bias I have adopted within this Thesis, while 
noting the qualification above, (that links with other attitudes that are firmly attributable 
to the agent suggests some degree of attributability of implicit attitudes to an agent), Levy 
answers the following questions as follows (Levy 2017: 6): 
 
1. Do agents exercise a sufficient degree of control over actions that have a moral 
character due to their implicit attitudes to appropriately be held morally responsible for 
them? Levy answers no. 
2. Are actions with a moral character due to implicit attitudes caused by states that 
properly belong to the agent, (and so appropriately be held morally responsible for 
them)? Levy answers no. 
 
To summarise, two positions on implicit bias and agent responsibility have been 
described. First, a position developed earlier and adopted within this Thesis, where the 
nature of implicit bias motivates agent responsibility for issuing behaviour. It has been 
argued that such behaviour is legitimately subject to guidance control, hence freely and 
responsibly undertaken as described by semicompatibilism. Second, a position where the 
nature of implicit bias does not motivate agent responsibility for issuing behaviour, 
summarised by Levy: 
 
Implicit attitudes do not seem properly to belong to agents’ deliberative 
standpoints, in the way required for responsibility-level attributability. The 
conditions under which implicit attitudes come to be suitably annexed to the 
agent’s deliberative standpoint are conditions under which it is no longer true 
that their actions have a moral character due to their implicit attitudes. So, if 
control, or attributability, or both, are necessary conditions of moral 
responsibility, agents are not directly responsible for actions that have a moral 
character due to their implicit attitudes. (2017: 26) 
 
It is beyond the scope of this Thesis to evaluate these differing positions; the overall 
undertaking is ultimately to look critically at semicompatibilism, not implicit bias. As 
noted, an alternative perspective on implicit bias has been introduced with the intention 
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of greater thoroughness in what is to follow. Semicompatibilism is at risk from the 
problem of luck; the next task is to look at how Cry’s plausible defence of 
semicompatibilism from the luck problem stands up considering both implicit bias 
perspectives. If Cyr’s defence falters under these circumstances, then a weakness in the 
semicompatibilist position with respect to luck is exposed, (or some aspect of Cyr’s 
defence requires attention). 
 The shape of this enquiry is as follows: Summarise briefly the essential problems 
that luck causes with respect to (semi)compatibilism and the key elements of Cyr’s 
defence, then carefully check the elements considering implicit biases forming part of an 
agent’s endowment or mechanism. How is the defence argument affected when implicit 
bias is introduced? Each implicit bias model will be considered, beginning with the most 
familiar, developed earlier within this Thesis, where the nature of implicit bias motivates 
agent responsibility for issuing behaviour. 
Summarising the discussion of luck and compatibilism: The most important 
feature of luck is its threat to moral responsibility due to related lack of control. In 
addition, to be lucky for an agent, an event or situation must have some importance to 
them; I have no control over London traffic, but it is of no importance to me that it is 
running particularly smoothly because I am currently working in Wales, therefore, such 
traffic conditions are not a lucky situation for me. Further, a lucky action or event is one 
that does not occur in a large proportion of nearby worlds (Cyr 2018). Luck threatens 
agent control over who they are, (and their issuing mechanism), and so their 
responsibility for who they are and what they do. History sensitive compatibilists, while 
accepting constitutive luck in the formation of agent endowment claim that agents can 
take control and be responsible for their endowment by taking ownership of their values 
and attitudes over time. Present day luck threatens to upset the possibility of taking 
ownership and so control and responsibility: Agent deliberation that should lead to 
ownership is subject to present day luck, hence the aim of taking control over time is 
defeated. As described, Cyr’s essential counterclaim is that agents are not presently lucky 
every time they take ownership of their endowments; moral education, self-discipline, and 
so on, can lessen the influence of present-day luck sufficiently for an agent to take 
ownership of their values and mitigate constitutive luck. However, moral education and 
self-discipline are subject to constitutive luck, suggesting a regression problem likely to 
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undermine taking ownership, but examples (Cyr 2018: 73) claim to show a small degree of 
moral responsibility is plausibly present from an early age; from a starting position of ‘a 
small degree of moral responsibility’ an agent’s moral responsibility is claimed to increase 
overtime, i.e., is a function of their history. Essentially, present day luck is not all 
pervasive, the agent has various means at their disposal to mitigate its affects and from 
a starting position completely dominated by constitutional luck an agent can take moral 
responsibility overtime. 
Having summarised the essential problems that luck causes with respect to 
(semi)compatibilism and the key elements of Cyr’s defence, does the presence of implicit 
bias, within an agent’s assortment of implicit and explicit attitudes and beliefs, cause any 
problems for Cyr’s argument? The implicit bias model adopted within this Thesis, where 
behavioural decisions are subject to a degree of reflection, does not in itself reveal any 
issues for Cyr’s defence of compatibilism from the luck problem. Recall, from Chapter 
5 it was concluded that while greater understanding is necessary concerning the reflective 
and impulsive processes that mediate between implicit social cognition and explicit 
behaviour within the interactive model (Deutsch and Strack 2010: 73), there is no doubt 
that control in an important sense, and so responsibility, is possible within this model. 
Cyr defends the possibility of meaningful reflection from the luck problem; the presence 
of implicit bias within an agent’s mix of attitudes and beliefs does not of itself affect the 
defence argument because by their nature implicit biases are included within the scope 
of agent reflection and deliberation. 
Consider now, the characterisation of implicit bias described earlier during 
discussion of Levy and the attributability position. Does the presence of this 
interpretation of implicit bias within an agent’s endowment cause any problems for Cyr’s 
argument? This is a more demanding situation to analyse. Some key elements of this 
characterisation of implicit bias are given below, drawn from Levy’s Paper Implicit Bias 
and Moral Responsibility: Probing the Data (2017).211 The list is not comprehensive, but based 
on relevance to the discussion to follow: 
 
211 I have reformatted and made minor changes to Levy’s text to aid presentation while hoping to retain 
and not diminish Levy’s intended meaning, see (Levy 2017). See also Consciousness and Moral Responsibility 
(Levy 2014b) and Précis of Consciousness and Moral Responsibility (Caruso 2015); Levy’s Paper is key within 
the debate, developing a ‘consciousness thesis’ and ‘global workspace theory’ that are employed to 
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1. Mechanisms with implicit attitudes as components may show complete insensitivity 
to particular reasons and thereby cause actions that have a moral character they 
otherwise would not have had. 
2. The deliberative standpoint is a test for the degree to which the attitude belongs to the 
agent. Attitudes are acquired through engagement with the deliberative standpoint only 
when they have appropriate relations with those that make up the standpoint; conversely, 
attitudes acquired in ways that bypass the deliberative standpoint will not become 
enmeshed in it. Of course, we can apply this test only if we can confidently identify some 
attitudes as properly belonging to the deliberative standpoint. We can often identify such 
attitudes by way of their role in the behaviour of agents: insofar as they are implicated in 
consistent and instrumentally rational decision-making and behaviour, these attitudes 
may be said to partially constitute the agent’s deliberative standpoint. 
3. There is plentiful evidence that implicit attitudes can be acquired in ways that bypass 
and even conflict with the attitudes that constitute an agent’s standpoint. 
4. Evidence about how agents acquire implicit attitudes is evidence for the degree to 
which such attitudes belong to their deliberative standpoint because under ideal 
conditions, agents acquire and maintain attitudes only when they are consistent with the 
attitudes constitutive of that standpoint; inconsistency should lead either to revision of 
their former attitudes or rejection of the new attitude. Evidence that agents acquire 
attitudes that are inconsistent with their (continuing) attitudes is therefore evidence that 
the attitudes acquired do not belong to the agent. Similarly, recognition of an attitude’s 
inconsistency with other attitudes should lead to the elimination of one or other: if both 
persist, we have reason to think that one or the other should not be fully attributed to 
the agent. (When acquired implicit attitudes are consistent with continuing attitudes, this 
is surely indicative of implicit attitudes belonging to the agent with related responsibility; 
for example, a situation where a person is both explicitly and implicitly biased). 
 
critique two leading accounts of necessary conditions for moral responsibility, real self-accounts and 
control-based accounts. Levy concludes that implicit bias is ‘not plausibly taken to be an expression of 
[the agent’s] evaluative agency, their deliberation and evaluative perspective on the world’ therefore 
based on the real self account an agent is excused moral responsibility. Similarly, on control-based 
accounts, including Guidance Control, Levy argues that agents are not responsible for implicit bias 
influenced behaviour (2014b: 95), (2014b: 115). 
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The intuition is that implicit attitudes when characterised in this way are, in an 
important sense, ‘outside’ of an agent’s deliberative standpoint (item 2, 3 and 4), 
therefore on this view not available as an object of rational reflection (item 1). As noted 
previously, Cyr’s defence of compatibilism from the luck problem requires the possibility 
of meaningful reflection; the absence of implicit bias from an agent’s mix of attitudes and 
beliefs that make up their deliberative standpoint reduces significantly, perhaps 
eliminates entirely, the possibility of rational scrutiny. Implicit biases, on this account, 
are subject to ongoing constitutional luck with attendant threat to agent responsibility.  
So, Cyr’s defence works if implicit attitudes are included within an agent’s 
deliberative standpoint. Levy’s alternative characterisation of implicit bias takes such 
attitudes outside of an agent’s deliberative standpoint, unavailable to Cyr’s defence, 
hence subject to constitutional luck. Compatibilism is still threatened by the luck 
problem in the context of agent implicit bias characterised by Levy. It has been shown 
that Cyr’s defence of compatibilism falls short, in that it leaves (semi)compatibilism 
exposed to the luck problem when considered in the context of Levy’s credible account 
of implicit attitudes. The term ‘falls short’ is used because other attitudes, beliefs and 
dispositions are included within an agent’s deliberative standpoint and so defended from 
the luck problem by Cyr’s argument. Further, it can be noted that based on this 
understanding of implicit attitudes, Levy concludes ‘if control, or attributability, or both, 
are necessary conditions of moral responsibility, agents are not directly responsible for 
actions that have a moral character due to their implicit attitudes’ (2017: 26); a position 
contra to that adopted within this Thesis, based on a different characterisation of implicit 
bias. 
 Before drawing final conclusions concerning semicompatibilism, implicit bias 
and luck there is a further point to make. While it can be seen how luck may affect the 
composition of an agent’s endowment, the very elements that an agent exercises to take 
ownership of their endowment, there is an intuition, an internal sense, that intervention 
into this process or some other consideration may be available. Earlier discussion of 
Kant and Freud (pages 23 and 27) perhaps motivate this intuition when it was noted that 
for Freud, reason has a special standing, having the capacity, (through psychoanalysis), 
to be free from the influence of desires, (unconscious forces), and act autonomously in 
accordance with reason alone and moral duty. Or with Kant, where reason is 
Title: Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position on Free Will and Responsibility? 
Chapter 6 
Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position? 
 
212 
independent of the natural world of appearances, causation and luck, directing human 
beings freely and autonomously within the moral landscape. Margaret Walker (1993) 
asks us to imagine what it would be like to live among what she describes as ‘pure agents’, 
where following Kant, this refers to agents whose reason is independent of the natural 
world of appearances, causation and luck. Walker’s argument is detailed and subtle, but 
the essential point is that pure agents are not burdened with blame by others for matters 
that are the outcome of luck, nor do they engage in blaming others where an unlucky 
situation has occurred. It is clearly difficult to imagine such a world, but an absence of 
blaming or being blamed for an unlucky state of affairs at first look appears quite 
attractive. However, if praise and blame are absent from situations thought to be the 
result of luck then perhaps other responses could also be thought inappropriate, such as 
sympathy, charity and empathy. Such an absence of personal response to difficulties that 
are the consequence of luck is surely undesirable. Walker argues that the ‘impure agent’, 
an understanding of agency that incorporates moral luck, ‘is not the worst we can do’ (1993: 
247). A purely rationalist approach, where blameworthiness is purely a function of 
faultiness, for example, if both drivers carelessly do not check their brakes and, on this 
account, are equally at fault when one driver thereby causes a fatality due to an unlucky 
event, is certainly counter intuitive. There is clearly something wrong or missing. Susan 
Wolf The Moral of Moral Luck (2001) develops a position that incorporates the rationalist 
position of blameworthiness as a function of faultiness, plus, following what is referred 
to as an irrationalist position, acknowledgement and approval of different emotional 
responses to different outcomes, from others and the agent who brought about the effect 
or outcome (Wolf 2001: 13). For the agent, feelings of guilt or regret are wholly 
appropriate and rightly proportional to the severity of the outcome. Referring to the 
example above, feelings of regret would clearly be present and appropriate if the brake 
failure element is removed and there was no faultiness at all; a pedestrian steps out such 
that the driver of a car with excellent brakes just cannot stop in time. These brief outlines 
of further reactions to the problem of luck, in terms of the ‘impure agent’ and the 
‘irrationalist position’, are given to illustrate the diversity of response to the problem of 
luck. 
Title: Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position on Free Will and Responsibility? 
Chapter 6 
Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position? 
 
213 
John Martin Fischer addresses the big issues of luck and the source of moral 
responsibility in Chapter Ten of Deep Control (2015c). After careful and detailed 
consideration, the key conclusion is: 
 
The mistake is to suppose that compatibilism seeks to identify an ‘Island of 
Control’ — an Inner Citadel. It is better to think of compatibilism as conceding 
from the beginning that we are thoroughly subject to factors entirely outside our control. 
Nevertheless, according to the compatibilist, we can still exhibit a meaningful and 
robust sort of control. It is not as if the compatibilist seeks to carve out a sphere 
of pure ‘internality’ and immunity to arbitrariness, and then must be embarrassed 
to discover that the inner sanctum is not secure. He never thought that we needed 
such a place. (added emphasis 2015c: 182) 
 
The chapter from which the above quotation is taken concerns ‘sourcehood’, examining 
the notion of ‘ultimate control’ or ‘self-creation’. Using several examples, John Martin 
Fischer argues such ultimate control is too demanding and accepts that we are thoroughly 
subject to factors entirely outside of our control and yet still retain agency and 
responsibility enabling control, ‘in a suitable sense’ (added emphasis 2015c: 185). We can 
be, using Fischer’s example, accountable for playing the cards that we are dealt, even if 
we did not make the cards or invent the rules of the game; we can be responsible without 
ultimate control or self-creation. In this Paper, John Martin Fischer meets head-on the 
challenges faced by semicompatibilism and guidance control due to luck, agency, 
determinism and the notion of ultimate control; the essential conclusion is that 
meaningful and responsible behaviour is possible and demands for ultimacy are 
essentially meaningless. 
In summary, luck is often claimed to be the most serious threat to historical 
notions of (semi)compatibilism by taking away vital responsibility enabling control. A 
defence of semicompatibilism from the luck problem was described based on the 
essential claim by Cyr (2019) that an agent is not presently lucky all the time, and an 
agent has the possibility of mitigating the effects of luck by employing self-control and 
drawing on their moral education. A regression problem is avoided by the notion of a 
‘little agent’; an agent’s first potentially free and morally responsible action, although at 
that point entirely constitutively lucky, can nevertheless be slightly responsible for their action 
(following Cyr 2019: 13). The defence of semicompatibilism was reviewed considering 
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two models of implicit bias, paradigm sources of behaviour that are subject to 
constitutive and present luck. First, the model adopted within this Thesis, where, simply 
expressed, agents are responsible for implicit bias issuing behaviour and second, 
following Levy (2017) a model where agents are not responsible. It was concluded that 
Cyr’s defence is not affected considering the first model when implicit attitudes are 
included within an agent’s deliberative standpoint. Levy’s alternative characterisation of 
implicit bias takes such attitudes outside of an agent’s deliberative standpoint, 
unavailable to Cyr’s defence, hence subject to constitutional luck. Compatibilism 
remains threatened by the luck problem in the context of agent implicit bias 
characterised by Levy and with respect to Cyr’s defence. This section concluded with 
some thoughts with reference to Kant (page 23) and Freud (page 27) concerning 
independence of reason from the material world, including luck, and a statement of John 
Martin Fisher’s position on luck and sourcehood. 
 
6.3 Summary of Part III 
Chapter 6 examined semicompatibilism/guidance control and a defence of 
semicompatibilism from the luck problem in light of implicit bias. The essential 
conclusions are these; implicit bias related behaviour was shown to be subject to 
guidance control and so agent responsibility. This is in harmony with the models of 
implicit bias developed in Part II, in the sense that semicompatibilism/guidance control 
and the models of implicit bias support agent responsibility for behaviour influenced by 
implicit bias. No problems with semicompatibilism/guidance control were found 
considering implicit bias related behaviour. An assumption, I believe to be reasonable, 
was made during this investigation concerning John Martin Fischer’s position on the 
epistemic condition of guidance control.  
 Having shown that implicit bias does not generate problems for 
semicompatibilism and guidance control in conferring responsibility level control of 
behaviour, I looked at implicit bias and related behaviour as a potential difficulty for a 
particular defence of semicompatibilism from the important luck problem. It was 
concluded that Cyr’s defence is not affected when considering the first model of implicit 
bias when implicit attitudes are included within an agent’s deliberative standpoint. Levy’s 
alternative characterisation of implicit bias takes such attitudes outside of an agent’s 
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deliberative standpoint, unavailable to Cyr’s defence, hence subject to constitutional 
luck. Compatibilism is still threatened by the luck problem in the context of agent 
implicit bias characterised by Levy. This is clearly important, as a defence of 
semicompatibilism from perhaps its most significant threat is jeopardised if Levy’s 
understanding of implicit bias is correct. 
 Finally, on page 201 it was noted that the luck problem is … threatening to 
semicompatibilism and the characterisation of implicit bias so far presented. Why is luck 
a problem for the characterisation of implicit bias with respect to the integrative model? 
The issue here is far from unique, in the sense that it is an example of general pervasive 
luck influencing construal of situations, formation of attitudes and deliberation itself. A 
possible response to this problem could generally follow Cyr, by developing an argument 
that influence of luck within the interactive model is not all pervasive and there is room 
to build sufficient autonomous reflection that warrants responsibility enabling control.  
 Holroyd and Kelly’s perspective, described in Implicit Bias, Character, and Control 
(2016), where implicit biases are part of who the agent is and agents can be evaluated for 
being influenced by them because the agent has control (i.e., ecological control) over 
such mental entities (2016: 175), does not consider moral luck. The implications of ‘the 
luck problem’ for Holroyd and Kelly’s perspective212 on implicit bias and responsibility 
cannot be explored here, however, much of what has already been considered in relation 
to luck is relevant. Following the comments above it is worth recalling that while it is 
claimed that the luck pincer, the constant ongoing influence of present luck, is 
problematic for ownership over time of our character, there are many notable voices 
that disagree, arguing that while agents may sometimes be presently lucky, ‘it is not the case 
that they are presently lucky in every case of taking ownership for their endowments’ (Cyr 
 
212 Although clearly within a different context, (deprivation, as a threat to the state’s legitimate punitive 
authority), it is clearly of great important to note Holroyd’s description of the role of luck or more likely 
bias Punishment and Justice (2010): ‘Further, we can append the example (of the impoverished parent) to 
make clear that the circumstances of want (as is the case in many instances of disadvantage or 
deprivation) result not from foolishness or poor motivation on the part of the disadvantaged, but rather 
from bad circumstantial luck, or more likely, a cumulative and pervasive infrastructural (and sometimes overt and 
personal) bias. We need only to consider the data that report that, for example, in the U.K. around two-
fifths of people from ethnic minorities live in low-income households—twice the rate for white people—
to see the plausibility of this assumption. That disadvantage tracks identity traits such as race, gender, 
and class should confirm the injustice it entrenches’ (Holroyd 2010: 94). 
Title: Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position on Free Will and Responsibility? 
Chapter 6 
Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position? 
 
216 
2018: 60). As previously noted, Dennett makes the same point, claiming the actions we 
perform are not entirely dependent on luck. (Dennett and Caruso 2021: 20)). 
 












An early interest in Sartre’s Roads to Freedom214 led to wider reflection on human freedom 
and responsibility, and ultimately to the question addressed by this Thesis; does implicit 
bias threaten the semicompatibilist position on free will and responsibility? 
It was important to place this question in the larger historical context of the free 
will debate. Part I concluded with an account of John Martin Fischer’s free will 
semicompatibilism to be taken forward into Part III. Part II had a similar purpose, 
seeking a clear position on implicit bias, particularly control of and responsibility for 
implicit bias influenced behaviour. 
Establishing a clear position on implicit bias was challenging, not least because 
of the many and sometimes conflicting views215 about what implicit biases are, how they 
are acquired, our possible awareness of and responsibility for related behaviour and 
whether mitigating strategies work. The purpose was not to present a definitive and 
conclusive argument for a particular position on these issues or make a comprehensive 
comparative study, but present a clear, defensible and plausible choice, one supported 
by substantial credible theory and practice. A model meeting these requirements was 
chosen based on Deutsch and Strack (2010) together with the contrasting approach of 
Holroyd and Kelly (2016). Importantly, both approaches conclude there is individual 
responsibility for behavioural expression of implicit bias. This is a key point; I have 
examined semicompatibilism considering a model of implicit bias where agent 
 
213 Being and Nothingness (Sartre 1984: 595). 
 
214 The first episode of The Roads to Freedom was broadcast on Sunday, 4th October 1970. The series was 
repeated on television once in 1976 and then disappeared completely for 36 years until a one-off 
screening at the BFI in 2012. Although there is great demand for the series to be made available on 
DVD, or simply broadcast again, there has been nothing since the 2012 showing. 
 
215 ‘…many and sometimes conflicting views…’ clearly, also describes the free will debate! 




responsibility for implicit bias related behaviour is acknowledged, from two substantial 
and different perspectives.  
Four questions may be raised by this approach: Was it a reasonable and promising 
idea to employ implicit bias as a means of critically assessing semicompatibilism, and 
why were two implicit bias perspectives chosen? How important was the choice of 
implicit bias model? If the choice of implicit bias model had a significant influence on 
how semicompatibilism responds, then how meaningful was the critique? 
I have argued that implicit bias is a valuable 216  and previously unexplored 
perspective from which to conduct a critique of semicompatibilism. (As previously 
noted, Brownstein makes an encouraging comment that implicit bias is ‘… a good test 
case for theories of moral responsibility that aim to accommodate the messy reality 
revealed by contemporary sciences of the mind’ (2016a: 766)). Initially, a wholly 
unconscious understanding of implicit bias and influenced behaviour strongly suggested 
an absence of agent control and so responsibility, even though it felt inappropriate that 
such behaviour should escape moral appraisal. Careful investigation of implicit bias 
showed strong and plausible arguments and evidence supporting agent responsibility for 
issuing behaviour, but would John Martin Fischer’s semicompatibilist model respond to 
the complex phenomenon of implicit bias with endorsement of agent responsibility? 
This is now familiar territory, but I believe it is worth confirming the importance and 
legitimacy of bringing together in a critical way the current and vital issue of implicit bias 
and a major position within the longstanding free will and responsibility debate. Two 
implicit bias perspectives were chosen; one essentially a psychological approach, an 
interactive model based on the work of Deutsch and Strack (2010), the other a 
philosophical approach by Holroyd and Kelly (2016).217 Two approaches were chosen 
with the intention of presenting a robust and defendable position to take forward into 
Part III; two different ways of understanding implicit bias, both granting agent 
responsibility for behaviour. This kind of starting position is reflected in the first section 
 
216 As noted in the Introduction to this Thesis, implicit attitudes can be directed toward many things, 
but it is the ‘very morally weighty’ judgment and evaluation of existing stereotypes or stigmatized groups 
of people, and such discriminatory behaviour generally, which makes implicit bias matter (following 
Brownstein 2016a: 765). 
 
217 See also Jules Holroyd What do we Want from a Model of Implicit Cognition? Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Issue No. 2, Volume CXVI (2016). 




of Vargas Implicit Bias, Responsibility, and Moral Ecology (2017); ‘ … the action must be 
suitably related to some internal feature of the agent, that is, some bit of psychology 
arranged in this way rather than that, such that the agent identified with the action, or 
that it flows from the agent’s values, or that it was a product of the agent’s rational or 
normative capacities’ (2017: 220). These approaches suggest various positions on agency, 
and it would be valuable to explore in some detail these models, and others, from this 
perspective. (See Appendix B Agent Causation, for a relatively brief discussion). 
How important was the choice of implicit bias model? Choice of implicit bias 
model clearly had some influence on how semicompatibilism responded, that said, I 
believe my critique of semicompatibilism is valuable and sound, based on a broadly 
accepted, nuanced and defensible understanding of implicit bias. From the complexity 
and disagreement within the free will/responsibility and implicit bias debates I have 
chosen particular positions and presented a critique of semicompatibilism in the context 
of a certain understanding of implicit bias; future research could, (and I would argue, 
should), look at freewill/responsibility and implicit bias across a broad range of free will 
and implicit bias perspectives.  
The structure of this Thesis is straightforward, from a clear position on 
semicompatibilism (Part I) and implicit bias (Part II), semicompatibilism was critically 
examined with view to showing problems with semicompatibilism that arise when 
considering implicit bias influenced behaviour (Part III). After careful examination it was 
found that John Martin Fischer’s semicompatibilism responded to the challenge of 
implicit bias; it was found that related behaviour is subject to guidance control, a 
conclusion in harmony with the models of implicit bias supported by much credible 
theory and practice. After showing this fundamental point, the focus of attention 
widened to examine an important defence of compatibilism from perhaps its biggest 
general challenge, the moral luck problem. The luck problem for compatibilism was 
chosen not only because it is one of the most substantial problems faced by 
compatibilists, but importantly, implicit bias appeared to be a paradigm example of a 
source of behaviour formed and often continually reinforced by factors that are subject 
to luck. Having looked specifically at the direct challenge of implicit bias for the 
semicompatibilist position itself, it was appropriate to investigate a defence of 
semicompatibilism from its biggest threat in the context of implicit bias. I concluded 




that Cyr’s defence of semicompatibilism from the luck problem was not affected 
considering a model of implicit bias when implicit attitudes were included within an 
agent’s deliberative standpoint. Levy’s alternative characterisation of implicit bias takes 
such attitudes outside of an agent’s deliberative standpoint, unavailable to Cyr’s defence, 
hence subject to constitutional luck. Importantly then, compatibilism remained 
threatened by the luck problem in the context of agent implicit bias characterised by 
Levy and Cyr’s defence. This is important because Cyr’s defence of semicompatibilism 
from perhaps its most significant threat is at risk if Levy’s understanding of implicit bias 
is correct. 
 The problem that luck brings to semicompatibilism is indicative of a more general 
problem described in Chapter 2, (page 50), the problem of manipulation. Helen Steward, 
quoted by John Martin Fischer My Way and Life’s Highway: Replies to Steward, Smilansky, 
and Perry (2008b), crystallises her scepticism of semicompatibilist accounts because of 
the problem of manipulation: 
 
It appears to me, moreover, that this same basic difficulty (for a mechanism to 
be ‘the agent’s own’) is going to infect any view that fails to assign actions the 
sort of metaphysically exceedingly distinctive nature I have been insisting they 
must have (See Appendix B). Any view which descends from the level of agents 
to the level of such things as mechanisms, processes and events is going to face 
the problem that any mechanism, process or event which occurs inside an agent 
can be set in train by someone, or something, which is not the agent. Only if one 
accepts that an action is essentially the exercise of a power by the agent whose 
action it is can this difficulty possibly be avoided. (Fischer 2008b: 173) 
 
The problem, as previously described, is created by the possibility that some form of 
agent manipulation ‘or event … set in train by someone, or something, which is not the 
agent’ could reproduce and maintain the contents of the agent’s mechanism, the actual 
mechanism that issues in behaviour. Under these circumstances the agent is surely not 
acting freely and responsibly. (It is interesting to reflect on the role of Frankfurt’s 
controller in this context). This can lead to scepticism concerning a central plank of 
semicompatibilism; the very possibility of the actual mechanism that issues in behaviour 
being truly ‘the agent’s own’. John Martin Fischer would not accept that under conditions 
of manipulation the issuing mechanism was the agent’s own and would argue that an 
agent was thereby not responsible for manipulated actions. Ownership and responsibility 




for the issuing mechanism for John Martin Fischer is the outcome of a detailed and 
subtle process that occurs over time, and yet, Steward’s argument continues to be 
troubling. 
 I mention this problem again within the Conclusion of this Thesis because 
manipulation, luck and the implicit influence of bias on behaviour, are all threats, (they  
may all be used as a basis of claims and arguments that threaten), agent ownership of the 
actual sequence mechanism and present the most significant difficulties for 
semicompatibilism.218 I have looked in detail at implicit bias and considered relatively 
briefly the luck problem and the very notion of agency. John Martin Fischer obviously 
takes the manipulation threat seriously; ‘manipulation’ is mentioned eighty-five times in 
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (1998) and Papers have been 
written specifically addressing manipulation, for example, Responsibility and Manipulation 
(2004). In reply to Steward, John Martin Fischer maintains that moral responsibility is a 
matter of how the actual sequence proceeds and  
 
it does not follow that such responsibility is expunged by facts about the distal, 
(situated away from the point of attachment or origin or a central point), features 
of the actual sequence, such as whether it is set in motion by an agent with certain 
intentions. So, for example, an agent can exercise guidance control along a certain 
sequence; that is, the sequence can contain behavior that issues from his own, 
appropriately reasons-responsive mechanism. Now whether this sequence was 
set in motion millions of years ago (or thousands or hundreds...) by an individual 
with the intention that it proceed just as it does seems to me to be entirely 
irrelevant to the agent’s moral responsibility. (my addition Fischer 2008b: 174) 
 
John Martin Fischer robustly defends his position, but based on this response, the 
discord between, ‘the sequence can contain behavior that issues from his own, 
appropriately reasons-responsive mechanism’ and ‘set in motion millions of years ago 
… by an individual with the intention that it proceed just as it does’, still appears 
problematic. However, for John Martin Fischer, ‘his own, appropriately reasons-
responsive mechanism’, the detailed and carefully considered requirement of guidance 
control, excludes by definition examples of manipulation because in such cases the issuing 
 
218  Some would say Manipulation and the Consequence Argument are the biggest challenges to 
Compatibilism (Kapitan 2000). John Martin Fischer’s semicompatibilism does not have to comply with 
the principle of alternate possibilities as a condition of (guidance) control and responsibility. 




mechanism is not the agent’s own. Introducing agent causation, (See Appendix B), into 
the semicompatibilist model could resolve the problem, but this would be too restrictive 
for John Martin Fischer’s project by committing to a particular metaphysical position.  
In Appendix A I look at the nature of mental representations responsible for 
biased behaviour and describe a position not built on propositional attitudes nor mere 
associations, (the two basic accounts of implicit bias, although the description ‘basic 
account’ is rarely appropriate), rather, based on the concept of mental imagery. Appendix 
B outlines some important considerations concerning agency. The possibility and nature 
of human agency is of vital concern within the free will debate. Much consideration is 
given within the free will debate to the apparent problem of agency in a world where 
determinism is true. While agency per se is not the principal enterprise of this Thesis, it 
is important to give via an Appendix an outline of some key issues, given their shared 
nature with the free will debate generally and with semicompatibilism in particular. I 
outline the standard conception of agency and standard theory of action, then briefly 
outline three metaphysical frameworks of agency and look at compatibilism, agency and 
emergentism. The idea of agent causation is found to be very plausible as an emergent 
human (and some nonhuman animal) property within an incompatibilist/libertarian 
model of free will. 
For information Appendix C provides a plot summary of Sophocles Oedipus Rex 
c429 BCE discussed in Part I. An illustration of human freedom restricted or eliminated 
by factors beyond an agent’s control yet retaining the possibility of meaningful 
responsible choices. A recurring theme, which may be seen ultimately in 
semicompatibilism. I believe it was important to locate semicompatibilism within an 
historical process rather than simply in isolation. 
 
 In final conclusion, from an historical perspective I have looked at some key 
issues concerning threats to human freedom. This concluded with a detailed description 
of semicompatibilism, the free will position chosen for investigation considering the 
phenomena of implicit bias. While the nature of implicit bias is controversial, a 
characterisation of implicit bias was developed based on what I believe to be substantial 
and sound research. The semicompatibilist position on free will and responsibility, 
developed by John Martin Fischer, was found not to be threatened by the challenge of 
implicit bias. Implicit bias related behaviour was shown to be subject to guidance control 




and so agent responsibility in accord with the models of implicit bias developed in Part 
II: No problems with semicompatibilism/guidance control were found when 
considering implicit bias influenced behaviour.  
Does Implicit Bias Threaten the Semicompatibilist Position on Free Will and 
Responsibility? Guidance control bypasses various metaphysical issues concerning the 
compatibility of moral responsibility and causal determinism; ‘… causal determinism is 
compatible with moral responsibility, … moral responsibility does not require genuine 
metaphysical access to alternative possibilities …’ (Fischer 2015b: 203). Implicit bias has 
no impact on guidance control’s separation from such metaphysical issues; there is 
nothing intrinsic to implicit bias that causes a problem for semicompatibilism’s 
essentially agnostic position on free will, expressed in terms of metaphysical access to 
alternative possibilities, such concerns may be respectfully put to one side. Also, there is 
nothing intrinsic to implicit bias that causes a problem for semicompatibilism and 
responsibility.   
It was found that Cyr’s defence of semicompatibilism from the luck problem was 
not affected when considering the first model of implicit bias when implicit attitudes are 
included within an agent’s deliberative standpoint. However, compatibilism is still 
threatened by the luck problem in the context of implicit bias characterised by Levy. 
A constant theme throughout this Thesis has been awareness. For example, 
awareness of the wrongness of actions and awareness of the presence and/or issuing 
behaviour of implicit bias. As noted from the beginning of this Thesis, much relies on 
our understanding of awareness, therefore it is worth confirming again, within this final 
concluding section, that a position has been taken within this Thesis, based on good 
theoretical and empirical support, that the notion of implicit bias as a totally unconscious 
phenomenon is not supported by available empirical evidence. That said, under stress 
an agent’s ability to deliberate is reduced with responsibility likewise lessened. The final 
words on this matter are from Madva, who argues persuasively and at length in Section 
2 of Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility (2018) that empirical evidence supports 
agent awareness of their implicit biases, concluding emphatically that ‘While many 
empirical questions remain unanswered, it seems clear that we cannot cast implicit biases 
into what popular authors … call “the locked door of the unconscious” ’(2018: 60). 




Future research could consider other free will/responsibility/agency and implicit 
bias positions and perspectives, aiming at a broader appraisal of the impact of the 
phenomenon of implicit bias on free will and responsibility. Given current (January 
2021) racial, political and social upheaval, the nature of implicit bias is under ever 
increasing scrutiny. Future research, taking account of new knowledge such ongoing 
enquiry creates, would continue to bring together in important ways the long-established 
theme of free will/responsibility and implicit bias scholarship.219  
I believe the research, arguments and conclusions presented above make an 









219 While discussing J. S. Mill On Liberty, Oskari Kuusela describes the vital role of philosophy in achieving 
freedom, that ‘to engage philosophically with obstacles to human freedom may be a liberating and 
emancipatory experience: … more generally, we might sometimes not even be properly aware of the 
obstacles to our freedom; the obstacles may be modes of being and thinking we have adopted 
unconsciously and quite unnoticed. However, in so far as philosophy is capable of drawing our attention 
to such things and can help us find alternative ways of thinking and acting, it can be comprehended as a 
liberating and emancipatory practice … . Thus conceived, philosophy is something we may take up and 
use to transform ourselves and to achieve freedom’ (added emphasis 2011: 38). 
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Mental Representations and Biased Behaviour 
 
 
In this Appendix I consider the nature of mental representations responsible for biased 
behaviour and describe a position that is not built upon propositional attitudes or mere 
associations, rather, drawing on both positions, it is based on the concept of mental 
imagery. Bence Nanay points out, ‘… what these biasing representations are is crucial 
not just out of theoretical interest. If we want to try to eliminate implicit bias, very 
different procedures would be needed depending on what these biasing representations 
are’ (2020). Continuing with Nanay, straightforward examples of associationist and 
propositional approaches to bias representation are given below. First, association: 
 
You have probably seen more female caregivers than male caregivers. And, 
following the mechanism of classic conditioning, you formed an association 
between being a caregiver and being a woman. One way to think about 
associations is as some kind of connection strength in your mind between the 
concept of being a caregiver and the concept of being a woman. When one 
concept is activated, the other one is highly likely to be also activated. So, when 
you hear someone talk about a caregiver, this gives rise to you thinking of a 
woman. Association is supposed to be quick, not under our voluntary control 
and, according to many … symmetrical (it goes both from caregiver to woman 
and vice versa). (2020) 
 
Alternatively, if the underlying biasing representation is a propositional attitude (typically 
a belief):  
 
So, you have a propositional attitude that caregivers are (likely to be) women. 
And it is this propositional attitude that explains your biased behavior. In the case 
of propositional attitudes, the relation between being a caregiver and being a 
woman is not symmetrical. The propositional attitude that caregivers are (or tend 
to be) women is different from the propositional attitude that women are (or tend 
to be) caregivers. (2020)  
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There are empirical examples, (Mandelbaum 2016; Nanay 2020), that claim to illustrate 
propositional and associative approaches to be problematic. For example, if biasing 
representations are associations, then conditioning could counteract them, but it is 
claimed that conditioning does not counteract bias, hence biasing representations are 
not associations. If biasing representations are propositional in nature then implicit bias 
should be sensitive to logical form, however, it is claimed, for example, that the sentence 
‘it is not true that old people are bad drivers’ may actually strengthen implicit bias by the 
association of ‘old people’ and ‘bad drivers’ rather than reducing bias.220 As Nanay notes, 
‘if the biasing representation were a propositional attitude (presumably a propositional 
attitude about old people driving badly), then exposure to a sentence that denies the 
content of this propositional attitude should not strengthen the implicit bias’ (2020). 
Similar examples are given that lead to a general conclusion that a way must be found 
that essentially takes forward what is true from both accounts into a new paradigm of 
bias representation. 
Nanay claims that such a way forward is possible, based on mental imagery.221 
Mental imagery appears to the subject as perceptual experience, however, unlike actual 
perceptual experience there is an absence of external stimuli. ‘Visual mental imagery, the 
most discussed variety, was thought to be caused by the presence of picture-like 
representations (mental images) in the mind, soul, or brain, but this is no longer 
universally accepted’ (Thomas 2019). Such images may be in some sense a construction 
based on experience, or of some imagined future experience that may be desired or 
feared. How does this concept help? The idea is developed by Nanay as follows; 
 
o It is claimed that experimental results about implicit bias show that the biasing 
representation, what exists or mediates between a stimulus and resulting behaviour, 
is sensitive to semantic content and insensitive to logical form (controversial). 222 
 
220 See Deutsch and Strack (2010: 64) for discussion of association – proposition accounts within theories 
of implicit social cognition. (Deutsch and Strack’s integrated model is the prime model used during critique 
of semicompatibilism in Part III). There are many sources for discussion of association – proposition 
accounts; Bertram Gawronski and Laura A. Creighton, Dual Process Theories (2013) is excellent. 
 
221 See also Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Biased by Our Imaginings (2019). 
 
222 I have not reproduced examples that lead to this claim, such description may be found in Section III, 
Implicit Bias as Mental Imager (Nanay 2020). 
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o Neither associations nor propositions satisfy both requirements. The classic accounts 
of implicit bias are problematic; associations are not sensitive to semantic content 
and propositional attitudes are not insensitive to logical form. 
o Mental imagery satisfies both requirements, sensitive to semantic content unlike 
associations but insensitive to logical form unlike propositions. 
 
I will say more about mental imagery, describing the claim that this concept satisfies the 
requirement of representation as sensitive to semantic content and insensitive to logical 
form. Nanay does not go into details of the debate about the format of perception but 
moves forward noting the assumption that representation has imagistic (precise images) 
non-propositional content. Sullivan-Bissett (2019) has much more to say, describing one 
(of two possible) non associative processes. Sullivan-Bissett does not have the same 
project as Nanay, (the unconscious imagination perspective of Sullivan-Bissett’s Paper 
is different from mental imagery), but the following sheds light on the role of mental 
imagery in the context of bias: 
 
First, when presented with a woman-stimulus, one could imagistically 
unconsciously imagine a weak woman. In this case, the implicit bias is identical 
to a single instance of unconscious imagistic imagining, rather than being the 
association between two unconscious mental images. (2019: 637) 
 
Following closely Nanay’s text; as noted, mental imagery is not a propositional attitude 
(it has imagistic content), therefore mental imagery does not enter into inferences. 
However, not all content-sensitive transitions between mental states are inferences and there 
can be content-sensitive transitions between mental states with imagistic content. An 
example is given of mental imagery leading to other mental processes in a way that is 
content-sensitive. For example, in a gift-wrapping task, the size of the wrapping paper 
to be cut from the roll is estimated by looking at the gift and the paper in a content-
sensitive manner by exercising mental imagery (2020). The key point is, the perspective 
of mental imagery describes content-sensitive transition between mental imagery and 
other mental processes not mediated by beliefs, other propositional attitudes or 
association. There are further considerations that motivate the role of mental imagery 
within implicit bias, particularly the idea that mental imagery may be conscious or 
unconscious. Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Biased by Our Imaginings (2019), argues specifically that 
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implicit biases are constituted by unconscious imaginings. Nanay summarises the 
properties of mental imagery within the context of implicit bias as affectively charged 
and action-oriented involuntary mental imagery that may be conscious or unconscious, 
subject to empirical and philosophical resolution, both states being allowed within the 
model.  
 There is a reasonable suspicion that the mental imagery approach has not 
resolved the claimed problems with the associationist and propositionalist accounts. 
There is a transition between trigger and mental image, and mental image and action. 
What is the nature of this transition? Such transitions may be explained either in 
associationist or propositionalist terms. Nanay accepts this criticism but claims progress 
has been made by arguing the current question concerning how a perceptual state gives 
rise to mental imagery and how mental imagery turns into behavior is quite a different 
question, and is a progressive step, from the question what kind of connection is there 
between concepts that lead to biased behavior? I take Nanay’s point but question the 
actual size of the step. That said, there is significant success claimed in counteracting 
implicit bias using various programs of manipulation of the subjects’ mental imagery. 
The well-known process of trying to visualise ourselves as members of another racial 
group or gender is claimed to reduce the consequences of implicit bias when in the 
company of these groups; the imagery-involving procedure is claimed to be among the 
most efficient ways of reducing implicit bias (Nanay 2020). Assuming such bias 
mitigating strategies are successful, it is difficult for the propositionalist to explain how 
this is possible. It is difficult to explain how a strategy involving a perceptual process 
could have any effect on a biasing representation that is a propositional attitude. 
Similarly, it is claimed that imagery-involving mitigation procedures are more successful 
than techniques that typically assume associationism, (repeated exposure to perceptual 
stimuli that goes against the association). The associationist would have difficulty 
explaining this. A good case is made for the mental imagery perspective; given that 
Nanay admits a slight weakness in his position on the nature of transitions I assume this 
will be the subject of future work. 
 Alternatives to the classic association – proposition positions on biasing 
representation have been described, based closely on Bence Nanay Implicit Bias as Mental 
Imager (2020), also Sullivan-Bissett Biased by Our Imaginings (2019). One aim of this Thesis 
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is to present a broad description of implicit bias and I believe providing an outline of 
another alternative to the fundamental association – proposition positions on biasing 


















The terms ‘agent’ and ‘agency’ have been used throughout this Thesis. It is important to 
comment on agency specifically, as the concept is deeply linked with discussion of free 
will and responsibility. I will mention the standard conception of agency and standard 
theory of action, then briefly outline three metaphysical frameworks of agency and close 
with A Metaphysics for Freedom (Steward 2012a) and a brief outline of compatibilism, 
agency and emergentism. The breadth and depth of these subjects is clearly beyond the 
scope of an Appendix, nonetheless, an outline is attempted to give a sense of the 
importance of agency and connecting themes within discussion of free will and 
responsibility. 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Schlosser 2019), drawing on G.E.M 
Anscombe Intention (1957) and D. Davidson Actions, Reasons, and Causes first published 
1963 and reprinted in Essays on Actions and Events (Davidson 1980: 3-20), describes the 
standard conception of agency and the standard theory of agency as follows:   
 
… a being has the capacity to exercise agency just in case it has the capacity to 
act intentionally, and the exercise of agency consists in the performance of 
intentional actions and, in many cases, in the performance of unintentional 
actions (that derive from the performance of intentional actions). Call this the 
standard conception of agency. The standard theory of action provides us with a 
theory of agency, according to which a being has the capacity to act intentionally 
just in case it has the right functional organization: just in case the instantiation 
of certain mental states and events (such as desires, beliefs, and intentions) would 
cause the right events (such as certain movements) in the right way. According to 
this standard theory of agency, the exercise of agency consists in the instantiation 
of the right causal relations between agent-involving states and events. (added emphasis 
Schlosser 2019) 
 





On this view, agency is the exercise of the capacity to perform intentional actions and 
the process of exercising the capacity to perform intentional actions, (i.e., being an 
agent), is an instance of the right causal relations between agent-involving states and 
events. The standard conception and standard theory have been subject to substantial 
and varied scrutiny which cannot be adequately presented here. However, one general 
area of criticism concerns the presence of mental states within this model. Criticism is 
usually based around one or more of the following three claims. First, controversially, it 
is claimed there are non-human beings that show agency and do not possess 
representational mental states; therefore, a mental states-based explanation is inadequate. 
Second, there are many instances of human agency that can and should be explained 
without ascription of representational mental states such as actions that do not involve 
deliberation. Therefore, a purely mental states-based explanation of agency is again 
inadequate. Third, more radically, all instances of agency it is claimed can and should be 
explained without ascription of representational mental states. From earlier discussion 
of the control of implicit bias, one is reminded of the substantial ideas of embodied and 
embedded cognition223 in the sense that description of human cognition in terms of 
mental states alone is far from complete. 
Having outlined the standard model of agency and mentioned one general critical 
approach concerning mental states, I will outline three metaphysical frameworks that try 
to explain the nature of agency and the relation between agents and actions drawing on 
section 3.1 of Markus Schlosser’s Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article Agency 
(2019). First, the event-causal framework: The agent’s role in exercising agency is 
characterised in terms of causation by the agent’s mental states. In a world where 
determinism is true, such mental states would be the result of previous events stretching 
 
223 Embodied cognitive science appeals to the idea that cognition deeply depends on aspects of the 
agent’s body other than the brain. Without the involvement of the body in both sensing and acting, 
thoughts would be empty, and mental affairs would not exhibit the characteristics and properties they 
do. Work on embedded cognition, by contrast, draws on the view that cognition deeply depends on the 
natural and social environment. The thesis of extended cognition is the claim that cognitive systems 
themselves extend beyond the boundary of the individual organism. Features of an agent’s physical, 
social, and cultural environment can do more than distribute cognitive processing: they may well partially 
constitute that agent’s cognitive system (Schlosser 2019). See also An Introduction to Implicit Bias (Beeghly, 
Erin, and Madva (eds.) 2020) and Embodied Freedom (A Draft Paper by Jeffrey Pannekoek, University of 
Tennessee, <https://utk.academia.edu/JeffreyPannekoek>) for detailed discussion of these ideas. 





back into the past, and together with fixed laws of nature would result in actions that 
conventionally would not be considered free actions.  
Second, the agent-causal framework: Agency is characterised in terms of a kind 
of emergent substance-causation, where causation by the agent is understood as a 
persisting substance; a kind of capability possessed by an agent. (To clarify, emergentism 
is a form of ontological materialism (or physicalism), the view that the contents of the 
world are exhausted by matter (Kim 2009: 10). Schlosser’s description of agent causation 
as ‘a kind of emergent substance-causation’ I believe is not committed to any view on the 
nature of the ‘emergent substance’). The agent’s role in the exercise of agency may be 
understood in terms of the exercise of an irreducible novel emergent agent-causal power. 
On this view, there is sufficient elbow room within a determined world for free actions 
to be initiated. There will be a causal chain, but the origin of that chain is the causal agent. 
Such a capability is problematic; the possibility of a material entity, i.e., a person, having 
such an emergent, (yet essentially material), property of downward causation acting on, 
yet independent of, the rest of the world is difficult to understand. Agent causation is an 
incompatibilist (personal freedom and a determined world are incompatible), libertarian 
position, (freedom is present and determinism inactive at the origin of the causal process 
that leads to actions by the agent).  
Third, the volitionist approach: Agency is explained in terms of acts of the will, 
usually called ‘volitions’. On this view, volitions are the source of agency. Volitions 
themselves are entirely uncaused and they are sui generis acts: they are acts by virtue of 
their intrinsic properties, not because of some extrinsic or relational property (such as 
having the right causal history). 
At the time of writing (July 2020), the most accepted position is the event-causal 
framework (Schlosser 2019). One plausible reason for greater acceptance is its relative 
simplicity, not requiring a mysterious emerging ‘something’ that is active independent of 
event-causation. However, the familiar problem of control over actions when all 
intentional actions are explained in terms of event-causation is clearly present. The 
volition model also has control issues in the sense that agent control of issuing behaviour 
appears absent as the agent is just the subject of volitions having no input into what is 
willed. The agent causal model previously described, by contrast, has influencing factors 
within the causal chain that originate within the agent. Factors that may include reasons, 





plans and the agent’s disposition. (See below mention of Timothy O’Connor’s article 
Agent-Causal Power (2013)). Of course, it could be argued that such influences may be 
freedom diminishing, being the result of factors over which the agent has no control 
such as constitutional luck. Further, if volitions ultimately have brain states as their 
origin, then acting independently of causation appears impossible. It is not possible here 
to make a comparative analysis of these three positions, however, it is valuable to 
continue by briefly considering one philosopher’s analysis of agency from a metaphysical 
perspective, one that discusses agency considering responsibility within a deterministic 
world. I will now mention Helen Steward Moral Responsibility and the Concept of Agency 
(2011) before concluding with comments on compatibilism and agency, and further 
clarification of emergence.  
In a conversation between Helen Steward and Michael Hauskeller (Steward and 
Hauskeller 2020), Hauskeller, from an agent-causal perspective, summarises the problem 
of agency very well: 
 
It seems to require something that is in fact conceptually far more difficult to 
grasp than the suspension of the principle of causality. What we need to get our 
heads around is not causation or its absence, but the possibility of self-causation. 
A true agent, it seems, is, like the God of some philosophers, causa sui, their own 
cause. Is this something we can really make sense of? In order to understand 
agency, we need to carve out a space for the agent to genuinely settle things: 
things that are neither uncaused nor causally determined by anything but the agent 
herself. (added emphasis 2020) 
 
Later, Steward comments: 
 
Surely no event in nature can just begin! Of course, actions require underlying 
neurological activity, and to that extent I would agree that we need some sort of 
account of how the causal principles which govern the underlying neurological 
hardware are to be rendered consistent with the idea that whether or not an action 
occurs is up to its agent at the time of action. Ultimately, it seems to me, what we 
need to understand is not self-causation, exactly, but rather whole-part causation. 
(added emphasis Steward and Hauskeller 2020) 
 
Steward’s position is essentially incompatibilist, but from an unusual perspective within 
most determinism – free will – responsibility literature. It is claimed that the reason 





responsibility and determinism are incompatible is not moral in the sense that 
determinism denies an agent the responsibility delivering power of doing otherwise, 
rather, determinism as it is usually understood, is inconsistent with agency, which is a 
necessary condition of moral responsibility, i.e., agency incompatibilism. A libertarian 
position is developed by Steward whereby ‘higher animals do have powers to make 
certain things happen, particularly changes to the distribution and arrangement of their 
own bodily parts in ways not merely dictated by the past and the laws’ (2011: 8). It is 
only possible to mention here that Steward develops a detailed concept of agency 
incompatibilism, within a detailed metaphysical framework. 224 A model of top-down 
causation is established, suggesting a natural, (without need of an additional substance), 
and distinctive emergent agent causal power over lower-level occurrences within a 
biological hierarchy that is the animal itself (following Steward 2012a: 24). 
 Having given a gloss of the agency debate, I turn specifically to compatibilism, 
the consequence argument, further mention of agent-causation and implicit bias. 
Compatibilism in terms of an agent as a source or origin of free (and responsible) actions 
can be described as follows: The notion of a part of ourselves acting in an important 
sense independent from ‘external’ determining factors is at once both easy and difficult 
to understand. It is easy because, as previously mentioned, the experience of making 
decisions feels completely free; deciding whether to continue typing or to stop work and 
make a drink feels to the one that chooses a completely free exercise of their agency. It is 
difficult, because looking at the world provides no such intimate first person sense of 
freedom, and the possibility of determined actions and behaviour beyond ourselves is 
not easily dismissed (following Thomas Nagel (2003: 229). 
 The consequence argument discussed previously, (see page 37), is the first of two 
basic arguments used by incompatibilists to support their position, outlined briefly again 
below: 
 
1. There is nothing we can now do to change the past. 
2. There is nothing we can now do to change the laws of nature. 
 
224 See all related works by Helen Steward, particularly Moral Responsibility and the Concept of Agency (Steward 
2011), The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Moral Responsibility (2012b) and A Metaphysics for Freedom (Steward 
2012a). 





3. There is nothing we can now do to change the past and the laws of nature. 
4. If determinism is true, our present actions are the necessary consequences of the past 
and the laws of nature. (That is, it must be the case that, given the past and the laws 
of nature, our present actions occur). 
5. Therefore, there is nothing we can now do to change the fact that our present actions 
occur. 
 
In other words, 225  determinism and free choice are incompatible. This is of cause 
controversial, generating considerable debate concerning the nature of time, causation, 
and so on. The second basic incompatibilist argument, to be considered here, concerns 
the agent as source or origin of free (and responsible) actions and is called the origination 
argument. Intuitively, the notion of free action sustained by its origin within the agent 
seems, based on our experience of the world, very plausible, but the origination 
argument highlights some difficulties. Typically, the argument is as follows (Timpe 
2003): 
 
1. An agent acts with free will only if she is the originator (or ultimate source) of her 
actions. 
2. If determinism is true, then everything any agent does is ultimately caused by events 
and circumstances outside her control. 
3. If everything an agent does is ultimately caused by events and circumstances beyond 
her control, then the agent is not the originator (or ultimate source) of her actions. 
4. Therefore, if determinism is true, then no agent is the originator (or ultimate source) 
of her actions. 
5. Therefore, if determinism is true, no agent has free will. 
 
There are many ways to counter this incompatibilist argument; the strategy described 
here looks at the first premise and develops a perspective where agents do act with free 
will because they can be the originator (or ultimate source) of their actions.226  
 
225 Literature concerning these concepts is vast, but previously mentioned works by Helen Steward 
provide clear and detailed exposition of the issues. 
 
226 An alternative strategy for compatibilists is rejection of premise 1, arguing that free action is possible 
even if the agent is not the originator (or ultimate source) of her actions. For example, with Frankfurt, if 





Timothy O’Connor’s article Agent-Causal Power (2013) is important within the 
agency debate. The fundamental claim is that ontologically emergent powers confer 
ontologically primitive causal power upon an agent, so provide the necessary form of 
control for freedom of action. Such causal power grants the agent a particular power to 
cause a ‘certain type of event within the agent: the coming to be of a state of intention 
to carry out some act, thereby resolving a state of uncertainty … ’ (O’Connor 2013: 233). 
An agent-causal event occurs in the presence of ‘motivational states’ that are present prior 
to the agent causing an intention to act; O’Connor notes that the influence of  
‘motivational states’ on the nature of the intention may be appreciable (2013: 235). 
Following this description, O’Connor makes a crucial point; such motivational states 
could include sufficient reasons for acting ‘of which I am entirely unconscious’ (2013: 235). 
Clearly this suggests the possibility of implicit bias as a contributor to the collection of 
motivators, but not in a direct causal role. If implicit bias is an integral part of a process 
with freedom at its heart, then the presence of implicit bias does not appear to fatally 
threaten freedom (and responsibility) within an agent-causal account of compatibilism. 
However, before making claims of this sort there is more work to do. While O’Connor 
notes that motivational states could include sufficient reasons for acting ‘of which I am 
entirely unconscious’, he is not saying that the whole process prior to action is 
unconscious. There is awareness of inclination, but the reasons behind that inclination 
may not be fully known or may be completely unknown and for this reason freedom is 
diminished because reasons are not necessarily available to rational examination. When 
a particular action is influenced by unconscious factors it is nonetheless a free action. 
O’Connor’s claim is clear on this point; acting from unconscious reasons diminishes 
freedom, but nonetheless ‘it remains open to me to undertake the action or not, I exhibit 
the … self-determination that is the core element of freedom of the will’ (2013: 236). In 
the case of implicit bias, an agent is aware of their inclination, i.e., to avoid contact with 
someone of a particular ethnicity, but are not consciously aware of the influencing bias 
that lies behind the conscious inclination. Awareness of an inclination to act in a 
particular way is crucial, facilitating the possibility to act differently with control and 
 
1st order volitions and 2nd order desires mesh appropriately then free action is possible without the agent 
as originator or ultimate source. 





responsibility; awareness and control of issuing behaviour without awareness or control 
concerning the possession of implicit biases. 
Before summarising, some final comments concerning emergence. Clearly, if the 
claim that agents act freely is based upon an emergent property, the actual phenomenon 
of emergence calls for further clarification. 
The key point is the notion of reality as layers in a hierarchical structure, where 
the bottom level is occupied by the most basic arrangements of matter and at increasingly 
higher levels complexity increases but no additional substance comes into play. Hence, 
emergence or emergentism is a form of ontological materialism (or physicalism); the 
world is comprised of matter, nothing more, just matter in varying degrees of 
complexity. As complexity increases, at higher levels of the hierarchy properties of living 
organisms emerge, with humans (and probably some animals) having qualities such as 
abstract thought and rationality emerging at the highest level of complexity, (given 
current development). Crucially, some of the properties at the higher levels are unique to 
that level and are not currently227explainable or predictable based on knowledge of  
lower, less complex arrangements of matter. Expressed more succinctly, ‘some of the 
properties characterizing entities of that (higher) level are irreducible to the properties at 
the lower levels’ (Kim 2009: 12). Kim clarifies emergentism and reductionism: 
 
… emergent properties are those that are not reducible to lower-level properties, 
whereas non-emergent, or resultant, properties are reducible. Emergentism and 
reductionism, then, are the two options regarding the metaphysical question 
concerning the inter-level relationship of properties. […] Emergentism with 
respect to a given level is the claim that some of the properties characterizing 
entities of that level are irreducible to the properties at the lower levels. 
Reductionism denies this, claiming that all properties at that level are reducible. 
(Kim 2009: 12) 
 
It is clear that an important question concerns how properties that characterise one level 
interact with those of other levels, particularly with those of lower levels? This question 
suggests the mind-body problem i.e., the nature or even possibility of interaction 
 
227 See Studies in the Logic of Explanation for careful exposition of this point, i.e., that ‘no explanation, in 
terms of microstructure theories, is available at the present for large classes of phenomena studied in 
biology and psychology’ (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948). 





between mind and body, (however, unlike emergent properties, mind is not a material 
or physical substance). More generally, how is it possible for the emergent mind having 
the novel property of consciousness to exercise or assert its causal powers in a world 
largely occupying a lower position within an emergentist hierarchy (following Kim 2007: 
7)? Without mental causation there is no human action or agency, without consciousness 
our whole conception of ourselves as thinking, reflective human beings, is lost.  
Emergentists often claim that emergent properties can exert their own distinctive 
causal powers within the material world; consciousness, thought and rationality having 
causal power is something most people would endorse based on experience without 
hesitation, however, the claim of ‘downward’ causation within the emergentist hierarchy 
remains controversial.228 
Summarising, I have outlined the standard conception of agency and standard 
theory of action, then briefly outlined three metaphysical frameworks of agency and 
looked at compatibilism, agency and emergentism. I find the idea of agent causation very 
plausible as an emergent human (and some, perhaps many, nonhuman animal) property 
within an incompatibilist/libertarian model of free will. While the irreducible nature of 
emergent human agency is currently (and may always remain) mysterious, the 
attractiveness of ontological materialism is undeniable. Human consciousness, while 






228 Detailed criticism of the emergentist position may be found in Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, 
Studies in the Logic of Explanation (1948: 148-152) and the classic C. D. Broad, The Mind and its Place in 
Nature (1925: 43-94). Kadre Vihvelin, Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter (2013) 
gives a particularly clear and detailed account of agent causation. See also all related Papers by Helen 
Steward for detailed account of agent causation. 











Sophocles: Oedipus Rex229 c429 BCE 
 
o King Oedipus of Thebes sends his brother-in-law Creon to find the cause of the 
mysterious plague that has struck the city. Creon reports that the plague will be lifted 
if the man who killed the former king, Laius, is brought to justice. 
 
o Queen Jocasta does not believe Tiresias when he says Oedipus is the murderer. Once, 
an oracle told her that their child would kill her husband, and because she believes 
that has not come true, she does not believe Tiresias. 
 
o To prevent her child from killing her husband, Jocasta left the baby to die on the 
side of the road. Oedipus suspects that he was that abandoned baby. When he first 
came to Thebes he met and killed a man on the road who turned out to be Laius, his 
father. He then met and married the widowed Jocasta, his own mother. 
 
o A messenger and a servant confirm the tale. Jocasta hangs herself out of shame. 




When Thebes is struck by a plague, the people ask King Oedipus to deliver them from 
its horrors. Creon, the brother of Jocasta, Oedipus’s queen, returns from the oracle of 
Apollo and discloses that the plague is punishment for the murder of King Laius, 
Oedipus’s immediate predecessor, to whom Jocasta was married. Creon further discloses 
 
229 Source: ‘Oedipus Rex – Summary’, Critical Survey of Literature for Students, Ed. Laurence W. Mazzeno, 
eNotes.com Inc. 2010 <http://www.enotes.com/topics/oedipus-rex#summary-summary-summary-the-
story> [accessed 26 May 2017]. 





that the citizens of Thebes need to discover and punish the murderer before the plague 
can be lifted. The people mourn their dead, and Oedipus advises them, in their own 
interest, to search out and apprehend the murderer of Laius. 
Asked to help find the murderer, Tiresias the ancient blind seer of Thebes tells 
Oedipus that it would be better for all if he does not tell what he knows. He says that 
coming events will reveal themselves. Oedipus rages at the seer’s reluctance to tell the 
secret until he goads the old man to reveal that Oedipus is the one responsible for 
Thebes’s afflictions because he is the murderer, and that he is living in intimacy with his 
nearest kin. Oedipus accuses the old man of being in league with Creon, whom he 
suspects of plotting against his throne, but Tiresias answers that Oedipus will be 
ashamed and horrified when he learns the truth about his true parentage. Oedipus defies 
the seer, saying he will welcome the truth if it frees his kingdom from the plague. 
Oedipus threatens Creon with death, but Jocasta and the people advise him against doing 
violence on the strength of rumour or momentary passion. Oedipus yields, but he 
banishes Creon. 
Jocasta, grieved by the enmity between her brother and Oedipus, tells her 
husband that an oracle informed King Laius that he would be killed by his own child, 
the offspring of Laius and Jocasta. Jocasta assures Oedipus that this could not happen 
because the child was abandoned on a deserted mountainside soon after birth. When 
Oedipus hears further that Laius was killed by robbers at the meeting place of three 
roads and that the three roads met in Phocis, he is deeply disturbed and begins to suspect 
that he is, after all, the murderer. He hesitates to reveal his suspicion, but he becomes 
increasingly convinced of his own guilt. 
Oedipus tells Jocasta that he believed himself to be the son of Polybus of Corinth 
and Merope until a drunken man on one occasion announced that the young Oedipus 
was not really Polybus’s son. Disturbed, Oedipus consulted the oracle of Apollo, who 
told him he would sire children by his own mother and that he would kill his own father. 
After he left Corinth, at a meeting place of three roads, a man in a chariot offended 
Oedipus. He killed the man and all his servants but one. From there he went on to 
Thebes, where he became the new king by answering the riddle of the Sphinx. The riddle 
asked what went on all fours before noon, on two legs at noon, and on three legs after 
noon. Oedipus answered, correctly, that human beings walk on all fours as an infant, on 





two legs in their prime, and with the aid of a stick in their old age. With the kingship, he 
also won the hand of Jocasta, King Laius’s queen. 
Oedipus summons the servant who reported King Laius’s death, but he awaits 
his arrival fearfully. Jocasta assures her husband that the entire matter is of no great 
consequence, that surely the prophecies of the oracles will not come true. 
A messenger from Corinth announces that King Polybus is dead, and that 
Oedipus is his successor. Polybus died of natural causes, so Oedipus and Jocasta are 
relieved for the time being. Oedipus tells the messenger he will not go to Corinth for 
fear of siring children by his mother, Merope. 
The messenger goes on to reveal that Oedipus is not the son of Polybus and 
Merope but a foundling whom the messenger, at that time a shepherd, took to Polybus. 
The messenger relates how he received the baby from another shepherd, who was a 
servant of the house of King Laius. At that point Jocasta realizes the dreadful truth. She 
does not wish to see the old servant who was summoned, but Oedipus desires clarity 
regardless of the cost. He again calls for the servant. When the servant appears, the 
messenger recognizes him as the herder from whom he received the child years earlier. 
The old servant confesses that King Laius ordered him to destroy the boy but that out 
of pity he gave the infant to the Corinthian to be raised as his foster son. 
Oedipus, now all but mad from the realization of what he did, enters the palace 
and discovers that Jocasta hanged herself by her hair. He removes her golden brooches 
and with them puts out his eyes so that he will not be able to see the results of the 
horrible prophecy. Then, blind, bloody and miserable, he displays himself to the Thebans 
and announces himself as the murderer of their king and the defiler of his own mother’s 
bed. He curses the herder who saved him from death years before. 
Creon, returning, orders the attendants to lead Oedipus back into the palace. 
Oedipus asks Creon to have him conducted out of Thebes where no man will ever see 
him again. He also asks Creon to give Jocasta a proper burial and to see that the children 
of the unnatural marriage should be cared for and not be allowed to live poor and 
unmarried because of the shame attached to their parentage. Creon leads the wretched 
Oedipus away to his exile of blindness and torment. 
 
~~~~~~ 
